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15 June 2000
Pentagon Spokesman Ken Bacon briefed.
Following is the Pentagon transcript:
DoD News Briefing
Thursday, June 15, 2000 1:35 p.m. EDT
Presenter: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA
Mr. Bacon:
Good afternoon. I have one brief announcement, and then
I'll entertain your questions.
We're joined today by members of the Joint Officers Public Affairs
Course, 15 mid-level public affairs officers who are here from all
services, and the Guard and the Reserve, and they are learning the
basics of public affairs, and one of the things they're going to learn
is how you ask questions at briefings. So with that introduction, go
to it.
Q:
In light of the announcement yesterday in Pyongyang of the
agreement to work toward unification, reunification in Korea, does the
Pentagon see an opportunity now, down the road -- or immediately or
down the road -- to reduce U.S. troops in Korea, eventually to
withdraw from Korea?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, first, we are extremely encouraged by the news out of
Pyongyang and by the fact that President Kim Dae Jung and President
Kim Jong Il have met. We think it's a very positive step forward. We
think it's the latest step in a series of encouraging events over the
last six or seven years, starting in 1994 with the framework
agreement, in which North Korea agreed to stop work on its nuclear
weapons and opened its facilities to inspectors from the IAEA.
The second encouraging event, obviously, was the Perry process and
some of the dealings we've had with North Korea in the course of that.
The most significant part of the Perry process was an agreement by
North Korea not to continue testing its longer-range missiles.
This summit follows, I think, those two previous achievements, and
it's another sign, apparently, that North Korea wants to become more
integrated into the world, less isolated. But we'll have to see what
comes out from this. All the signs are encouraging, all the talk about
reconciliation and reunification is encouraging. The fact is, North
Korea remains a major regional power with approximately a million
people under arms, heavily armed along the DMZ.
In terms of our troops in South Korea, President Kim Dae Jung has told
Secretary Cohen and other U.S. leaders, that even if there is
unification in the future, he would like U.S. troops to remain in
Korea because they are a stabilizing force. Basically, they help
assure peace and stability throughout the entire region, and that's
why we have nearly a hundred thousand troops stationed in Japan and
Korea and throughout the Asia Pacific region.
Q:
But does Secretary Cohen share that view in the sense that --
wouldn't this offer an opportunity for the U.S. military to reduce its
international commitments? Couldn't it conceivably?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I think everybody appreciates that this summit has
just concluded. The U.S. troop presence in South Korea apparently was
not discussed. That's at least according to accounts I have read on
the Associated Press. An interview with the South Korean ambassador to
Washington said that U.S. troops were not discussed in the course of
this summit. It may be something that's discussed in the future.
I think there is a lot of reason for exuberance right now about what's
happening on the Korean peninsula, but I think it needs to be somewhat
warier controlled exuberance at this time. There's been one summit;
it's turned out well. There is talk of another summit with President
Kim Jong Il going to Seoul later this summer. And I think we just have
to wait to see how events unfold.
Right now North Korea continues to have a large well-armed force
deployed close to the DMZ. We hope that will change. It's 50 years
this summer, since the Korean War began. It is time to have a peace
settlement; it's time to have reconciliation. I think both presidents,
both Presidents Kim, see that, and they are apparently trying to move
in that direction. But how this unfolds, how 50 years of hostility and
distrust and suspicion can be unfolded, and how quickly remain to be
seen. We hope very quickly, but I think that time will have to tell.
Q:
Ken, doesn't this take some of the edge off the deadline to field
the first phase of national missile defense by 2005, because that has
been tied to development of a ballistic missile threat from North
Korea?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, it's been tied to a ballistic missile threat from
more countries than just North Korea. Obviously, we welcome any
diplomatic progress that reduces ballistic missile threats to the
United States, to our allies and to our troops stationed around the
world. If this does in fact lead to such a reduction, we will welcome
that. But North Korea is not the only country we worry about. We worry
about Iraq, we worry about Iran, and we worry about other countries
that are working on long-range missiles or that already have chemical
and biological weapons and would like to have ways to deliver them
with long-range missiles. So this is not a problem that exists with
just one country; it's broader than that.
