01 June 2000 Transcript: DOD Briefing on Cohen Agenda in Europe, Russia A senior Pentagon official says Defense Secretary Cohen, who travels to Moscow in June, will be in a position to follow-up on any arms control issues which may arise during the June 3-5 Clinton-Putin summit. The timing of Cohen's trip "is fortuitous," the official told reporters during a Defense Department background briefing June 1. He also said the United States is working with NATO allies and Russia on a number of cooperative research and development programs as well as technology-sharing issues. The briefing was organized to discuss Defense Secretary Cohen's trip to Europe beginning June 6 to attend the regular spring NATO Defense Ministerial and the third Nordic-Baltic-U.S. Defense Ministerial, but the session was quickly overtaken by reporters' questions on key defense issues, including technology-sharing with Russia on the proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) program. When asked if President Clinton is willing to share NMD technology with the Russians, one of two briefing officials said, "it's important to remember that we've already proposed a series of activities with Russia on sensor experiments which relate to missile defense broadly. And we have also proposed with the Russians that we work on Theater Missile Defense cooperation." He also said the United States has proposed working with the Russians on early warning. On the prospect of extending NMD defense to NATO allies, the official said, "We would certainly be quite open to discussion with the allies about cooperative steps to meet the long-range missile threat to Europe as it emerges." If NATO allies seek U.S. assistance in defending against such threats, he said, "we will be there." The officials also highlighted some of the key issues on which Cohen will focus during his meetings, including the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) -- to make allied and U.S. military equipment more compatible; the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI); and Balkans issues, with an emphasis on Kosovo. All the ministers will be focusing on "how to achieve the kinds of capabilities that are sought," a senior official said, including "enhanced mobility . . . precision engagement, (and) logistics away from home." Cohen also will visit Sweden for bilateral meetings. The official praised that country's substantial contribution to the peacekeeping effort in Kosovo. Following is the transcript of the DOD background briefing: Background Briefing Senior Defense Officials Thursday, June 1, 2000 -- 2:00 p.m. EDT Capt. Taylor: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Today we're going to have a background briefing about the trip that the secretary of Defense is taking next week. And we have two senior Defense officials, which is the way we would appreciate you identifying them: senior defense officials. And this is senior defense official number one, just for your information, and he will talk about the parts of the trip that he's associated with and answer your questions. And then senior defense official number two will materialize on the scene and he will similarly talk about his portions of the trip and answer your questions. Senior Defense Official: (Off mike.) (Laughter.) Capt. Taylor: That's right. Otherwise it's way too hard for the transcribing team to keep track of stuff. Question: Ah, thanks a lot. Capt. Taylor: Sir? Senior Defense Official: Thank you. The secretary of Defense is going to Europe, including Russia. Senior Defense official number two will deal with the Russian part. He goes to Europe for the NATO defense ministerial. Many of you have been there before. He will then go on from the defense ministerial to have a Nordic-Baltic-U.S. defense ministerial. This is the third time that we've had that. And then he will go from there to have bilaterals in Sweden, and then from Sweden he will go to Russia and then home. At the defense ministerial, again, as I think all of you know, there are a series of regular meetings. These include the so-called Nuclear Planning Group, the Defense Planning Committee, and the North Atlantic Council of Defense Ministers. There's also a meeting with the Ukraine, and a meeting with the Partnership for Peace defense ministers, the so-called Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of Defense Ministers. And then a meeting with the Russians. In broad terms, one of the key focuses for the secretary is the Defense Capabilities Initiative, which as you'll recall was approved by the heads of government last year at the NATO summit here in Washington. It was very much a Secretary Cohen initiative to begin with. If I recall correctly, he began speaking about it at NATO in June of 1998. It was approved last year, and we've made a reasonable amount of progress on it since. The key issue now that I think all the ministers will be focusing on is how to achieve the kinds of capabilities that are sought. Those relate to enhanced mobility, enhanced precision engagement, logistics away from home, C3, which you've heard. And the secretary has talked about the importance of both reallocating resources and providing additional resources. We expect to have an event there where a group of the NATO countries will be able to sign an agreement, still ongoing, so we'll have to talk about the specifics when