01 March 2001

Transcript: State's Rand Beers Briefs on Anti-Drug Certification

President George W. Bush has certified 20 of 24 illicit drug producing and transit nations as fully cooperative in pursuit of the goals of the 1988 United Nations Drug Convention aimed at stemming international drug trafficking.

Two of the 24, Burma and Afghanistan, were not certified in the annual review.

Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Rand Beers described the findings to reporters at a March 1 press briefing at the State Department in Washington. U.S. law requires the State Department to conduct the review, formally known as the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) for presentation to the Congress each year.

Beers said Cambodia and Haiti also were not certified but were granted a waiver from those provisions of the law that call for a withdrawal of aid for non-cooperating nations. The waiver is granted when the vital interests of the United States are better served by continuing the flow of aid to the nations in question.

Nigeria and Paraguay were not certified, and granted such waivers in last year's review, but this year were upgraded to full certification.

Regarding Haiti, Beers said the administration has decided that a "withdrawal of aid would aggravate an already bad situation," even though the review found that the Haitian government had failed to take some important counter-trafficking measures.

Beers was joined in the briefing by Robert Brown from the Office of Supply Reduction at the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Brown had especially high praise for the progress that Mexico has made in countering the drug trade.

Brown said Mexico has "done some extraordinary, record-setting ... world-class opium production and marijuana production eradication." He also commended Mexican law enforcement, adding that "seizure levels were extraordinary."

The certification process has been the target of criticism from some governments because of the judgmental process involved. Beers acknowledged that opposition, but said, "While some governments resent what they describe as a unilateral, subjective assessment of their performance, we believe that the process encourages openness and reveals those areas where we can improve our collective effort."

Protests from other governments have won some sympathy in the U.S. Congress where discussion has begun about amending the law. Beers said the State Department is not yet ready to comment on the varying proposals for changing the INCSR review. He added, "Any modification or replacement must consider and have within it an enforcement mechanism in order to ensure continued counternarcotics cooperation."

Beers also said the 1986 law has been effective in elevating the importance of counter-narcotics activities on the international foreign policy agenda.

Following is a transcript of the briefing:

(begin transcript)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Spokesman

ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS RANDY BEERS AND ONDCP DEPUTY DIRECTOR ROBERT BROWN ON THE 2000 NARCOTICS CERTIFICATION DETERMINATIONS

March 1, 2001

Washington, D.C.

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome. I see everybody has got their documents all over the place, which is good.

If I can, I would like to introduce Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers and Acting Deputy Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Robert Brown. They will make brief remarks on the President's Year 2000 Narcotics Certification Determinations, and then they will be glad to take your questions.

So let me turn it over to them.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Thank you, Richard. Good afternoon. I would like to begin by welcoming Bob Brown, who is here on behalf of the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Today, the President sent to Congress his annual Determinations on Narcotics Certification. The State Department also sent to Capitol Hill the Year 2000 International Narcotics Strategy Control Report, which I can see you all have, the big green book on your desks.

You should all have this report, which describes the counter-narcotics efforts in over 140 countries around the world. There is a press kit that includes today's White House press releases on the decisions, copies of the certification law and the 1988 UN Drug Convention, along with a fact sheet on the certification process.

Before I talk about the key decisions, let me briefly describe the certification process. Under US law, the President must certify each year whether the governments of the major drug-producing countries and drug transit countries have cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on their own to meet the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

If the President does not certify a government, it is ineligible for most forms of US assistance, with the exception of humanitarian and counter-narcotics assistance, and the US is obliged to vote no to any assistance loans in multilateral development banks for countries denied certification.

The law also provides for waivers of those countries which, because of their vital national interest to the United States, should be exempted from the sanctions related to the denial of certification. The narcotics certification process is an integral part of our drug control policy, and it provides an opportunity to make what we believe is an objective assessment of each country's drug control efforts during the previous year.

While some governments resent what they describe as unilateral subjective assessment of their performance, we believe that the process encourages openness and reveals those areas where we can improve our collective effort. Throughout its 15-year existence, the certification process has proved to be an effective, if blunt, instrument of policy for enhancing counter-narcotics cooperation.

