(begin transcript)
RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. Sorry for the short
delay. It happens. Today is Wednesday. Two announcements. First of
all, Secretary Albright has sent a letter to all Members of the Senate
urging their support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban.
The letters were sent yesterday. It goes through the reasons why this
treaty is in the interest of the United States and why failure to
ratify this treaty could harm our efforts to promote nonproliferation
around the world. We will be providing a copy of that letter to you
after the briefing.
Secondly, on the subject of Georgia we have a statement welcoming
Georgia's accession to the World Trade Organization. That is, the
country of Georgia.
With those announcements, let me turn to those questions you haven't
yet asked.
Q: Will, the letter I'm sure will take care of any questions about the
perils that the underground test ban treaty faces.
RUBIN: I don't mind taking additional questions.
Q: Well, if I had the letter I could ask the questions but I don't
have the letter so it's hard to --
RUBIN: You could imagine. You could imagine. You've pressed on things
with less knowledge before.
Q: No, no, but this is - yeah, but as we both have known from our
past, arms control is a technical and difficult thing. Is there any -
I guess the best way to put it without having seen the letter, is
there any room for bargaining? Is there any acceptance by the
Administration of some of the arguments made by the critics of the
treaty? Is there any disposition to fine-tune it in a way that might
just squeeze it through, or are you going to stick to principle? Are
you going to stick to the treaty?
RUBIN: Let me say that we certainly agree with those Senators who have
said that the treaty isn't perfectly verifiable. We've never claimed
it was perfectly verifiable. We've said that with the treaty we'll
have a lot more knowledge about what goes on in the world than without
it. We certainly agree with those who expressed concern that we ought
to maintain a nuclear deterrent and have that deterrent be safe and
reliable, and there are conditions attached to our proposal for the
treaty that would ensure that we would be in a position to act if it
was determined that our weapons were not safe and reliable.
So we, after all this time, have given a great deal of thought to many
of the legitimate questions. We think we have developed proposals that
answer the legitimate questions. For those who adopt the view that we,
the United States, should stop testing and continue our moratorium but
somehow not sign this treaty, we don't know how to counter that
argument because that strikes us as unilateral nuclear disarmament. We
should somehow keep a moratorium but not have a treaty that will lock
in the international rule of the road against testing for countries
like China, Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan and we have
certainly tried to counter as responsibly as we can most of the
legitimate criticisms. But if you want to say that the United States
shouldn't test but I just don't like arms control treaties and we
shouldn't ratify this treaty, there is no way to counter that
argument.
With respect to the schedule, I think Joe Lockhart spoke to this this
morning. We have to operate on the assumption that this treaty is
going to be voted on next Tuesday. Secretary Albright is flying back
today to prepare for her testimony tomorrow - I believe it is
scheduled for 2:30 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - and
she is preparing for that and planning to return from her trip for
that purpose.
As far as whether some arrangement might be made, we have said for
some time that we have profound concerns that a treaty as important as
the CTB, the Comprehensive Test Ban, is not being given the due
consideration it deserves with serious analysis, serious discussion,
serious consideration of the numerous issues that it involves.
Q: You've covered this and I won't take time of you, but has she done
any lobbying with individual senators of late? I know the President
has but I haven't heard if -
RUBIN: Yes, she has called a number of senators over the last two
days. She has also worked with a number of former secretaries
including Secretary Eagleburger, Secretary Baker, Howard Baker, and
others who we think may be influential with senators from both
parties. So she has done a number of phone calls from the road and
will continue to do that as needed.
Q: Do you see any signs that your campaign in favor of the CTBT is
making any headway, is cutting any ice with the Republican senators?
RUBIN: We know this is an uphill battle. I think we've not expressed
any doubt about saying that. This is an extremely difficult challenge
on a short time frame to explain in detail the issues related to
reliability of the stockpile, seismic monitoring, the Central
Intelligence Agency's ability to determine what testing may go on in
the world, the on-site inspections that are permitted, the monitoring
stations, 300 or so that would be placed around the world to seek to
verify testing.
