Excerpt: Commission Says Vietnam Suppresses Religious Activities
(USCIRF's April 30 annual report on religious freedom)

The Hanoi regime "continues to suppress organized religious activities forcefully and to monitor and control religious communities," according to the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF).

The Commission released its second annual report April 30 on Capitol Hill. The USCIRF was created by legislation to monitor religious freedom around the world and report to the Congress.

The USCIRF called on the United States to accept the "moral responsibility" to support and protect Vietnamese people who are seeking "the realization of fundamental human rights."

While the communist government tries to restrict even religious groups it formally recognizes, the commission said, it reserves its harshest treatment for those religious communities it does not recognize, such as independent Protestant churches.

The USCIRF said Congress should ratify the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) between Washington and Hanoi, but only after passing a sense of the Congress resolution calling for Vietnam's communist government to make "substantial improvements" in the protection of religious freedom. These improvements must include measurable standards, such as the release from "imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or intimidating surveillance persons who are so restricted due to their religious identities or activities."

The commission recommended that, should Congress ratify the BTA and approve conditional Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for Vietnam, "it should review Vietnam's progress on the protection of religious freedom as part of an annual review of that status."

Until religious freedom significantly improves in Vietnam, the commission said, the United States should "initiate or support a resolution to censure Vietnam at the annual meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights and should engage in a sustained campaign to persuade other governments to support it."

The full text of the USCIRF's report can be found at: http://www.uscirf.gov/reports/01May01Report_Index.php3

Following is an excerpt on Vietnam from the commission's report:

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VIETNAM

A. Introduction

Despite a marked increase in religious practice among the Vietnamese people in the last 10 years, the Vietnamese government continues to suppress organized religious activities forcefully and to monitor and control religious communities.1 The government prohibits religious activity by those not affiliated with one of the six officially recognized religious organizations. Individuals have been detained, fined, imprisoned, and kept under close surveillance by security forces for engaging in "illegal" religious activities. In addition, the government uses the recognition process to monitor and control officially sanctioned religious groups: restricting the procurement and distribution of religious literature, controlling religious training, and interfering with the selection of religious leaders.

There have been significant developments in U.S. policy toward Vietnam in the past year. In July 2000, after a one-year delay by the Vietnamese government, the United States and Vietnam signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement, which, if ratified by the U.S. Congress, would pave the way for the granting of conditional normal trade relations status to Vietnam. In November 2000, President Clinton visited Vietnam, marking the first visit to that country by a U.S. president in more than 30 years.

In February 2001, the Commission held a public hearing in Washington, D.C., on religious freedom and U.S. policy in Vietnam. The Commission heard testimony from representatives of a number of Vietnamese religious communities, as well as experts on Vietnam and its relations with the United States. In addition, the Commission and its staff have met with representatives of the Vietnamese government, Vietnamese religious communities, and human rights organizations with expertise in Vietnam (including Vietnamese-American organizations), as well as academic experts and U.S. government officials. It has also solicited information from organizations and individuals that were unable to meet with the Commission or its staff. Moreover, at the invitation of Ambassador Dinh Thi Minh Huyen, Director of the International Organizations Department at the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, the Commission made a formal request in November 2000 to visit Vietnam. Although the Vietnamese government has "welcomed" the Commission's visit, it has informed the Commission that such a visit should be hosted by Vietnam's Commission on Religious Affairs, which would be unable to accommodate the Commission until at least May 2001. This fact has prevented the Commission from traveling to Vietnam prior to the release of this report.

The Commission invited Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, a Roman Catholic priest based near Hue, Vietnam, to testify at its February hearing and Fr. Ly submitted written testimony. Fr. Ly has been persistently critical of the Vietnamese government's failure to protect religious freedom - activity that led to his imprisonment for close to a decade. On March 5, 2001, the Vietnamese official media confirmed that the government placed Fr. Ly under administrative detention (i.e. house arrest) for "publicly slandering" the Vietnamese Communist Party and "distorting" the government's policy on religion.2 The Commission remains deeply concerned that the Vietnamese government may be punishing Fr. Ly for his response to the Commission's invitation. The action of the Vietnamese government is clearly a demonstration of the government's continued suppression, not only of religious freedom, but of other fundamental human rights as well. Moreover, the Commission believes that the United States has the moral responsibility to support and protect those Vietnamese citizens, including Fr. Ly, who have the courage to speak to us in the pursuit of the realization of fundamental human rights.