Q:
Correct me if I'm wrong. Isn't the 2005 deadline tied specifically
to North Korea? Is there any intelligence estimate that Iraq or Iran
will have intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach the
United States by 2005?
Mr. Bacon:
I think the lesson of the Rumsfeld report is that countries
have been able to develop these capabilities more quickly than we had
hoped or anticipated at one time.
So you're right, we have been worried about North Korea, but we are
also worried about other countries as well. And one of the things the
president will have to decide, when he sits down to look at whether or
not he should make a deployment decision later this summer, is what
the threat is and whether it's changed. That's one of the four factors
he'll have to consider. So he will be looking at what's going on on
the Korean peninsula and what's going on elsewhere when he makes that
decision.
Q:
Could you tell us whether the White House has a legal opinion now
about whether building the very initial parts of this National Missile
Defense would in fact bring the administration in violation of the ABM
Treaty?
Mr. Bacon:
The president has not made a decision on that question.
Q:
But is there -- there's a report in the New York Times this morning
that suggests that White House lawyers have drafted an opinion that
very initial construction, such as, for instance, laying the
foundation of the warning radar at Shemya, would not be in violation
of the ABM Treaty. Are you familiar with this legal opinion or can you
tell us anything about it?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I can tell you that lawyers have analyzed deployment
timetables and they have analyzed the construction requirements for
the radar in the Aleutians on Shemya Island.
They have come up with a number of options. And the president at the
appropriate time will review their legal analysis and their options
and make a decision.
Remember, when he makes a decision later this year, he has to look at
four things. He said he will look at four things. One is threat, one
is the technical capability to build a system, the third is the cost,
and the fourth is the impact on arms control regimes. So I think those
four topics cover everything that we've brought up here so far on NMD.
And he'll have to sit down, after he has the results of the July test,
integrated flight test five, and look at what's happening in terms of
threat, cost, technical capability and arms control.
Q:
You said that the lawyers have come up with various options. Do
those options include some sort of minimum construction of the system
that would not violate the ABM Treaty and would postpone a decision
for deployment to some point down the road?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I think that I'll defer discussion of the options
until the president has a chance to review them and make a decision,
which will be some months off. But I think you can reasonably assume
that the lawyers have looked at a variety of combinations.
Bill?
Q:
Ken, with regard to the national missile defense and Mr. Cohen's
and your recent trip to Moscow, is it correct that there was little
detail forthcoming from the Russians on their missile defense proposal
for Europe? And is it also correct that the U.S. and Russian technical
people will be meeting in the near future? And what is the timing on
that meeting? Do you have an idea yet?
Mr. Bacon:
Let me give you a little background. Secretary Cohen was in
Moscow on Monday and Tuesday, and on Tuesday he met -- had about a
45-minute meeting with -- private meeting with his Russian
counterpart, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, the minister of defense of Russia.
Then he had about a 45-minute meeting with President Putin, and that
was followed by about an hour session with Marshal Sergeyev's team and
Secretary Cohen's team. A primary topic of conversation in all these
meetings was national missile defense.
At the end of the meeting with President Putin, President Putin said
that he expected Marshal Sergeyev and his team and Secretary Cohen and
his team to get together and gradually bridge the gap between the two
sides. And in that spirit of trying to bridge the gap on questions
involving national missile defense we, working with our Russian
counterparts, identified three areas that need further exploration.
The first is in analysis of the threat. As Marshal Sergeyev said, the
Russians see a potential threat in the future; we see an actual threat
today. So both sides agree that there is an emerging threat, but we
have different views of the timing of that threat. So one area where
we've agreed to sit down and talk is on threat assessment, to see if
we can come up with more unified view of the threat. Or at least
explore why we differ on the threat assessment.
