26 April 2000

Excerpts on Arms Control: State Department Noon Briefing

State Department Spokesman Jamie Rubin briefed.

Following are excerpts from the State Department transcript:

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
Wednesday, April 26, 2000
Briefer: James P. Rubin, Spokesman
(NOTE: Final Daily Press Briefing with Spokesman Rubin) .

Q: On missile defense?

Rubin: Please.

Q: Okay. Jesse Helms gave quite a speech on the floor of the Senate just an hour or so ago. He said he would basically entertain no amendments to the ABM Treaty for the duration of the Clinton Administration. In view of that, what does that do for prospects of initiating some sort of missile defense since you want changes in the ABM treaty before then?

Rubin: Right. Well, Secretary Albright is right now meeting with Foreign Minister Ivanov and his team. And she has a full team of officials from the State Department, the Treasury Department and the Defense Department. And they are working on this very question. Indeed, arms control is the centerpiece of the discussions that she's having here over the next couple of days. There will be a press conference with Foreign Minister Ivanov tomorrow afternoon.

Our approach in these discussions with Foreign Minister Ivanov is to make clear our determination to adjust the ABM Treaty because the world has changed. The world of 1972 of the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed, and now the real dangers that we face are from the third countries -- the North Koreas, the Irans and others.

We've been making this case to the Russians. During the course of the next two days, I expect her to make the case very clearly that, in talking about changes to the ABM Treaty, three D's apply. The bureaucrats have come up with the three D's, and they are: number one, we're not talking about destroying the ABM Treaty; number two, we are not talking about the decoupling of offense and defense but, rather, both the offensive side and the defensive side; and that is, strategic arms cuts and adjusting the ABM Treaty need to move in parallel with the same level of effort and the same results; and, thirdly, that there is no chance of deferral. Clearly, the Russians would like to avoid this issue. They've made that quite clear and they would like the issue deferred. And Secretary Albright is making clear that deferral is not an option.

So this issue is being joined between the United States and Russians on our view of what's best for the United States of America, and that is to have a treaty that allows us to reduce our strategic forces with the Russians, get deeper cuts than we have now, reduce the nuclear danger that way; but, at the same time, allow a limited national missile defense that would allow us to defend against a small number of North Korean or Iranian missile warheads.

That is, in our view, the best and most secure way to defend the American people while advancing our security. If the Russians can agree to that, we will be making a very strong and powerful case that this is the course of wisdom for the United States. And it is not a surprise to us that there are senators who wish the ABM Treaty would go away. They've been trying to do that for quite some time. That's not new. And so what we will do is make the most persuasive case that we can, if we get this amendment, that this is the best way to defend the United States while advancing American security, and we hope that all senators put the national interest over any potential ideological opposition to a treaty from 30 years ago.

Q: Is the plan to go to Congress to amend the treaty irrespective of Russia's position? And how can you --

Rubin: No, no, we wouldn't go to Congress to amend a treaty unless we had agreed to an amendment with the Russians.

Q: Excuse me, I spoke too rapidly. There are things you have to go to Congress with regarding the ABM, the succession -- the accession of Russia, Ukraine, et cetera, to the Treaty, for instance.

Rubin: That's a separate protocol, yes.

Q: I'm asking -- the question before you is: What about Senator Helms' rather clear warning? Are you still willing to risk --

Rubin: Well, there's nothing new about Senator Helms' view that he doesn't want to see the Senate approve anything that could strengthen the ABM Treaty. We think there are two protocols that could strengthen the ABM Treaty. We're going to consult with the Senate about the best way to proceed; in the meantime, proceed apace with the Russians in this intensive way over the next couple of days, leading to a summit in June with President Clinton and then President Putin -- because he's now President-Elect but by then he'll be then President Putin -- and work on that then.

If we are able in the course of that do arrange for this amendment to be approved, then we would consult with the Senate on that, too. I'm not prepared to speculate on what time we would submit these protocols or any potential amendments we negotiate with the Russians to the Senate.

Q: When you speak of consulting with the Senate, do you mean specifically Senator Helms as well as --

Rubin: Well, of course. He's the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. His views are obviously well known to us, but we would obviously consult with him.

Q: So you're not taking no for an answer?

Rubin: Well, Senator Helms is not the entire Senate. He's an important senator and, we have -- in the past, treaties have been approved that he voted against and that he opposed.

Q: Is it the understanding of the United States -- have you been sitting in on the discussions with Mr. Ivanov -- that there will be no further reductions on the part of the Russians of their nuclear stockpiles as long as there is some chance that the ABM Treaty would be modified in this country; is that correct?

Rubin: That's not the Russian position. The Russian position, as stated by President-Elect Putin is that, if the ABM Treaty is eliminated by American action, they will consider themselves no longer bound by the START II and the START I Treaty. But that's not a problem for us because we're not interested in destroying the ABM Treaty. That's one of the D's that we're not interested in. We're interested in amending it. If we succeed in amending it, then this will not be a problem.

Q: You're talking about the complete destruction of --

Rubin: They've said if the ABM Treaty becomes null and void, their support for these other agreements will become null and void.

(Discussion of Elian Gonzales Case and US Position on Growing Conservative Backlash Against Majlis Elections omitted.)

Q: Can we go back to the ABM issue?

Rubin: Oh, good. I like that best.

Q: I knew you'd be delighted. When the Secretary was in Moscow, she talked about a certain flexibility on the part of then-Acting President Putin.

Rubin: Right.

Q: Is that still the case? Because what he said in New York and what he said here has been slightly contradictory.

Rubin: Right. What we thought was interesting was the extent to which -- I'll fix that in a second. Thanks.

What we were interested in and intrigued by was the fact that Acting President Putin, who has since become President-Elect Putin and will soon be President Putin and will be then-President Putin, indicated an expression of understanding for the new threats that exist in the world and offered to work with us on those new threats, both on assessing what they are and on figuring out ways to deal with them, while maintaining the fundamental principles of the ABM treaty.

Well, that's our position. We want to maintain the ABM Treaty, but we want to make an amendment to deal with one of these new threats. In Foreign Minister Ivanov's comments in New York and in his public statements in one of our nation's major newspapers, he has indicated that there are new threats and he has proposed the way to deal with them is through anti-tactical ballistic missile cooperation, below the threshold of the ABM Treaty.

And we think that's fine and that's a necessary area to work on, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, but it's insufficient. So it's necessary but insufficient to work on ATBM and I want to therefore say that we still believe that it is possible that as we and the Russians cooperate and work together in the coming days, that they will see the wisdom of proceeding down the course that we've set forth. And we've heard nothing since that meeting the Secretary had with Acting President Putin that indicates that he has moved backwards from that position that we regarded as constructive.

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