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15 June 2000
"The security of everyone in the Euro-Atlantic community today is
intertwined ... and Russia is and should be a major player in the
European security system," U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow
said at St. Petersburg University June 15.
Vershbow, the U.S. permanent representative on the North Atlantic
Council, made his remarks during a joint NATO-Russia conference on
"Military Force in International Relations in the 21st Century."
While the end of the Cold War created the opportunity to build a
united, democratic Europe, he said, ethnic conflicts, terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction present new challenges.
"Over the past decade, NATO has transformed itself to meet these new
challenges -- this time in partnership, rather than in competition,
with Russia and the other new democracies in Europe's eastern half."
Vershbow pointed out two areas in which NATO and Russia are
cooperating to meet these challenges: The Partnership for Peace (PfP)
and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. "With PfP on the military
side and its counterpart, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
on the political side, we have helped solidify the links of new and
old states in pursuit of the common goal of a democratic, secure and
united Europe," he said.
It is unrealistic to expect that NATO and Russia would always agree,
Vershbow said, citing their differences over last year's NATO action
in Kosovo. Yet Russia ultimately "played a crucial role in the
diplomatic process that ended the Kosovo conflict on terms that were
acceptable to both NATO and Russia," he noted.
"We regret that Russia disagreed sharply over the means to solve the
crisis, but we are glad that we managed to come together in defining
the basis for a just peace. Now our common challenge is translating
that into a reality on the ground in Kosovo...and making sure that we
stay together when the next crisis arrives."
Vershbow said there are no parallels between NATO's Kosovo campaign
and Russia's actions in Chechnya, and he observed that "Russia needs a
political strategy and a political interlocutor with which to
negotiate terms under which the civilian population of Chechnya can
return to rebuild their lives."
He also discussed NATO enlargement, stressing that it "does not
represent a military challenge or threat to Russia, nor does it
exclude Russia," and he pointed out that "NATO's new Strategic
Concept, adopted at the Washington Summit in 1999, specifically states
that NATO no longer considers Russia to be a threat or an enemy, but
rather a partner."
"The United States and all of its allies agree that Russia is and
should be a major player in the European security system.... NATO and
Russia definitely have lots of work that is worth doing. We look
forward to addressing our common priorities in meeting the security
challenges of a dynamic and increasingly united Europe," Vershbow
concluded.
Following is the text of Vershbow's remarks as prepared for delivery:
European Security: A Priority We Share
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council
St. Petersburg University
June 15, 2000
It's my great pleasure to be with you here today. It has been some
years since I last visited St. Petersburg. The chance to return again
to the splendor and history of this great city was one I could not
pass up -- particularly as St. Petersburg holds some of the secrets to
the mind of Russia's new President. I hope that I'll be able to
generate some discussion of the important roles and obligations that
NATO and Russia share in building a more secure, united and democratic
Europe in the 21st century.
The political, economic and security changes that have taken place in
Europe in the past 10 years are truly extraordinary. The Warsaw Pact
is gone, and with it the Soviet Union. In their places are new states
-- as well as old states with new forms of government. Helping new and
old states succeed in their transformation and integration into the
wider trans-Atlantic community should be a common cause for the
Russian Federation and all the 19 countries of NATO.
The reason why this is so is very simple: The security of everyone in
the Euro-Atlantic community today is intertwined. The divided,
confrontational (if stable) Cold War world has given way to the
opportunity of building a united, democratic Europe for the first time
in history. But the end of the Cold War order has also been
accompanied by new problems, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Over the past decade,
NATO has transformed itself to meet these new challenges -- this time
in partnership, rather than in competition, with Russia and the other
new democracies in Europe's eastern half.
The tile of this conference is "Military Force in International
Relations in the 21st Century." When we think of the role of the
military, we often reflexively begin by considering force levels,
defense budgets, and the ability to project military power. Yet,
increasingly in the trans-Atlantic community, it is the role of the
military within democratic societies that is just as important. I have
in mind the role the military can play as an institution in preserving
and strengthening fundamental democratic values, assisting civilian
authorities, and supporting diplomacy. I would like to touch briefly
on all these roles today, as well as on our conference's main theme.
