May 3, 1999

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote arms control and disarmament, to achieve and maintain an effective international nuclear safeguards system, and to promote peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy.

During the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, NPT parties agreed to extend indefinitely the Treaty, making it a permanent part of the global security system. NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Conference also agreed to two other decisions: (1) "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament," which affirmed the need to "move with determination toward the full realization and effective implementation of the provisions of the Treaty" and (2) "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty."

The United States is strongly committed to the NPT, to efforts that further strengthen the Treaty, and to the broader international nonproliferation and arms control regime. The United States has taken numerous practical steps -- unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral -- to affirm this commitment and to underscore the fact that a permanent NPT is a positive force for international efforts to promote progress in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. Many of these steps have been taken since the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Conference.

President Clinton affirmed on April 17, 1996, that the United States remains committed to the pursuit of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.

On September 21, 1998, President Clinton reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the "eventual goal of nuclear disarmament."

In a September 24, 1996, speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton expressed the hope that during the next century "the roles and risks of nuclear weapons can be even further reduced -- and ultimately eliminated."

In an historic step, President Clinton and President Yeltsin, at their summit in March 1997, issued a joint statement on future reductions in nuclear forces, reaffirming their shared commitment to reduce further the nuclear danger and strengthen strategic stability and nuclear security.

Noting that START and the 1991-1992 unilateral initiatives "will help to ensure the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament," Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, at their summit in September 1998, underscored their commitment to the START I and ABM treaties; declared their resolve to "collaborate in expediting the entry into force of the START II Treaty"; and confirmed their willingness to begin START III negotiations immediately after Russian ratification of START II.

In a joint communiqué of June 4, 1998, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China restated that they "remain determined to fulfill their commitments relating to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT."

The United States eliminated all ground-based intermediate-range missiles by the end of May 1991, as required by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The START I Treaty entered into force in December 1994. Implementation of the Treaty is running well ahead of schedule. The United States is already below the START I final limit on the number of delivery vehicles (1600 launchers and bombers) which does not take effect until December 2001.

All nuclear weapons have been removed from the territories of the other three START I Parties:  Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, all of which have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The United States has deactivated its ballistic missile systems to be eliminated under START I by removing more than 3,900 nuclear warheads from Minuteman II and Poseidon C-3 and C-4 missiles. All U.S. heavy bombers to be eliminated under START I have been moved to the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base elimination facility, where they are being destroyed.

The START II Treaty, signed in January 1993, is a follow-on to START I. It is designed to achieve deeper reductions in strategic nuclear forces and enhance strategic stability by eliminating the most destabilizing weapons systems -- that is, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

On January 26, 1996, the United States Senate voted to give its advice and consent to ratification of START II. Approval by the Russian Duma and the Federation Council is necessary before START II can enter into force.

Once START II has been fully implemented, the United States will have reduced its nuclear forces by two-thirds from peak Cold War levels.

The United States and Russia have agreed to deactivate by December 31, 2003, all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps.

In a joint statement at their March 1997 summit in Helsinki, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that START III will establish by December 31, 2007, a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic weapons for each party.

The agreed-upon levels for START III represent a 30-45 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II, a 60-65 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START I, and an 80 percent reduction below peak Cold War levels.

At Helsinki, the two Presidents agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control agreement to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. They also agreed that START III should include other measures designed to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, including the prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads. Additionally, they agreed that in the context of START III they should explore possible confidence-building and transparency measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems.

On September 26, 1997, the United States and Russia signed several agreements in support of the bilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, including:

• a Protocol to START II extending its implementation until December 31, 2007. This extension is needed to encourage Russia's ratification of START II, in view of its concerns over the cost of dismantling nuclear weapons systems. The extension will apply equitably to both Parties.
  
  
• letters legally codifying the Helsinki commitment to deactivate by December 31, 2003, the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that will be eliminated under START II, thereby ensuring that START II's security benefits are realized in roughly the same time frame as originally intended.

