8 June 2000

Holum Outlines Security Rationale for Arms Control Process

Senior Arms Control Adviser John Holum says weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies are not only becoming increasingly accessible, but for some countries they are also "apparently irresistible."

Holum warned May 31 that spreading missile technology "and the apparent ambitions of some states for ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capabilities," are "creating a new security environment that cannot be wished away or ignored."

In a keynote speech to the annual Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conference in Norfolk, Virginia, the State Department official said the security rationale for arms control "needs more prominence globally" and that non-governmental actors "must remain a valuable part" of the arms control process.

At the same time, even though the end of the Cold War has resulted in greater international pressure for speedier weapons disarmament, he said, "we cannot negotiate agreements that are not yet ripe, or go beyond what we believe is in our national interest, simply on the basis of demands."

He pointed out that the easy tasks in arms control were all accomplished long ago "and now we're deeply into the heavy lifting: the myriad and mounting challenges of implementation; increasingly sophisticated unsavory characters and regimes; advancing techniques of misdirection and concealment; the cases where, by some lights, proliferation looks reasonable; the risky side effects when arms are taken apart; the absolute certitude both of those who think we're going too slow and those who think we're going too fast."

During his speech entitled, "Keeping Arms Control Relevant: Ten Observations," Holum said the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference which ended in New York on May 20 was a success for having produced "a reasoned document upon which all member States could agree." It was a success, largely, he said, because NPT parties realized that the treaty "is profoundly in all of their security interests." He also said he hoped the spirit of the NPT Review "will provide a useful precedent" that will carry over into the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva where efforts have been long under way to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.

On small arms, Holum said the United States wants to conclude this year a Firearms Protocol to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention "to stem the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking by harmonizing global export and import policies."

Following is the text of Holum's remarks:

(begin text)

Introduction

I'm delighted to be here. I was delighted to come even back in the old days, when DTRA was DSWA (Defense Special Weapons Agency) and the Department of State -- or at least the most important part -- was ACDA (the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Your conferences not only give me a chance to address important issues, but also allow me to take away far more than I bring, drawing from collective wisdom you assemble.

In the past I have come mainly as an advocate, to represent the administration's views on specific arms control issues. As the Clinton administration begins winding down, I thought it would be appropriate to be a bit more reflective.

Specifically, I want to share some thoughts on keeping arms control relevant, as the security environment continues to evolve in new and unpredictable ways.

Arms control has contributed immensely to stability. Whether through bilateral agreements to reduce strategic offensive forces; unilateral steps, such as those taken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991; multilateral efforts, such as the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), or the permanent extension of the NPT; or through other measures, such as our on-going efforts in Russia to improve the security of nuclear materials and safety of nuclear reactors, the world has relied on arms control to reduce threats, and introduce predictability into otherwise volatile environments.

Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia and, of course, the Senate's refusal to provide its advice and consent to CTBT ratification, some question the value of this discipline. Indeed, after the Senate's CTBT vote some proclaimed, with no lack of hyperbole, that the vote signified nothing less than "the end of arms control." Some feel the Clinton administration's consideration of National Missile Defense (NMD) portends the same fate from another direction.

Are the critics right? Is there still a useful, stabilizing role for arms control, or has the enterprise become obsolete and so highly politicized that progress is no longer possible?

That is emphatically not my view. We live in an era of mounting challenges, with WMD and missile technologies increasingly accessible and, to some, apparently irresistible. It is more, not less, important to embrace all steps that can promote stability.

Toward this end, I would suggest 10 broad messages -- I thought of calling them "principles for arms control in the new millennium" but that seems a bit grand. I'll call them "observations," and let you decide.

First, a reminder of what works: arms control must continue to have as its preeminent goal the enhancement of security.

I won't dwell on this because it is obvious, certainly to this audience. But there are places where it needs elaboration. The essential point is that we don't do arms control as a morality play or as a favor to others; we do it when it serves our security, by limiting threats to our territory, our people, and our interests in the world.

Second, the security rationale for arms control needs more prominence globally.

It gets lost in two ways. The first is when other agendas get in the way. Negotiations to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention are dragging in Geneva, in part because some non-aligned states insist that in exchange for a stronger BWC, we should be prepared to weaken export controls and the Australia Group. To sharpen one tool by blunting another is not a good bargain, and we won't take it. But it illustrates the problem that multilateral arms control too often is considered a "zero sum" struggle among competing economic or political interests, instead of a "plus sum" endeavor in which all are after, and all gain, security.

The security dimension is also overlooked in expectations of what can be attained. In the CTBT negotiations, some non-aligned sought to give the Treaty greater disarmament "bite" by defining a greater scope -- steps tending toward banning the bomb, instead of what the negotiation was about, banning the "bang".

