16 March 2000

Excerpts:

Energy Secretary Richardson on Test Ban Treaty, Regional Proliferation

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson repeated the Clinton administration's call for swift Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in a speech March 16 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"It is not a question of whether we will ratify, but when," Richardson said. "Let's get it done."

The secretary also called upon Congress to recognize the "critical importance" of cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia under a $100 million Long- Term Nonproliferation program proposed by the administration.

But he stressed that major investments in collaborative research and development under the program would not proceed until concerns about "certain nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran" are resolved.

Following are excerpts from Richardson's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

President Clinton has said time and again that our nation faces no greater threat than the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While we have torn down the iron curtain that once stretched from Stettin to Trieste, corners of the world's stage remain in shadows. One need only look to the Balkans to understand that. One need only look at the situation in South Asia to understand that.

Have we made progress? For more than 40 years, the United States and Russia engaged in a circular test of resolve. We conducted hundreds of nuclear tests, produced hundreds of tons of fissile material, and put thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. Thankfully, this is no more.

The Department of Energy plays a central role in America's upholding this pledge to peace. We are the guardian of America's nuclear deterrent. Our Stockpile Stewardship Program is working today to confirm the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile without underground testing. Three annual certifications -- and a soon-to-be-completed fourth -- are proof of its enduring success.

This Administration's goal on nuclear testing is clear: we support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). I know that you have already heard from General Shalikashvili, the President's appointed representative to lead a CTBT ratification Task Force. I plan to work closely with the General to get this done.

Nationwide polls show that 80 percent of Americans agree that the time is now for a global ban on nuclear testing. It is not a question of whether we will ratify, but when. Let's get it done.

Without the CTBT, we lose one of our best tools for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and restraining their development. Failure to ratify also erodes our ability to lead in nonproliferation matters. We saw what happened when the Senate failed to ratify last year. Other nations questioned our leadership, and doubted our commitment. That's not what America stands for.

What we do stand for is a commitment to nuclear reductions and the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. With that goal in mind, we continue paving the way for deeper, irreversible, and more secure reductions along with our Russian partner. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has dismantled over 13,000 nuclear weapons, eliminated over a dozen types of nuclear warheads, and drastically drawn-down the nuclear weapons infrastructure.

We are ahead of schedule to reduce nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles under START I and, having ratified START II, we hope to move quickly to a START III agreement -- one that will bring our Stockpile down 80 percent from its Cold War peak. Russia, too, is making solid progress reducing its nuclear stockpile.

We have also removed more than 200 tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from the United States military stockpile. Russia has offered similar pledges for its own surplus materials, and we're very close to completing a bilateral agreement with Russia to dispose of 68 metric tons of U.S. and Russian military plutonium. And we're accelerating negotiations with Russia and the IAEA to complete the Trilateral Initiative, which would allow eventual international monitoring of excess military materials.

The United States' record is evidence that our commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is as solid as ever. The Treaty remains a firm, strategic pillar in the foundation of our national security.

Partnership for Nonproliferation

President Clinton forged one of the strongest pillars in our national security when he launched the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative -- designed to address the new proliferation challenges that arose with the Soviet Union's fall.

The Department of Energy plays a central role in these threat reduction activities. In Russia, our Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program has helped improve the physical security of 450 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- about 70 percent of the fissile material at highest risk for diversion or theft.

Our Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program is also helping us secure weapons of mass destruction expertise, and curb the specter of "brain drain." Since 1994, more than 6,000 weapons scientists in Russia and the Newly Independent States have been supported through 400 non-military projects. And our Nuclear Cities Initiative is working to create jobs for nuclear workers facing unemployment as facilities in the Russian complex are consolidated or eliminated.

But while our "heart is in the work," we need to ensure that enough of our dollars are in it, too.

To fill this need, the Administration is proposing to Congress a new, $100 million Long-Term Nonproliferation Program for Russia. I hope that Congress recognizes the program's critical importance. In testimony before the House and Senate over the past weeks, I have seen promising signs.

The plan looks to plug gaps in managing fissile material from various stages in the fuel cycle. We'd like to work with Russia in constructing a new, dry-storage facility for their nuclear power plant spent fuel to prevent the further accumulation of separated civil plutonium.

We'd also conduct joint research into modern nuclear reactor technologies and fuels, to devise more proliferation-resistant systems. And we would cooperate to examine the complicated questions relating to the geologic disposal of spent fuel and nuclear wastes.

The plan also looks to expand our cooperative work with the Russian Navy to secure their stocks of nuclear fuel, and to accelerate efforts to consolidate and convert more and more highly enriched uranium to a form not usable in nuclear bombs.

One important note, we continue to have concerns about certain nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran. Quite simply, major investments in collaborative R&D under this plan would not go forward until those concerns are resolved.

Addressing Regional Proliferation

And what of the burdens we fare elsewhere? Shadows remain in regions of instability and proliferation concern -- from South Asia, to the Middle East and East Asia. While the Cold War is over, others may look to sow a new nuclear harvest of their own.

We must continue to seek lasting solutions that address the underlying causes of conflict; that seek out incentives to reward good behavior and help nations form cooperation; and that build-up national communities of arms control and nonproliferation specialists. As a technical agency with long experience in arms control and nonproliferation, the Department of Energy makes a unique contribution to President Clinton's regional diplomatic initiatives.

In North Korea, we are securing 8,000 plutonium-bearing spent fuel rods in support of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Our Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Lab is educating foreign officials and experts on technical applications for monitoring agreements -- whether it's a demilitarized zone or a shared watershed.

And we're promoting confidence-building steps to ease tensions in the Middle East, and encourage India and Pakistan to advance initiatives like the CTBT and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. During his trip, President Clinton will convey the message that a nuclear build-up in South Asia is not only dangerous to those nations, but also sets an extraordinarily harmful precedent for others. It is also out of step with so much of the work we do -- that I have discussed here tonight.

Now, India and Pakistan are -- of course -- sovereign nations, and can decide their own national security needs. But we happen to believe that nuclear weapons are not the answer, that their security is much more closely tied to economic and social development. There are so many opportunities for success. On my trips abroad, I have made it a special point of emphasis with India, Egypt, Israel and others to promote technical dialogues and urge regional interdependence -- particularly in the area of energy cooperation. These nations are brimming with talent, including staggering gifts in high technology.

We are eager to re-engage with India in many areas -- but how far we are able to go depends on progress addressing our nonproliferation concerns. We obviously need to engage India on this issue. We are ready to do so, and the President will make this clear.

Still, some may look at what I have said and ask: What is our policy? I say it is the dismantling of weapons, the securing of materials used to build arms, the diminishing of nuclear peril around the world, and the allying of former-foes in friendships for the ages. That is our policy.

Some may look at what I have said and still ask: What is our aim? In one word: Peace. That is our aim. Now, I ask you: How can we not achieve that? After all -- like the Titan of Pittsburgh himself -- our heart is in the work.

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)