The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the United States is committed to continued efforts to strengthen its viability and effectiveness.

On September 26, 1997, after four years of negotiations, officials from the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed agreements addressing the succession to the ABM Treaty by states of the former Soviet Union and the demarcation between ABM systems, which are limited by the Treaty, and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems, which are not limited by the Treaty per se. These agreements, which will be provided to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, are designed to preserve and enhance the viability of the Treaty.

Since 1988, the United States has reduced both defense expenditures for strategic nuclear weapons (now less than 3 percent of total DOD funding) and the number of personnel performing duties with strategic nuclear forces by almost two-thirds.

The Department of Defense's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was approved by the President and is still in force today, created no new missions or roles for nuclear weapons. The basic premise of the NPR is that nuclear weapons play a smaller role in U.S. security today than at any other time in the nuclear age. The Government of the United States favors this diminished role for nuclear weapons.

As of 1992, U.S. ground forces no longer train for nuclear delivery missions and have no nuclear capability.

Since September 1991, U.S. nuclear-armed strategic bombers are no longer on alert.

As of May 1994, the United States no longer targets any country on a day-to-day basis with its strategic nuclear forces.

In July 1997, the United States reached a milestone in a program to strengthen further its controls against the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons by the installation of special coded control devices on all its ballistic missile submarines. All U.S. nuclear weapons systems are now protected by coded control devices to assure against unauthorized or accidental use.

At their September 1998 Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin announced an initiative for developing a U.S.-Russian ballistic missile Shared Early Warning (SEW) arrangement and for establishing a voluntary international regime for pre-launch notification of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The underlying U.S. objective is to enhance strategic and regional stability by minimizing the danger of a launch of ballistic missiles based on the false warning of attack.

U.S. and Russian SEW experts have already begun meeting to develop plans to implement the early warning initiative, including the establishment of a U.S.-Russian Joint Warning Center (JWC), to be located in Russia. Once Washington and Moscow reach an agreement on the pre-launch notification part of the early warning initiative, we will look for appropriate forums within the international community to invite additional participation.

All the following programs were canceled in 1991-1992: mobility programs for ICBMs, the small ICBM program, new Peacekeeper missile production, the follow-on to the Lance missile, the nuclear Short-Range Attack Missile program, the Tactical Air to Surface Missile, the Advanced Cruise Missile program, and a new artillery-fired atomic projectile.

The United States has no new ballistic missile submarines or new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles under development.

The United States halted production of B-2 bomber aircraft at 21. All B-1 bombers are dedicated exclusively to non-nuclear missions.

As part of the 1991-1992 unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, all non-strategic nuclear weapons -- including nuclear cruise missiles, depth charges, and torpedoes -- were removed from surface ships, multi-purpose submarines, and land-based naval aircraft bases.

On July 2, 1992, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the completion of the worldwide withdrawal and retirement of the U.S. stockpile of nuclear artillery shells, Lance missile warheads, and naval nuclear depth bombs to U.S. territory in accordance with the Presidential Initiative. All of these weapons have now been eliminated except for a small number of artillery projectiles whose elimination will be complete in 2002.

As a result of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the capability to deploy nuclear weapons on carrier-based, dual-capable aircraft and the option to deploy nuclear cruise missiles on surface ships has been eliminated.

In 1986, the United States had fourteen different tactical nuclear weapon systems; today the United States has two. Of these, all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles were withdrawn to the United States in 1992, and the air-delivered tactical bomb stockpile has been reduced by 60 percent, and all excess tactical bombs have been eliminated.

Since 1988, the United States has dismantled more than 13,300 nuclear warheads and bombs, averaging more than 100 per month. Since 1988, the United States has eliminated more than a dozen different types of nuclear warheads.

Since 1988, the United States has reduced its overall nuclear warhead stockpile by 59 percent (i.e., 80 percent of the non-strategic nuclear stockpile and 47 percent of the strategic nuclear stockpile have been eliminated).

