Text: Presidential Certifications for Major Drug Producing/Transit Countries

(White House says the President did not certify Afghanistan and Burma)
(2160)

The White House says that, acting on recommendations from Secretary of
State Albright, four drug producing and transit countries were
certified by President Clinton "on the basis of the vital national
interests of the United States." Those four were Cambodia, Haiti,
Nigeria and Paraguay.

The President did not certify Afghanistan and Burma.

Following is the White House text:

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

March 1, 2000

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

Annual Presidential Certifications for Major Drug Producing and
Transit Countries

Acting on recommendations from Secretary of State Albright, President
Clinton today sent to the Congress his certification determinations
with respect to the current list of major illicit drug-producing and
drug-transit countries. Of the 26 countries and certain jurisdictions
on this year's list, 20 have been certified as either cooperating
fully with the United States or taking adequate steps on their own to
combat the illicit drug problem. They are: The Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Taiwan,
Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Four majors list countries were certified on the basis of the vital
national interests of the United States: Cambodia, Haiti, Nigeria, and
Paraguay. The President did not certify Afghanistan and Burma, thus
substantially restricting most forms of U.S. assistance for these two
countries other than specified categories of counter-drug and
humanitarian assistance.

Peru continued to pursue its comprehensive counter-drug strategy
throughout 1999, achieving excellent progress towards the goal of
eliminating illegal coca cultivation. An additional 24 percent was
eliminated in 1999, for an overall reduction of 66 percent over the
last four years. Peru's counter-drug alternative development program,
working through 103 local governments, almost 700 communities, and
more than 15,000 farmers, significantly strengthened social and
economic infrastructure in the illicit growing areas and helped shift
the economic balance in favor of licit activities.

Peru's significant reduction of illegal coca cultivation demonstrates
that its comprehensive counter-drug strategy is working. The key focus
now is maintaining and improving the complementary programs that have
proven successful, including manual eradication of illegal coca crops,
counter-drug related alternative development, airbridge denial
operations, and land and maritime/riverine interdiction.

Bolivia also pursued an aggressive counter-drug strategy in 1999.
Exceeding the schedule of its own five year plan to eliminate all
illicit coca from Bolivia, last year the Banzer administration
eliminated an unprecedented 16,999 hectares, for a net reduction of 43
percent. And despite a slight downturn in the Bolivian export sector
in 1999, export volumes of nearly all alternative development crops
improved. Although Bolivia remains the world's third largest producer
of cocaine, its cocaine became less marketable last year due in part
to successful law enforcement efforts to prevent precursor chemicals
from being smuggled into the country. As is the case for Peru, Bolivia
continues to demonstrate that countries with the political will to
implement proven counter-drug strategies can achieve significant and
sustainable progress, particularly in cooperation with regional
neighbors and other countries for which the global problem of illicit
drugs is a national priority.

In Colombia counter-drug efforts continue to improve in key areas,
demonstrating the commitment of the Pastrana administration to
implement decisive measures both on its own and in cooperation with
the United States. In addition to substantial drug seizures, Colombian
achievements included: Operation Millennium, a coordinated initiative
involving Colombian, Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agencies that
resulted in more than 30 major arrests; enhanced air interdiction
operations by the Colombian Air Force; strong advances in combating
maritime trafficking; and increased support by the Colombian armed
forces for eradication and lab destruction operations carried out by
the Colombian National Police. Despite these dedicated efforts,
Colombia remains the world's largest cocaine producer: over
three-quarters of the world's cocaine hydrochloride is processed in
Colombia. Approximately 80 percent of the cocaine used in the United
States originates or transits Colombia, as does a significant
percentage of the heroin. This enormous illicit drug problem, coupled
with other serious, interrelated societal, economic and governmental
problems, constitutes an urgent crisis now confronting Colombia.