More generally, the end of the Cold War has increased international pressure for faster disarmament. But we cannot negotiate agreements that are not yet ripe, or go beyond what we believe is in our national interest, simply on the basis of demands.

On the other hand, about two weeks ago in New York we completed a review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, where both of these tendencies were in play. The conference occurred in a strained environment, to say the least, with the United States in the spotlight -- the CTBT voted down, strategic arms control slowed down, new ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) issues intruding. Yet the Conference was a success, producing in the end a reasoned document upon which all member States could agree.

Of course, I attribute that in fair part to the skill of our interagency team on the ground in New York, led by Ambassador Norm Wulf, one of our most gifted and persistent practitioners of multilateral diplomacy. Russian ratification of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) II and the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) on the eve of the conference also helped.

But I think success was also due in large measure to the realization of the membership that the Treaty is profoundly in all of their security interests. That means no one has an interest in bending it out of shape, through misuse as a lever to pry from the nuclear weapon states speedier disarmament than their security interests allow.

Perhaps the NPT Revcon (Review Conference) will provide a useful precedent. I hope this spirit will carry over into the CD and Biological Weapons Convention as well. The credibility of these venues is on the line.

Third, we need specialized approaches for the hard cases.

Generally speaking, states that join treaty regimes comply with them. But some key states, as experience also tells us, do not join, and others cheat.

I don't have a guaranteed formula for success. That's why these are called the "hard cases," to distinguish them from "easy" things like the test ban and START III. But I must say I am skeptical of "one size fits all" concepts that would gather all the problem countries in a room and offer the same bargain to them all -- which could, for example, have us either promoting light water reactors in Iran, or not supporting them for North Korea. Dealing with these hard cases is best accomplished on a case-by-case basis, with concerted strategies focused on the specific circumstances, and on what unique incentives and disincentives may be available to us and to others seeking a solution.

But as we have seen with Iraq and North Korea, we need approaches we can sustain over the long haul -- and should not expect quick and or cost-free results.

Fourth, we should continue the process of negotiating reductions in strategic arms.

With Russia's nuclear arsenal headed downward anyway, it may be tempting to ask, "why bother? Russia's economic woes are forcing it to reduce its weapons anyway; what's in it for us?"

One answer is that negotiated and verifiable agreements can influence how, and for how long Russia reduces its forces. Absent formal agreements, there's a good chance Russia would retain or build destabilizing systems, such as the heavy land-based MIRVed (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles) missiles banned by START I and II. Absent formal agreements both sides would lose verification, which we need more of, not less. And absent formal agreements, we would be dependent on something we earnestly hope is temporary, Russia's economic distress, for long term stability -- or, conversely, a Russian government, putting security first, might spend sums it can't afford on a strategic buildup, thus putting democratic reform and market economics at risk.

Moreover, we should think of START in the context of steps to address other problems that are high on everyone's agenda -- particularly safeguards and controls on Russia's WMD materials, technology and expertise, which we want to keep out of the wrong hands. This is painstaking work, pursued through multiple mechanisms -- among them Cooperative Threat Reduction, the science centers, plutonium disposition, the HEU (highly enriched uranium) agreement, the nuclear cities initiative, and various incentives to curtail WMD and missile cooperation with countries like Iran. If the START process were to break down, it's likely those vital efforts would suffer as well.

Fifth, once negotiated, arms control agreements should not be considered immune from re-examination.

We agreed that Europe's sharply altered political and security landscape warranted adjustment in the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty, replacing bloc limits with national ceilings and affording Russia greater flexibility in the disposition of its forces.

And, as you know, we're making that same argument to Russia regarding the ABM Treaty. The spread of missile technology, and the apparent ambitions of some states for ICBM capabilities, is creating a new security environment that cannot be wished away or ignored. We're working to address it on many fronts, including both prevention and deterrence. But we are reaching the stage where defense also belongs in the mix.

As was done with the CFE Treaty -- as has been done before with the ABM Treaty itself -- we believe it can be preserved as a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the best way to do that is to update it to account for threats that could not have been contemplated when it was agreed nearly 30 years ago.

Sixth, we need to think realistically about verification.

It's no secret that during the CTBT debate we were on the defensive on verification. The questions were easy and the answers were complex -- not that we could detect any violation, but essentially that we could probably detect and deter violations that could damage our security in time to respond.

Yet that is increasingly the case. The question is whether difficulty of enforcement is sufficient reason not to have a law in the first place. I suspect few would argue that we should withdraw from the Biological Weapons Convention because it is unverifiable; rather, we should improve it. More generally, the standard of "effectively verifiable" is what we can realistically achieve, and we shouldn't pretend otherwise.

In each case, we have to do a "net assessment." Recognizing that verification will never be perfect, are we better off with the treaty and its verification regime than we would be without.

