TEXT: SHATTUCK ON U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN ASIA
(U.S. can play significant role in Asian democracy)

Washington -- The United States can play a significant role in promoting Asian democracy through diplomatic engagement and the use of a wide range of foreign policy tools, including carefully tailored democracy assistance programs, according to John Shattuck, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights and labor.

"Democracy in Asia is a reality in some countries and an opportunity in many others," he said.

"In formulating our country strategies, we have many tools at our disposal to support our diplomatic efforts, ranging from our assistance programs to sanctions," Shattuck said in testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific September 17. "Although I will be describing the positive measures we use in democracy assistance programs, we also can and do use negative measures where necessary, including restricting arms sales, opposing loans from international financial institutions, and cutting off bilateral and multilateral assistance."

U.S. democracy assistance programs are carried out by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Shattuck said. "Although USAID implements most of the programs, we work together closely in order to ensure that our various programs are in harmony with each and in support of our policy goals. We also make sure that our programs dovetail with the excellent work of the Asia Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and Radio Free Asia."

Shattuck pointed out that U.S. democracy-promotion programs have four main goals:

"-- enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights;

"-- encouraging the development of a politically active civil society;

"-- promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; and

"-- fostering transparent and accountable governance."

In Asia, he said, the United States currently conducts a range of activities in pursuit of each of these goals.

Following is the text of Shattuck's statement to the committee:

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STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE JOHN SHATTUCK

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR

ON "U.S. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN ASIA"

BEFORE THE

HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

SEPTEMBER 17, 1997

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on the topic of U.S. democracy promotion in Asia.

Mr. Chairman, in Asia as elsewhere, the Clinton Administration views the promotion of human rights and democracy as one of the fundamental goals of our foreign policy, in addition to preserving America's security and fostering our prosperity. The spread of democracy is both an end in itself -- for it vindicates the values that define our republic -- and a means to out security and prosperity. History clearly demonstrates that free nations are more reliable partners, alike in maintaining peace and in conducting commerce.

At the same time, there have beep some in recent years -- both in Asia and the United States -- who have warned that the future will be one of inevitable conflict between East and West, a clash of civilizations, a showdown between different cultures and values. At this summer's annual Association of South East Asian Nations' Post Ministerial Conference, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a western export and called for its revision. Secretary Albright immediately responded that the concept of human rights reflects the very principle of civilization itself.

To those who dismiss our efforts to promote human rights and democracy as an expression of American imperialism, let us simply point to figures like Mahatma Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, Corazon Aquino, Aung San Suu Kyi, Wei Jingsheng, Martin Lee and millions of people around Asia and the rest of the world who have voted, marched, worked, been beaten and sometimes killed for their devotion to the universality of human rights and democracy.

Considerable democratic progress has been made in Asia during the past decade. Since 1986, the Philippines, south Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Mongolia, Cambodia, Nepal, and Bangladesh have re-entered or entered for the first time the community of democratic nations. Moreover, in many of the remaining authoritarian countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and even China, the success of economic reforms has led to some progress in strengthening the rule of law and in creating space for a civil society.

Today I would like to discuss with you the diverse ways in which the United States is helping Asia's new democracies to consolidate their gains as well as how we are supporting progressive forces in the non-democracies.

Needless to say, Asia is a vast region encompassing a great diversity of cultures, religions, ethnic groups, and political and economic systems. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration's strategy for promoting democracy in Asia is founded on the belief that the legion's spectacular economic growth of recent decades provides the basis for a democratic future.

Simply put, economic development can gradually undermine authoritarianism because it can create social forces that seek to develop autonomy from the state. As Professor Gerald Curtis has recently written, "A middle class grows that demands representation, a working class emerges that sooner or later demands the right to organize and engages in political action, and a business community that may have been spawned by the state develops its own resources and demands autonomy." In Asia, the relatively recent democratic transitions in Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea all demonstrate this basic point.

Mr. Chairman, let me be clear. I am not endorsing a theory of economic determinism. Economic development facilitates but does not cause democratization. I am arguing that in Asia the United States should respond to the opportunities for political reform that have beep created by widespread economic success. We must stand by those who are struggling for human rights and democracy in these changing societies. In the end, of course, we must tailor our democracy policies and programs to the specific circumstances of each country.

