Text: Beers Testifies on Drug Certification Process

(Assistant Secretary explains premise of U.S. policy)  (2190)

The underlying premise of the annual U.S. drug certification process
is that the global drug trade is "potentially so destructive to all of
us that we must deal with it in a straightforward fashion," says Rand
Beers, assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and
law enforcement affairs.

Testifying March 21 before the Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control, Beers said the world's drug problems cannot be
confronted unless "we identify them, and sometimes those problems
reveal painful truths," adding: "That applies as much to the United
States as to any other country affected by illegal drugs. We try to
identify our own shortcomings and remedy them. We expect others to do
the same."

In response to criticism that the certification process does not hold
the United States to the same level of accountability as other
countries, Beers said there is "abundant evidence" of the strong and
continuing U.S. commitment to attacking all aspects of the drug
problem. Moreover, he said, "it should be evident to most governments
that the president of the United States cannot make so important a
public declaration without being certain of and accountable for his
facts."

The United States is thus "presenting itself to the same international
public scrutiny it visits on the rest of the global community," he
said.

Beers explained that the drug certification process is required by
U.S. law, which orders the executive branch to certify annually
whether the governments of major drug-producing and transit countries
have cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps to meet
the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.

If the president does not certify a government, it is ineligible for
most forms of U.S. assistance, with the exception of humanitarian and
anti-drug aid, Beers said.

Following is the text of Beers' testimony, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)
     
Rand Beers
Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs
Statement before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
Washington, D.C., March 21, 2000

A Review of the Annual Certification Process

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the President's
narcotics certification mechanism with the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control. This is a straightforward procedure.
Every year the President must certify that the governments of the
major drug producing and transit countries have cooperated with the
U.S., or taken adequate steps on their own, to meet the goals and
objectives of an international standard that most countries have
signed onto -- the 1998 UN Drug Convention. If the President does not
certify a government, it is ineligible for most forms of U.S.
assistance, with the exception of humanitarian and anti-drug aid. The
U.S. is also obliged to vote "no" to any assistance loans in the
multilateral development banks for countries denied certification.

The certification process is a statutory requirement. In 1986, the
Congress -- frustrated by what it perceived at the time as reluctance
on the part of the State Department to take effective measures against
the governments of drug source and transit countries -- introduced the
drug certification process. It required the executive branch to
identify the major drug producing and transit countries and impose
sanctions on those that 1) do not cooperate with us, or take adequate
steps on their own, in meeting international drug control goals, or 2)
that represent a vital interest to the United States. The Congress in
effect has asked the Executive Branch to answer a simple question:
Since the drug problem so directly affects the U.S. and its citizens,
are funds that we provide to source and transit countries appropriate
and cost-effective when weighed against counternarcotics cooperation?
Every year since 1993 the President has gotten everyone's attention --
both at home and abroad -- by being forthright in judging each
country's degree of cooperation in our collective effort to stop the
production and flow of illicit drugs.

As a public diplomacy instrument, the drug certification process
represents an important departure from traditional bilateral
diplomacy. Where traditional diplomacy relies on confidentiality and
private communication, public diplomacy calls for openness and
transparency. The certification process is the closest thing we have
to full public disclosure of the U.S. Government's objective
assessment of the international drug situation. And on the
international scene, full disclosure is always sensitive, since no
government likes to see a spotlight on its weaknesses.

The underlying premise of the certification process is that the drug
trade is potentially so destructive to all of us that we must deal
with it in a straightforward fashion. We cannot confront problems
unless we identify them, and sometimes those problems reveal painful
truths. That applies as much to the United States as to any other
country affected by illegal drugs. We try to identify our own
shortcomings and remedy them. We expect others to do the same.

Let me take a moment to answer the criticism that the certification
process invokes a double standard, since some claim it does not hold
the U.S. to the same level of accountability. Obviously, we cannot
certify ourselves without being accused of bias; but that does not
mean we are evading public examination. It should be evident to most
governments that the President of the United States cannot make so
important a public declaration without being certain of and
accountable for his facts. There is also abundant evidence of the
continuing strong commitment of the United States to attack all
aspects of the drug problem vigorously. So by the certification
determinations, the United States is presenting itself to the same
international public scrutiny it visits on the rest of the global
community.

In addition, by issuing a high-profile determination, the President is
in effect holding up the credibility and objectivity of the U.S.
Government for international public scrutiny. If the determinations
are factually incorrect, we will be the first to correct the record.
But seldom has a country objected to the veracity of the statements in
the President's determinations; they have only objected to their being
made public -- which is the whole point of the process. In that
regard, the hue and cry over the application of this policy is, quite
frankly, a testament to its effectiveness.

Prior to the March 1 deadline for certification, we see countries
introducing legislation, passing laws, eradicating drug crops, and
capturing elusive drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence. These
countries know that their actions will have an impact on their
certification decision. They also know what the U.S. expects from
them.