In many countries, military and civilian authorities now work closely
to provide the necessary infrastructure for the functioning of
civilian society. In the case of the U.S. military, this has entailed
work on such projects as the building of roads, schools and clinics.
U.S. military officials also coordinate with civil emergency experts
to make available military resources -- from the U.S. mainland or from
reserves in Europe, Asia, or Central and South America -- to assist in
responding to natural disasters, such as floods or earthquakes.
Developing the capabilities and resources within the military to
support democracy in civil society is important. Democracy and respect
for human rights are as much a factor in regional peace, stability and
security as economic development or maintenance of military force
levels.
Through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO has sought to extend
this kind of civil-military cooperation across Europe in support of
democracy and integration. PfP was launched in 1994 and now
encompasses virtually all the nations of Europe and the former Soviet
Union -- from the Baltics to the Balkans, and from the Caucasus to
Central Asia. Russia was one of the first countries to join, and
Croatia just became PfP's 46th member. Under PfP, NATO and its
partners have sought to improve the security of all nations by
fostering military-to-military links among former adversaries and
supporting the process of democratic reforms. With PfP on the military
side and its counterpart, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
on the political side, we have helped solidify the links of new and
old states in pursuit of the common goal of a democratic, secure and
united Europe.
Since PfP was established in 1994, Allies' investment of time and
resources into the program has paid off. It has brought 27 partner
nations closer to democratic structures, solidifying the democratic
bases in these countries, including civilian, democratic control over
the armed forces. But equally important, PfP has helped to make
European militaries more interoperable so that they are able to
cooperate in combined peacekeeping and crisis management operations
that we may face in the 21st century. The success of the NATO-led
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo has been greatly
enhanced by the participation of armed forces from nearly two dozen
partner nations.
Partnership for Peace has another dimension that is, to put it
diplomatically, more controversial here in Russia. PfP is the main
means for helping countries that seek to join NATO to develop the
capabilities and experience needed to qualify for membership. NATO has
taken in new members several times in its 51-year history, and will do
so again in the future. We strongly believe -- and history bears us
out -- that taking in new members has increased stability and security
in Europe. This was the case in NATO's early days, when Greece, Turkey
and Germany were admitted in the 1950s, and when Spain was admitted in
1982. It is also the case with NATO's first post-Cold War round of
enlargement, the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
last year.
NATO enlargement does not represent a military challenge or threat to
Russia, nor does it exclude Russia. Enlargement is an open process
which encourages states to look beyond their own national concerns and
place greater priority on strengthening security and stability in
their own neighborhood. Military integration of three former Warsaw
Pact states has not led to the creation of any new NATO bases on their
territory or the movement of nuclear weapons closer to Russia's
borders. In fact, even as NATO has enlarged, it has dramatically
reduced its overall conventional force levels and cut its tactical
nuclear forces by 85 percent. These are the facts, and we have yet to
hear a convincing explanation from Russia as to why the incorporation
of sovereign states into a defensive alliance is a threat to Russia.
The best way for Russia to assure itself that this is not the case is
through close cooperation with NATO.
Now let me turn to the conference's main theme. Here I would like to
be equally frank in addressing the issue that is, I'm sure, foremost
in your minds when thinking about the use of force: Kosovo. This is
especially timely, since it was almost exactly one year ago that
Russia played a crucial role in the diplomatic process that ended the
Kosovo conflict on terms that were acceptable to both NATO and Russia.
These terms were laid down in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244, enacted a year ago this week.
It would be an understatement to say that NATO and Russia had serious
differences over the use of force in resolving the Kosovo crisis. From
our point of view, Milosevic's repression and ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo represented a real threat to regional stability and challenged
our most basic values of freedom and human rights. Milosevic's
militant nationalism had precipitated three previous cross-border
conflicts in the Balkans, and we were not prepared to tolerate actions
that threatened a wider war in Southeast Europe and a major
humanitarian catastrophe.
In fact, Russia seemed to share this view when it supported a series
of UN Security Council resolutions in the course of 1998. Those
resolutions threatened serious consequences if the parties did not
halt the violence and accept a political solution. Diplomatic efforts
were tried, but these did not succeed -- in large part because NATO
and Russia could not agree on how to link military force to diplomacy.