we're in Europe. But I simply alert you to that. A second issue undoubtedly will be what the Europeans themselves are doing, the so-called European Security Defense -- sometimes called "Identity," sometimes "Program." We have had some significant progress. NATO and the EU have agreed to set up working groups. The EU has since last December had a so-called "headline" goal that's compatible with the DCI goal, with a heavy focus, again, on mobility and sustainability. And part of this meeting will be to make sure that NATO and the EU are coordinating at the ministerial level and to continue this effort. The third issue undoubtedly will be Balkans issues, obviously Kosovo. They will certainly discuss the Milosevic regime, what should be done about it, how to help stabilize the countries around the area. Although it's not specifically the bailiwick of the defense ministers, they'll talk about the Stability Pact. There is a defense element of that. There's also a resource element, which is more prime ministers and finance ministers. I mentioned they will meet with the Ukraine minister. Senior Defense Official number two will talk about that; likewise on the Russian meeting. And then there's the meeting with the partners. One of the important things to think about in terms of things that happen over time but don't happen dramatically is that if you look at the Partnership for Peace, which started approximately six years ago with relatively limited activities, we now have a situation in which partners have both contributed substantially to the Bosnia effort, the peacekeeping effort and also to the KFOR effort. I mean, for example, Sweden, which we'll be visiting, has over -- I don't know if I have an exact number, but over 750 individuals in the KFOR effort, as do a whole number of the other partners. So it's been the kind of thing that has acted as a force multiplier for NATO. It's the kind of situation where we had not any NATO, but NATO with its associated partners operating as the important security entity in Europe in situations that involve force. Let me stop there. And I am happy to talk about any or all of this -- (inaudible) -- if you want to excuse me, go right on to senior defense official number two, we can do that too. Q: Sir, do you believe that the Defense, Trade and Security Initiative will come up as a major issue? Senior Defense Official: I am sorry. That's just a mistake on my part. It's even in my notes. The secretary will definitely talk about that. Obviously, it was announced at the foreign ministers' meeting and also here in Washington. He will review that with his counterparts. I can tell you that we have already gotten extremely good feedback from the Europeans on that. The ministers, I am sure, will be interested in the particulars of what may be involved, what it may imply for their country; how do they get as involved as they can. And he'll both, if you will, have a discussion of it, and then I expect that it will be a matter of informal discussion also. Q: Will you be making the DCI list available from that Defense Security -- Senior Defense Official: (Inaudible) -- have available or not. I'll have to -- we will be making it available, but I don't know that we have it available at this meeting. I'll have to check on the answer for you. I'll find out for you. Q: Will they talk about extending missile defense to the allies? Senior Defense Official: National missile defense will definitely come up, I am sure. And I am sure all the allies will be interested in the president's comments, as reported yesterday. I have only actually read about the -- I have only seen the news reports myself. I haven't had a chance to actually go over the comments themselves. But I am confident that that will be an issue. Q: Can you give us any sense; did the president sort of make an offhand comment? Has this been talked about and considered? Is he going to offer anything more in detail about how he would extend it to the allies? Would we offer it to them? Would they buy it? Senior Defense Official: I think we can talk about that. Senior Defense Official number two is actively involved in that, and I think the answer is that we may need a little bit more time to give you a better background briefing. But we'll turn to Senior Defense Official number two and keep the record clear. Senior Defense Official: I think that one needs to look at the situation as we know it, what's happened so far. First, with regard to potential cooperation on defense against ballistic missiles, it's important to remember that we've already proposed a series of activities with Russia on sensor experiments which relate to missile defense broadly. And we have also proposed with the Russians that we work on theater missile defense cooperation -- we've actually had two training exercises with them. And we have also proposed that we work with them on early warning. With NATO, we are already working with NATO allies on theater missile defense. In fact, there is a U.S.-Dutch-German Patriot capability -- deployable capability -- embodied in the U.S.