The second has to do with -- the second area of further discussion
deals with Russian proposals for a theater missile defense system that
would protect Europe. This is something that we support. We have
talked to our European allies for several years about working with
them on theater missile defenses that would protect Europe.
Unfortunately, a theater missile defense system that would protect
Europe would not protect the United States. But we have agreed to talk
with the Russians and with our NATO allies further about TMD systems
in Europe.
The third area is an idea that President Putin and Marshal Sergeyev
have proposed just recently, and that's a so-called umbrella or cap
over threatening countries, potentially enemy countries that would
have missiles that they might want to fire at the United States or at
Russia.
Now, there have been two descriptions given to this by Russian
officials. President Putin and others have talked in terms of a
missile defense system, an umbrella that would involve an active
defense system. Marshal Sergeyev, the Russian defense minister, has
talked in terms of a political umbrella that would consist of
diplomatic and economic efforts designed to stop countries like Iran
or North Korea from building long-range missiles that would threaten
the United States or Russia or Europe or other countries. So Secretary
Cohen and Marshal Sergeyev also agreed to sit down and talk about this
so-called umbrella concept.
I think there are several aspects to that: One, we need to have a
better idea of what they mean. Two, we need to know if they have ideas
for making an umbrella concept work that would involve missile
defenses, presumably shooting missiles down, shortly after they have
launched, within minutes of launch, in the so-called boost phase.
We think a boost-phase defense system offers some fairly daunting
technological problems. And you may have seen a briefing that Under
Secretary Walter Slocombe gave at NATO, last week, on Thursday, that
ran through in considerable detail what some of the technical
difficulties are for a boost-phase intercept system. And then we want
to also explore how we might be able to work together on a so-called
political umbrella that was suggested by Marshal Sergeyev.
So we proposed that these first meetings on threat assessment and
boost-phase intercept be held in Moscow on June 25th and 26th -- I
believe is the date. That's the date we have a prescheduled meeting
with the Russians of something called the Defense Consultative Group.
That's a group that meets -- teams meet -- from time to time to review
defense issues of mutual interest.
We proposed in Moscow on Tuesday, that two topics be added to that
group. The Russians said that they would consider that. They did not
agree to it; they said they would consider it. They wanted to make
sure that they would be able to have enough to make a worthwhile
consideration or discussion at that time; in other words, preparation,
I guess.
Q:
What were those two topics going to be?
Mr. Bacon:
The topics were going to be threat assessment and
boost-phase intercept.
Q:
Now, on the agenda that you laid out there, one thing that is
pretty clear is none of those things have anything to do with the
national missile defense, from the U.S. point of view, as far as I can
tell, right?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, boost-phase intercept is certainly an idea that's
been talked about in the United States. It's promoted by some here.
Boost-phase intercept in certain situations might work. In many other
situations, we believe, it would be extremely difficult. And the point
most worth making is that it would not meet our schedule for fielding
a national missile defense system. And that schedule right now is to
try to have a system operating by 2005.
Q:
I guess I should have said this agenda did not meet the -- the
proposed national missile defense did not seem to have anything to do
with that and working out differences with the Russians about that.
Mr. Bacon:
About our proposed -- well, that is strictly true, yes. I
mean, what they've suggested are other approaches.
Yes?
Q:
So, is there -- it doesn't appear that on this agenda there's any
room for further discussion of amendment to the ABM Treaty or
discussion of what steps might be allowed in the construction of the
initial phases of an NMD system without abrogating it; is that
correct?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, first of all, President Clinton and Secretary Cohen
-- I believe Secretary Albright as well -- have all said that we want
to deploy a very limited national missile defense system within the
ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty has a provision that allows it to be
amended, and it has been amended once, there's no reason why it
couldn't be amended again. We've made the argument with the Russians
that we believe it's possible to deploy this system within the
framework of an amended ABM Treaty, and we would like to do that
because we think it would provide the strategic stability that the ABM
Treaty has provided since 1972.