Prior to the March 1 deadline for introducing our decisions each year, we have seen countries introduce legislation, pass laws, eradicate drug crops, and capture elusive drug kingpins. The timing is no coincidence. These countries know that their actions will have an impact on the President's certification decisions, and they also know what the US expects from them.

We are aware that there is a growing sense among some in Congress that there may now be more effective approaches to strengthening international counter-narcotics cooperation. Several different bills have been recently introduce in the Senate that would change the certification process in some way.

While I have long supported certification, and believed that it has been a useful tool, we should not hesitate to investigate other ways to encourage cooperation on counter-narcotics. Recent years have seen a dramatic shift toward greater international cooperation in this area, and certification or any alternative should reflect the evolving international environment in an effort to strengthen that cooperation. And I testified this morning about certification and what the Administration believes might be acceptable in the way of alternatives.

Let me now turn to talk about the decisions, though, for this year. The President certified 20 of the 24 countries, and the majors list is fully cooperating with the US. Nigeria and Paraguay, which received vital national interest certifications last year, this year were upgraded to full certification. Two countries, Cambodia and Haiti, were not granted certification for cooperating but were granted national interest waivers. Two others, Burma and Afghanistan, were denied certification.

Last year, the cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan increased by 25 percent, and Afghanistan now accounts for about 72 percent of the global supply. Earlier this year, we received credible reports of decreased poppy cultivation in Taliban-controlled areas. Enforcement of a poppy ban is welcome news, but this development did not distract the international community's attention from the presence of large opiate stockpiles in the country, and unabated drug trafficking from Afghanistan.

Our assessment of Burma's performance remains unchanged as well. Although the Government of Burma took various measures to combat counter-narcotics production and trafficking, those efforts pale in comparison to the scope of the problem and showed little progress from 1999. The Government of Burma has also been unwilling or unable to take on the most powerful trafficking groups directly, and continues to refuse to surrender major drug traffickers under indictment in the United States, including the drug lord Khun Sa.

Cambodia remained a weak link in the region's efforts to combat the narcotics trade as well. Despite some positive developments, corruption in Cambodia has remained widespread, and until this crucial problem begins to be addressed, effective law enforcement will remain elusive. Vital national interest certification was granted to promote democracy in Cambodia and stability in the region.

Although Haiti has demonstrated cooperation in a limited number of areas, especially US maritime interdiction operations, Haiti failed to take other significant counter-narcotics actions. However, US vital national interests required that US assistance to Haiti continue. A cutoff to aid in Haiti, including programs aimed at attacking the roots of Haitian poverty and hopelessness, chief catalysts in the Haitian involvement in drug trade and illegal migration to the United States, would aggravate an already bad situation.

We had significant progress in two countries, Nigeria and Paraguay. The Nigerian Government's commitment to cooperating with the US on law enforcement during the past year was demonstrated by the transfer to US custody of four different defendants wanted on serious narcotics or narcotics-related charges, including two of the President's list of significant narcotics kingpins. The head of the national drug law enforcement agency there has declared an all-out offensive against drug trafficking, and there is an evident desire to strengthen our counter-narcotics relationship.

Finally, Paraguay's counter-narcotics efforts were reenergized by the new head of their anti-drug secretariat, who has formed a new unit to investigate major drug traffickers and their organizations, and his efforts have led to the arrest of four major drug traffickers in that country and the destruction of aircraft ferrying cocaine from Brazil.

Paraguay also enhanced its cooperation with its neighbors by signing agreements on judicial cooperation and information-sharing, and by expelling two of the arrested traffickers to Brazil.

Let me turn the floor now over to Bob Brown, who will talk about our global supply reduction efforts, and how they fit into our overall drug control strategy.

Thank you.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Thank you, Randy. Good afternoon to you all. Several comments. First on the certification law, the certification process itself, these International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports themselves, the submission of the majors list, preparation of submission, and finally the preparation, coordination, preparation and submission of the presidential determinations all done by the State Department, are, in my view, about as effective an interagency process as I've seen done in the US Government. So if I may, a kudos to State Department and how they implement the certification law and all these various facets.

Secondly, I've offered each of you some -- I hope you've all had a chance to look at them -- some handouts here, and let me just briefly touch on a couple points there. The first page there, the multi-colored graph if you will, puts into a bit of perspective what we're talking about today. And I thought that might be helpful to you.