On September 24, 1996, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The Treaty was the product of 2-1/2 years of arduous negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), in which the United States played a leading role.

Conclusion of a CTBT by 1996, was specifically called for in the 1995 NPT Conference decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament."

The Treaty's preamble states that the CTBT, by banning all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since September 1992, and is committed to maintaining its testing moratorium until entry into force of the CTBT.

In September 1997, President Clinton transmitted the CTBT to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Achieving U.S. ratification as soon as possible, and no later than September 1999, is a top priority for the Clinton Administration.

To enter into force, the CTBT must be ratified by 44 states named in a Treaty Annex. The United States has been working bilaterally and multilaterally to secure the Treaty's entry into force at the earliest possible time.

Along with other signatories, the United States is working in the CTBT Preparatory Commission to establish a verification regime consisting of an International Monitoring System. consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures.

The United States strongly supports efforts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), as recently affirmed in President Clinton's message to the CD in January 1999, and in its support for the 1998 UN First Committee "cutoff' resolution.

The United States has ceased production of all fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

A cutoff treaty based on the 1995 consensus negotiating mandate agreed to by the CD would halt worldwide production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and thus would be an important nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation step. Such a treaty was specifically called for in the 1995 NPT Conference decision on "Principles and Objectives."

The United States is continuing its efforts at the CD to negotiate this treaty. The United States sees an FMCT as an important milestone on the road to nuclear disarmament.

The United States and Russia are continuing efforts, begun in 1994, to make permanent the cessation of plutonium production for nuclear weapons in both countries.

On September 23, 1997, the U.S. and Russia signed the "U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement," which entered into force immediately. Under this new agreement, the United States will provide assistance to Russia to convert its three operating plutonium-production reactors by the year 2000, so that they no longer produce weapon-grade plutonium.

Additionally, the ten Russian plutonium-production reactors (already shut down) and all fourteen U. S production reactors (shut down since 1989) will remain closed permanently. The effect of the Production Reactor Agreement and these other steps is that the U.S. and Russia are legally agreeing to cut off production of plutonium.

The September 1997 agreement marks the first time that the United States and Russia have placed limits on the materials for nuclear warheads themselves and also marks a new stage in U.S.-Russian cooperation to regulate and verify nuclear materials, to limit their use in weapons, and to build mutual confidence through increased transparency.

Since September 1993, the United States has unilaterally removed approximately 226 metric tons of fissile material from its nuclear stockpile and has voluntarily pledged to make this excess fissile material available for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as soon as practical.

Of the 226 metric tons of excess material, twelve metric tons is now under IAEA safeguards at three U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities; 26 metric tons has been committed for such inspections by the end of 1999; and 52 metric tons will be made available for international inspection, consistent with plans for treatment, storage, and material disposition.

In April 1996, the United States proposed to work with the IAEA to carry out a verification experiment at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant on the downblending of weapon-grade high enriched uranium (HEU). This HEU was a portion (13 metric tons) of the 26 metric tons committed at the 1996 IAEA General Conference to be made available for international inspection by September 1999. IAEA monitoring of downblending began on December 1, 1997, and ended in July 1998. The experiment helped demonstrate the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament, and provided valuable experience in international verification of the disposition of weapons-usable materials.

After considering options for the disposition of surplus HEU, DOE, on July 29, 1996, adopted the blending down of HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) as the preferred disposition alternative. This option will convert the material to a form unusable in nuclear weapons and, where practical, allow for the reuse of the resulting LEU in peaceful, beneficial ways that recover its commercial value.

To demonstrate to the international community the transparency of the downblending of approximately 600 kilograms of HEU obtained from Kazakhstan through "Project Sapphire," the United States made portions of the BWX Technologies (formerly Babcock and Wilcox) facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, eligible for IAEA safeguards. In August 1996, the IAEA began its initial physical inventory verification activities on the downblending operations. To date, the IAEA has verified the downblending of approximately 400 kilograms of that HEU. The remaining HEU is scheduled to be downblended in 1999 under IAEA safeguards.

