15 February 2000

Transcript: Holum on Arms Control, Non-proliferation

Arms control remains central to America's national security interests and to the international security environment, and the United States will continue to take a leadership role in non-proliferation efforts, according to President Clinton's Senior Advisor for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Security Affairs, John Holum.

Arms control is "far preferable to building more offensive weapons and greater defenses. It is much less costly, it is much more reliable," he said February 15 during a Department of State WorldNet interactive television program between Washington and Paris.

"Despite the setback last October when the Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty [CTBT], the United States remains committed to a leadership role in arms control and non-proliferation efforts. We won't let up one single bit in those efforts."

The five-year review conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will begin in April in New York, and Holum said the conference presents both a great challenge and opportunity.

"There is likely to be a great deal of debate on the pace of disarmament and on the effectiveness of the non-proliferation norm," he said. "But we have an obligation and an opportunity, I think, to make this a successful conference, where countries will come away feeling that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is indispensable to their security; that it is not a favor to the nuclear weapon states but rather a security instrument for all of its members because it gives them the assurance that their neighbors aren't acquiring nuclear weapons; and the confidence through International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring that that commitment is being kept."

A member of the television audience in Paris asked Holum about proposed U.S. changes in its Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia to allow for a national missile defense system against threats from rogue states. Holum emphasized that the system would have "a very limited capability," using only the same number of interceptors already authorized under the treaty.

"The treaty doesn't prohibit missile defenses -- it limits them to a hundred interceptors defending a region. What we are proposing is a system that has a hundred interceptors. The only difference is that it have a national defense capability."

Holum said this would represent a "minor shift" in the ABM Treaty, "and further future efforts will depend on whether and how the threat evolves, or whether we are capable of limiting it through negotiations."

One of the criteria for deploying a national missile defense system, he said, is the overall security environment, "and clearly our relationships and the views of our NATO allies play an important part of that." This is why the United States believes it is extremely important to engage in "detailed discussions" with its European colleagues on both the substance of the proposed changes and on the negotiating process with Russia.

Asked if this course might cause a split in NATO, Holum said he didn't think it should and he hoped it wouldn't. One thing that would ease "a lot of the concerns we have heard from our allies is if this agreement can be negotiated with Russia.... It won't take away all the concerns, obviously, but it will take away most of the concerns from people who see this as an abandonment of the historic efforts towards arms control," he said.

In explaining America's motivation to amend the ABM Treaty, Holum noted that it was negotiated almost 30 years ago when the strategic environment was "dramatically different."

"No one could envision that there would be the danger of developments of ICBM capabilities and weapons of mass destruction capabilities in third countries, additional countries, that might not be affected by traditional rules of deterrence," he said. "So we need to continuously look at the changing security environment."

Regarding renewed efforts to win Senate ratification of the CTBT, Holum said that, as a practical matter, it is unlikely the Senate will reconsider it during the remainder of President Clinton's term in office. What the Clinton Administration hopes to do, he said, "is to be prepared in case the opportunity [of another Senate vote] presents itself, and at a minimum to hand off the treaty to the next administration in much better shape for a possible ratification effort."

Holum also discussed non-proliferation issues as they affect South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East.

Following is a transcript of the WorldNet program:

WorldNet "Dialogue"
U.S. Department of State
Office of Broadcast Services
Washington, D.C.
GUEST: John Holum, President's Senior Advisor
for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Security Affairs

TOPIC: U.S. POLICY ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
POST: Paris
HOST: Nathan Roberts
DATE: February 15, 2000
TIME: 09:00 - 10:00 EST

MR. ROBERTS: Good afternoon, and welcome to this special edition of WorldNet's "Dialogue." I am your host, Nathan Roberts.

In October, as you know, the United States failed to approve the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT, and in Europe and elsewhere the Senate's actions shocked many of the United States' closest friends and allies. But despite this setback, top U.S. officials have emphasized that America remains strongly committed to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

(Begin videotape.)