So these are all complicated issues. We still regard this as an uphill
battle. But we believe that a failure to ratify this treaty will make
it harder and harder for us to pressure other countries not to test. I
can't remember - I can't even count how many times members of Congress
and others have legitimately asked what is the United States doing to
stop India from going down the nuclear road, to prevent North Korea
from becoming nuclear and to ensure that China doesn't develop a whole
new generation of modern nuclear weapons.
These are the concerns that we have shared that are out there that
this treaty is designed to advance, and failure to ratify will harm
our ability to stop China from developing a new generation of nuclear
weapons; it will harm our ability to stop and pressure India and
Pakistan to not go down the nuclear road, not just with respect to the
CTBT but with respect to a whole number of other steps. So we continue
to make the case. We certainly hope that senators are beginning to see
that if this treaty is voted down our credibility on the world stage
to deter and pressure other countries not to go nuclear will be
seriously weakened.
Q: In her conversations and all, does she sense any momentum in the
Administration's direction? Has anybody converted anybody who was
again saying - having second thoughts, without naming names?
RUBIN: We certainly have detected a sense among some senators who were
not presumed supporters of this treaty that they are worried about the
consequences of the treaty not being ratified. But whether that is
leading to a positive vote is a different question.
Q: Could I jump in here? You said you're worried about the
consequences. Are you referring to the political domestic consequences
or the --
RUBIN: The international consequences. Normally those senators don't
tell the Secretary of State what's happening in their home state.
Q: Sometimes they give it away.
RUBIN: And certainly if they would, I would give it away.
Q: Does the Administration take any position on whether the vote
should be deferred beyond this Congress?
RUBIN: What I have said - and I'll be happy to repeat here for you -
is that we've always been concerned about the compressed time frame.
We have never liked the compressed time frame. We have always worried
that the compressed time frame would not allow the treaty to be given
the consideration of a major arms control treaty, which if you look
back - whether it's starting with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the ABM
Treaty, SALT I, SALT II, START I, START II, the CFE Treaty, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention - all
of those treaties have received full and extensive consideration by
the Senate - and if you want to throw me a bone for knowing the names
of all those treaties at any time, I'd welcome it.
But this is the first of these major treaties that hasn't received
that consideration so, from the beginning we've said we're worried
about it. But this is the schedule. We don't make the Senate schedule.
I've worked there and the Senate makes its own schedule. It's not the
Administration that can determine the Senate's schedule.
So we expect there to continue to be discussions between the White
House and the Senate about timing and consideration but, from our
standpoint here at the State Department and from Secretary Albright's
standpoint, we are continuing to make the case for the treaty and
explain the dangers of failure to ratify the treaty.
Q: There does seem to be a movement by both opponents and proponents
of the treaty to perhaps put off such a vote. What do you think are
the consequences of just maintaining the status quo, putting it off,
as opposed to actually voting it down?
RUBIN: We think, obviously, the worst outcome would be to vote this
treaty down. There is no question in our mind about that. We did not
propose this particular schedule for Senate consideration so if the
Senate wants to propose another schedule we would obviously want to be
supportive of a schedule that ensured serious consideration, serious
analysis, in a timely manner.
Q: Do you have any idea how the letters came as a result of the
personal contacts between the Secretary and senators?
RUBIN: The idea of her sending a letter?
Q: Yes.
RUBIN: I think it came from her sense as the week developed that she
needed to make clear to all the senators concerned that, as Secretary
of State, she is in a position to tell senators what the foreign
policy consequences of a treaty are, both positive and negative, and
she felt now that the Senate was moving towards the beginnings of
serious consideration that they ought to know her views.
Q: Could I draw on that? You keep referring to failure to ratify as a
possible outcome. In a briefing last week, Mr. Holum told some of us
that if it were not ratified in this vote there was always a
possibility of coming back with it again and again until you get the
votes.
Is that not right?