Russia was not prepared to join NATO -- or even to acquiesce -- in
threatening air strikes to encourage acceptance of a political
settlement; nor was Russia willing to endorse the demands made during
the Rambouillet negotiations for an international military force in
Kosovo to enforce compliance by both sides with the terms of a
settlement. (Experience had shown that such a force was indispensable
to making any deal last for more than a few days.)
Unfortunately, diplomacy without a credible threat to use force is
often not effective. More unfortunate, but a fact of life in
diplomacy, is that sometimes force must be used. The world is not so
transformed that we can relegate to history the need to take up arms
and use military force in support of a just cause. And Kosovo was a
just cause.
Kosovo demonstrates clearly that international thinking on sovereignty
is evolving at the dawn of the 21st century. No longer can dictators
hide behind borders and perpetrate the most heinous of crimes --
including deportations, ethnic cleansing and even murder -- without
prompting other states to act. This was a view shared not just by
NATO. It was neighbors and others throughout the Euro-Atlantic
community that came together with the Alliance in defense of our
common values of peace, democracy and human rights. NATO nations put
the lives of the men and women of their armed forces on the line to
defend those values and to prevent a wider regional crisis; and the
front-line states stood with NATO until success was achieved.
We regret that Russia disagreed sharply over the means to solve the
crisis, but we are glad that we managed to come together in defining
the basis for a just peace. Now our common challenge is translating
that into a reality on the ground in Kosovo -- a very difficult
challenge -- and making sure that we stay together when the next
crisis arrives.
Some have drawn parallels between NATO's air campaign to end Serb
repression in Kosovo and Russian actions in Chechnya. We reject this.
In the case of Kosovo, the international community, including Russia,
sought to protect members of an ethnic group that had suffered 10
years of repression and violence at the hands of the Milosevic regime.
Moreover, the international community, including Russia, pursued
diplomacy for several years before resorting to force. We continued to
employ diplomacy even while using force to reverse ethnic cleansing.
And we have now taken on the "problems of victory," deploying a
substantial military force and hundreds of civilian personnel to
prevent a return to hostilities and to implement the terms of UNSCR
1244. That resolution calls for the establishment of stability,
security and political autonomy as the basis for all Kosovars -- Serb
and Albanian -- to rebuild their lives.
Unfortunately, we have not seen anything similar in Russia's
involvement in Chechnya. Russia needs a political strategy and a
political interlocutor with which to negotiate terms under which the
civilian population of Chechnya can return to rebuild their lives. As
President Clinton told President Putin during their recent meeting, a
policy that causes so many civilian casualties without a political
solution cannot ultimately succeed. On the contrary, Russia risks
sowing the seeds of a long-term insurgency on its unstable southern
periphery. That is not in our interests or yours.
Some in Russia have also considered NATO's decision to use force
against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] as a sign that
Russia's views are not listened to, not respected, and that NATO
places no value on partnership with Russia. This is absolutely not the
case. NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Washington Summit
in 1999, specifically states that NATO no longer considers Russia to
be a threat or an enemy, but rather a partner. Indeed, as NATO looks
eastward, it no longer sees the dangers of the Cold War, but rather
the promise of a new era of partnership in tackling the many problems
that all of us face. Partnership is now the guiding light for NATO's
relations with Russia, and all the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Now, of course, we will not always agree. But the United States and
all of its allies agree that Russia is and should be a major player in
the European security system. The circumstances that pulled NATO and
Russia into closer cooperation after 1991 are pulling them closer
again as we slowly find common ground in rebuilding peace and
stability in Kosovo. In Kosovo our forces have developed close working
relationships, as they did before that in Bosnia. We need to extend
this cooperation beyond the context of military operations in the
Balkans. NATO is ready to expand military and political cooperation
with Russia, as it has with the other countries of the Euro-Atlantic
area. We hope Russia will agree to a broadening of this partnership
now that our Permanent Joint Council is back in business.
The NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, is fond of saying that
NATO and Russia are doomed to cooperate for their own benefit and for
the benefit of the entire Euro-Atlantic community. Kosovo made it
clear that we have the best chance of meeting European security
challenges when NATO and Russia work together. The security
environment and security challenges are not stagnant -- they are
constantly evolving. We must be ready to think of new ways of adapting
present structures -- or building new ones -- that will provide for
security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Russia's cutting-off of dialogue
with NATO during Kosovo -- at the exact time when our cooperation was
most needed -- was a great disappointment to us all. Now that Russia
has returned to full cooperation, we can begin again to build
cooperation and trust.