ANNOUNCER: In 1996, President Bill Clinton became the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Following the Senate vote, he vowed that efforts to bring the CTBT into force will continue:

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Today I say again on behalf of the United States we will continue the policy we have maintained since 1992 of not conducting nuclear tests. I call on Russia, China, Britain, France, and all other countries to continue to refrain from testing. I call on nations that have not done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and I will continue to do all I can to make that case to the Senate. When all is said and done, I have no doubt that the United States will ratify this treaty.

ANNOUNCER: Meanwhile, the United States is pressing ahead on all fronts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. A leading means is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, and its system of strengthened safeguards.

In keeping with their disarmament obligations under the NPT, the United States and Russia have made massive reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Since 1988, America alone has dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear warheads. And with both countries ahead of schedule in their START II reductions, U.S. and Russian officials have begun to discuss a START III treaty, which would cut both countries' strategic arsenals even more deeply, to 80 percent below their Cold War peaks.

But the path to further reductions is hardly straightforward. Russia, China, and even some of America's allies in Europe and elsewhere, have expressed concern that U.S. missile defense plans will upset the strategic balance and break the momentum of nuclear disarmament. And, more broadly, developments around the world show that the global non-proliferation consensus is in constant need of tending. These include: Saddam Hussein's continued defiance of United Nations weapons inspectors; nuclear tests on both sides of a disputed border in South Asia; serious questions about North Korea's military intentions; and concerns about the vulnerability of civilian populations to chemical or biological attacks.

Now with the growing availability of mass weapons and missile technology, some in the international community question whether the United States continues to value international arms control arrangement, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty coming up for review in April as a key first line of defense.

(End videotape.)

MR. ROBERTS: We are most fortunate to have with us today a senior government official who has been at the center of these issues since early in President Clinton's first term, John D. Holum, the administration's senior advisor for arms control, non-proliferation and security affairs. Previously Mr. Holum was the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. And Mr. Holum, welcome to WorldNet's "Dialogue." We are delighted you could be with us this afternoon. I know you have some brief opening remarks before we get to the questions.

MR. HOLUM: Thank you. I am very happy to be here, and with our audience in Paris, and also viewers in Islamabad.

I would like to just make three quick points before we begin with the questions.

The first is that arms control remains central to our national security interests and to the international security environment. It's far preferable to building more offensive weapons and greater defenses. It is much less costly, it is much more reliable. So it's central to our thinking in international security.

The second point is, as the film underscored, despite the setback last October when the Senate failed to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the United States remains committed to a leadership role in arms control and non-proliferation efforts. We won't let up one single bit in those efforts.

And the third point is that as part of those efforts, we and our friends in France and elsewhere around the world have a great challenge and opportunity coming up in April -- just a couple of months from now -- when the NPT, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is up for its five-year review.

There is likely to be a great deal of debate on the pace of disarmament and on the effectiveness of the non-proliferation norm. But we have an obligation and an opportunity, I think, to make this a successful conference, where countries will come away feeling that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is indispensable to their security; that it is not a favor to the nuclear weapon states but rather a security instrument for all of its members because it gives them the assurance that their neighbors aren't acquiring nuclear weapons; and the confidence through International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring that that commitment is being kept. So the NPT is an important focus as we move toward the April conference.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, thank you very much for those comments, Mr. Holum.

Now I would like to welcome our participants in Paris for the interactive portion of this broadcast, as well as the rest of our viewing audience. So we'll begin. Please go ahead, Paris, with your first question.

Q: Good afternoon, Mr. Holum. It's -- (inaudible). You spoke earlier of President Clinton's determination to get the treaty which the Senate failed to ratify in October. But what assurances can you give us that it is at all likely?

MR. HOLUM: Well, I can't give you an absolute guarantee. The Senate, as you know, voted the treaty down, and there is a lot of resistance to the treaty. But I'd underscore several points. One is that we have undertaken, through the formation of a high level task force, with an important role for General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to engage with the Senate in a more detailed review of the issues that arose during that brief debate last October.

