|
12 June 2000
En route to Moscow June 12 for meetings with Russian President
Vladimir Putin, Minister of Defense Igor Sergeyev and other officials,
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen answered reporters' questions
about the International Criminal Court, the U.S. proposal for a
limited national missile defense (NMD) system, the Russian proposal
for a cooperative defense project, and Putin's visit to North Korea.
Cohen said he would be discussing with the Russians a number of issues
in addition to NMD, such as "training together, preparing the forces
that will be deployed to Kosovo... shared early warning.... the
Cooperative Threat Reduction program. We'll look for ways in which we
can generally engage them and look for areas of cooperation,
understanding that there'll always be areas of dispute, but we'll work
through them in a diplomatic fashion."
He said the Europeans' view on NMD is "important" and that "you cannot
have an effective NMD system unless you have the cooperation of key
allies, whether it's in phase one or phase two of your proposal. Their
interest should be taken into account.... The President first has to
make a decision as to whether we're going to deploy or not, and then
we would have to have the support of the allies in order to carry out,
certainly, phase one and phase two."
Asked if Russia is trying to divide the NATO allies into supporters
and non-supporters of NMD or Russia's proposed cooperative defense
project with the United States, Cohen said the Russian proposal is "a
very vague concept or idea, which has no defined parameters. So, it's
hard for me to have a responsible comment on it until I know more
about it."
Following is a transcript of the interview:
DOD News Briefing
Secretary Of Defense William S. Cohen
Monday, June 12, 2000
(Media availability en route to Moscow, Russia)
Question:
Going back to your answer...
Secretary Cohen:
Answer on what?
Q:
Answer on the International [Criminal] Court, the War Crimes
[Tribunal??]. We were talking on the way over that it was an
interesting answer, and that if Saddam Hussein or Milosevic would have
said the same thing, we'd be, like, "That's preposterous -- they're
horrible human rights violators, and they need to be brought up in
front of a court of law." How do you --
Cohen:
They also don't have a respected judicial system. The United
States does, and we have demonstrated over the years that whenever
there is an allegation of an abuse on the part of a soldier, that we
have a judicial system that will deal with it very effectively.
Our concern is that once you have a totally independent international
court that is not under the jurisdiction, supervision, and is not in
any way influenced or obligated to a supervisory institution like the
United Nations Security Council, then the potential exists for
allegations to be made against our soldiers that can be frivolous in
nature. You could have charges brought, or you could have soldiers
apprehended and brought before The Hague. I think this would be very
destructive to our international participation. It would be
intolerable as far as the American people are concerned. As long as we
have a mature, respected judicial system, then there should be some
insulation factor, whether it is a filter on the part of authorization
from the UN Security Council or some measure to protect people against
frivolous charges that can be brought.
Now, we just saw recently the charges brought against NATO in which
Carla del Ponte had to make a very thorough examination. But the very
notion that there would be an allegation of war crimes, given what we
went through to protect innocent life, is just the shape of some
things to come in the way of allegations being made by third parties,
by other nations, that would seek to embarrass or try to in some way
to hinder U.S. participation in international affairs. So, if there
can be something worked out whereby a non-party that has a mature
judicial system and is respected as such at the international level,
then I think that consideration should be given, and we could be
supportive of the court. But if there is no protection for our
soldiers -- we're the ones that are called upon virtually every time
to be deployed all over the world -- then, we would adamantly oppose
it.
Q:
Well, couldn't what happened with Nader this time happen again
still with the war crimes tribunal? There would be nothing that
they're deciding now that would stop similar things from happening
again, right?
Cohen:
In terms of the court that they currently have? That is not an
international criminal court. That is under the jurisdiction of the
UN.
Q:
What, realistically are you expecting from these meetings in
Moscow? I mean, what, realistically, do you think the Russians will
(inaudible)?
Cohen:
Well, we're going to talk about some things in addition to NMD
[national missile defense] and ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty]. We
will talk about training together, preparing the forces that will be
deployed to Kosovo, having a kind of pre-deployment joint training
session and preparatory sessions. We will talk about areas of shared
early warning. We will talk about that in greater detail. We will talk
about the need to continue the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
We'll look for ways in which we can generally engage them and look for
areas of cooperation, understanding that there'll always be areas of
dispute, but we'll work through them in a diplomatic fashion. I will
take advantage in dealing with some of their intellectual and academic
members tonight. Tomorrow, as I understand it, the meeting is on with
President Putin. It was supposed to be today. Then, it got changed.
So, it's on for tomorrow. Obviously, with the Duma members, I have met
with them each time that I've traveled to Moscow, and when they come
to the United States, I meet with them. So, we will just talk about
ways in which we can cooperate. I will try to find out more about
their proposed NMD system, but I think it's just important that we
continue to stay in contact.