The United States is scheduled to downblend 50 metric tons of HEU over the next six years, converting the material to low-enriched form suitable for use in civil power reactors and rendering it unusable for weapons purposes. To demonstrate to the international community the transparency of this downblending project, the U.S. will continue to make portions of the BWX Technologies facility eligible for safeguards, and is seeking IAEA verification of the downblending.

Since October 1995, the United States has been working with the IAEA to incorporate international safeguards features into the design of a facility -- the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility located at Savannah River -- planned for storage of plutonium designated excess to defense needs. The United States is also preparing a second facility at the Savannah River Site to accept plutonium from other sites for storage under IAEA verification.

On January 14, 1997, DOE stated its decision to pursue a strategy for plutonium disposition that allows for: (a) immobilization of surplus weapon plutonium in glass or ceramic forms, and (b) irradiation of surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuels in existing reactors, while reserving the option to immobilize all the surplus. Both approaches would provide physical barriers to the reuse of plutonium declared excess to U.S. national security needs and help ensure that it is never again used for nuclear weapons or defense purposes.

The MOX and immobilization options would also preserve the long-standing U.S. policy of not engaging in plutonium reprocessing or recycling, since spent fuel from the burning of surplus plutonium in reactors would not subsequently be reprocessed.

The United States, the Russian Federation, and the IAEA commenced a Trilateral Initiative in September 1996 to address the unique challenges of providing assurances that fissile material from weapon programs, once removed, remains outside of such programs. The purpose of IAEA verification is to promote international confidence in the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament. Technical activities have included workshops and joint demonstrations in the United States, Russia, and Vienna.

Significant progress has been made toward developing approaches and technologies that will support IAEA inspection of both U.S. and Russian excess fissile materials in sensitive forms while protecting and preventing the disclosure of classified nuclear weapon-related information, as well as developing verification approaches for the Russian fissile material storage facility at Mayak and a U.S. plutonium storage facility at Savannah River.

At their summit in September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin affirmed the intention of each of their countries to remove by stages approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programs, and to convert this material so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. The conversion will be accomplished through consumption of plutonium fuel in nuclear reactors or the immobilization of plutonium in glass or ceramic form mixed with high-level radioactive waste.

The U.S. and Russia also agreed to seek to develop acceptable methods and technology for transparency measures, including appropriate international verification measures and stringent standards of physical protection, control, and accounting for the management of plutonium.

Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the United States is continuing to cooperate with the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union to accelerate the destruction and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles and their launchers, and infrastructure, and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use or diversion of nuclear weapons or fissile material. As of March 1999, the United States has committed almost $2.3 billion in such cooperation.

In the early 1990s, the United States established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program to provide nuclear security support for nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union possessing weapons-usable nuclear material not in weapons form. We are now providing assistance under this program to 55 sites. The MPC&A Program is rapidly improving the security of approximately 650 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in forms other than nuclear weapons stored and used at these nuclear sites. As of March 1999, the United States has allocated $573 million in such cooperation.

The United States strongly supports efforts to strengthen and reinvigorate the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

The threat of theft or sabotage of nuclear materials poses a global proliferation risk and a potential danger to public health and safety. Criminal diversion and subsequent illicit trafficking of nuclear material could assist states or terrorist groups to bypass the carefully crafted controls of the international nonproliferation regime and permit them to construct or otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device.

The most effective means of preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is at the source. Thus, the physical protection of nuclear materials has been recognized as a key element of international strategies to prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear materials.

Through bilateral and multilateral efforts, the international community has achieved many improvements in physical protection in the past two decades. However, the international legal framework for physical protection efforts -- the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials -- has lagged behind technical and political developments.

The Physical Protection Convention requires the application of physical protection measures only to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes while in international transport (or storage pursuant to international transport).