In formulating our country strategies, we have many tools at our disposal to support our diplomatic efforts, ranging from our assistance programs to sanctions. Although I will be describing the positive measures we use in democracy assistance programs, we also can and do use negative measures where necessary, including restricting arms sales, opposing loans from international financial institutions, and cutting off bilateral and multilateral assistance.

Our democracy assistance programs are carried out by the State Department, USAID and USIA. Although USAID implements most of the programs, we work together closely in order to ensure that our various programs are in harmony with each and in support of our policy goals. We also make sure that our programs dovetail with the excellent work of the Asia Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and Radio Free Asia.

Types of Democracy Assistance

Mr. Chairman, the democracy-promotion programs of the United States have four main goals:

-- enhancing respect for the rule of law and human rights;

-- encouraging the development of a politically active civil society;

-- promoting meaningful political competition through free and fair electoral processes; and

-- fostering transparent and accountable governance.

In Asia, we currently conduct a range of activities in pursuit of each of these goals.

Rule of Law and Human Rights

Rule of law programs form a central part of our democracy promotion strategy in Asia for several basic reasons. First, a democratic society requires a legal framework that guarantees respect for human rights and ensures a degree of regularity in public and private affairs. Second, corruption and abuse of authority have an obvious impact on both economic development and democratic institutions. Finally, effective public administration is essential to enhancing popular support for democracy.

In Mongolia, we are beginning new activities to follow up on our earlier assistance to the new judicial system contained in the 1992 constitution. Our new program will promote the concept of judicial independence both inside and outside the judiciary. It will educate members of the judiciary on their role in the protection of civil liberties. It will foster better communication between the parliament and the judiciary as well as among the various courts of the judiciary. And it will encourage the formulation and adoption of a judicial code of ethics.

In Cambodia, we have been assisting since 1993 indigenous NGOs involved in the promotion of human rights. None of this assistance is channeled through the government. Despite the major setback for democracy that occurred this September when Hun Sen seized power, we continue to support human rights NGOs in Cambodia because they represent the backbone of the democracy movement. Through our assistance, we have helped to create a national network of human rights organizations. Last year the major NGOs that we support reported over 1,000 human rights violations. More recently, these NGOs have courageously monitored the cases of those killed or missing as a result of the violence this past July.

In the area of human rights, we are also supporting the Cambodia Genocide Program. Conducted by Yale University, the program is documenting the mass killings carried out by the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979. The work of the program will be made available to the public and will be used by any tribunal or truth commission that might he established to investigate these crimes against humanity.

The United States has also been instrumental in establishing a nationwide organization of public defenders, the Cambodian Public Advocates (CPA). Formed in January 1996, the CPA defenders have provided high-quality representation at all levels of the Cambodian judicial system. Last year a full one-third of CPA clients received reduced sentences or were acquitted. In the first nine months of 1996, the courts referred 34 percent of all cases to public defenders (up from 20 percent in 1995), reflecting the courts' increasing recognition of the value of defenders. Similarly, earlier this year the Minister of Justice approved the installation of public defender desks in all courtrooms. Also through out assistance, the Cambodian Bar Association has established a Legal Aid Department, with 30 lawyers volunteering time in collaboration with public defender organizations.

In Indonesia, our democracy assistance has also supported the promotion of human rights and the expansion of legal aid. We are assisting the major Indonesian human rights NGOs, which have increased their monitoring of corruption and abuse of power. In addition, we support the National Human Rights Commission, a quasi-independent body that has begun to develop the means to expose human rights violations. With our support, it opened a field office in East Timor and began a human rights training program. In the area of legal aid, the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute pursued in 1996 650 cases concerning civil, political, land and labor rights.

In Sri Lanka, our rule of law assistance has targeted two areas: court administration and alternative dispute resolution. In the former, we have helped to automate the system for tracking cases in the Court of Appeals, resulting in a dramatic shrinking of its backlog. In the latter, our training has both increased the efficiency and expanded the clientele of local mediation boards throughout the country. In 1996, over 200,000 Sri Lankans submitted disputes to these boards, and three-fifths of the cases were resolved.

Finally, in Vietnam, we are now beginning a program to support the reform of commercial law and trade policy, essential prerequisites for the development of an open economy, transparency in government and accountability of officials in economic ministries.