RUBIN: First of all, if Mr. Holum said it I'm sure it's right. I don't
see the relevance of that. I don't see the relevance of that.
Q: (Inaudible) this vote -- (inaudible)?
RUBIN: I know that one can begin to speculate on what the effect of a
negative vote might be. But, certainly, if this were voted down, it
would be the first major arms control treaty voted down by the United
States Senate in the modern era and I don't think one should begin to
minimize those consequences.
What might happen after that, I'm not prepared to speculate. We
certainly hope that doesn't happen.
Q: So you are not prepared to say, and I could understand why you
might not be, whether the US would think the lesser of two evils is to
continue a moratorium? Obviously, you're not going to start testing
again?
RUBIN: The President has made clear that so long as the Stockpile
Stewardship Program ensures the safety and reliability of our weapons,
we see no need to test and we certainly don't want to do anything that
will give other countries additional excuses to restart their testing
programs or to begin testing. So that would certainly be our view.
But let's remember that while in this country treaties may be tools
that are questioned and are deemed of danger or dubious value, in most
parts of the world the treaty as an instrument of international
diplomacy, gets a much bigger support, and so for some countries in
the world, the fact that there is a treaty really does become a
deterrent because they don't want to be out of the treaty regime.
We're the United States and sometimes for our own reasons we explain
why we can be outside of a treaty regime because we are taking other
steps.
But let's remember that for many countries in the world, they would
like to test, probably. There are a number of reasons why they haven't
yet. One of them is they don't have the access. Another might be that
they decided that the downsides of testing outweigh the upsides.
This treaty is one of the ways in which other countries make their
calculation. When I say that, the critics of the treaty immediately
say, oh, that's na��e to think they would not test because of a
treaty. I am not saying that they wouldn't test because of a treaty;
but the fact of a treaty is one of many factors that go into their
decisionmaking and to remove that factor would be ill-advised in the
extreme.
New subject? Okay.
Q: The case of Hani al-Sayegh. Taken into consideration in the Human
Rights Watch report and Amnesty International report, International
Religious Freedom Act report, first, are you absolutely satisfied with
the assurances you got from the Saudi Arabians that Mr. Hani
all-Sayegh will not be tortured?
Secondly, are you going to insist that he has a lawyer and that the
lawyer will represent him while he's interrogated?
Thirdly, are you going to insist that your consular staff will have
access to this suspect at least who is in your protection now?
RUBIN: I am not aware that he is an American citizen that would obtain
- have the right to American consular access overseas. So I don't
understand why consular officials - consular officials work for
American citizens. He is not an American citizen. So the idea - the
question about consular access doesn't apply.
With respect to the torture convention, one of the issues that was
addressed prior to the removal or the planned removal of Mr. al-Sayegh
was the question of the torture convention, and the United States
received assurances from Saudi Arabia -- satisfactory to the United
States -- that we are living up to our obligations under the torture
convention. That is something that was part of the discussion between
the Attorney General, the Secretary and Saudi officials. We are
satisfied that we are living up to our obligations.
Q: Will he have a lawyer there?
RUBIN: You'll have to ask him about his intentions for a lawyer.
Again, you're assuming that we, the United States, determine the legal
circumstances of a citizen from another country in a third country,
and I wouldn't make that assumption.
Q: Part of the statements made by the UN Human Rights Watch said that
the United States failed before to prevent torturing US citizens in
Saudi Arabia, so how come you think you will be able to prevent
torturing a Saudi citizen?
RUBIN: Let's bear in mind that it's not our job to prevent. We're the
United States but it doesn't mean we can stop every bad thing from
happening in the world, and human rights groups and others need to
understand that we don't determine everything that happens in the
world. We are not in a position to control the whole world.
What we are in a position to do is to abide by our obligations under
the torture convention and those obligations have been carefully
considered; they've been discussed in detail between the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State; and the judgment was that we, by
removing him to Saudi Arabia, would be fulfilling our obligations
under the torture convention.