It was important that Marshal Sergeyev come to the PJC [NATO-Russia
Permanent Joint Council] meeting in Brussels. It's been too long that
they've been away. There are a whole variety of issues we've got to
talk about in addition to NMD.
Q:
Do you have any doubt, at this point, that this isn't simply a ploy
to divide the allies?
Cohen:
So far, it's a very vague concept or idea, which has no defined
parameters. So, it's hard for me to have a responsible comment on it
until I know more about it. We can look for ways on a TMD [theater
missile defense] program, certainly. We can look for ways to cooperate
on joint projects. We already have a number of projects underway
working with our allies, and we certainly could work with the Russians
on TMD programs. Based on what I have heard today, this concept
doesn't really effectively deal with the issues that (inaudible).
Q:
Based on what you've heard today, do you see any basis for
cooperating with them?
Cohen:
I have to know more about it. I haven't dismissed it, but I've
raised the kind of questions that are important to raise. That is, we
don't know whether it's a boost phase intercept system or not. If so,
then there are a lot of questions that flow from that. If it's not
boost phase, then how would it protect the United States? If it's not
boost phase, you still have the ABM modification issues involved. So,
there are a lot of things that have to be clarified before we have a
responsible comment.
Q:
How important is the European view going to be in your
recommendation to the President on whether to move ahead?
Cohen:
Well, it will be important, but that's the reason why I spent
so much time dealing with the Europeans.
Q:
How important?
Cohen:
It's important, and I've tried to convey that. You cannot have
an effective NMD system unless you have the cooperation of key allies,
whether it's in phase one or phase two of our proposal. Their interest
should be taken into account, which is one reason why I have spent so
much time explaining our system.
Q:
Did you get a sense from them that the Russian proposal had eroded
any of their support or had caused some questions in their mind or
made things more difficult for you?
Cohen:
No, I don't get that impression. I think they still have
genuine questions and concerns about the NMD project in itself. I
don't think that the Russian proposal -- because it's not really a
proposal, not really something concrete -- has made much difference.
Q:
So, he didn't divide the allies?
Cohen:
No, and the allies have not signed onto the system which we
have not signed onto ourselves because the President hasn't decided to
deploy it. We're still in the stage where the President first has to
make a decision as to whether we're going to deploy or not, and then
we would have to have the support of the allies in order to carry out,
certainly, phase one and phase two. Phase one is much more limited
because of what will be required, software types of changes rather
than construction of (inaudible). But we will continue to work with
the allies, and if we can work with the Russians, we will do so. What
I've heard today doesn't really deal with the issue that we have.
Plus, the time factor -- if they're talking about developing a boost
phase type of interceptor system, it's going to be at least 10 year's
away and we need to have a system somewhere around...
Q:
You still think what they're talking about is a boost phase?
Cohen:
I don't know. I really don't know.
Q:
Let me ask you something else. There's been criticism again just in
the past couple of days that the ABM testing has been essentially
rigged to make it look like it works even though it can't possibly
work. The man who's proposing this is a reputable scientist. He's
apparently looked at the data. I know that you all have been coming up
with a point by point rebuttal. Are you satisfied that the testing and
design has been as rigorous as possible, not simply dummied up to make
it look like it works?
Cohen:
I am not interested in recommending the deployment of a system
that doesn't work. So, my answer is that I will look very carefully
and scrutinize everything. We're going through stages right now,
looking at the technology involved. That's very, very challenging in a
very time compressed period, but I am not interested in endorsing
something that is either structured in a way that is bound to fail or
is simply a system which we spend billions [thousands of millions] of
dollars on that doesn't have any chance of working effectively. We
believe that the testing to date demonstrates the validity that we are
close to having a technology that can, in fact, defeat a few dozen
missiles fired by a rogue state, and that's the criterion that I will
look at.
Q:
Are you taking any kind of message from the United States to
President Putin on his visit to North Korea?
Cohen:
No. I just learned about his position. He's going.
Q:
Is there anything that you're hoping he's going to, you know...
Cohen:
If President Putin can persuade the North Koreans to give up
their missile program, I think that we would all welcome that, but
he's already issued a statement that he doesn't intend to make any
statement about their missile program.
Q:
I have a question on the nature of the threat. What is it about...
Cohen:
I'm sorry. Am I correct about that, Ken?
Bacon: I haven't seen any (inaudible).
Cohen:
I saw a report that said that he didn't intend to try to urge
them to discontinue their missile system. To qualify it, I thought I
saw a report to that effect.
Sorry, you're out of time.
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Return to the Washington File
|