A robust international legal framework can act as a positive force, reinforcing existing efforts and encouraging further ones. The United States is pursuing diplomatic efforts to strengthen the Physical Protection Convention. In particular, the United States has proposed that the convention be amended to:

• Apply to nuclear material and facilities used for peaceful purposes while in domestic use,

storage and transport;


• Apply to nuclear material declared excess to national security needs;
  
  
• Require standards for physical protection equivalent to IAEA guidelines for physical protection; and
  
  
• Provide some form of limited peer review

The United States strongly and actively supports the establishment of a strengthened and cost-effective IAEA safeguards system, including an increased capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, and the incorporation of new technologies to enhance effectiveness and efficiency.

In June 1995, the United States joined other IAEA Board of Governors members in approving a range of IAEA safeguards strengthening measures under existing authority, which built on other measures approved by the Board, beginning in 1992, following the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program.

The June 1996 IAEA Board of Governors meeting established an open-ended committee to complete a model protocol to comprehensive safeguard agreements containing measures for which the IAEA needed complementary authority. The United States worked intensively to gain agreement in the committee to forward an effective protocol for Board approval as soon as possible.

In May 1997, the United States joined other IAEA Board of Governors members in approving this Model Protocol for strengthening IAEA safeguards. The new strengthened safeguards measures, including the Model Protocol, will strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards and enhance the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear materials and activities.

The United States hopes all states will cooperate in the implementation of the new strengthened safeguards system and will complete and bring into force the additional Protocols to their safeguards agreements.

The United States signed its Additional Protocol in June 1998, thus becoming the first nuclear weapon state to negotiate and sign an additional protocol. The U.S. Government is currently preparing to submit this Protocol to the Senate and, following Senate approval, to bring it into force.

The United States will accept the Protocol in its entirety and will apply all its provisions, excluding only information and locations of direct national security significance to the United States. The United States will treat the Protocol as an integral part of its existing voluntary offer safeguards agreement.

On March 25, 1996, the United States signed the three protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty, the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Under Protocol I of the SPNFZ Treaty, the United States is required to apply the basic provisions of the Treaty to its territories in the zone (e.g., American Samoa and Jarvis Island) established by the Treaty. Under Protocol II, the United States agreed not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Party to the Treaty, Protocol I Parties, or territories located within the zone.

Under Protocol III, the United States agreed not to test nuclear explosive devices within the zone established by the Treaty.

On April 11, 1996, the United States signed the protocols for which it was eligible to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba.

Under Protocol I of the ANWFZ Treaty, the United States undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against any Party to the Treaty, or the territory of any Protocol III Party that lies within the zone established by the Treaty. Under Protocol II, the United States undertakes not to test or assist or encourage the testing of nuclear explosive devices anywhere within the zone established by the Treaty.

The United States supported the consensus UN General Assembly resolutions supporting the negotiation of a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty, and sent an expert delegation for consultations in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, with the Central Asian drafting group in July 1998. The United States continues to be willing to review and provide comments on any draft text of a treaty, and is closely monitoring the development of the CANWFZ Treaty.

The United States continues to work with ASEAN states on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty toward a Treaty and Protocol that conform to longstanding U.S. criteria for supporting NWFZs.

The United States continues to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, provided they meet longstanding U.S. criteria for such zones.

In April 1995, the United States reaffirmed in a Presidential Declaration that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT. The only exception to this global negative security assurance is in the rare event a state, allied or associated with a nuclear weapon state (and therefore benefiting from such alliance or association) engages in an armed attack against the United States, its armed forces, or its allies. The United States joined the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in issuing virtually identical national declarations extending these assurances to NPT non-nuclear weapon states.

In April 1995, the United States jointly sponsored, with the other permanent members, UN Security Council Resolution 984 which strengthened positive security assurances for NPT non-nuclear weapon states threatened with nuclear aggression.

Resolution 984 illustrated the ways in which the Security Council could render assistance to such a state including "appropriate measures... to restore international peace and security" which are called for in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The United States along with other nuclear weapon states have provided additional guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Latin American and Caribbean Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty; the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty; and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.