Q: The consular stuff aside, will investigators have access to him
after the --
RUBIN: I'm not going to speculate on what's going to happen in the
future. We've lived up to our obligations under the torture
convention. Let's remember who we're dealing with here. We're dealing
with a person who we believe is responsible for terrorist acts, but we
also don't believe we have the evidence to prosecute him in a court of
law. There are a number of incidents this person has been involved
with where we believe there is information that innocent people have
been murdered and killed, and we've gone through extraordinary legal
processes to ensure that we, the United States as the country of laws,
treat him properly.
So for everyone to now worry about what would happen to him in Saudi
Arabia is legitimate. We worried about that and that is why we went
through our legal process. But if you have questions as to what will
happen in Saudi Arabia beyond our obligations under the torture
convention, I recommend you put them to the Saudi Government.
Q: You are not talking about the moral obligation of the United States
now. You are taking it legally, literally speaking.
RUBIN: Again, if you want to talk about moral obligations, you know,
every day there are 75 issues here that come before us about problems
in the world - bad things happening - and the United States is not
capable of stopping every bad thing from happening in every bad place,
in places that are bad. We don't do that. We do the best we can. We
try to marry our principles with our pragmatism and, in the case of
Hani al-Sayegh we went to extraordinary lengths to ensure that we were
acting consistent with the torture convention.
Q: Could you deal with the Kofi Annan suggestion for a larger UN role
in Timor? I have a specific question about returning refugees.
RUBIN: On the first question, we do support a UN mission in East Timor
and we support Secretary General Annan's efforts to bring peace and
stability to that region. In particular, we respect the views the
Secretariat and his representatives have and the knowledge they have
about the on-the-ground situation in East Timor and the necessary
military, civilian and humanitarian resources that have to be put in
place.
As our diplomatic efforts and our assistance to the Australian-led
mission, INTERFET, demonstrate, we do support bringing peace and
stability to East Timor. We welcome the proposal the Secretary General
has put forward for a transitional administration in East Timor. We
will have to, obviously, look carefully at the proposal and consult
with the UN with respect to the size of the mission and the cost of
the mission.
Q: It's a complex subject to deal with in a Q&A form but it sounds
like, you know, there is something to be said for his approach but you
haven't changed your mind, have you, about regional powers, if that's
what Australia is, taking the lead?
RUBIN: No. We always envisioned the Phase III - yes, the Phase III of
the process always envisioned turning over responsibility to a UN
peacekeeping force and we have always supported that. The question is
the size and the cost, and those are issues that we think need to be
carefully examined. Certainly, right now we are supporting Australia's
efforts to involve themselves. When we get to Phase III, we have
supported it in principle but we want to look at some of the details.
Q: Is the US comfortable with the notion that the Indonesian
Government would be in charge of or would administer the return of
refugees? Are we looking - do you think that's a logical situation
considering what's happening there?
RUBIN: The Government of Indonesia reports that it is actively engaged
in efforts to register those in West Timor who fled the violence in
East Timor and return them if they so wish. While we are encouraged by
their intentions, we are gravely concerned by the methods being used
to achieve this objective. Registration as currently conducted is
under the gaze of the militias. We are also concerned that people do
not have access to good information about the situation in East Timor.
We strongly encourage the Government of Indonesia to allow the
international community, specifically the High Commissioner on
Refugees, to become full participants in the process of registration
and return. The Government of Indonesia has announced that the first
returns will occur later this week by flying 2,000 people to Dili. As
many as 230,000 Timorese remain in camps and dispersed in communities
in West Timor. Many have expressed their desire to return to East
Timor as soon as possible but returns have not begun and, as I
indicated, we are gravely concerned about the current situation.
In that regard, let me say that Assistant Secretary Harold Koh is in
West Timor. He has observed some troubling information that he has
going to be raising with the Indonesian Government, the nature of
which I can't get into at this time. But I will try to ensure that
when he comes back and reports to the Secretary that he is available
to all of you here in the briefing room.