Your question about early deployment steps -- the issue here is if we
are to meet our deployment goal, our operational goal of 2005, we have
to take the initial steps to build a new X-band radar on Shemya Island
this year, and we have to begin building -- doing the initial work on
the radar next year and the year after. Because of the weather
situation there -- and there was a recent report that showed how windy
it was -- there is a limited amount of time for building, and we have
to plan years ahead in order to get it done on time.
So, to go back to Jamie's earlier question, what our lawyers have been
looking at are the options we have for beginning to build this -- the
initial phases of this radar within the restrictions or terms of the
ABM Treaty.
And they have looked at that, and they have made some -- they have
come up with some options, which the president hasn't -- has not had a
chance to decide on yet.
Q:
Let me just rephrase that question. I mean, there's one point you
didn't address, which is, in my understanding, in terms of the talks
that are now going forward between the two tactical teams, there's --
in the agenda you mentioned, there is no discussion of the ABM Treaty.
There is no agenda item on possible amendment of the ABM Treaty. That
issue didn't appear to be under discussion anymore, at least according
to the agenda you described. Is that correct?
Mr. Bacon:
The ABM Treaty is the responsibility of the State
Department. There have been extensive discussions between State
Department officials and Russian officials on the ABM Treaty and our
hopes to amend it. Those are ongoing. They are happening at high
levels and at other levels.
Secretary Cohen specifically dealt with other issues. It doesn't mean
we care any less about the ABM Treaty, because I didn't mention it.
It's just not his responsibility to renegotiate or amend the ABM
Treaty. So he dealt with issues that are under his area of
responsibility.
Yes, Jim?
Q:
Did Secretary Cohen raise with the Russians what the lawyers are
now saying in terms of when construction could begin on the Shemya
radar without violating -- without being in violation of the treaty
and --
Mr. Bacon:
He did not specifically, but it had been raised with the
Russians at an earlier time.
Q:
And was there any reaction from the Russians as to whether they
would --
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I think that I won't get into diplomatic discussions.
Yes?
Q:
Ken, if threat assessment is discussed at this June 25th, 26th
meeting, will U.S. officials provide the Russians with classified
information on our threat analysis, something like classified NIE,
anything like that?
Mr. Bacon:
I don't know the details, and I can't answer that question.
I just don't know at this stage.
Q:
Why is it so important to deploy this missile defense within the
ABM Treaty? And the second part of that question is, on what basis
does the administration believe the treaty is still in effect, despite
the fact that many critics, Jesse Helms and others, insist that it's
not really legally enforceable anymore because it was made with a
Soviet Union that no longer exists?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, we don't believe that's the proper interpretation. We
believe that the treaty is still in effect, and if we -- and we're
operating on the assumption that, one, it is in effect today, and we
would like it to remain in effect.
Your first question was "Why?" You know, the initial idea behind the
ABM Treaty was that if people built very extensive missile defense
systems, it would then provoke the other side to proliferate, build
more and more and more missiles to overwhelm any defensive system,
because you could always, by multiplying the number of missiles and
warheads, overwhelm a defensive system.
And the feeling was that you could not have a stop in the arms race,
let alone a reversal of the arms race, as we have had, without an
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
So the treaty was -- dates back to 1972. And since then, we have,
through a period of long negotiations, reached first the SALT I
agreement, then renamed to START I, and now the START II agreement.
And we have seen the arsenals come down. Initially after the treaty
was signed, the arsenals continued to grow, but after we began
achieving arms control agreements with first the Soviet Union and now
the Russians, we've seen the arsenals come down, from over 10,000
strategic nuclear warheads on each side to a little over 6,000 now on
each side. And as you know, under the START II agreement, they would
come down to 3,000, to 3,500. And President Clinton and previous --
former President Yeltsin agreed that there would be a START III
agreement that would strive to bring the warheads down to 2,000 to
2,500.