Essentially, the certification issue drives us to a focus on international narcotics control programs. And I wanted -- I think it's quite evident here, just to make sure, but I wanted to point out that, as you see here, compared to the other elements of our drug control -- federal drug control spending, you see that for the fiscal year '01, the yellow zone if you will, amounts to about 5 percent or so of the total fiscal year drug control budget for that year. So the international focus, or the international programs, as compared with domestic law enforcement, 51 percent; demand reduction programs, a third or 33 percent; and interdiction programs, 12 percent, perhaps gives you at least a budget perspective of the relative weight of the international programs that quite easily would be the focus of our discussions today given the certification issue.

Secondly, if I could ask you perhaps to take a look at the following page, what you'll see there is essentially us looking at the various priority of drug challenges in the United States drug control strategy, beginning with cocaine and going to the impact of cocaine abuse on our country. You'll see essentially the source country focus of our cocaine strategy.

And I would highlight here -- perhaps it's worthy of development and Q&A or subsequent sessions -- I would highlight the astounding progress and successful programs in the two principal source countries of Peru and Bolivia. Specifically in Bolivia, you see 82 percent reductions, an extraordinary reduction on coca cultivation, owing to the commitment of Government of Bolivia, its own dignity plan and what is just a sustained coca cultivation reduction effort. You see similar reductions in Peru -- some years ago the principal source of coca cultivation, cocaine production -- there a 68 percent decline since '95.

You see the production areas highlighted there for Colombia, and there too we think that there has been some, given a whole series of problems that I'm sure most of you are familiar with, you see nonetheless, I think, some very successful programs focused on dealing with this exploding coca cultivation in the south of Colombia. The figures that are just now out, that perhaps you're aware of but I'll restate here, with regard to calendar 2000 coca cultivation details in Colombia which cite an overall 11 percent expansion in the last calendar year. That compares with a general average of about 20 percent in the preceding four years, so a continued increase and a continued consolidation in southern Colombia but, relatively speaking, a lower level increase of what we had seen in the past.

Going back to the budget issue, if I might just a moment, I gave you a perspective of the federal drug control spending, one category to the other. Let me also say that the details of the United States fiscal '02 drug control budget are not going to be known until early April, April the 3rd, I believe, but I would give you just a general framework to consider that budget from in the drug and crime area. The total budget, having seen the first draft there, the 18-whatever, 18.3, if it is, total, the total budget for '02 will be about $19 billion. That will include some specific plus-ups across the demand area of prevention and treatment, and will specifically include over $500 million for the Colombia and Andean area.

I would want to go a bit beyond just the Andean framework. The graphic that I've offered you here -- and by the way, following that is a pie chart that basically provides the specific components of our Colombia initiative in support of the Colombian Government's Plan Colombia -- just to give you the numbers, the gross numbers, that make up the $1.3 million supplemental from last year.

What do I want to do next? Let me ask you, or present to you if I can, a comment or two not reflected in the graphic here about Mexico. Mexico, I think, too has in the course of last year done some extraordinary record-setting -- I would almost want to classify it as world class -- both opium production and marijuana production eradication program that involves an extraordinary level of effort from the Mexico military. And again, the levels of eradication almost exceed any other similar effort in the world today. The seizure levels were extraordinary last year. The prospect of even increased cooperation in the drug policy area is also strengthened, I think, by the political events both in Mexico and in our own country.

Challenges remain, to be sure. Corruption and powerful criminal groups, just as challenges surely present themselves on the United States side and elsewhere in the hemisphere, on continued and effective demand reduction as well.

If I may just add a point or two more about demand reduction. I have added to your handouts there -- again, if I could just refer to them here -- two fact sheets. One of these gives an overview of the current domestic drug situation in the United States. It just provides highlights. At the close of it, it gives you a point of contact within our office should you want more detailed information on drug abuse and its consequences in the United States.

And the last two pages are yet a second fact sheet. This addresses the area of what demand reduction programs the United States Government has ongoing in the country today.

So again, kudos to the conduct management of the Administration's implementation of the certification law. I think the strategy itself is being well pursued. Clearly there are continuing problems, as there will always be, and a couple more detailed fact sheets on the drug abuse situation and what we are doing about it in the United States.

So that is what I wanted to say. Randy, perhaps we could --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: We would be happy to take questions now.