This treaty was more than two years in negotiating. It was carefully reviewed before being sent to the Hill for review. Then it was debated for a matter of only two weeks. That's clearly not enough to consider something as important as this.

So we've heard signals from quite a number of senators that they would like to understand it better, have a better focus on the issues that came up on stockpile stewardship, on verifiability.

I'd underscore in addition to that that the United States remains committed to the no-testing regime. So while we continue to work on ratification in the United States, the president has made clear we will continue the moratorium that we began in 1992, that we have no plans to test; and that we'll encourage other countries to ratify, so the treaty can come into force soon. Until we have 43 other ratifications, the United States' failure to ratify won't be holding up entry into force of the treaty, because it requires 44 specified countries. But it is still unfortunate in my view that the United States has not thus far been able to be out in front leading that effort, as we'd prefer, but rather trailing behind.

I might say in this context that it's an important step that France has ratified the treaty, and we hope we can catch up.

Q: (Inaudible) -- with Le Monde. How do you address the opposition of most of the Europeans to the U.S. project of the missile defense system? They consider it destabilizing. They don't feel threatened by rogue states. They feel there will be sort of an agreement between the Russians and the Americans on their back. How do you address this skepticism or hostility of the Europeans towards the U.S. missile defense project?

MR. HOLUM: Well, let me emphasize two points: one, process; and the other substance. On process, we think it's extremely important to engage in detailed discussions with our European colleagues on these plans as we go forward, both on the substance and on our negotiating process with the Russians. After the president made his decision, I came to Paris immediately after stopping in Moscow to explain the state of play there. I came to Paris, as well as to several other NATO countries, to outline where we were. And we are continuing those discussions, both bilaterally and through the NATO headquarters in Brussels. Each time we have a negotiation or a discussion part of our team stops in Brussels. And we will continue that process.

One of the criteria for deploying the system is the overall security environment. And clearly our relationships and the views of our NATO allies play an important part of that.

Now, on substance, one of the points I'd stress is that we are proposing to adjust the treaty in a very limited way, only sufficient to develop a national missile defense capable against a few tens of unsophisticated warheads from a country like North Korea. If Russia and the United States both were to develop this kind of system, which is unlikely, because the Russians don't seem to have any plans to do so, that would have no interference with the deterrent forces of our European allies, France and the U.K., who have nuclear capability. So we are working on a very limited adjustment.

So it's overblown, I think, to suggest that what we are proposing to do here will dramatically upset the nuclear balance or undercut the basic principles of nuclear disarmament that we have been pursuing for the last 20 or 30 years.

Q: And you do not think it will drive a wedge in NATO or split in NATO?

MR. HOLUM: Well, I certainly hope it won't. And I don't think it should. Remember that the United States here is dealing with a unique risk, for the near term at least. The intelligence estimates that we have shared with our allies point to a danger over the next five or six years that North Korea would develop an ICBM capability, an inter-continental ballistic missile capability, that could threaten parts of the United States. Now, that same threat, that same danger, probably doesn't apply in the case of Europe, because the United States has a unique security relationship with South Korea.

And our concern here -- it may be useful to amplify on it a little bit -- is not that we expect a bolt out of the blue or an attack from North Korea, but rather an attempt to use this capability for coercion in for example preventing the United States from coming to the assistance of South Korea, should they be threatened with attack. So it undercuts our alliance relationship potentially in that region. Now, that is not something that in the near term endangers Europe, but it does endanger our alliance relationships in Asia.

Should the threat in the Middle East develop, that obviously will have some bearing on Europe, and something we need to continue to discuss. But the basic question it seems to me on decoupling and division is to turn the question around and ask would the United States be a better ally if it is threatened with nuclear capabilities from North Korea? If it remains vulnerable to those capabilities, and it seems to me that the United States is a better ally to the extent it feels more secure, more able to carry out its alliance commitments.

Q: (Inaudible) -- again from Agence France Presse. Can I ask you clarify the statement or commitment or plans to extend the missile shield to the allies of East Asia, Taiwan and Japan? And to answer the anxieties that have been expressed here at the official level about how that might unleash a new arms race with Beijing -- (off mike).