So we have reversed the growth and actually begun to achieve
reductions. And I think that what's made that possible is the ABM
Treaty. We would like to keep that treaty, which has helped bring
strategic stability to our relationship, in effect because we think it
will continue to make the world more stable and give a degree of
predictability that we would miss without it.
Bill?
Q:
Now Ken, did you say that the U.S. national missile defense
program, if indeed approved this summer, is going to be quite a bit in
advance of anything the Russians have proposed, and that their
proposals to us, our conferences with them upcoming later in June,
that those would not -- in other words, we would not slow down our
program to meet the Russians halfway? And secondly, does the
conferences that are coming up this June 25 and 26, are those going to
-- oh, how do I say -- is that talking with the Russians and
cooperating with the Russians going to have anything to do with the
president deciding about the national missile defense? Or is that --
or can you clarify?
Mr. Bacon:
We right now are building a national missile defense --
developing, working on a national missile defense system designed for
deployment in 2005 because we believe a threat will exist in 2005.
So we want to have the national missile defense system, which is very
limited, and would not protect us against any major attack, a huge
size attack of the type the Russians could launch. We don't expect
them to, but they could. We are working on a program to get a defense
system in place by 2005. We are not aware that either of the
suggestions made by Russia could be done in time to meet the threat we
see. So we, right now, will continue to move forward.
Now, remember, the president has made no decision to deploy a national
missile defense system. He won't do that for several months. First, we
have to wait for the test in July and then he'll have to sit down and
evaluate the results of that test along with information in the three
other areas that I suggested. So that's why we're aiming for 2005.
I would not read a huge amount of significance into this defense
consultative group meeting between U.S. and Russian teams in June. It
was previously scheduled, it was dealing with a number of bilateral
defense issues. We proposed that we add two other areas. One is threat
assessment or analysis, and two is boost-phase intercept, which the
Russians have talked about. We proposed that because we would like to
get more information on their thinking and we would like to begin
engaging in more detail than we've been able to do so far. They have
not yet, as far as I know -- at least they didn't in Moscow on Tuesday
-- immediately accept that suggestion. I don't believe we've heard
from them yet on whether they will add those two issues to the agenda.
But I wouldn't -- and even if those two issues were added to the
agenda, it will be the first of several discussions we'll have with
them in these areas, and I don't think that either question will be
resolved by the time the president sits down to make his decision
later this summer.
Q:
(Off mike.)
Mr. Bacon:
Just a second.
Q:
I did not see the Slocombe remarks, so maybe the answer to my
question is somewhere in all of that, but when you spoke about
boost-phase intercept, it almost sounded like a fairly strong
repudiation of our own boost-phase intercept, since you talked about
the notion that the technology isn't really suitable.
Mr. Bacon:
Well, it depends -- I think you should read the remarks
because they go into considerable detail. But basically, in order to
have an effective boost-phase intercept system -- and some of our
theater missile defense systems are based on that -- you have to be
relatively close to the launching missile. There are certain areas of
the world where we could be close to launching missiles. North Korea
happens to be one of them where we could be close if we deployed
certain types of systems, particularly sea-based systems. There are
other countries where it would be very difficult to get close enough.
Iran would be one where it would be difficult to be close enough. So
the boost-phase intercept system is dependent in part on geography.
There are also other technological problems. One is that you have a
very short amount of time, probably 300 seconds or less, to acquire
the target and to shoot it down. And shooting it down we don't think
would be easy in all cases.
So you should really read the Slocombe remarks because they're very
detailed on this. But he was just raising some of the technical
challenges. It doesn't mean we couldn't solve the challenges, it
doesn't mean that we won't try to solve these challenges. But we don't
think that we could solve the challenges in time to have a system
deployed in 2005.
Q:
But we're still committed to our boost-phase intercept program?
Mr. Bacon:
We are still working on boost-phase intercept programs in
theater missile defense.
Yes?
