Reasons for Ratification

Fact Sheet: Reasons for Ratification

1. The CTBT will allow America to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. The U.S. will enter into a CTBT with a proven, well-tested nuclear stockpile. Past nuclear explosive testing has provided a rich database characterizing the operation of our weapons, and this database will serve as a benchmark for comparing, without nuclear explosive testing, the operation of our weapons in the future. We have instituted a rigorous and technically sophisticated program of stockpile stewardship, and we are confident that with this program we can maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The Treaty was carefully negotiated to ensure it would not prohibit activities we will carry out to maintain our deterrent. Moreover, the President has established concrete, specific Safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT.

2. The CTBT will constrain the development of more advanced nuclear weapons by China and Russia. The CTBT's prohibition on nuclear explosive testing will have the practical effect of constraining China and Russia from developing with high confidence more advanced and more dangerous weapons.

3. The CTBT will strengthen the NPT regime and the U.S. ability to lead the global nonproliferation effort. The nuclear weapon states' commitment at the 1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to conclude a CTBT in 1996 was instrumental in achieving the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. U.S. ratification of the CTBT will make good on this commitment, thereby bolstering American leadership in the global diplomatic campaign to preserve and strengthen the NPT regime. U.S. ratification will also strengthen our efforts to promote additional steps to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. The CTBT will constrain "rogue" states' nuclear weapons development and other states' nuclear capabilities. Even if rogue states were able to assemble sufficient nuclear material to produce a simple fission weapon without nuclear testing, the CTBT would force them to place confidence in an untested design (which military leaders might find unacceptable), as well as constrain any further improvements in nuclear weapon design. Other potential adherents with nuclear capabilities would, without direct foreign assistance or nuclear testing, lack confidence in the performance of sophisticated nuclear weapons beyond simple fission designs.

5. The CTBT will improve America's ability to detect and deter nuclear explosive testing. Detecting, identifying and attributing nuclear explosive testing is a high national security priority. The CTBT's global network of seismic, hydroacoustic, radionuclide and infrasound sensors will aid America's national capabilities to monitor nuclear explosive testing across the globe, as well as deter any nation from believing it can conduct a nuclear explosive test undetected by the international community. With the CTBT in force, the United States will gain a new tool to assess compliance with a ban on nuclear testing: the ability to request a short-notice, on-site inspection of a suspicious event.

6. CTBT ratification by the United States will encourage further ratifications. U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention facilitated ratification by Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. In the same way, U.S. ratification of the CTBT will encourage ratification by other states, including India and Pakistan, who have each announced an intention to adhere to the CTBT.

7. CTBT ratification by the United States and others will strengthen global norms against testing. Ratification of the CTBT by the United States and the vast majority of the international community will strengthen the international norm against nuclear testing, and thus help to support the efforts of the international community to gain universal adherence to the Treaty.

8. CTBT ratification by the United States will allow the U.S. to participate fully this fall in a key international Conference. Under the Treaty, a Conference of States that have ratified the CTBT is to be held October 6-8 if all 44 States that must ratify to trigger entry into force have not done so by then. If we have not ratified, we can only participate in the Conference (which will consider steps to accelerate entry into force) as an "observer."

9. The CTBT has the support of American defense experts and citizens. The CTBT has the unanimous support of the Administration's security team. It has been endorsed by prominent military and foreign policy experts, including four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations. It has the support of numerous scientific, environmental, and religious leaders. A July 1999 poll found that 82% of Americans, regardless of their political affiliation, favor prompt CTBT ratification by the U.S.

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