Q: I understand that you obviously want a different registration
process but the concept of people going home under the right
circumstances?
RUBIN: We do want the refugees to return home, yes. We very much want
them to return home. One of the things that Secretary Albright has
been doing over the last week is urging the Indonesians to begin to
disarm the militias in West Timor so they're not posing a threat to
refugees in West Timor and not making it harder for them to return to
East Timor.
Q: Could I ask a question on the "T" word, torture, with regard to the
Middle East? Have you got any response yet from the Israeli Government
regarding the three men, Americans, who were tortured in an Israeli
jail?
RUBIN: I'll get that for you. I don't have anything prepared.
Q: And a second question concerning the visit of the Latin Patriarch
here over the weekend and some of his other people in a Holy Land
ecumenical fund that they've created to protect the Christians of the
Holy Land. During that visit, it was pointed out that there were three
- no, five resolutions have been submitted up on the Hill which would
basically intrude into the Jerusalem negotiations. Is the Department
taking a stand on these resolutions? I won't try to describe them.
RUBIN: I must have missed that report in my copy of The New York Times
today, but I will check it for you.
Q: This is something that might have been missed last week. The Pope's
planned visit to Iraq.
RUBIN: I hate the word "missed."
Q: There was a letter from - an open letter to the Pope from some
Iraqi intellectuals published last week, and I wondered - it was a
rather unusual document and I wondered if perhaps the State Department
had any comment on it.
RUBIN: Well, this is Iraqis writing the Pope on behalf of Saddam
Hussein, as far as I can tell, to worry that the Pope's visit won't be
sufficiently pro-Saddam Hussein in its content. So I doubt they sent
us a copy of that letter.
But with respect to the Pope's visit, let me say this: Our
understanding is that no decision on the Pope's travel has been made.
Obviously, this is for the Vatican to decide. We have made clear to
the Vatican through diplomatic channels our views regarding Saddam and
his regime and likely efforts to manipulate his pilgrimage for
political aims. We have urged the Vatican to take the question of and
the reality of this manipulation into account as they plan for and
carry out his intended pilgrimage to Iraq.
So we have been concerned that the regime of Saddam Hussein would
manipulate his visit, as they have manipulated pretty much anything
anybody has ever tried to do for the people of Iraq, and to the extent
that others on behalf of the Iraqi regime have a different view, we
wouldn't agree with that.
Q: Speaking of Iraqi letters, King Abdallah of Jordan said today that
- he is on his way over here, apparently - but he is bringing a letter
with him from the Iraqi administration given to him by Tariq Aziz. Has
there been this - is this the first in a series of communications or
has there been some -- (inaudible)?
RUBIN: First of all, I wouldn't assume there is some big issue here.
The Iraqis regularly seek to have discussions with American officials
and we're not interested in those discussions; we're interested in
Iraq complying with Security Council resolutions and with Iraq living
up to the requirements of those resolutions and agreeing to pursue the
resolutions that they're required to resolve.
The Iraqis would like to present their problem as a problem with the
United States and we do not believe they have a problem with the
United States; they have a problem with the United Nations. So their
attempts to have contact with us or attempts to try to make it seem
like if they could just satisfy the United States everything would be
fine, that's not the case. The Iraqis are in serious violation of
Security Council resolutions and that is the reason they're isolated,
the reason they have sanctions in the world.
Whether King Abdallah has such a letter or doesn't have such a letter
would not be for me to comment, but taking the question in general as
to Iraqi desire to talk to the United States, that would be our view.
Q: While we're at it, his schedule seems to be very much uncertain
right now except for seeing the President. Do you happen to know if
the Secretary will see him this week? He's due tomorrow now, not
today.
RUBIN: He's arriving on the 7th, tomorrow. He'll be here for a private
visit. He will be meeting the Secretary and I'll get you a time for
that.
Q: (Inaudible) this week?
RUBIN: I don't believe so.