As I mentioned earlier, the new and emerging security challenges we
all face include threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) --
be they biological, chemical or nuclear -- and the means to deliver
those weapons against military or civilian targets. The proliferation
of these weapons to states that do not accept the rules of the
international system threatens Russia and all the members of NATO. We
sincerely believe that we must meet this threat together.
This brings me to the hottest topic on the U.S.-Russian and
NATO-Russia agenda, anti-missile defense. In Moscow two weeks ago,
Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed to a Joint Statement on Principles
of Strategic Stability. That document included a joint acknowledgement
of the emerging threat posed by proliferation of WMD to rogue states,
even though our leaders did not agree on how best to address those
threats. We hope that further negotiations will lead to common ground
on how to cooperate in developing defenses against these weapons while
strengthening the 1972 ABM Treaty. Russia claims that this cannot be
done - that any change in the ABM Treaty would destroy the basis for
strategic stability between our two countries. But speaking frankly,
we do not believe your leaders have made a convincing case. In fact,
President Putin's new proposals for a cooperative "missile shield" to
defend Europe and Russia may provide a basis for narrowing our
differences on this issue.
In our view, the strategic environment has changed since the ABM
Treaty was signed almost 30 years ago. The United States and Russia
can still base their strategic relationship on mutual deterrence. But
meeting the new threats from rogue states requires a combination of
diplomacy and military means. Our efforts to defuse the growing threat
posed by rogue states such as North Korea have involved both. The
United States has been talking to North Korea since 1994, trying to
persuade the regime in Pyongyang not to squander its scarce resources
on a program to develop nuclear weapons. While we have succeeded in
limiting their nuclear weapons development, we have not succeeded in
stopping the development of long-range ballistic missiles.
The world changed in August 1998, when North Korea tested a missile
with three stages that could become an ICBM. As a result, there is now
strong bipartisan support in the U.S. for a limited National Missile
Defense system, within an adapted ABM Treaty, that would be able to
stop attacks from North Korea but which would not affect Russia's much
larger strategic missile capability.
The proliferation of ballistic missiles is only one of the emerging
threats on which we need to cooperate. We must also find ways to
prevent conflict and promote stability in the new democracies in
Europe and Eurasia. These new challenges require different
capabilities, but also more effective collaboration between NATO and
the United Nations, the OSCE, the European Union, and other
organizations - this must be a team effort. Russia's participation in
the G-8, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as its
cooperation with NATO under the NATO-Russia Founding Act and its
special relationship with the EU, have produced benefits for Russia.
The openness of older institutions to new ties with Russia has
benefited everyone by enabling Russia to contribute to common economic
and security objectives in Europe.
Russia still needs to fully overcome a legacy of distrust and the
zero-sum thinking in its dealing with NATO. At the same time, NATO
needs to be more imaginative in taking Russia's views into account.
The creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council three years
ago was an effort to do just that, and there have been many small but
important achievements since then. For its part, the Russian
Government also needs to be frank about its own interest and need to
work with NATO. This has been, at least implicitly, recognized by
President Putin in saying that he does not feel NATO poses a threat to
Russia (and might even wish to join the Alliance some day!). The
Russian people need to understand that NATO is continuing to adapt
itself to deal with many of the same new security problems that Russia
also faces. These problems can best be solved through the broadest
possible international cooperation, political as well as military.
As always, we need to be realistic. Cooperation can only be based on a
sober assessment of interests as well as a common foundation of
values. Issues such as Chechnya raise questions about Russia's
commitment to those values, and will continue to present obstacles to
developing the strategic partnership we would like to see. But NATO
has been, and remains ready to cooperate, and the NATO-Russia Founding
Act provides a broad and ambitious agenda. We look forward to working
closely with Russian political and military leaders -- including you,
if that is where your career path leads.
The American president Theodore Roosevelt once said that: "Far and
away the best prize that life offers is the chance to work hard at
work worth doing." NATO and Russia definitely have lots of work that
is worth doing. We look forward to addressing our common priorities in
meeting the security challenges of a dynamic and increasingly united
Europe.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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