Q: Randy, can you give us some idea of how many people in the Department go into doing this report, and how much effort -- is this a full-time effort of your office alone? I mean, I just want to get some sense of --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: I'm afraid that that doesn't do justice to the issue. This is not just within the Department. We have officers in each embassy around the world who have to both write the report and clear that report in their own embassies in order to provide it to us. It then comes in to a central location in INL and goes out to all of the regional bureaus. So there is a country desk officer, at a minimum, in each of the bureaus who looks at that particular country report.

There are 140-plus country reports in there. I have just doubled that number to 280, so what we are talking about -- and this is not an annual exercise, but it is an exercise that consumes a number of people-hours, really beginning in November or early December on through to the first of March. And we are talking about a number that is greater than 300 people working on this issue.

Q: You mentioned that the United States should not hesitate to look at alternatives to this process. I know there are a few alternatives on the Hill being proposed. Can you tell us which one you would favor, or if you have another idea that is better still?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: As I said this morning, the Administration is not prepared at this particular point in time to comment on the merits or shortcomings of any of the individual bills. We are prepared to look at alternatives. Any modification or replacement must consider and have within it an enforcement mechanism in order to ensure continued counter-narcotics cooperation, and any suspension must retain the power to de-certify using current standards.

We are not in favor of exemptions for any individual country or region at this time, but we would be prepared to look at regional carve-outs in the future if mutually acceptable and credible multilateral evaluation mechanisms are in place and working.

Q: Besides the certification to Mexico, in the report, the State Department mentioned a lot of -- emphasized a lot of corruption of last year, and also mentioned a decrease in the interdiction of cocaine in Mexico -- over 30 percent last year in comparison to 1999.

My question is, why are these facts in the report if the United States gave the certification to Mexico?

And I have another question on Peru. There is a lot of -- a small portion of Vladimir Montesinos related to corruption and the narco-traffickers in Peru. And there is also in Latin America a lot of reports being publicized in the media signaling his relations with narco-traffickers.

Why is that in the report? There is little mention of Montesinos and narco-traffickers, his relationship with narco-traffickers. Is it because he was mentioned as a CIA informant of the United States? Or what is the reason?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Let us start with Mexico, and then we will move on to Peru.

As all of you know, and as any rational person must understand, dealing with the drug trade or criminals of any form is a process; it's not something that you get to at some point in time and have completed and then go on to something else. So that while progress and cooperation may be outstanding, there are still going to be things, shortcomings, that need to be dealt with and problems that need to be fixed.

So when we report in the International Narcotics Strategy Control Report on an annual basis, we talk not just about what we've done but what other things need to be done and dealt with. So that's why you have a report that talks about things that we wish would have been better.

Let me go specifically to the issue of seizures. Seizures are a valuable measurement of activity, but we are very conscious of the fact that a rise or fall in seizures doesn't necessarily mean that the government is doing a better or a worse job. There are explanations for movements in that particular measurement in either direction that can be considered positive or that can be considered negative. We use it as one of the tools to try to understand what activities are, in fact, under way.

Bob, why don't you comment on Mexico, then we'll come back.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Good question, series of questions. Corruption. It is a problem in part fueled by our estimate of -- I think we say $63 billion annually we put -- Americans and citizens put -- into the illicit drug trade. Some portion of that has this corrosive, corrupting effect, both in our own country and all the transit countries back to the source of these drugs. So clearly that is a contributor to this common problem of drug-inspired or drug-induced corruption.

On the seizure area, echoing exactly what Randy says, there is a specific aspect to the more recent history in Mexico in that the eastern Pacific seizures -- that is, off of Mexico's west coast, Central America west coast, and leaving the west coast of Colombia where this exploding coca cultivation is growing -- those seizures in this past period of time were extraordinarily high. So I think if you expanded the scope of your question to seizures in the region, I think you would see that they are generally stable -- the level of seizures.

On the issue of Peru, I assure you that the allegations that Mr. Montesinos was a CIA agent have nothing to do with what you regard as scanty reporting on Mr. Montesinos' involvement in the drug trade or corruption, first point. Second point, we are still uncovering Mr. Montesinos' activities, as are you. As they become relevant and revealed to us and you, I am sure we will have more to say about them in the future.