Q: Thank you, Jamie. Iraq was designated yesterday by State
Department, in addition to six other countries, as violators of human
rights, of religious rights for minorities. Jamie, what's the point,
first of all, for the State Department to make this list now, since
United States has no ties with six out of the seven countries? And why
now?
RUBIN: Well, there is testimony this afternoon by Robert Seiple, the
Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom, and he will announce the
Secretary's intention to designate five countries as countries of
particular concern. Those five countries are Burma, China, Iran, Iraq
and Sudan. Formal congressional notification as required by the act
will take place in the next few days.
This is a designation pursuant to a law that is the latest
manifestation of Secretary Albright's commitment to promote religious
freedom around the world. She is determined to promote religious
freedom in every region for every faith. She has raised the issue
personally in her meetings with foreign leaders, has met extensively
with religious leaders and has worked with an advisory committee.
The law requires that these designations be made if the Secretary so
determines and the specific criterion will be discussed more in this
testimony but, essentially, that the country concerned has engaged in
or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Five
of these countries met this standard and that is why they were so
designated.
The Secretary also intends to identify the Taliban in Afghanistan,
which we do not recognize as a government, and Serbia, which is not a
country, as particularly severe violators of religious freedom. The
reasons for this designation, to respond directly, is there is a law
and this is a law that we support, that we signed, that we want to
implement, and that is why they were so designated.
Q: What can they do right now? What United States can do right now
against six of all these countries with no ties? Most of them are
under sanctions already.
RUBIN: First of all, I assume, as journalists, you understand the
value in shining a spotlight on human rights abuses. That is something
that we think is an important part of the process of promoting human
rights, is shining a spotlight on abuses.
To the extent that this report can help do that, that will be a good
step. To the extent that some of these countries - and it is not true
with all of them - are already so cut off that there is nothing
further we can cut off, that doesn't mean we shouldn't identify them
as countries that are violating religious freedom just because we
don't have ties with them. Those we do have ties with, we will make
our own judgments as to what the right sanction should be.
Q: These are directly violating - these are countries that directly
violate religious freedom or do they, by chance, suppress various
ethnic groups and, as a result, religious freedom is limited? You're
talking about Serbia violating religious freedom or is it that Serbia
- well, you know my question.
RUBIN: Let me read the standard again for you.
Q: Because I want to see how Serbia fits in with it.
RUBIN: The government concerned has engaged in or tolerated
particularly severe violations of religious freedom during the
preceding 12 months. In Serbia, the predominantly Christian Orthodox
authorities employed the killing, torture, rape and forced mass
emigration of Kosovar Albanians, who are overwhelmingly Moslem, in an
effort to drive them from the region.
Q: It's religious, too.
RUBIN: It has a religious component.
Q: Of course it has a religious component.
RUBIN: Andrea, yes.
Q: New subject.
RUBIN: Same subject. There's some demand on the part of your
colleagues. In the front and then we'll go to the back. Yes.
Q: On what grounds other than the level of your political relations
would you include Iraq on that list and not Saudi Arabia?
RUBIN: Well, we make our judgments and we've made a judgment - if you
look at the report itself - as to what has gone on in Saudi Arabia and
what has gone on in Iraq. It is our judgment that, in Iraq, that the
violations have been particularly severe of religious freedom. We have
made comments about human rights problems in Saudi Arabia in our human
rights report that is addressed in the religious freedom report, and
one makes judgments as to where the worst offenses are and that's what
we've judged.
Q: This designation has no automatic consequences?
RUBIN: It does require, as I understand it, some sanction to be
imposed; although, in cases where there is a complete cutoff of ties,
one wouldn't be able to implement that sanction. So the question would
be, whether that would stay in reserve if the other problems that led
to those sanctions were resolved and the country would come back into
the fold and it would stay on the list of issues that would justify
our specific action.
Can I go to one of your colleagues now or --
Q: Same thing. Could you just explain the mechanism for deciding what
the sanction would be?