In September 1999, the Pastrana administration unveiled its "Plan
Colombia," a balanced and comprehensive strategy to address the many
challenges facing the country. The new strategy is well-conceived,
incorporating multi-faceted programs that have been proven to work in
Peru, Bolivia, Thailand and other countries. The key components
target: the peace process; the economy; counter-drug programs,
including eradication, alternative development and interdiction;
justice system reform and human rights protection; and democratization
and social development. If adequately resourced and skillfully
implemented, the new strategy should enable Colombia to make
substantial progress in all areas.

The United States strongly supports Plan Colombia and has already
contributed to funding the $7.5 billion strategy. The Administration
has proposed to the Congress a balanced and fully integrated program
totaling more than $1.6 billion over the next two years to assist in
implementing Plan Colombia and in preserving counter-drug successes in
Peru, Bolivia and other countries in the Andean region.

The Government of Mexico remains committed at the highest levels to
implementing effective counter-drug programs and to cooperating with
the United States in efforts to defeat and dismantle heavily armed and
well-financed international drug trafficking organizations. In recent
years, the two governments have constructed an unprecedented framework
for coordination, a mechanism for evaluation of progress, and several
fora for regular consultation on counter-drug issues.

Under President Zedillo's leadership, Mexico achieved some notable
successes in 1999. These achievements included: further implementation
of its multi-year $500 million public security investment plan; over
8,000 drug-related arrests, including several major traffickers;
significant maritime seizures involving close cooperation between the
Mexican Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard; a 39 percent increase in
marijuana eradication over 1998 and a corresponding net production
decrease of 19 percent for the year; a more than 25 percent drop in
net opium gum production; and the extradition of 14 fugitives to the
United States, including two Mexican national drug traffickers.

Mexico's achievements, however, continued to be undermined by chronic
institutional weaknesses, particularly drug-related corruption and
judicial obstacles to the swift extradition of fugitives. President
Zedillo has made combating corruption a national priority, and has
taken steps to improve internal controls, but he acknowledges that
success will take time.

Cambodia took a number of steps forward in 1999, including increased
emphasis on eradication of illicit marijuana plantations, first-time
drug seizures at Phnom Penh's international airport, and several
dismissals of senior officials for corruption. In addition,
cooperation by Cambodian authorities with the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration was excellent. However, political turmoil and related
violence, coupled with endemic corruption, effectively precluded a
fully credible anti-drug effort. There has been no fundamental
institutional reform that would meet the law enforcement challenge
Cambodia faces from lawless elements, including major drug
traffickers.

Thus, despite some improvements, Cambodia still failed to meet the
statutory standard for certification based on full cooperation with
the United States or taking adequate steps on its own to achieve full
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug
Convention. Given that democracy in Cambodia is not yet fully
established, U.S. vital national interests call for certification on
that basis in order to promote democracy in Cambodia and stability
throughout the region. Should counter-drug sanctions be imposed, it
would not be possible for the United States to provide
strategically-placed assistance to respond to potential crises and to
strengthen Cambodia's economic and institutional bases for a
democratic system.

Haiti is a significant transshipment point for drugs, primarily
cocaine, moving through the Caribbean from South America to the United
States. With many obstacles confronting the Government of Haiti,
including extensive corruption, weak institutions and scarce
resources, little significant counter-drug progress was made in 1999.
This was generally the case even in areas where such progress was
reasonably achievable.

Haiti thus failed to meet the statutory standard required for
certification based on full cooperation with the United States or
taking adequate steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the
goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, a cutoff
of bilateral assistance would threaten security and democratic
stability in Haiti, both of which bear immediately and directly on
U.S. ability to disrupt the flow of both illicit drugs and
undocumented Haitian migrants into the United States. Haiti has
therefore been certified on the basis of U.S. vital national
interests.