Q: Do you have any idea whether the international component of federal drug control spending will increase? I noticed it was fairly small here, and can we anticipate an increase? If so, can you say roughly by how much?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Yes, and no.

Q: Okay. Number two, I read both Burma and Nigeria, and Nigeria was certified and Burma of course was de-certified without a waiver. It seems to be an objective look at the two countries suggests to me that Burma is doing better than Nigeria; the only thing you could point to in Nigeria were the four extraditions, and it seems to me they didn't do anything else.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: On the issue of Nigeria, we believe that the Nigerians made a significant step forward over this past year, and it is signified -- you're absolutely right -- it is signified in the clearest sense by the extradition of those four drug traffickers, but it is not limited to that. There have been arrests and seizures that are also significant in our view.

But remember, we're talking about working together with the government here, and what we're talking about here is that it is our view that this government in Nigeria has improved significantly in its cooperation with us. And we believe that it's important to move forward with that level of cooperation. That is not the case with the Government of Burma.

Bob, do you want to comment?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: I would simply echo. And if you focus on the issue of cooperation, I think that's where the discriminator is between the two. In the case of Burma, though having been surpassed substantially by Afghanistan as a source country for opium, you have the number two -- significant nonetheless -- source of opium, heroin in the world. And secondly, you have an exploding and threatening in the region methamphetamine or synthetic drug production also. So, I mean I just echo the -- if cooperation is the discriminator, I think that's the best answer to your question.

Q: But it seems (inaudible) put them in tablets, and they have a relatively ambitious eradication program. But your point is that the -- so at the cooperation level with US efforts, that they're lacking?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Yes, and the prospect for cooperation. I think the production level -- and don't hold me to this, I'd be happy to search it for you, search out a better answer. But we're talking into the multiples of hundreds of millions of methamphetamine tablet production capacity in Burma.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: That is the most significant problem for Thailand today in the drug area: methamphetamines flowing out of Burma into Thailand. We have spent some considerable time and effort working with the Thai Government on this issue. The Burmese Government has been unwilling to give anything on it.

Q: Mr. Beers, two questions. The first one is what would you say about the fact that the demilitarized zone in Colombia was the zone in Colombia which showed the highest rate increase in coca production? And what should the government do about it? Should they go ahead and eradicate there? What should they do?

And the second one is, in the overview of the report, when you describe the relationship between narco-traffickers and guerillas, you describe that relationship as a narco alliance -- I mean, a narco-political alliance that threatens to destabilize Colombia. Can you clarify what you mean with "narco-political alliance"? I mean, are you giving a political status to guerillas in Colombia?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: On the first question, the increase that you have cited in the despeje is what our estimate suggests. It went from 6,000 hectares at the end of '99 to 7,900 hectares at the end of the past year. That is about a 33 percent increase. That is three times the rate of increase in the country at large. 7,900 hectares is not a large amount in the overall tabulation for Colombia, and as we have said, as the Government of Colombia has said, our initial effort will be focused on the Putumayo-Caqueta area principally.

When there is a decision to go into the despeje, this is a Colombian Government decision. We are prepared to work with them in that regard. And eventually, if we are to deal with drug trafficking in Colombia, the Colombian Government will need to deal with the drug cultivation that is going on there.

But as we have said for some time now, we are focused on getting the most efficient effort that we can produce in Colombia in the shortest possible time, and that is why we are focusing on Putumayo and Caqueta today.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: I would just put a number to what you have already said. I hope these figures are generally right. That total at the end of last year of coca cultivation in the demilitarized -- in the despeje -- is about 6 percent of the national -- as of the close of last year -- of the national cultivation amount. So to put into a general perspective of how much that amounts to, and that would drive our support programs to the Government of Colombia in terms of eradication right where they are in southern Putumayo.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: We are not opposed to elimination of drug cultivation in the despeje. Don't mistake these remarks for that. With respect to the narco-political alliance, we are simply saying that the symbiotic relationship that is developed between the insurgents and paramilitaries on the one hand, the illegal forces within Colombia, and the drug traffickers, the illegal criminal organizations within Colombia, is such that you have in effect a political alliance, political in the sense that they, for their own internal political purposes, have chosen to ally with one another in order to pursue their own goals, which obviously commonly include drug trafficking.