MR. HOLUM: I missed the first part of the question. Did you talk about extending the shield to allies in Asia or allies in Europe?

Q: In Asia.

MR. HOLUM: Yeah, the state of play there -- and we are now talking about theater missile defenses rather than national missile defenses -- and we haven't ruled out the possibility of sharing theater capabilities in Asia. But this is further off than national missile defense decisions. The theater capabilities are unlikely to be available until around 2007.

The only decision that has been made so far, or the policy direction, is that we plan to deploy TMD, theater missile defense, to protect U.S. forces stationed in the region. Now, as far as protecting others, we are jointly engaged in research with Japan, who has expressed some interest. South Korea has not expressed interest in theater missile defense, believing it's excessively costly, and is focusing on air defenses. Taiwan has expressed some interest. And we haven't ruled that out, but neither have we ruled it in. It's a matter for continued discussion. It's no secret, as you are well aware, that China is adamantly opposed to any deployment of theater missile defenses on Taiwan. And obviously we need to discuss this issue with China as it evolves.

One point that we make continuously in those discussions is that Taiwan's interest in theater missile defense is a direct result of China's deployments of missiles offshore or threatening Taiwan's territory. So what we are hopeful is that there can be restraint, a regime of restraint that would make this unnecessary. But as of now it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions.

Q: I'll go back to the substance. There is an argument here in Paris, as well as other places in Europe, that if you build even a small missile defense system it is an incentive for other states -- like Pakistan or India or North Korea -- to develop more missiles so that they are capable to defeat your missile defenses, so that actually to build a missile defense system is an incentive for proliferation from states which would proliferate. How do you answer that argument?

MR. HOLUM: Well, first of all, I would make the point that our missile defense -- we don't regard it as oriented against countries like India or Pakistan, and don't anticipate a threat to the United States from those countries. This has a limited -- at least as conceived -- has a limited life in the sense that it's entirely possible over a period of time that a country like North Korea would develop either large enough numbers of missiles or sufficiently sophisticated penetration aids to defeat the system. Whether they'll do that is a matter of conjecture. You could argue, as you have, that building a defense encourages them to do that.

On the other hand, if you have a system that is capable against a few tens of missiles, it sends the signal to North Korea that anything they invest in the first few tens of missiles is wasted, that before they have any military effectiveness or diplomatic effectiveness they have to go considerably beyond where they now seem to be headed, out of a very impoverished economy. So it could work, as you say, to cause them to build more and more sophisticated weapons. On the other hand, it could convince them that this process isn't worth the cost and the effort and cause them to negotiate a settlement to avoid missile capabilities.

Let me emphasize in that context -- I am sure you are aware of this -- that under the guidance of former Defense Secretary Bill Perry and Ambassador Wendy Sherman, the counselor in the State Department, we have been engaged in a very active effort to prevent these developments in North Korea, and obviously that could have an impact as well on the long-term picture.

Q: My name is Julian Lidley French (ph) from WEU Security Studies in Paris. First is a point really -- and I really liked your response to it, but we are talking here about the future, talking here about a mixture of missile defense and arms control. And my concern is that given the advances in technology of the British and French system in the last 10 years -- (inaudible) -- been able to see how START III cannot involve U.K. and French forces and so forth, because as the build-down goes on in START I and START II, their relative importance decreases. Now, given that allies do oppose ballistic missile defense, are you not, A, in danger of weakening your allies' deterrent capability; and, B, preventing further progress on arms control?

MR. HOLUM: I don't think so. But it depends on where this all evolves over the long term. Remember -- and I emphasize again that this is a very limited capability with only the same number of interceptors that are already authorized under the ABM Treaty. Remember that the treaty doesn't prohibit missile defenses -- it limits them to a hundred interceptors defending a region. What we are proposing is a system that has a hundred interceptors. The only difference is that it have a national defense capability. So this is a minor shift in the treaty. And further future efforts will depend on whether and how the threat evolves, or whether we are capable of limiting it through negotiations.