-German-Dutch extended air defense task force in Europe. And we also are pursuing a number of cooperative research and development programs with the NATO allies in the area of theater missile defense. And finally, we have told the Russians that the question of cooperating with our NATO allies on defense against long-range missiles is an issue that is likely to arise in a future round of negotiations. And we've told the allies that we've told the Russians this. And so, as on other technology-sharing issues in the past, we would certainly be quite open to discussion with the allies about cooperative steps to meet the long-range missile threat to Europe as it emerges. Q: Well, here's a question -- will Cohen expand on what the president said yesterday? Is this a more firm proposal, or is it just something that will be discussed at a future -- Senior Defense Official: I think what I want you to go back and do is view what the president said not necessarily as a proposal, but in the context of what we are already doing, and we are already doing a significant amount. Q: There is no way that the United States would leave the NATO allies unprotected if they wish to be protected. The U.S. would certainly cooperate if a technology is acquired, perhaps even join them -- is that correct? Senior Defense Official: If the allies seek U.S. assistance in defending themselves against long-range missile threats to Europe, as those threats emerge, we will be there. Q: Could I follow that? Having heard what you said in response to Tom's question, are you saying that President Clinton's remarks yesterday do not mean that the United States has decided it will share strategic missile defense technology with the Russians? Senior Defense Official: I'm saying that what you have to do is look at the president's remarks -- first of all, you should go to the White House to find out what the president said. Q: I know what he said, but I want to ask -- Senior Defense Official: But the second thing I'm saying to you is the president's remarks didn't come out of the sky. The president's remarks come in a context of a series of initiatives already underway, and that you need to understand and interpret them in that context. Q: So he's not going any further than what has already -- the cooperation that already exists? Which is not, after all, missile intercept technology. Senior Defense Official: What's out there is out there. What may come further, you know, may come further. I don't think things have been ruled out. Q: But this question has been hanging in the air for some months, if not years: Would the United States share missile intercept technology with the Russians? And I have to say, that the president seemed to answer that question yesterday by saying yes. Senior Defense Official: The degree of technology sharing that we do with the Russians will obviously depend on the degree of discussions and where we go with discussions at this summit and at subsequent summits. I'm not ruling anything in or I'm not ruling anything out, nor do I think the president intended to rule anything in or out. But you've got to build on where we are. Senior Defense official one may wish to amplify on this. Senior Defense Official: We'll leave that issue and go on. Any others? Q: Generally, do you expect progress, or expect to be reporting -- or that the secretary will be reporting to the allies on progress on, say, for example, START III, on ABM, and the sort of things that we all expect to come out of summit meetings? Senior Defense Official: Well, there's going to be a summit meeting. The secretary obviously would be in a position to report on the summit meeting. But I can't tell you what's going to happen because it hasn't happened yet. Q: Would you be able to address the Force Proposal 2000 issue? I understand you've been getting a couple of reports. What are your expectations? Senior Defense Official: Yeah, Force Proposal 2000, as most of you know, are essentially the way we set up force goals for the allies and ourselves; that is what they need to do in the context of NATO. They will be approved at -- as I technical matter, they get approved at this meeting, made force goals, and then they have to be implemented. The burden of the defense capabilities initiative is to focus NATO -- and including the force goals -- on certain kinds of capabilities, like mobility, like enhanced engagement, and the like. And the Force Goals 2000 were significantly changed from the Force Goals '98, in accordance with the defense capabilities initiative, and that was done by the military authorities. Our desire is to have those implemented as fully as possible, and that goes back to the issue of resources. You need resources to do that. Now, you can get resources essentially in two ways. One is to reallocate away from some things that you're doing already. One thing that can be considered is that there are a lot of so-called "main defense forces," which were forces that made a lot of sense under the Cold War conditions, because they were to fight in place, if you will. And the second is to add additional resources; that's what the administration and the Congress have done for the United States, which is increasing its budget. And we think we need to do both. We need to get the alliance to spend more to be able to meet the force goals. Q: One of the things the secretary always does on these things is kind of mend fences, talk to the allies and so forth. But there are some frictions in the alliance. We have Congress complaining about a lack of police officers in Kosovo. We have not, as far as I can tell, not any -- none of the NATO allies have come out supporting the planned