Q:
Ken, I'm confused a little bit about the agenda of these meetings
coming up. You mentioned three things initially -- the threat, the
theater idea of the Russians, and then the boost phase thing. Then you
say that the threat and the boost phase, the U.S. had asked be added
to the agenda, but there's no response; is that right? Does that mean
that the theater idea of the Russians is definitely on the agenda of
these talks?
Mr. Bacon:
No. No. The two we suggested were the ones that we think we
need the most information about soonest, which are the common threat
assessment and boost-phase intercept. The Russians suggested to us
that they have some ideas for making boost-phase intercept work, and
perhaps something we could pursue jointly. We would like to know what
these ideas are, we would like to know what their technological
prowess in this regard is, and what their thinking is about a joint
project. We don't know, and that's why we proposed that we add it to
the agenda.
Q:
Then how about the theater?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, the theater is something that's been discussed for
some time. We'll continue to discuss it.
It's something that can be discussed at NATO, it can be discussed at
the Permanent Joint Commission, which is Russia and NATO, and it can
be discussed bilaterally between the U.S. and Russia. That didn't
happen to be -- as I said, we focused on the two things we wanted to
pursue most urgently, which are the threat assessment and the boost
phase intercept.
Q:
(Off mike.)
Mr. Bacon:
No, we just saw that as a moment of opportunity, when our
teams would be meeting and it would make sense -- the top person in
our team would be Ted Warner, Assistant Secretary Warner, who plans to
go to Moscow for those talks. And it seemed to be a reasonable time to
take up President Putin's charge to try to gradually bridge the gap
between our two sides.
Yes.
Q:
Can you tell us what the Pentagon's position is on proposed Senate
legislation that would make disclosing classified information to the
news media a felony punishable by up to three years in prison?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, we are certainly in favor of steps that restrict the
misuse of classified information or the improper publication of
classified information. This is -- we do not -- we're not a law
enforcement agency, and we don't write or enforce laws in the way the
Justice Department does, and the Justice Department has spoken out on
this. They're the ones who are working on the details. But we support
in general the idea of steps that reduce the misuse of classified
information.
Yes.
Q:
I want to jump back to the North-South agreement.
Mr. Bacon:
Sure.
Q:
I don't want to make you repeat anything that you already said at
the top of the briefing.
Mr. Bacon:
Thank you.
Q:
But, again, the fact that the two leaders met face to face and
they, you know, agreed to work together towards eventual
reunification, while the United States thinks about and prepares for
eventual reunification, are we more open to a review of the size and
composition of U.S. forces in South Korea and Japan as well?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, that question is just, I believe, somewhat premature,
because we have a very -- we've just completed an extremely hopeful
summit that has, I think, a large amount of very good feelings and
real possibilities for progress, but a very small amount of details
and clear paths for reaching that progress.
We hope, obviously, that the two President Kims can flesh out a path
to peace and travel down that path. And we hope that they can end the
hostilities between their two countries. And we hope eventually that
they will be able to work out what they both want, a reunification on
fair and reasonable terms that work for both countries.
That's not going to happen next week, it's probably not going to
happen next month; and it may not happen next year, although I think
the whole history of the spread of democracy through the former Soviet
Union is that change can happen very quickly once it starts.
But our goal is to remain a force for peace and stability, not just in
Asia, but all over the world. And in Asia, we think that the
foundation of the stability we have been able to bring is our forward-
deployed forces. So we plan to maintain forces forward-deployed.
It's also -- I will repeat just one thing, which is that President Kim
Dae Jung has said to American officials, including Secretary Cohen,
that it's his desire that U.S. troops remain in South Korea even after
unification, because he sees U.S. troops there as an important and
powerful and effective force for stability.
Q:
If there was some change within Kim Dae Jung's statement, the
president's statement; if he changes his mind on that aspect, would
the U.S. then respect his wishes to decrease?
Mr. Bacon:
We can't remain in countries where we're not wanted, and we
have not. We have, I think, brought peace and stability to the Korean
peninsula and certainly helped protect the South Korean people in
conjunction with their own forces. And we plan to keep doing that as
long as we can.