In that context we should weigh such questions as, will national technical means play a useful role? Would states that are unprepared to provide sensitive data to the United States have fewer qualms about providing it to an international, non-discriminatory organization? How much better can we monitor events of importance to our security than if we didn't have the treaty regime? Is our security at risk if a treaty violation occurs and is not detected?

If we support the Treaty's objectives, and we can satisfactorily answer these questions, we probably have a regime that is in our interest to support.

Seventh, arms controllers need to be opportunistic about technology.

A good example is the IAEA's (International Atomic Energy Agency) Strengthened Safeguards Protocol. It was inspired by the discovery of active nuclear programs in Iraq and North Korea, in the latter case because technology was better than North Korea thought. But the Protocol also became possible because of advances in technology, giving the Agency more capacity, with broadened access, to detect activities at undeclared sites.

As the exhibits associated with this conference attest, there is abundant potential to be plumbed -- remote, unattended sensors for monitoring; increasingly sophisticated data fusion and analysis techniques, to help manage and assess rapidly accumulating data; more rugged, portable and user-friendly verification equipment.

Arms control should also build on advances in enabling technologies and basic sciences: smaller and more efficient power sources for unattended sensors; expanded interoperability between systems; and comprehensive signature libraries and phenomenology studies.

So I remain an enthusiast of strengthening the nexus between arms control and technology.

Eighth, arms control increasingly has to deal with non-governmental actors.

This is particularly the case for business, where treaties seek to expand inspection rights, such as the CWC's "anytime, anywhere" provisions, or the enhanced inspection rights under the IAEA's strengthened safeguards. The BWC negotiations are dealing with this problem right now. In negotiating such agreements, we need to account not only for security needs but commercial realities.

As to policy, NGOs have, of course, been forceful arms control advocates for many years. The open question is whether the "Ottawa process" pattern is likely to be repeated. My guess is not, but yours is just as good. In that case, as you know, NGOs took the lead in international efforts against anti-personnel landmines, and would accept nothing less than a complete ban. As a result, the Convention does not include most of the major historic producers and users of landmines. Absolutes don't fit very well with the give-and-take that is required to achieve broadly-based arms control results.

But in any event NGOs must remain a valuable part of the process, and keep contesting our judgments of what can be achieved.

Ninth: We need to put greater emphasis on non-traditional tools, such as small arms measures and confidence-building, to deal with regional or internal conflicts. In some parts of the world small arms have become weapons of mass destruction. Arms control methods can help -- one reason why our professional on-site inspectors keep encountering what I've heard Admiral Barnes describe as "pop-up missions."

Among other initiatives, we want to conclude this year a Firearms Protocol to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention, to stem the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking by harmonizing global export and import policies. We're also providing assistance to ensure the safe storage or destruction of surplus stockpiles of these weapons. So we're working on many fronts, and will continue.

This leads to a tenth and final observation. It is critical that arms control policymaking and implementation have bipartisan understanding and support.

The Senate's CTBT vote suggests that the bipartisan tradition of arms control has eroded. It must be restored. That is the basis of our on-going efforts, aided by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, to quietly work the issues on CTBT, and we hope set the stage for resumed Senate consideration.

In the same vein I heartily welcome, and have done my best, along with Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, to cooperate with, the new National Security Working Group (NSWG) in the Senate, co-chaired by Senator (Thad) Cochran (Republican, Mississippi) and Senator (Robert) Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia). We brief them regularly, including on our discussions the ABM Treaty and START III. Members of Congress are stretched thin. It is reason for celebration when they are prepared to probe deeply into not only our policy conclusions and diplomatic strategies, but also our underlying reasoning about arms control's role.

At a minimum, we can find a core understanding, so we will be dealing on the basis of reality, rather than caricatures. Perhaps, the NSWG can be a worthy successor to the Arms Control Observers Group in ensuring that, when treaties reach the Senate, they have a base of informed support.

Conclusion

On the basis of this, you will discern that in rocky times for arms control I've lost none of my enthusiasm for these endeavors.

But in a group like this, that's an unexceptional view. You are fully aware that the obvious and easy things were all done long ago, and now we're deeply into the heavy lifting: the myriad and mounting challenges of implementation; increasingly sophisticated unsavory characters and regimes; advancing techniques of misdirection and concealment; the cases where, by some lights, proliferation looks reasonable; the risky side effects when arms are taken apart; the absolute certitude both of those who think we're going too slow and those who think we're going too fast.

Yet you persist, and devote your time to understanding this mission more fully and doing it better. For you recognize this work as central to national and international security, and to the day-to-day safety of people around the world.

For that you have my admiration, my heartfelt thanks, and my best wishes for an enormously successful Conference.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)