missile defense. What is the status at the moment? What are the problems? Am I overinterpreting this? Senior Defense Official: The secretary never has to mend fences, because he always has outstanding relations. If I interpret your question correctly, what you're saying to me -- and I'm putting words in your mouth, which is usually what you guys do to us, but let me see if I can get the question right. Are you saying, do we have an alliance that has lots of problems and is not working well together, or do we have an alliance that is working well together? And I would say that we have an alliance that's basically working very well together, and let me tell you why, and then let me go to your particular points. You have an alliance that has been able to conduct operations very effectively. You have Bosnia and then you have Kosovo. It did so effectively from a military point of view, and it did so effectively from a political point of view. The war ended quickly -- 78 days is quick. And one of the fundamental characteristics of the effort, both as a military matter and as a political matter, and as I think in most observers' views, including mine, as a matter of ending the war, was the way NATO was able to stick together, the solidarity. You have a whole series of actions that have been taken -- taken place over the past several years to create new structures, or alternatively, change existing structures in the alliance, all of which are uniformly agreed to. The Partnership for Peace -- it brings in all the countries that are not NATO members. For example, we're going to Sweden. Sweden is a neutral country, but it is now a neutral country that feels comfortable with working with the alliance in Europe's security issues. They are in KFOR, which I mentioned. That is a major change. You have an institution to help the Ukraine -- (to other briefer) -- do you remember the title? I can't remember. Senior Defense Official: NATO-Ukraine Council. Senior Defense Official: Right, NATO-Ukraine Council. You have the PJC for Russia. So what you do is you have an alliance that is able to do lots of things, do so effectively. It's not a classic news story in a sense that, you know, we're not saying who wins the boxing match, we're just doing stuff together. There are also problems, I mean, there's no issue about that, but there are real-life problems. We do not have enough police in Kosovo. I'm going to do this from memory, but my recollection is that there's a requirement -- it's 4,700 or 4,900, and we have about 3,400. It's not just the Congress that thinks that's a problem; I think it's a problem, the secretary of Defense thinks it's a problem, I think some of the other heads of state likewise think it's a problem. And the issue is how to get more police there. So there's not a difference on the objective, there's an implementation issue. With respect to NMD, while I'll leave the major things to senior defense official number two, the point I would say is that we've had lots of discussions with the Europeans. There have been very good exchanges. And this is the kind of way that an alliance comes together and builds consensus. So I don't think that your premise is right; I think your premise is actually affirmatively wrong. I think you basically have a working alliance, and then you have issues that have to be dealt with. Q: Is there likely to be discussion of the "technology gap" which the alliance said, "Boy, it was really bad during the war. We promise we're going to close it." And lo and behold, no country has increased its defense budget and you're not making much progress at all on that, from what I can tell. Senior Defense Official: The technology gap, as you put it, was one of the factors that led to the Defense Capabilities Initiative. It was also one of the factors that was apparent in Kosovo, where there were certain missions that only the United States could do. We have made progress, but we haven't made a success yet. And I think it's important to differentiate between the two. The first point on the progress was an agreement that things had to change, and that's the agreement on the key issues on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, that's the agreement on the Force Goals 2000, all of which built this in. The allies have to agree to the force goals, which they have done. The next issue is, as you say, implementation and resources, which I've already said, but I will repeat, you need to have more resources focused on these kind of capabilities. The secretary has said that a number of times. We all think that that's necessary. And the question will be how to get them. And again, I'm repeating, but you have two ways to get them -- reallocate from old things you don't need to do anymore, or increase budgets. And I think those have to be decided by the countries in the alliance, but they have to be done if we are going to be a success. And I don't think you can do it all by reallocation. There have been some successes along the way. Already we have done some things, like we've agreed on enhancing the alliance's logistics capability away from home by creating a so-called "Multinational Joint Logistics Center," which is a logistics counterpart to CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force. We have had some agreements on C3 architecture. We have had a decision, for example, by the