International Information Programs

Fact Sheet:
Statements Supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

General John Shalikashvili
General Colin Powell
Admiral William Crowe
General David Jones:

Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Presidents Clinton, Bush, Reagan and Carter

"On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) Treaty to the United States Senate for its advice and consent, together with six Safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into this Treaty.

These Safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness. They also specify the circumstances under which the President would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under the CTB to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified. With these Safeguards, we support Senate approval of the CTB Treaty."

Statement released by the White House Press Secretary, Washington, January 28, 1998

General Henry H. Shelton:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff support ratification of this Treaty, with the safeguards package that establishes the conditions under which the United States would adhere to the Treaty."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testimony before the House Committee on National Security, February 5, 1998

Secretary William Cohen:

"Beyond the defense realm, economic and diplomatic initiatives such as nonproliferation can help shape a favorable international environment. Also important [is] the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which I urge the Senate to ratify."

Secretary of Defense, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 3, 1998

Secretary Madeleine Albright:

"Now more than ever, the CTBT is relevant to American security and world peace. Now more than ever, we need to get the Treaty's monitoring and detection system up and running. Now more than ever, we need to declare that testing is not smart, not safe, not right and not legal. Now more than ever, we need to demonstrate that the world has entered a new era, in which the greatness of nations is measured not by how much they can destroy, but by how much they can build. So I ask the Senate, as the President has asked the Senate, 'Do not stall, do not delay, approve the CTBT.' On this critical measure, at this perilous time, American leadership should be unambiguous, decisive and strong."

Secretary of State, speech at the Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, June 10, 1998

National Security Advisor Samuel Berger:

"By its terms, the CTBT cannot enter into force until the United States and other key designated nations ratify it. If we fail to ratify, we will undercut our own efforts to curb further nuclear arms development, particularly in South Asia... ."

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, speech at the Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, January 12, 1999

Secretary Bill Richardson:

"Ratification of the Treaty this year is essential. Without this Treaty, we will lose one of the most important tools available to us for constraining the development of more advanced nuclear weapons, and limiting the spread of nuclear weapons to new states. Failure to ratify also seriously erodes our ability as a nation to lead in nonproliferation matters. Without ratification, we undercut our credibility in persuading India and Pakistan to join us in this important regime. And without ratification, we are not eligible to join with other nations later this year to discuss ways to facilitate the Treaty's entry into force, if necessary. Moreover, it would run counter to the desires of most Americans, who want this Treaty to enter into force. The Senate's failure to act this year would reduce - not increase - our national security.

Secretary of Energy, speech at the Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, January 12, 1999

Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO):

"We fully support the goal that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should enter into force as soon as possible and, to this end, encourage all states to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay."

Statement after NATO Ministerial meeting, Brussels, December 2, 1997

G-8 Foreign Ministers:

"We call upon all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rapidly to ensure its entry into force, and welcome the determination of the member governments of the G-8 that have not yet ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date."

Communique after G-8 Foreign Ministers meeting, London, June 12, 1998

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze and Dr. Sidney D. Drell:

"A common thread in our experience is that our national interest is best served when America leads. When America hesitates, opportunities to improve our security are lost, and our strategic position suffers. This year, America has an opportunity to lead a global effort to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation by ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). ... We urge the Senate to ratify the CTBT now."

Former arms control negotiator and ambassador-at-large in the Reagan administration (Nitze); advisor to the federal government on national security issues (Drell), letter to the Washington Post, June 21, 1999

Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. Freeman Dyson, Dr. Richard Garwin, Dr. Kurt Gottfried, Dr. Marshall Rosenbluth, Dr. Jeremiah Sullivan, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Dr. Herbert York, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr:

"...there is one essential step -- which only the Senate can take -- which would greatly help to protect the United States against the weaponization of stolen nuclear secrets: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Whatever information on thermonuclear weapons China may have obtained, it is implausible that Beijing would deploy weapons that incorporate this information without first conducting nuclear explosive tests outlawed by the CTBT. ... Even if China did acquire detailed design information on sophisticated nuclear weapons, there is no basis to assume that China would field a warhead based on this information without new nuclear tests. ... As Dr. Harold Agnew, former director of Los Alamos Scientific (now National) Laboratory observed, "If China doesn't resume testing, no harm will possibly have been done other than to our egos." ... Nuclear proliferation -- aided by espionage or not -- is one of the greatest threats to American security. U.S. ratification and entry into force of the CTBT will greatly strengthen the nation's ability to contain this threat, and thus enhance the national security interests of the United States."

Scientific and military experts, letter to The Honorable Trent Lott, July 30, 1999

Dr. John Browne of Los Alamos, Dr. Paul Robinson of Sandia, and Dr. Bruce Tarter of Lawrence Livermore:

"We are confident that the Stockpile Stewardship program will enable us to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing."

Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Directors, briefing to the President, Los Alamos, February 3, 1998

The American Association for the Advancement of Science:

"The Board of Directors and the Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science urges the United States Senate to give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to ratification as soon as possible."

Statement after meeting of AAAS Board of Directors and the AAAS Council, February 15, 1998

Senate Democrats:

"The United States must not relinquish its leadership in the nuclear non-proliferation arena. We respectively urge you to hold all necessary hearings and to report the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for timely consideration before the CTBT inaugural conference.

45 Democratic Senators, letter to the Honorable Jesse Helms, July 20, 1999

Sens. James Exon, Mark Hatfield and George Mitchell:

"The responsibility of the Senate leadership is to ensure the intent of the Founding Fathers is respected: If 67 or more senators agree the CTB should be ratified, it should be. If 34 or more senators disagree, it should not. Consistent with the Constitution, though, this is a question of fundamental importance that all 100 should decide. And when they do, we are confident the Senate will send a clear signal to India and the world that the next century will be one without nuclear tests."

Former Senators, letter in The Washington Times, May 27, 1998

Sens. Arlen Specter and Joseph Biden:

"Failure by the United States Senate to ratify the Treaty may give rise to an inference that the United States government is not serious about banning nuclear testing and may, in effect, encourage or at least not discourage such testing."

Senators, joint letter to their colleagues, July 29, 1998

President Dwight D. Eisenhower:

"This Government has stood, throughout, for the complete abolition of [nuclear] weapons testing ..."

February 11, 1960

"...[not achieving a nuclear test ban] would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration - of any decade - of any time and of any party."

Interview with Walter Cronkite, CBS, May 29, 1961

President John F. Kennedy:

"The conclusion of such a treaty [to end nuclear tests] would check the spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas ... it would increase our security - it would decrease the prospects of war."

Speech at American University, Washington, June 10, 1963

President William Jefferson Clinton:

"Unfortunately, the Test Ban Treaty is now imperiled by the refusal of some senators even to consider it. If our Senate fails to act, the treaty cannot enter into force for any country. ... We have a chance right now to end nuclear testing forever. It would be a tragedy for our security and for our children's future to let this opportunity slip away."

Remarks in the Rose Garden, July 20, 1999


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