Q: Will this Administration have any new ideas regarding what has been called "the balloon effect," which is when neighboring -- one country's neighbor has a decrease, or has a successful eradication, while other countries bordering it will have an increase? It seems that that is what has happened as we watch a decrease in production get (inaudible) in Peru and Bolivia, with an increase in Colombia.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: This Administration will announce its specific numbers for State Department budget, along with the same time frame that Bob Brown indicated at the beginning of April, and at that point in time we will be able to talk specifics.

But as I have said, and as Bob has said, what we are talking now about is a significant budget request for an Andean regional program, which will cover not just Colombia, but Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, as a geographic area. And it will be balanced so that Colombia does not have the 85 percent funding that it did in the Plan Colombia Supplemental. It will be closer to a 50/50 ratio between Colombia and the other states in the region, and it will be more heavily devoted to economic programs like alternative development, and that too will approach closer to a 50/50 relationship overall.

But I don't have any of the specific numbers to give to you at this time. We are still working on the details of that budget and how to present it to the Congress, and of course to you all.

Q: As you mentioned before, there are some in Congress and some within the Administration -- and also, Mr. Brown, your predecessor, General McCaffrey -- who feel that the process of certification -- they kind of say, what's the point if we are going to certify 20 of the major drug producers, and also give a waiver to some of the countries because it is in our national interest?

Could you explain the point of certification? Would it be more fruitful to kind of just work on these cooperative programs without having to finger-point or grade countries, when we know we are going to pass, give them a pass anyway, at the end of the day?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Those are certainly a fair approximation of many of the criticisms of the current certification process. But as I said in my opening remarks, and as I said on the Hill today, this is not a process without utility as well.

When it was established in 1986, there were two important features to the international narcotics environment that were relevant to Congress's decision to create this legislation. The first was a concern that the administration at that time was not paying sufficient attention to the counter-narcotics, or the drug issue, as an element of American foreign policy. And it wanted -- the Congress wanted -- to force the then-administration to pay more attention to drugs as an issue in American foreign policy.

The second feature was that there was also a willingness, or a sense, on the part of a number of countries around the world to either not want to look at drugs as an issue within their own national boundaries, or to feel that the issue was entirely demand-driven, and that the United States or the consuming countries around the world only had to stop consuming those illegal drugs for the problem to cease to be a problem on an international basis.

That particular piece of legislation, I can say from personal experience, certainly forced the Executive Branch to take a heck of a lot more account of the drug issue as an element of American foreign policy. Having gotten to the point that we are now, we won't go back. So if that is an essential element, then I think to a very large degree, that objective has been achieved.

Secondly, if the objective is to get countries around the world to focus on the issue of drugs as a serious problem within their own national boundaries, the fact that the United Nations General Assembly Special Session of 1998 was created wholly to talk about the drug issue on a global basis, if the Summit of the Americas has in each one of its meetings talked about the drug issue and created the multilateral evaluation mechanism in the western hemisphere as a form of cooperation based on a hemispheric strategy, then I think with respect to the seriousness with which the world is prepared to look at the drug issue as a national issue within each of our countries and as an international issue between each of our countries, then I think that aspect has been accomplished. Does that mean we ought to keep it or not? That is what we are in the process of talking about. Bob?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Good question. The certification legislation, as Randy has stated, was borne of another era, and for some specific purposes. It clearly has, over the years, caused some positive actions to be taken around the globe in the broad area of drug production, drug trafficking, even drug abuse.

On the other hand, and very obvious to all of us with the President's visit to Mexico, there are some strong irritations to it. And I think they exist -- these downsides, if you will -- because of the change in the way we all -- not just the United States, but certainly throughout our hemisphere -- look at the drug issue.

The drug issue, unlike the 1986 vintage when this legislation was born, is now a common problem. There are demand problems and challenges throughout the hemisphere. There is drug production not only in Colombia and Peru and Bolivia, as my small graphic showed; there is drug production right here in the United States -- marijuana, methamphetamine and synthetics.

So it is a common problem now, and I think that foundation of allowing common multilateral, at least hemispheric, MEM-process type approaches, gives us a new environment to pursue modifications, changes, other approaches.