Now, as to START III -- I think beyond START III there is a realistic possibility that strategic arms reduction talks and the process will gradually involve allied forces. It's too little understood I think that in fact through their own actions our allies are already reducing their strategic arsenals. France for example has eliminated its intermediate-range missile capabilities and is relying on its submarine forces. The U.K. has also taken significant steps downward unilaterally in strategic arsenals. Given the degree of sophistication of France and the U.K.'s missile capabilities, even at reduced numbers, this system would not be capable against them if the Russians elected to follow suit and build their own system. So, again, we are talking about a very limited step -- not a dramatic step to throw out the entire theory of the ABM Treaty in the offense-defense trade-off.

Q: Thank you for that answer. If I could just follow up that answer specifically on an issue of the ABM Treaty. This issue of a slight adjustment -- as I understand it, Article 2 and Article 6 refer to exotic technologies -- (inaudible) -- very clear about the -- (inaudible) -- further development of exotic defense. How in your opinion is what is currently going on outside of the laboratory actually not affect the ABM Treaty fairly fundamentally?

MR. HOLUM: You mean in terms of the testing that is underway on theater missile defense and the national missile defense tests?

Q: That area.

MR. HOLUM: We have been very scrupulous in making sure that the kind of both laboratory research and physical testing in the field for both theater and national missile defenses are in compliance with the limits of the treaty. The treaty doesn't prevent the development of national missile defenses short of the first steps towards deployment. What we are proposing to do in the context of the treaty is a very limited set of amendments that would essentially say -- or adjustments to the prohibitions of the treaty -- that would essentially say you can go this far and no further. You can take the 100 interceptors you are already authorized -- obviously those interceptors could be tested and deployed under the treaty -- you can take those interceptors and put them at a site where they would have a capability of defending nationally. That would take 100 interceptors, a new ABM radar at Shemnya (ph) in Alaska, and five upgrades to existing early-warning radar. So it's a very modest set of proposals.

I think one thing that would, I am quite confident, would solve a lot of the concerns we have heard from our allies is if this agreement can be negotiated with Russia. If we can have this -- it won't take away all the concerns, obviously, but it will take away most of the concerns from people who see this as an abandonment of the historic efforts towards arms control.

Q: Precisely regarding the ABM Treaty, I would like to ask you a very political question, maybe polemic. I read in the American press that it is such a priority for the United States now to have these changes in the treaty that it explains that the U.S. government had such a soft position or reaction regarding to the war in Chechnya, so as not to antagonize the Russians, because in exchange you would like to get this change in the ABM Treaty.

MR. HOLUM: I wouldn't place any -- I don't know where that appeared, but I wouldn't place any credence in it. You'll recall that when Secretary Albright was in Moscow at the end of last month she was very outspoken, both publicly and in her meeting with Acting President Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov about our strong objections to the approach the Russians are taking in Chechnya. So I don't think we have down-pedaled that area of disagreement at all.

I think one of the things that we tried very hard to do, and that it's important to do, is to pursue multiple lines of engagement at once. We are going to clearly have areas of continued disagreement with the Russian Federation, but that shouldn't prevent us from being able to cooperate where our interests coincide.

And the question that Russia will need to face -- and we have also emphasized with Russia as we approached this decision is, is it a good idea to force President Clinton to choose between the ABM Treaty in its entirety and proceeding with a deployment that is widely regarded on a bipartisan basis in the United States as necessary to protect our security. We want to preserve the benefits of the ABM Treaty. So does Russia. And I think we should be able to engage on that, even as we maintain a rather rigorous disagreement that I know is shared by the European Union and many others around the world.

Q: Julian Lidley French (ph) from the Western European Union Institute again. I have a question for the future, I might. You just talked about the European Union. There are many developments taking place inside the EU -- a common European security policy is part of that. These have long-term implications. And one of the issues that we Europeans are now starting to address is the role of nuclear forces in policy. What is the United States' position on the prospect of a role for Anglo-French nuclear forces as part of the European defense policy?