In addition to these country-specific rule of law programs, we have also recently begun assisting the ASEAN Human Rights Working Group. The concept of the working group originated at the 1993 ASEAN Ministerial Conference, which committed ASEAN to the eventual establishment of a mechanism for addressing human rights. However, it was not until the 1996 Conference when the official human rights bodies of Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines formally urged ASEAN to meet its earner commitment. The goal of the Working Group is to encourage ASEAN member -- governments to incorporate human rights on domestic as well as regional agendas.

We are also supporting two regional initiatives to strengthen women's rights. The first is devoted to increasing regional cooperation in combating the related problems of trafficking in women and girls and the spread of HIV/AIDS. The initiative has brought together government officials, NGO representatives, doctors, lawyers and human rights activists from countries around the region -- including Thailand, India and Nepal, where these problems are the most acute. The second initiative is addressing the serious problems experienced by female migrant workers. It is working with governments and NGOs in both home and host countries to advance reforms that wail protect the rights of these Asian women.

Civil Society

A strong civil society is an essential component of a democracy. The concept of civil society, however, covers a broad swath. Therefore we have designed our democracy programs in Asia to focus on support for indigenous organizations that: engage in civic action to promote democracy; encourage deliberation of public policy; monitor government activities; and educate citizens about their rights and responsibilities. This formulation includes public advocacy groups, labor unions, independent media institutions, politically active professional associations, human rights and good governance organizations, and local associations that aggregate and articulate the needs of their constituents.

In Mongolia, the United States has supported advocacy NGOs since the beginning of our democracy assistance program in 1991. These NGOs have played a critical role in Mongolia's successful democratic transition, having been in the vanguard of civic education, women's empowerment and elections monitoring. In January of this year, our assistance to civil society culminated in the parliament's passage of a law protecting NGOs. The law contained the two key provisions that the NGOs wanted: tax-exempt status of NGOs and deductibility of donations. Confirming the emergence of NGOs as a major force in Mongolian politics, the law will contribute to the long-tern viability of civil society.

In Indonesia in recent years, we have also been important supporters the country's increasingly influential advocacy NGOs. Indonesian civil society has begun to speak out more effectively on a variety of issues, and consequently the government has included NGOs in its decision-making process. In particular, the government now sometimes seeks the views of NGOs on draft laws, policies and regulations. Moreover, there occurred in 1996 several important instances of NGO influence: the government requested that the National Human Rights Commission investigate the July 27th riot after the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute investigated missing persons; it made lead-free gasoline available to the public as a result of lobbying by an environmental advocacy group; and it adopted a clearer policy and distributed human rights handbooks to soldiers after abuses in Irian Jaya were reported by NGOs.

In the Philippines, we have supported the formation of coalitions of disadvantaged and under-represented groups to increase their participation in the policy arena. This assistance rests on the belief that a strong, civil society can ensure government policies and policy implementation will benefit the many, not just the few. The coalition model has shown that it can transform weak groups into strong alliances and put their interests at the top of the policy agenda.

Indeed, the coalitions that we have assisted are making a considerable impact on the government. The urban-poor coalition obtained presidential support to repeal a Marcos-era law criminalizing squatting. The fisherfolk coalition provided convincing testimony to Congress, based on its independent evaluation of a $7-6 million government fisheries project funded by the Asian Development Bank. And while other NGOs walked out of local bearings on the Mining Act, a coalition of indigenous peoples' groups that we sponsored used data and analysis to influence the Act's implementing rules and regulations.

Electoral Processes

The initiation or conduct of an electoral process provides an opportunity for democratic forces to organize and compete for political power. That is why requests for assistance in support of an electoral process deserve special consideration.

In Mongolia, we supported indigenous NGOs in conducting widespread civic and voter education in preparation for the landmark parliamentary elections of 1956. For example, one NGO carried out a multifaceted program to inform voters on the differences among the platforms of the political parties as well as on the background and views of individual candidates. Another provided training to journalists on media coverage for the elections. These activities complemented the excellent party-training work undertaken by the international Republican Institute.

In Cambodia, the United States provided substantial support to the UN-sponsored elections in 1993, both in terms of electoral administration and of training for political parties. Until the suspension of our electoral assistance in the wake of last July's violence, we bad prepared similar assistance for the national and local elections planned for 1998. In particular, we assisted the Ministry of Interior in drafting electoral laws that met international standards and in planning for an effective voter registration.