So I guess I'm just really echoing, Randy, what you have said. But there are some pluses and minuses to certification. Over time, the nature of the approach to the problem internationally has definitely changed. The problem is more present to us all. It allows some cooperative approaches that perhaps transcend the original purpose of the certification legislation.

Q: Thank you. On Panama, the report says that declining coca seizures suggests that transit patterns are shifting. Does that mean that Panama is becoming less important as a transshipment point, and where are these shipment patterns moving to?

And secondly, on money laundering, Panama has been listed as a non-cooperating nation by the FATF. Your report praises the Moscoso Government and all that she has done, yet we are still on that list. What is that Panama needs to do that it has not yet done to get off that list, please?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: First, with respect to trafficking patterns, yes, they have shifted. Two years ago, we would have said that the overland route within Central America was more significant than we think that it is today. The trafficking pattern appears to have shifted to the Pacific route that Bob described earlier, although I have to say that the Canal still represents a channel through which drugs are moved, particularly to the European market.

Secondly, with respect to the money laundering issue, yes, Panama was put on the first list produced by the Financial Action Task Force of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories. Panama, subsequent to that, did pass some legislation in the January meeting of the FATF that was duly noted. It is FATF's intention at its June plenary session to review progress by all of the states that were listed on the first list, and to make determinations as to whether or not any of those countries should be removed from that list. And it is FATF's fervent hope that some states will be able to be removed from that list in order to demonstrate that this is not a regime that can't be changed. But I can't tell you today what those results are going to be. We have to wait till June.

Bob, do you want to add anything?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: I would just add a point about the trafficking pattern question, just as a sort of a factual background. In terms of cocaine movement, which is surely the bulk of illicit drugs in motion in our hemisphere, you should consider generally in the Central America-Mexico corridor, if you can imagine that in your mind's eye, that accounts for about two-thirds of all the drug movement -- several hundreds of tons annually -- and about one-third is through the Caribbean area.

Now, some of both of those, and smuggling of drugs out of elsewhere -- Bolivia, elsewhere in South America -- does go direct to Europe and in an increasing level. But within that two-thirds and one-third, you will see the traffickers, the criminal groups, exploiting weaknesses as they see it at that particular time.

So those percentages change. It would be overland more this year. It may well be fast modes to someplace in Mexico next year. So generally two-thirds and one-third, and the variance between those two major vectors change over time and will continue to change.

Over the many years they have changed. For example, it used to be much more of an aircraft/general aviation-dependent smuggling enterprise. And I think through the efforts of our own country and others in the region, we have generally driven that to what you see as essentially a maritime -- exclusive maritime movement now. So a minor point perhaps.

Q: Mr. Brown, in these handouts you have given us -- I don't recall previous years -- there's a couple of pages on US efforts to reduce demand. Have these always -- has this information always been here, or is this here in response to criticisms of the US?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Good question. Credit for responding to criticism.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Note that.

(Laughter.)

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: My response would be, any discussion of good drug policy is a discussion of appropriate balance of demand and supply policies and programs. I thought -- it's just that sometimes we focus on our support to the Colombian Government, and we lose perspective -- perhaps it's our own fault -- that actually there is a huge, challenging set of issues out there that involve the basics of what the demand situation is of drug abuse in our own country and what we are trying to do about it.

So I have to take personal blame. It was my election to do that; surely nobody suggested that I ought to.

Q: So this is the first year this has been in here?

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BROWN: Those sorts of fact sheets actually have been for years and years; it's just that they don't often work themselves into international focused meetings.

But I have colleagues that are, I have to admit, three times sharper than I am, that have been doing those for many years. And between Health and Human Services and our Department of Education and that whole set of players, they are familiar and work with these issues all the time.

Q: Assistant Secretary Beers, you mentioned in your comments that it was partly the helplessness of the Haitians which contributed to illegal migration to the US that qualified it for a waiver. If that is the case, then why does the helplessness of the Afghans, which presumably contributes to the heroin production there and hurts American teenagers, not qualify it for a waiver?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: The Afghan situation, in terms of the difficulty of the Afghan people in this particular -- with respect to this particular question, is fortunately or unfortunately not an issue of migration to the United States.

Q: But heroin production migrates to the United States from Afghanistan.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Very little.

Q: Okay.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BEERS: Okay.

MR. BOUCHER: Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

(end transcript)