Over the past several years, we have made the administration of the
certification process more transparent. Each spring after the
decisions are announced, our embassies give a formal demarche to each
country, explaining the prior year's decision and setting benchmarks
for the coming year. The benchmarks become the standard by which the
country is reviewed in the following year's process. Throughout the
year, the embassy goes back to the government to discuss progress and
barriers in meeting the benchmarks. When the President finally makes
his decisions on March 1, there should be no government taken by
surprise.

Likewise, it is no surprise that the threat of public exposure has
produced some amazing results, which have had a great impact on our
anti-narcotics efforts overseas. For example, drug corruption works
best in the shadows. The lower the visibility of a drug organization's
subversive operations, the greater its chance for success. It cannot
withstand for long the spotlight of public scrutiny. The drug
certification process offers an effective way of attacking such
corruption, since it is the legislative equivalent of an international
spotlight that we can focus on corruption. Section 490 of the Foreign
Assistance Act requires the President to certify annually that each
major drug producing or transit country has cooperated fully or has
taken adequate steps on its own to meet the standards of the 1988 UN
Convention, including exposing public corruption.

Unfortunately, there are also governments such as in Afghanistan and
Burma that cannot be influenced by the certification process, and are
increasingly falling behind in their efforts to attack drug
trafficking. These two countries remain the largest illicit sources of
opium and heroin. We continue to receive reports that the Taliban are
actively involved in Afghani drug trafficking; in Burma, the
government has declined to go after the powerful ethnic groups that
control the opium trade. In these examples, the certification process
and the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) serve
to inform the international community of the situation in these
countries, and to gain the support of other countries in calling for
greater counternarcotics efforts by Afghanistan and Burma.

The purpose of the certification process is not to punish; it is to
hold all countries to a minimum acceptable international standard of
cooperation in meeting the goals of an international convention to
which all but a small minority of countries are parties. In making the
certification determination, we also take into account the fact that
some countries face much greater obstacles than do others. In the
early 1990s, the President's "Statements of Explanation," which
accompanied his certification decisions, were often publicly critical
of the counternarcotics performances of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia;
yet, we knew that many of the law enforcement agencies in these
countries were doing their best against difficult odds and with
inadequate resources. So, it is with great satisfaction that we see
today a continuing downward trend in illicit coca cultivation. The
total coca crop remains at its lowest level in 10 years, even
factoring in a sharp rise in cultivation in Colombia. Peru and Bolivia
have made substantial annual inroads against coca cultivation, with
respective cultivation reductions of 24% and 43% last year.
Remarkably, among the many factors that contributed to their success
was the determination to reinforce drug crop eradication efforts to
remove the public annoyance of unfavorable annual certification
reviews. Of course, the difficult situation in Colombia shows that
political will and courage can only go so far without the proper means
of material support -- which is why we are engaged in supporting
President Pastrana's Plan Colombia. Admittedly, certification has been
most effective in the Western Hemisphere, although it has clearly
raised the profile of the narcotics issue in Nigeria and in most major
drug producing and transit countries in Asia.

The June 1998 UN General Assembly Special Session on Narcotics
confirmed much of what we have been saying through the certification
process for many years. Specifically, that the drug problem is a
threat to all nations and that there is a common and shared
responsibility to address this issue in an integrated fashion. The UN
Special Session did much to mute the criticism of the substance within
our certification process, in that it called for the creation of
country-specific counternarcotics strategies, regional exchanges of
information, and implementation of the multilateral counternarcotics
conventions to which most nations are signatories. These issues are
taking on particular relevance for European nations, which are now
feeling the impact of multi-ton loads of cocaine from South America,
as trafficking organizations begin to exploit the untapped demand for
drugs in Europe.

Some opponents of the process argue that certification is an
unnecessary tool that only serves to cause ill will in U.S. bilateral
relationships. I concede that certification is at times a blunt
instrument, but I believe that it serves a purpose -- which ultimately
is to give governments in key drug countries the strongest
encouragement to stop the drugs before they reach U.S. shores. Carrot
and stick diplomacy works to our advantage in this case.

That said, the Administration also supports the OAS Drug Commission's
Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism--MEM. Designed to encompass all
Western Hemisphere countries in addressing individual and regional
counternarcotics performance, it provides a consensual forum for a
frank exchange of views, evaluation, and remedial action. Potentially,
it provides a mechanism that could make our unilateral certification
process in the Western Hemisphere an anachronism, particularly in
light of the excellent efforts of certain key producing and transit
countries. In April, the OAS Drug Commission will convene the first
meeting of country representatives to the MEM, at which time we will
have a better idea of how rigorously this concept will be executed in
practice.

The certification process, with all its flaws, has produced results.
The strength of the certification process lies in its transparency. We
want to assure all of our partners in the anti-drug struggle that we
are not asking of them any more than we ask of ourselves. It is
because of this partnership that collectively we have made significant
gains against the drug trade. It is also through this partnership that
nations in Europe, Asia, and Africa with increasing drug demand
problems can commit themselves to supporting the counternarcotics
efforts of the major drug producing and transit countries. And it will
be this partnership that ultimately puts the international drug
syndicates out of business.

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Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)