MR. HOLUM: Well, the -- I think the NATO collectively has addressed this issue in 1990 and 1991 in visiting NATO's strategic concept. And at that time, and then more recently at the NATO summit last year, we made clear that nuclear weapons, whoever they belong to, have a very limited role in NATO's strategic concept. They are truly weapons of last resort. Their role has shrunk. As you know, United States' tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have been dramatically reduced, and the weapons that have come out, by and large both in terms of delivery systems and actual warheads, been eliminated.

Q: This is -- (inaudible) -- from Agence France Press. Back to the substance of non-proliferation and what could be done to further that goal, and how that ties up with America's plans for a missile defense. I mean, it does seem to me that the philosophy behind the -- (inaudible) -- has been that the nuclear powers are a club and they will act together. Large and small have the same -- (off mike) -- the United States adopts to enter a separate system, its own separate defense, then that kind of pulls the carpet out from under the general -- (off mike) non-proliferation, and therefore it is in a sense, as we go forward an incentive to other states to regard what has been so far achieved. That's certainly an argument put forward here.

MR. HOLUM: Well, first of all, we collaborate with the P-5 nuclear weapons states in a variety of ways and in a variety of fora; for example, in the Conference on Disarmament there was a great deal of close work together in agreeing on the test ban. But we also have different fora where we work not in concert, entirely in concert, with each other. For example, up until now, as was referred to earlier, the strategic arms reduction process has been a bilateral one, aimed at getting the U.S. and former Soviet Russian forces down to levels where it made some sense to broaden the talks to include the other three nuclear weapon states. This has been a matter of keeping each other informed, but not a matter of negotiating a common position.

We work together -- and I want to bring us back briefly to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, because we have been working very hard to have a common view among the P-5 on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its benefits, as well as our pace of fulfillment of commitments under Article 6 to pursue the disarmament process. So this is a mixed picture.

Now, as to the ABM Treaty, it is a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia. The motivation for adjusting the treaty -- and I'd emphasize the decision to proceed with deployment has not yet been made -- but the motivation for adjusting the treaty was something that was not foreseen when the treaty was negotiated in 1972. At that time the strategic environment was dramatically different. No one could envision that there would be the danger of developments of ICBM capabilities and weapons of mass destruction capabilities in third countries, additional countries, that might not be affected by traditional rules of deterrence. So we need to continuously look at the changing security environment. This is something that NATO has done routinely, that we have done among the P-5 routinely.

But the United States needs to also deal, as I mentioned earlier, with its distinct security relationships, such as that with South Korea. We are asking for understanding, we are asking for support, and we are certainly being entirely transparent in what our plans are. But I don't think that this is a common decision as opposed to a common interest and concern.

Q: (Off mike.) Just a point to follow up your last comment. Certainly in Europe, and I think it would go for allies around the world, in what is a robust relationship -- I spent my life for example in capitals and in Brussels in particular, and there was a need for an improved PR campaign I would say on behalf of the U.S. to carry allies with it. Yes, there are direct bilateral links; yes, there are talking going on at a high level. But either at the senior political level there is an ignorance about what the United States is trying to achieve, and I believe could damage the alliance in the longer term. I think it's very important that we face up to that as allies. And I would call upon the United States to redouble its efforts to convey exactly the objectives, the treaty-borne objectives, and the strengthening of the alliance that the end result can achieve.

MR. HOLUM: I think that's a fair point, and I accept the responsibility for me and others to be more publicly visible as well as in our bilateral and alliance-wide discussions. Remember that President Clinton and his administration resisted the idea of national missile defense throughout his administration -- took a lot of political heat for it. It's been a political issue in the 1996 and in other campaigns. So the president comes to this reluctantly.