Poly-crime organizations centered in Nigeria operate extensive global
trafficking networks, dominate the Sub-Saharan drug markets, and
account for a large part of the heroin imported into the United
States. They also transport South American cocaine to Europe, Asia and
elsewhere in Africa, especially South Africa, and export marijuana to
Europe and West Africa. The new democratic government of President
Obasanjo's strong public denunciation of drug trafficking and
financial crimes is a welcome change from the high-level indifference
of previous administrations. In addition, there were some counter-drug
successes in 1999, related primarily to improved enforcement at
airports, arrests of drug couriers, and illicit crop eradication.

Overall, however, the Nigerian counter-drug effort remains unfocused
and lacking in material support, with no new actions or policies to
bring about change. There were no major trafficker prosecutions or
arrests last year, nor were there any extraditions in response to
outstanding U.S. extradition requests. Corruption was widespread and
potentially effective counter-drug laws were generally not enforced.

While Nigeria does not meet the statutory criteria for certification
based on full cooperation with the United States or taking adequate
steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the goals and
objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, U.S. vital national
interests require providing humanitarian, economic and security
assistance to Nigeria in addition to counter-drug and humanitarian
assistance. Not doing so now would jeopardize not only an emerging
democracy in one of Africa's most important countries, but also
Nigeria's attempts to reinvigorate its failing economy and its support
for democracy and peacekeeping throughout the region. A decision not
to certify Nigeria would block assistance that the new
democratically-elected government needs to meet these challenges,
seriously damaging the prospects for success of stable, transparent
democracy in Nigeria.

Paraguay, a significant cocaine transit country, failed to accomplish
the majority of its counter-drug goals for 1999. In particular, no
major traffickers were investigated, arrested or prosecuted, nor were
sufficient measures taken to prevent or punish corruption related to
drug trafficking. A decision not to certify Paraguay would, however,
cut off civilian and military assistance programs designed to
strengthen Paraguay's democratic institutions, thereby negatively
impacting U.S. vital national interests related to drug trafficking,
terrorism, intellectual property piracy and environmental
preservation. In 2000, the Government of Paraguay should translate its
oft-stated political will into concrete action against major drug
traffickers, money laundering, and official corruption.

In Afghanistan, there has been a sharp increase in poppy cultivation,
in refining of opium into heroin, and in trafficking of illicit
opiates. Last year, Afghanistan cultivated a larger poppy crop and
harvested more opium gum than any other country by a wide margin.
Increasing evidence supports the conclusion that the largest of
Afghanistan's factions, the Taliban, is fully complicit in the illicit
drug trade. Controlling 85-90% of Afghanistan and 97% percent of the
opium cultivation area, the Taliban derives significant income from
every phase of drug production and trafficking, through crop taxation
and other means.

The substantial increases in large-scale opium cultivation and
trafficking, coupled with the failure of Taliban authorities to
initiate an appropriate law enforcement response, preclude a
determination that Afghanistan has taken adequate steps on its own to
achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the UN 1988
Drug Convention, to which Afghanistan is a party. Nor has Afghanistan
sufficiently cooperated with U.S. counter-drug efforts. In the absence
of verifiable and unambiguous steps by the Taliban to counter the
illicit drug problem, the United States and other concerned countries
are compelled to redirect their counter-drug efforts to interdiction
and border control strategies in surrounding countries.

Burma is the world's second largest producer of opium and heroin after
Afghanistan. Counter-drug efforts in 1999 showed progress in several
areas, including: increased methamphetamine and ephedrine seizures;
modest expansion of crop eradication; and a number of arrests of
members of some cease-fire groups for drug trafficking.

Such efforts must be stepped up, however, if they are to have a
significant impact on the overall trafficking problem. Large-scale
poppy cultivation and opium production continue, decreasing in the
last few years largely because of severe drought conditions rather
than eradication programs. The Government of Burma's effective
toleration of money laundering, its unwillingness to implement its
drug laws, and its failure to render notorious traffickers under
indictment in the United States all remain serious concerns. Burma's
counter-drug efforts are far from commensurate with the scope of the
illicit problem within its borders.

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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)