Q:
Are we preparing, or would we be open to prepare, for that in the
event he would ask --
Mr. Bacon:
Well, the summit just ended today. And it's very -- as I
say, it's high on promise, but we haven't yet had the performance that
will turn those promises into reality.
I hope we can. I think everybody hopes we can. Everybody sees this as
an enormously exciting possibility. It's a bold step by both
presidents, and it's one that could enormously pacify that part of the
world, and one of the longest-running hostilities in Asia. We're very
much in favor of that, but we're not there yet, and I just think we
have to be very clear that we intend to remain a force for stability
in that area as long as we are needed. And President Kim Dae Jung has
suggested that we'll be needed for a long time to come.
Yeah, Pam?
Q:
With regard to the threat -- I assume the answer is yes -- is the
U.S. intelligence community going to do another threat assessment or
national intelligence estimate before the president makes his
decision?
Mr. Bacon:
I mean, I assume that he will be able to use the latest
information, but I don't know about the formal steps we'll take.
Q:
And with regard to the threat again, in the Defense Consultative
Talks in Russia when Warner talks about the threat assessment, is the
United States at all open to lowering its view of the threat in
keeping with more of what Russia views is the case? Or is the agenda
there to convince Russia that the threat is higher than they think?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I think initially the agenda is to find out -- is to
explain to them why we see the world as we do, and to find out on what
basis they see the world as they do. That's the first thing, is to
understand each other's views. As Marshal Sergeyev said, we do have
different views. It's not that they deny there's a threat, they just
see it farther out than we see it. So we would welcome an opportunity
to sit down and discuss that with them.
Yes, Jim?
Q:
On the Korean thing, are there any mutual steps that the United
States could envision that North and South Korea and the United States
could take to try to ease some of those military tensions along the
border -- something that could be done very quickly?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, as I said, the issue of U.S. troops, as far as I
know, was not discussed during the summit. And I base that on comments
I've read by the South Korean ambassador to Washington. So I think
it's --
Q:
Something more in the way of confidence-building type --
Mr. Bacon:
Well, that's something that could evolve.
Obviously, if there is going to be a real reduction of tensions,
there'll have to be confidence-building measures and, presumably, a
movement of troops away from the border. But I think we're -- we hope
that happens, but it hasn't happened yet, and I think it's premature
to speculate about it right now.
We obviously want to see a firm and convincing and lasting movement
toward peace and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula, and we will
do whatever we can to help that happen. I think we've already played a
major role, through the Perry process. I think we've worked very hard
to engage with North Korea, not only with Ambassador Gallucci's
negotiations that led to the framework agreement, but the talks that
Charles Kartman of the State Department has been holding with the
North Koreans for several years. We have been very determined to work
with the North Koreans. At the same time, we're providing a
substantial amount of food aid. I think the Agriculture Department is
announcing today that it is providing an additional 50,000 metric tons
of food to help alleviate starvation in North Korea.
So, we have engaged with North Korea, we've worked with North Korea,
and we will continue to do that. But nothing we can do can substitute
for face-to-face negotiations between North and South, and that's why
this summit has been so encouraging.
Bill?
Q:
Coming along in a few days will be Mr. Putin, who will visit the
North Koreans. Was anything said in Moscow to Mr. Cohen or his team
about Mr. Putin and the Russian group talking to the North Koreans
about the missile program and the problems that it is causing, the
concerns that it is causing Russia and China?
Mr. Bacon:
Well, I think Russia is well aware of our concerns about
North Korea's missile program. Mr. Putin himself, President Putin
himself, brought it up very briefly, and he's certainly, I think,
looking for ways to reduce the threat of -- that other countries feel
from North Korea's missiles. But I think he would have to discuss that
himself, and I can't predict what will come out of his meetings with
North Korea.
Q:
Thank you.
Mr. Bacon:
Thank you.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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