As a result of providing security assurances through protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones, the number of non-nuclear weapon states receiving legally-binding assurances against the use of nuclear weapons from all five nuclear weapon states, will have increased since the 1995 NPT Conference from 33 to 99 when all ratification and entry into force actions have been taken. This number could increase to 109, if the nuclear weapon states and ASEAN nations can resolve their differences over the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and Protocol.

Since the conclusion of the 1995 NPT Conference, the United States has continued to promote universal adherence to the Treaty. Nine states have joined the NPT since May 1995: Angola, Andorra, Brazil, Chile, the Comoros, Djibouti, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu.

There are now only four states worldwide outside the NPT regime (Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan).

The United States strongly supports the 13 benchmarks affirmed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1172, including the ultimate goal of Indian and Pakistani adherence to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework commits North Korea to remain a party to the NPT and to keep its safeguards agreement in force. We continue actively to implement the Agreed Framework.

The United States strongly supports maintenance of United Nations sanctions on Iraq until that country fulfills all of its UN Security Council obligations. Under UN resolutions, Iraq must make available for elimination all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), allow monitors, and fully disclose past WMD programs.

The UN Security Council has consistently joined with other members of the United Nations in unanimously determining that Iraq has not complied with its obligations.

The United States supports the continuing efforts of multilateral export control organizations to make their work as transparent as possible, including the October 1997 Vienna Seminar on Transparency in Export Controls and the follow-on Seminar in New York in April 1999.

Nuclear-related export controls are already highly transparent, provide nonproliferation benefits to all NPT parties, and promote nuclear cooperation with NPT parties that behave responsibly. This transparency effort is an integral part of U.S. bilateral and multilateral activities to promote broader understanding of and adherence to internationally-recognized nuclear export control guidelines.

Over the past year, the United States has continued to support peaceful nuclear cooperation efforts through its contributions to IAEA technical cooperation programs including, the implementation of technical projects and the provision of experts, equipment, and training. The United States is the largest contributor to the IAEA's technical cooperation efforts.

In addition to cooperation through the IAEA, the United States maintains bilateral "sister-laboratory" arrangements with Argentina, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, and Thailand, and is pursuing such arrangements with Romania and Uzbekistan.

In 1996-97, the United States brought into force agreements for cooperation with Bulgaria, the 15 nations of the European Atomic Energy Agency, Argentina, and South Africa. In 1998, an agreement with Switzerland entered into force and agreements were signed with Ukraine and Romania. The Ukraine agreement and previously-signed agreements with Kazakhstan and Brazil have completed the required review period by the U.S. Congress and await entry into force pending action by the other party. The Romania agreement will be submitted to Congress for review early in 1999.

Since 1978, the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program has been working to minimize and eventually eliminate the use of high enriched uranium (HEU) in civil commerce. More than 30 research reactors in foreign countries have been converted or will be converted from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and higher density LEU fuels capable of converting all operating research reactors are being developed. Also under development are new techniques to use LEU instead of HEU for medical isotope production.

Under a May 1996 DOE Record of Decision, the United States has offered to accept the return of about 19 metric tons of spent HEU fuel of U.S. origin from research reactors in 41 foreign countries. Several shipments from Europe, Canada, Asia, and South America have already been made, and DOE expects that the great majority of the material will be returned before the RERTR acceptance program ends in May 2009.

The United States also has taken the lead in supporting the establishment of international instruments related to nuclear safety and liability. Such agreements (including the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage) are necessary to promote and secure the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy for all countries.

In September 1997, the United States was the first signatory of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which was adopted in September 1997 by majority vote during a diplomatic conference in Vienna. This "Waste Convention" expands the framework of the Convention on Nuclear Safety by calling for national coverage for spent fuel and radioactive waste in keeping with agreed international standards.

On April 9, 1999, the United States ratified the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

The United States was also the first signatory of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which was opened for signature on September 29, 1997. The new regime addresses the treatment of legal liability resulting from a nuclear accident.