British to lease four C-17s. There are a whole host of those. I don't want to overstate. There's a difference between progress and success. We haven't achieved the goals of the DCI yet. We are on track. We won't achieve them unless adequate resources are provided. That will be a focus of this meeting. Q: Have you seen, just as a point of fact, any European country increase its defense spending since the end of the Kosovo conflict? Senior Defense Official: Yes. And I will get -- I can remember the Canada, which is not European, but I take it you really meant non-U.S. I believe that there has been one other. And I apologize; I will try to get you the answer. But the facts are the facts, and I'm not trying to -- I think it's Canada plus one, if I recall correctly. And I don't mean Luxembourg. Q: Is there any concern that the Europeans aren't coordinating closely enough with NATO on their efforts to build an autonomous force? Senior Defense Official: We have supported the so-called ESDI or ESDP very strongly. And I think one of the things that happens is that there are concerns by people who are not as involved in the actuality of what is going on. When the defense minister from France came over, he gave some very strong speeches that were very positive -- strong speeches on the ESDP approach and how to work with NATO -- that were very positive from the U.S. point of view. We have since then made progress on a variety of so-called links, arrangements between the two entities, of NATO and the EU. And there are now four working groups set up to work on particular things, like exchange of security clearances would be one good example. We have to finish those off. And so until they are done, they are not done. But we have set them up. It's done in a timely fashion. It's good to remember that the EU and NATO -- but if I recall correctly, 12 of the countries are in both. So it's not one entity versus another with no overlapping membership; they are substantially the same. So there are things to be done. We all know it. I would have concern if they didn't get done, but I am pleased with where we are now. Q: This is for No. 2: The Russians have already made quite clear that they don't want to amend the treaty for national missile defense. When the secretary meets with Sergeyev, will he offer any new arguments, perhaps deal-sweeteners, or will he just repeat the arguments that have been rejected repeatedly? Senior Defense Official: The secretary will obviously follow up on what happens at the summit. Should there be any breakthroughs at the summit, the secretary will be in a position to exploit them. Should the summit -- Q: Do you have any information to give us about possible breakthroughs? Senior Defense Official: No. No. But I think that the timing is fortuitous. And I think that the secretary will be there, and arms control will be one of the issues on his agenda. And so we will be in a position to follow up on these kinds of issues. If I might take some time, just for a moment, from senior official No. 1, just to say: He will have essentially three meetings or three opportunities to meet with Sergeyev in the next several weeks. He will have the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Defense, which represents the first time that that body has met with the Russian defense minister since the Kosovo action began. He will have a bilateral with Sergeyev in Brussels, and then he will go to Moscow where he will have a series of meetings with Sergeyev, among others. And what our plan is to do, is to spend the time in Brussels, both in the PJC defense and in the bilateral, talking largely about issues that involve NATO and Russia -- the alliance and Russia -- to include revising and energizing the work program and the PJC, and also to discuss joint activities such as Kosovo and the broadening of ties between NATO and Russia. Once in Moscow, the focus will be more on bilateral issues, to include the summit follow-up, arms control in general, shared early warning, broadening defense cooperation between the various arms of the Russian armed forces and our own cooperative threat reduction. So it will be a wide and varied menu, and there will be plenty of opportunities to engage. Q: But as far as any sweeteners or new arguments or anything coming down the road -- Senior Defense Official: I think the secretary coming right after the summit will be in a position, as I said, to follow up on the summit, rather than to create new opportunities right after the presidents have met. Q: Is he planning to take any sort of a message to Sergeyev regarding Chechnya? Senior Defense Official: Chechnya will be discussed. Q: But what is he trying -- Senior Defense Official: You know our position on Chechnya. We think that the Russians have reacted with excessive force and that the situation needs to be brought back to civil authority as quickly as possible. Q: Well, do you see any softening in their position on ABM? Senior Defense Official: Softening in their position on ABM -- Q: (Off mike.) Senior Defense Official: That's a very broad subject. I think that the Russian government -- I think that there are significant elements in the Russian government which, over the past six to 12 months, have come to appreciate more our understanding of the threat, our analysis of the threat, and they are sympathetic to our view of the growing