RUBIN: The Secretary would make a judgment.
Q: That was the next question. You have menu items to choose from.
Have you made the choice?
RUBIN: Right. We have no judgments or specific choices to announce at
this time.
Q: Is this the first time that any countries or non-countries have
been so designated under this law?
RUBIN: It's a new law. It's the first time, yes.
Q: Back to Iraq --
RUBIN: I'm sorry, I forgot one of your colleagues. Let's go over
there. She was being so polite, unlike some others.
Q: This week in Cuba, there is a conference going on about Hemingway
and there are about 100 - roughly, about 100 American scholars who
wanted to attend and only a few were granted visas. Can you explain
why the others were denied?
RUBIN: Yes. Under the embargo, travel to Cuba for legitimate scholarly
purposes is permitted under a general license. The applicant must
demonstrate proper academic credentials and demonstrate that the trip
is academic in nature. The application in question was submitted by a
fishing organization.
US tourism to Cuba is not permitted under US laws. The Department of
Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control has statutory
responsibility for enforcing the embargo and licensing requests.
Obviously, they would get into the details more clearly.
We were not consulted on this particular license here at the State
Department, but I think that the fact it was submitted by a fishing
organization made it hard to justify under the academic exception.
Q: There are fishermen who are intellectuals.
RUBIN: I am not a fisherman so I don't know your reference.
Q: Back to Iraq, there is a British report to the effect that the
United States may be prepared to accept a kind of temporary suspension
of sanctions on Iraq in exchange for Iraq opening its doors again to
international inspection teams.
RUBIN: Well, there are often reports in the British press. That's one
of those - anyway, I'll stop there - common reports. What I can say
about that is we have been discussing with Britain, the United
Kingdom, France and Russia the question of how to reestablish
consensus in the Security Council on Iraq.
We are insisting on compliance by Iraq. There is no change in the
international regime possible. In the absence of Iraq's full
compliance with Security Council resolutions, we are prepared to
discuss a number of measures, provided there is full compliance and
provided the proceeds and money that might be created would not go to
Saddam's regime which has a habit of using that money solely for the
purpose of either enriching the elite or building weapons of mass
destruction or otherwise improving the military machine that he
maintains.
Q: Have there been any communications between Secretary Albright and
the new foreign minister of Japan?
RUBIN: Yes, there has been a communication. Last night, Secretary
Albright spoke with the Foreign Minister of Japan and they had a good
conversation. It turns out Secretary Albright taught one of the
Foreign Minister's sons in her class in Georgetown. They talked a
little bit about that and they looked forward to having an early
meeting.
Q: Did she call the Foreign Minister or did he call her?
RUBIN: I think it was arranged; it wasn't a one or the other. I think
she made clear she wanted to congratulate him and he made clear he
wanted to talk to her and it was arranged.
Q: Will they be able to meet face to face any time soon?
RUBIN: Well, we're hoping for an early meeting. I just don't have a
date for that for you yet.
Q: Did they talk at all about having a two-plus-two with the defense
ministers as well, possibly this month?
RUBIN: I hadn't heard that.
Q: I know you've had lots of statements in the days past about foreign
aid. I wondered if you could advance on that?
RUBIN: Do it again?
Q: In lieu of the vote last night in the House and a vote today, as
early as today, in the Senate. And if you could be specific about
where you're concerned specifically in the areas that are being --
RUBIN: Yes, we are very concerned about the foreign operations bill.
It simply doesn't provide enough funding to carry out an effective
foreign policy. The serious cuts in the foreign operations bill fall
across virtually all of our programs. A few examples of this are with
respect to Wye River. The bill provides none of the funds requested by
the President for the Fiscal 2000 to support the Wye River agreement.
This funding is essential to support the renewed dedication of the
Israelis and Palestinians to implement Wye and achieve an historic
permanent status agreement over the next year.