Although our direct electoral assistance to the Cambodian government remains suspended, important work in support of Cambodia's civil society has not ceased. We continue to assist NGOs engaged in democracy building and rule of law programs -- including the work of Cambodian NGOs involved in voter education and the monitoring of registration and elections. We will be looking carefully at the possibility of providing electoral assistance beyond the modest programs currently in place. Carefully calibrated assistance can be an important confidence-building mechanism as Cambodia prepares for free and fair elections. However, we do not intend to support an undemocratic process.

In the Philippines, our assistance recently produced a consensus among the president, legislators, the electoral commission and NGOs on an electoral modernization bill for the 1998 elections. In addition, we sponsored a regional workshop on elections that has led to the creation of a regional center in Manila and to requests for technical assistance from as far away as Mongolia.

In Bangladesh, we assisted many aspects of the important parliamentary elections of June 1996. We helped the electoral commission train the local officials responsible for running the polling stations. We supported a large delegation of foreign electoral observers and provided technical assistance to a coalition of 180 Bangladeshi NGOs that fielded domestic observers in all 300 constituencies. Voter education, which we assisted through NGOs, contributed to the largest voter turnout in the country's history, 74% compared to 55% in the parliamentary elections of 1991. Most of this increase was due to an almost doubling of the female turnout, another tribute to the efficacy of the voter education program.

Government Accountability

The promotion of good governance has become a major theme among all donors supporting Asian democracy. In large measure, this reflects recognition of the fact that corruption, mismanagement and government inefficiency are inextricably linked with poor performance in development. The challenge in to design good governance programs that are consistent with the broader goal of promoting democratic development. In this regard, U.S. programs focus on supporting executive branch ministries to plan, execute and monitor budgets in a transparent manner; strengthening legislative policy making, budget and oversight capabilities; and decentralizing policy making by working directly with local governments.

In Mongolia, we are starting a new program to build on our earlier assistance to the parliament. We will help the parliament's majority and minority caucuses professionalize their operations. We will assist members of parliament in improving communications with their district constituencies. And we will support each of Mongolia's three major parties in developing a plan for their long-term development.

For the past decade, the United States has assisted the government of the Philippines in formulating and implementing a revolutionary plan for decentralizing political authority. Today, Manila no longer monopolizes Philippine politics and government. Instead, provinces, cities, towns and villages have significantly increased their power. The central government's commitment to decentralization is reflected in the growth of central revenues that are allocated to localities. These revenues rose from $280 million in 1989 to $3 billion in 1996. Moreover, local governments have made much progress in raising their own funds through credit, bonds and taxation.

In Bangladesh, we are similarly helping to improve local governance. We are assisting local NGOs to better identify the needs of their communities and to bettor communicate these needs to the local governments. In turn, we are helping to increase the capacity of local governments to respond to their citizens. We are also working with communities to increase the number of women candidates running for seats on the local councils.

Burma

Mr. Chairman, authoritarian governments that oppose any political reform obviously pose the greatest challenge for democracy promotion. Burma is one such case. Our immediate goal in Burma is to start a genuine dialogue between the SLORC and the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi and with representatives of the ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, as recently as this week, the SLORC has rejected dialogue with ASSK and the NLD. We have worked with our friends and allies to isolate the SLORC internationally until it ends its widespread repression of human rights and agrees to a meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition that won the 1990 elections overturned by the SLORC.

To that end, we have employed a variety of means -- including the withdrawal of our ambassador from Rangoon, restrictions on visas, the cessation of assistance to the government, and most important our opposition to international lending and our ban on new U.S. investment. Many of our friends and allies have taken similar measures. With the entry of Burma into ASEAN, we have also made it clear that we expect ASEAN's other member governments to use their influence to convince the SLORC to begin a dialogue with the opposition. Working on multiple tracks, we have made certain that Burma will not rejoin the international community until it starts respecting the rights and votes of its people.

In addition, we are conducting a program of humanitarian assistance and support for Burmese pro-democracy activities. In managing earmarked funds for Burma, the State Department has awarded grants in FY 96 and FY 97 to the National Endowment for Democracy totaling about $2.2 million. We have also made grants to the International Rescue Committee and World Concern Development Organization.

The Endowment uses these funds to train the future leaders of a democratic Burma, to disseminate material supportive of democratic development, to increase international awareness of conditions inside of Burma, to strengthen the organizational and functional capacity of pro-democratic groups, and to promote understanding and cooperation among the various ethnic and religious groups of Burma in their efforts to further the democratic cause.