ballistic missile threat. I think that there are significant elements of the Russian government, including those in the armed forces, which understand that the limited national missile defense that we propose is not a threat to their strategic deterrent, nor will it be. Whether or not President Putin decides that this is the time to agree with President Clinton on a way forward is something that we're all going to have to wait and see. But even if they don't, this is a good opportunity for fruitful exchange between the secretary and his Russian counterpart on where we are, what our system is, why we continue to proceed in the direction we're going and to give full transparency on what we're about so that again, as we've been saying from the beginning, there will not be any surprises for the Russians in what this administration is planning to do in the area of missile defense. Q: Does it -- just your personal opinion -- the fact that China is making such a ruckus and Russia is being so uncooperative about national ballistic missile defense, does that show you that, in fact, this system that the United States is developing is a viable system in the eyes of the Russians and the Chinese? Senior Defense Official: You mean viable in the sense that they're afraid of it? Q: Well, are they afraid it's going to work? Senior Defense Official: Well, I don't need -- are senior officials allowed to have personal opinions? Staff: No. (Laughter.) Senior Defense Official: I would say to you that you've got to look at the whole scope and context of our relationships with the Chinese over decades and with the Russian government and its Soviet predecessor. The Soviet government was never going to agree to the deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing missiles to Europe, and it was never going to sign an arms control agreement that would do away with the SS-20. Indeed, it walked out of the arms control talks when the first ground-launched cruise and Pershings arrived in 1983. And then 18 months later, the negotiations resumed and two years later we had a treaty that eliminated the whole set of missiles. So one has to distinguish between rhetoric and hard-headed diplomacy when the time is right to cut certain deals. I think it's important, as I said, to go back to the notion that there are more Russians in influential positions who understand and appreciate where we are coming from on this issue than was the case a year ago. And we have that on the basis of high-level exchanges with the Russians. As far -- Q: What are their positions? Senior Defense Official: Who are the people? Q: Yes. Senior Defense Official: I'd rather not say, because it would violate the confidentiality of those discussions, although it's a good try. (Laughter.) With the Chinese, there are other things that are important to remember, and that is, we continually hear that if the United States goes ahead with this kind of a deployment, the Chinese are going to start building strategic forces again. The Chinese are building strategic forces. The Chinese today have a program where they have two intercontinental ballistic missiles under development, a submarine-launched ballistic missile under development, a submarine to launch that SLBM, and long-range cruise missiles. So we're not talking about an "if," but we're talking about the size of these kinds of modernization programs, which I will point out, began in the early 1990s and which have had some significant Russian assistance. They are not a reaction to NMD, they are ongoing. We believe that the Chinese program will produce a force that is not going to be threatened by a national missile defense. And it is our intention not to threaten the Chinese with a national missile defense, and we have some discussions, and senior defense official number one has been in those discussions with the Chinese about what NMD is intended to do and what it's not intended to do. But one has to always be careful of comments coming from various governments that are designed to influence our own opinions and public opinion. Q: You were late. You can't ask any questions. We saw you come in late. Senior Defense Official: Yes, sir? Q: You were talking about shared early warning. There are press reports that the Russian early warning system is in chaos and disarray, doesn't work very well, it's falling apart, and so forth. Are these -- what's your assessment of the Russian early warning system, since we're talking about shared early warning? Senior Defense Official: I don't think it is in chaos and disarray or falling apart. I mean, the Russian early warning system is clearly not as robust as the system that the Soviets had. There has clearly been deterioration in the system since the end of the Cold War, both the number of satellites, operational satellites on orbit, and in the radars that are operational. That said, I think that the Russian system does provide them with adequate warning today. We are not ourselves comfortable with the degree of warning, and that was evidenced by the fact that in September 1998, the president made a proposal to the Russians that we share early warning information. It's in everybody's interest that the Russian government have excellent warning information. We and the Russians have been negotiating on implementing that presidential offer. In fact, it may be a summit deliverable, in which