In the area of Russia and the Newly Independent States, the Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative is also being cut. We think this is
extremely important to protect our nation from the potential spread of
weapons of mass destruction and the bill effectively provides no
resources to continue this initiative and reduces our ability to
prevent international security threats that may emerge from the former
Soviet Union.
In North Korea assistance to KEDO is cut, which could jeopardize our
ability to fulfill our commitments under the agreed framework to
provide heavy fuel oil. People have criticized the agreed framework
but let's remember the agreed framework froze nuclear activities at
Yongbyon and has helped us prevent a situation where North Korea has
threatened the world with nuclear weapons. This cut interferes with
our ability to manage this agreement and therefore jeopardizes the
national security of the United States. It could also damage our
position in Asia as other countries look at the effects that this
could have.
Similarly, there are cuts in peacekeeping. The bill cuts this
peacekeeping program by 41 percent. It will decrease funds available
for missions in Bosnia and Croatia, reduce assistance for the Africa
Response Initiative such as ECOMOG and eliminate funding for other
regional activities. Let's remember it's members of Congress as much
as we do who time and time again look at crises in the world and ask
why isn't the United States in a position to help alleviate these
problems?
Well, if they're going to tie our hands, take our money away, then
they are going to be responsible for our inability to affect these
many crises in Africa and around the world. The list goes on and on
and on. It's another example of Congress refusing to provide us the
tools that we need to be performing the diplomacy that they
legitimately expect us to perform. Diplomacy is the first line of
defense and time and time again members of Congress have asked the
question of why we didn't do something earlier or why we didn't do
more or why we didn't solve some problem quicker or where we made this
mistake and that.
With the funds they are giving us, we won't be able to act at all in
many parts of the world. So they need to understand that they are
cutting America's first line of defense, which is our diplomacy.
Q: If I could follow up on that, what's your assessment of why this is
happening? The Financial Times, for example, today is reporting that
it's an example of hostility towards foreign policy and I just was
curious to hear your --
RUBIN: I can't assess clearly the motivations for such ill-advised
policies. My mind doesn't work that way.
Q: Do you have any updates on the slave labor talks that are going on?
RUBIN: Just that the question was asked yesterday about the numbers.
Jim Anderson is going to come by - look at that, he came right back in
the room.
On that question, I can just tell you in response to your question
yesterday, the German Government did not make a proposal yesterday. We
expect the German Government will make a formal proposal tomorrow
morning.
Today's meeting deals with procedural issues relevant to the
establishment and working on the foundation initiative. We are still
planning to have a press event tomorrow here in the Department with
Deputy Secretary Eizenstat.
Q: Another subject?
RUBIN: Please. You can leave now, Jim.
Q: Yesterday I asked this question as well. Do you have any comments
on joint military exercises conducted by Cyprus and Greece in Cyprus?
RUBIN: There are joint military exercises going on now in Cyprus.
Greece and Cyprus are conducting their annual joint exercise,
Nikiforos, from October 2nd through the 7th. We have urged and
continue to urge all sides to avoid taking any actions that could
increase tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. We continue to work
hard to get the two sides into negotiations without precondition under
UN auspices, as called for by the group of AID and UN Security Council
resolutions. Special Emissary Al Moses will travel to the region next
week to explore ways to move forward.
Q: Yesterday, when President Clinton was asked about deploying the
anti-ballistic missile system, his reply was: when it is ready. Those
were his words. And I would ask, Mr. Rubin, what is standing in the
way besides the readiness of the system, besides the ABM treaty with
the Russians? I understand some of our allies have some issues or some
opposition. Could you enumerate?
RUBIN: There are a number of factors that are being considered as we
go forward to decide whether to deploy an anti-ballistic missile
system next year. Some of those factors include technical feasibility;
i.e., when it is ready. Other factors include the negotiations under
way. There are five or six factors that I would like to get you for
the record, that we would take into account, being a responsible
country that wants to ensure that we have taken into account all of
the relevant factors before making a decision of this significance. I
would be happy to get you the formal five factors that I believe are
being taken into account.
Thanks.
(end transcript)