Our assistance has helped the democratic opposition prepare for eventual talks with the government. It has enabled Burmese economists to work together on an economic plan for a future democratic Burma. The Endowment has also facilitated discussions between the National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic groups on constitutional proposals for tabling in eventual talks with the government. These discussions and other negotiations within the democratic movement have also given the opposition experience with democratic practices. Without international assistance, the voices of opposition leaders forced into exile would be weak and scattered, and pressure on the government to enter into genuine talks lessened.

Our program has allowed organizations to document the human rights abuses inside Burma. This documentation has been the crucially important background for resolutions on Burma taken in UN Human Rights Commission, a key element in forging international consensus on Burma.

Finally, U.S. assistance has kept open the flow of accurate information to Burmese inside the country. The SLORC has attempted to control all information available to Burmese, most significantly by keeping the leader of the democratic opposition under virtual house arrest. Such outlets for information as Radio Free Asia and the Democratic Voice of Burma help break the isolation of Burmese from the world and increase their understanding of the possibilities for a democratic future.

China

Mr. Chairman, we are also planning, in consultation with the Congress, to develop a democracy program in China that would seek to strengthen both civil society and rule of law.

Despite the widespread and massive human rights abuses that we have documented in our annual human rights report, some positive changes have taken place in China. Chinese society has opened dramatically in the last 20 years and continues to open. The average Chinese enjoys a higher disposable income, looser economic controls, greater freedom of movement, dramatically increased access to outside sources of information, greater room for individual choice, and more diversity in cultural life. Accordingly, new social groups with economic resources at their disposal have also arisen and become increasingly vocal, representing the first signs of a Chinese civil society.

Today, there are 1500 national level NGOs and 200,000 lower level NGOs registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the number of organizations and the scope of their activities are growing rapidly. To a significant degree, these organizations are all subject to control by the government. The best-known of these organizations are those with well-defined professional, relief, charitable, and educational missions. There are, however, growing numbers of organizations being initiated at the grass-roots level by individuals, communities, or enterprises interested in addressing problems of social welfare, consumer or environmental affairs that are often neglected by the government.

Although subject to broad government regulation, these groups are increasingly able to develop their own agendas and many have support from foreign secular and religions NGOs. Some seek advocacy roles in public interest areas like women's issues, the environment, and consumer rights. These organizations provide opportunities for the United States and other countries to support the development of civil society in China.

China has also made progress in strengthening the rule of law. Since embarking on its policy of economic reform in the late 1970s, the Chinese government has recognized the need to develop the country's legal system. At the outset, Chinese leaders were principally motivated by a desire to attract foreign investment and avoid a repetition of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. By the mid- to late-1980s, authorities were stressing a broader role for law in guiding the actions of economic entities and state regulators in a market-oriented economy. Most recently, President Jiang Zemin elevated the concept of "ruling according to law" to the level of one of the Communist Party's "guiding principle" for managing state and society.

In the late 1970s, in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, China's legal system was nearly nonexistent. In the late 1970s, China had two law schools, approximately 3,000 lawyers for over one billion people, no independent law firms, a rudimentary judicial system with poorly trained judges and a system of outdated and unenforced laws.

With the help of foreign legal experts, much progress has been made in recent years. Today in China there are over 100,000 lawyers and over a hundred law schools. The courts and procuratorate (state prosecutor) have established centers to provide in-service-training to the expanding ranks of judges and prosecutors. Lawyers, who previously were generalists serving as employees of state-run law offices, now often specialize in particular subfields of law and practice in essentially private law cooperatives and partnerships. And much new legislation has been passed, including laws in areas with a direct impact of human rights democracy -- e.g., the Administrative Procedures Law, Lawyers Law, State Compensation Law, Prison Law, and Criminal Procedure Law.

USIA exchange programs, NED, and NGO programs have already played a role in promoting rule of law in China. There are, however, countless opportunities for the United States and others to do much more.

Mr. Chairman, in the coming weeks, we would like to explore with you and your colleagues our preliminary ideas for developing civil society and rule of law programs for China.

Conclusion

Democracy in Asia is a reality in some countries and an opportunity in many others. The United States can play a significant role in promoting Asian democracy through diplomatic engagement and the use of a wide range of foreign policy tools, including carefully tailored democracy assistance programs.

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