The way U.S. thinking evolved was last year, 1999, there was a new intelligence estimate that dramatically accelerated the timetable by which the threat of ICBM and WMD capabilities from North Korea and then potentially Iran was going to arrive. It used to say 10 or 15 years; now it says basically within the next few years. They accomplished that in one sense by what I think is a logical analytical change, and that is to say you don't decide that the threat is there only when there is a fielded force of a number of missiles and a trained set of operators. The danger actually occurs when there is a single missile that is capable of carrying a WMD warhead to the United States. We too often are mirror-imaging our own approach, and saying we wouldn't deploy anything until it was fully tested, and we had the forces fully trained. But this intelligence estimate I think logically said, look, the capability of coercion and of actually wiping out a U.S. city happens when there is one ICBM that can get there, and it doesn't have to be tested as thoroughly as we might do in our own program.

So once that new threat assessment arrived the president pursued the kind of response that would be specifically tailored to that threat. There are some who say let's abandon the entire treaty -- it's outmoded, negotiated almost 30 years ago, it doesn't fit at all, and why can't we defend America? The president has fully recognized the importance of the treaty to strategic stability. We want to keep the treaty. We want to continue the arms reduction process. And he still hasn't made a decision as to whether to proceed with this first phase program. It will be guided, as I am sure you have heard, by both not only the technology, but by the cost, by the threat as it evolves, and by the strategic environment. And the strategic environment includes a whole range of considerations including arms control, including relations with our allies. So this is still very much an alive process, and we want to hear the views of our allies. We are soliciting them. And that will all be factored into the decision. But this has been a hard process for this administration, which had resisted demands to abandon the treaty and demands to proceed precipitously with the national missile defense.

MR. ROBERTS: As we continue now, Mr. Holum, let me ask you to elaborate a bit on some of the things that have been brought up, and perhaps some that haven't here, with some questions. First of all, concerning CTBT, will it be resubmitted for Senate ratification? If so, what are the chances?

MR. HOLUM: Well, the treaty is still pending in the Senate, and we will certainly be prepared, or want to be prepared, for a renewed effort if that becomes feasible. I think as a practical matter it is unlikely that the treaty will be taken up again by the Senate while President Clinton is still in office. That is still this year. There are some circumstances where that might change. I think if something good happened internationally -- good being 43 other countries ratify and the United States is the last country still holding out -- I think then some Senators might be inclined to take it up again. Or if something bad happened internationally -- that is, if somebody tested again. And there could be made the argument that the United States is lagging behind its non-proliferation obligations. I think under circumstances like that, which I think are unlikely, it might be possible to reconsider it.

What we want to do with General Shalikashvili's effort and with our steps to engage Senators is to be prepared in case the opportunity presents itself, and at a minimum to hand off the treaty to the next administration in much better shape for a possible ratification effort.

MR. ROBERTS: Absent CTBT, what steps is the administration taking to limit and prohibit nuclear proliferation?

MR. HOLUM: Well, we are really focusing now on the NPT Review Conference, which will be a crucial international focus on nuclear non-proliferation. And in support of that, recognizing there will be a great deal of attention at the conference on what has been done by the nuclear weapons states to continue disarmament, we will be emphasizing facts on the ground. Obviously there are more negotiations that need to be pursued. The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, and we are actively engaged in that effort. But the key to us, it seems to me, is to focus on what has already been accomplished and what's being accomplished in terms of actual disarmament.

Thirteen thousand warheads have already been eliminated, and that is continuing. We are taxing the capability of our dismantling plant at Pantex in Texas to take nuclear weapons apart -- not only the delivery systems, not only the missiles and bombers which are being sliced apart, but to actually disassemble the warheads themselves. At the same time, we are working very closely with the Russians through the cooperative threat reduction program to take down their nuclear forces. Both countries are running ahead of schedule in implementing the mandates of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to eliminate nuclear forces. And we are prepared to resume negotiations as soon as Russia ratifies START II. We are prepared to proceed with START III, which will take us down to 80 percent below the forces deployed at the height of the Cold War. And these are things that are actually happening. And it's not only eliminating or taking down weapons covered by the treaties; we are making the reductions irreversible by taking the weapons apart and then extracting the plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, and disposing of those as well, as far as plutonium is concerned in negotiations now underway. So this is a very active disarmament agenda.