case we would want to move out to implement it. If not, we will want to push negotiations faster so that we do get to implement it. The Russians do not seem to be living in fear of a warning blackout. The posture that their strategic forces have today is very clearly a peacetime posture. It is not the posture that you would attribute to a government that believes it's about to be struck and it would be struck by surprise because of weakness in its own warning systems. But nevertheless, we think that there should be better data, and that's why we are so interested in working on shared early warning. Q: I went out to Colorado Springs to see the facility there. Is that what's -- something like that, is that -- Senior Defense Official: That would be a prototype. But that relied on U.S. data and the Russians phoning home. What we would seek to create in Russia is a building into which data from both U.S. and Russian sensors flow. It would be the first-ever situation where U.S. and Russian officers were standing duty together 24 hours a day, seven days a week and they could compare data coming in from Russian sensors and U.S. sensors, and if there was an anomaly, if the sensors did not agree, then they could resolve that situation very quickly. So it will be a first in many ways. Q: It would be located -- Senior Defense Official: It would be located generally in the Moscow area. Q: For either one of you, what is your latest assessment and level of concern about the Russian BW program? And what might you be bringing up at this meeting to try and get more insight into what you do believe the Russians are doing? Senior Defense Official: BW is -- Senior Defense Official: This is senior official number two. Senior Defense Official: You can call either of us by our first names and you can still get the right -- (laughter) -- we did that purposely -- "senior." Russian BW is not on the agenda for these upcoming meetings. There are, of course, residual concerns in the U.S. intelligence community that some Russian offensive BW program survives. I don't think we can say anything conclusive as to whether that is true or not true. What is certainly true is that it was a very large program; there was a large program as late as 1992. Over the past 10 years, we have had increasing degrees of access to the civilian facilities and what's know as Biopreparat, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. With Americans on the ground in those facilities, the odds of there being secret biological warfare, offensive biological warfare programs at those facilities goes down dramatically to zero, I would say. We've had access to the so-called Bio Level Four containment facilities at those civilian Biopreparat complexes. We are working with the civilian Biopreparat people in many areas to develop transparent commercial pharmaceutical and other medical research at those facilities to provide continued employment for the scientists. So I cannot tell you, you know, with absolute assurance that there is not somewhere in Russia the remnant of an offensive BW program, but I can tell you that we have had tremendous success in gaining access to former offensive BW facilities and are fairly confident that those facilities are no longer involved in any offensive program. Q: So your assessment, if I understood your first statement, is that there is still what I think you called residual -- Senior Defense Official: No. I said that there was a concern in some quarters of the intelligence community that a residual program might exist, and that I could not provide you proof-positive that it did not exist. But it would be very hard to prove the absence of this program. We don't have full access, obviously, to all biological facilities in Russia, in particular to the military facilities that deal with biological research. Is there an offensive BW program there? I can't tell you that. Is intelligence compelling in any way? We don't comment on intelligence, but there is nothing that is particularly compelling. If there was, it would be a top-of-the-line issue. Q: Will terrorism be discussed? The last time the secretary was there he offered closer cooperation on -- Senior Defense Official: I would assume that would be discussed. Q: And specifically with regard to working together to -- against Osama bin-Laden. Senior Defense Official: This is an area in which we obviously we have a great deal of interest. We have a great deal of interest in working with the Russians on anti-terrorist activities, without regard to specific source. Q: They recently made some threats of air-strikes against Afghanistan. You know, what's the position here on that? Senior Defense Official: Go ask the Russian embassy. Q: Oh, so you're fine with it? Senior Defense Official: No, I didn't say I was fine with it. The Russians -- you said, the Russians have made some threats of airstrikes against another sovereign country. Yeah. Go get the Russian embassy to comment. International law is clear about what you can and can't do outside your borders. Q: So you would not favor that, is that what you're saying? Senior Defense Official: Jack, that would be a good assumption. (Laughter.) Q: I think that's what I was trying to get you to say. Senior Defense Official: I said it. Staff: Thank you very much. (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) Return to the Washington File