Article: State Department Says 85-90 Percent of Colombian Coca to Be Destroyed

08 March 2001

Article: State Department Says 85-90 Percent of Colombian Coca to Be Destroyed

U.S. official Phillip Chicola discusses spraying campaign

By Eric Green
Washington File Staff Writer

Washington -- The Colombian government's aerial spraying of coca plants will eventually wipe out 85 to 90 percent of the illegal crop in Colombia, says Phillip Chicola, director of the State Department's Office of Andean Affairs.

Speaking March 8 at a forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Chicola said the United States agrees with Colombian President Andres Pastrana that stopping the illegal drug trade is crucial to bringing an end to Colombia's long-standing civil conflict. Peace in Colombia is "highly unlikely," he said, "until and unless the fuel for the conflict -- that is, the profits generated by drug trafficking and other criminal activity" -- disappears or diminishes.

"It is very difficult to get any of the armed groups who live off the illegal narco-trafficking to seriously engage [in national reconciliation] as long as there are great profits" to be made from the drug trade, Chicola said.

He said that since the U.S.-backed aerial eradication campaign began last December, more than 30,000 hectares of Colombian coca fields have been eliminated. "We believe we will end up destroying 85-90 percent of that coca," he added.

The United States' $1,300 million support package for Plan Colombia -- approved by Congress last July -- also backs the Colombian government's "robust effort" to establish a greater presence in southern Colombia, where armed guerrillas and narco-traffickers have been operating with relative impunity. The U.S. package simultaneously supports the alternative development of legal crops, the activities of human rights organizations, and efforts to build a stronger judiciary in Colombia, Chicola said.

He stressed that the assistance is not linked to any one U.S. administration, and indicated that the United States can be expected to back any future democratically-elected government in Colombia. Plan Colombia comes to its scheduled conclusion when Pastrana's term in office ends in August 2002.

"We're in this for the long run, this is our national policy, this is not the policy of any [one] given administration," Chicola said.

At the same time, he warned that only Colombia can solve its own problems. The United States "cannot substitute [for] the political will and the societal will that are necessary" to bring peace to that country, Chicola said. Officials in Washington are convinced that Pastrana is committed to making the necessary changes, and "we hope to God the next government is also serious about it," he added.

Chicola reminded the audience that implementation of the U.S. aid package began only recently, and that while the short-term results are "encouraging," the long-term solutions to Colombia's problems "do not loom anywhere near the horizon."

He said the peace talks underway between the Colombian government and the guerrillas are "probably the key to solving Colombia's problems over the long term, but they are by definition very long and complicated and I suspect they will take a very long time before they come to fruition."

Another speaker, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia Myles Frechette, offered a mixed view on the level of support Pastrana and Plan Colombia are receiving from the Colombian people. One clearly bright spot, he said, is that the delivery of U.S. counter-narcotics equipment to southern Colombia is apparently going well.

Frechette, who served as U.S. envoy to Bogota in the mid-1990s, said that with the exception of 25 Huey II helicopters that will not arrive until the beginning of 2002, all other equipment will meet its scheduled delivery date, and counter-narcotics military battalions "will be trained and ready to go."

The former diplomat, who now works in the private sector, praised Pastrana "for being honest from the beginning" about the length of time that will be necessary to bring peace to Colombia. Frechette said that while critics have assailed Pastrana for not concluding a peace agreement, Pastrana's real mission was to begin a process "which could then be carried forward by successor presidents."

The Colombian president, Frechette said, will effectively become a "lame-duck" president at the beginning of 2002 and so major progress in the peace negotiations with the guerrillas is unlikely. The guerrillas, he suggested, will instead turn their attention to wooing the candidates running to succeed Pastrana.

Frechette said two important tasks facing the Bush Administration involve winning international financial support for Plan Colombia, and obtaining approval from the U.S. Congress to renew and enhance the 1991 Andean Trade Preference Act.

He called Pastrana's February's trip to Washington to meet with President Bush and members of his administration a "big success." The meeting had "limited objectives and it achieved them," he said. The two leaders established a rapport, Frechette added, and the Bush Administration publicly agreed to support the Andean trade act. Both Colombian and U.S. officials should be "pleased" with the results of that meeting, he said.