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23 January 2002
U.S. Official Defends Security at Nuclear Weapons SitesResponds to Congressman's allegations of lax securityA U.S. official says allegations that the Department of Energy has lax security at its nuclear weapons facilities are false and misleading. Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration John Gordon said in a January 23 press release that he has assessed the security conditions at the weapons sites many times "and I personally reviewed our posture immediately following the terrorist attacks in September." Gordon's remarks follow the release of a letter sent to the Department of Energy (DOE) by U.S. Representative Edward Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat who co-chairs the Bipartisan Task Force on Nonproliferation. Markey said numerous security problems have occurred at DOE nuclear weapons facilities, such as the Los Alamos National Laboratory, and that "mock terrorists" were able to access weapons grade uranium and plutonium in security tests at the facilities more than 50 percent of the time. He said that, according to experts, a group of terrorists could, once inside a facility, quickly build and detonate a bomb which could achieve the same explosive force as a small nuclear weapon. Gordon said in response that there is no question that DOE takes security seriously as a critical part of its mission, and charges that there is a 50-percent failure rate in security tests "are simply untrue." Gordon said other federal agencies look to DOE's security force as a model for effective practices, and he added that the energy agency regularly trains individuals in other federal security organizations. Following is the text of the press release: Department Of Energy Washington, DC - Administrator John Gordon released the following statement regarding security at the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons facilities: "As the Administrator of the NNSA, I am responsible to the Secretary of Energy and the American people for the security of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. I have assessed the security conditions at our sites many times and I personally reviewed our posture immediately following the terrorist attacks in September. Allegations that the Department of Energy has lax security at its nuclear weapons facilities are false and misleading. Charges that there is a fifty percent failure rate in our security tests are simply untrue. While we welcome serious inquiries into the Department's security practices, it is unfortunate that some try to create a climate of fear grossly disproportionate to the risks to the public. Such unfounded allegations are a disservice to the communities that are home to our national defense facilities. There is no question that DOE takes security seriously as a critical part of our mission. The strong group of professionals who protect our sites are a source of pride and it is grossly unfair to characterize individuals or the system as uncaring or ignoring problems. Other federal agencies look to the DOE's force as a model for effective practices, and in fact DOE regularly trains other federal security organizations. As is often the case in "reports" such as the one from POGO, the use of outdated data contributes to misleading conclusions. In the mid 1990s, when budgets were severely cut and security was progressively degraded, there was a higher level of risk. Now we aggressively protect our people, facilities, and material, and we display a formidable security posture to potential attackers. Our forces are well-trained and well-equipped. They are tested by outside challengers, often to failure - so we know where weaknesses are. Then we fix the problem. The physics of creating a bomb has been well understood by the DOE for a long time. That is why we have security and operational measures in place to provide a high level of assurance that these materials remain safe and secure. Nuclear material is not at risk at Department of Energy facilities." Additional information on this topic is available at the following Web site: www.energy.gov |
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