I mentioned earlier that France has also taken significant steps in disarmament. And these are things we need to present at the NPT Review Conference to demonstrate that the process of disarmament is alive, vital, continuing, and headed precipitately in the right direction.

MR. ROBERTS: Is there an expectation India will sign CTBT during President Clinton's visit?

MR. HOLUM: I think that's unlikely. Certainly the entire question of non-proliferation will be on the agenda when the president goes to South Asia. The leadership in India has been, as they said they would, working on building a consensus for signature of the CTBT. I personally am doubtful whether that will occur before the president's trip. I hope it will. That would be an important step. It's also one of a number of steps that we think are important to avert an arms race in South Asia that the president will be addressing on his trip.

MR. ROBERTS: Let's go back to Paris right now for another question for Mr. Holum. Go ahead Paris.

Q: It's Julian Lidley French (ph) again. I find myself -- (inaudible) -- controversial this afternoon here. Just taking you up on this point of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly Article 6, the general comprehensive disarmament. How would you react to a country like India who says, Well, take the U.K. -- in the last 10 years the U.K. has virtually proliferated -- it has gone from a fairly basic ballistic missile system -- submarine-launch system in the Polaris system to the most advanced submarine ballistic missile system available, the Trident V-5. It has launched four very large ballistic missile submarines last -- deployed last year. Is it not difficult to say to a country like India when yourselves and your allies are in a sense proliferating through technological development that you must in turn refrain from developing a first-generation system? Are we in danger in a sense of shooting ourselves in the nuclear foot?

MR. HOLUM: No, I don't think so. First of all, the modernization that has been conducted by the U.K. and several others tends to be in the direction of making systems more secure, more precisely targetable, but not more capable of destroying more targets. In fact, the number of weapons has been going down in the U.K. as well as in France and Russia and the United States. So I don't think -- I wouldn't refer to that as proliferating weapons so much as refining delivery systems and the safety and security of those systems.

Now, I am also not making the argument with India and Pakistan that our -- that they should disarm as a favor to us, that they should have avoided nuclear testing as a favor to us. This is a security issue for the people of those countries to consider. It's my very strong belief that nuclear capabilities do not add to their security. In countries so close to each other and at such odds over a border dispute in Kashmir, the addition of nuclear weapons to the equation is, it seems to me, a very dangerous step for India and Pakistan to take. So it's not a matter of saying, Match our approach; it's a matter of saying, Consider your own security interests, and evaluate whether this is really the right step to pursue, the right course to pursue. We are not arguing that anybody should be satisfied with our accomplishments on disarmament. We still think we have a great deal further to go. I think the trend is in the right direction. But remember that 182 countries around the world, many of them with difficult arguments and disputes with their neighbors, have determined that nuclear weapons are something to be avoided, and that their security interests are advanced by undertaking an obligation not to pursue nuclear weapons.

MR. ROBERTS: Before we say goodbye, Mr. Holum, any closing thoughts?

MR. HOLUM: Well, I'd just say I really have enjoyed this very stimulating discussion. The questions have been good, probing, and I think they pretty well covered the waterfront of nuclear issues. They demonstrate that we have a lot of work to do in the United States, as one of the interlocutors suggested, in making clear the limited character of what we are trying to do on national missile defense, and how we see that fitting with our alliance commitments and our relations with other members of the P-5 and with the NATO alliance more broadly.

So I welcome the chance to have this discussion. I plan to continue it in both public and private fora as we go forward toward dealing with this very difficult issue.

MR. ROBERTS: Thanks very much, Mr. Holum. I am afraid we have run out of time, even if there are plenty of other questions that need to be asked. I'd like to thank our distinguished guest here in the studio for joining us on this afternoon's program, and to Paris for your great thoughts and questions.

From Washington, I'm Nathan Roberts. And from everyone here in Studio 48, thanks for watching. We hope to see you next time for another edition of WorldNet's "Dialogue."

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