B. Religious Demography

Vietnam is the world's 13th most populous country, with a population of nearly 80 million people.3 The oldest and largest religion is Buddhism, and approximately 50 percent of Vietnamese are Buddhists. The Roman Catholic Church in Vietnam has a following of approximately 6 million people. The Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao Buddhists are two indigenous religious communities, each of which has from 1 to 3 million adherents. The Cao Dai religion was formally organized in the 1920s and its religious center is located in Tay Ninh province in southern Vietnam. It is syncretic in nature, combining elements of Catholicism, Buddhism, Taoism, and the traditional worship of spirits and ancestors. The Hoa Hao religion is considered by many of its followers as a "reformed" branch of Buddhism. Huynh Phu So founded the religion in 1939 at Hoa Hao Village in the southern province of An Giang, and most Hoa Haos continue to live in that region of the Mekong River Delta. The Hoa Hao religion does not have priests, builds few temples, and eschews many of the ceremonial aspects of other Buddhist traditions. Protestants in Vietnam reportedly number approximately 700,000 to 800,000. About two-thirds of the Protestant population are members of ethnic minority groups, including the Montagnards in the Central Highlands and the Hmong in the northwestern provinces. By all accounts, the number of Protestants in the country has grown substantially in recent years. There is also a small, primarily Sunni, Muslim population estimated at 50,000 persons spread throughout Vietnam. Finally, there are between several hundred and 2,000 Vietnamese Baha'i followers, who are largely concentrated in the south.4

C. Religious Freedom

1. legal Framework

The Constitution of Vietnam provides for the freedom of religion and belief for citizens of the country.5 However, the Constitution also permits restrictions on these freedoms in furtherance of vaguely defined interests of the state and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The Constitution guarantees that all aspects of the polity and society are controlled by the VCP ("the vanguard of the Vietnamese working class" and the "faithful representative" of the whole nation) and the Fatherland Front (the umbrella organization of non-communist elements, which along with its member organizations "constitute the political base of people's powers").6 Several constitutional provisions also allow the government to punish "severely" all acts that violate the undefined "interests of the motherland and the people."7

In April 1999, the Vietnamese government issued a Decree Concerning Religious Activities (1999 Religion Decree), which establishes the basic legal framework within which religious activities take place and codifies state control over religious organizations. The 1999 Religion Decree defines the extent of the Vietnamese government's control of religious communities and activities. Article 5 states:

All activities which threaten freedom of religious belief, all activities using religious belief in order to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to prevent the believers from carrying out their civic responsibilities, to sabotage the union of all the people, to go against the healthy culture of our nation, as well as superstitious activities, will be punished in conformity with the law.8

The decree stipulates that religious organizations must be registered with the state and religious activities must be approved by the relevant levels of government, including, in some cases, the prime minister. For example, the "printing and dissemination," and "the production, the commercialization, and the export and import" of religious products and literature "must be submitted to the regulation of the State."9 The government must also approve the nomination, ordination, and the transfer of clergy and lay "specialists."10 Furthermore, religious organizations and officials must report, and obtain when necessary the authorization of the Bureau of Religious Affairs for, their interactions with foreign organizations and individuals, and their activities abroad.11 Finally, the decree essentially ensures that the Vietnamese government need not return confiscated religious properties to their original owners.12

In addition to the 1999 Religion Decree, the government decree on administrative detention is frequently used to detain and harass religious believers for unofficial religious activities.13 This decree permits the use of administrative detention without trial for six months to two years as a means to punish those who contravene national security.14 Activities that contravene national security are further defined in the Vietnamese Criminal Code to include activities seeking to overthrow the Communist government and attempts to undermine national unity, such as promoting division between religious believers and nonbelievers.15

The Vietnamese government's Religious Affairs Bureau is reportedly preparing a new ordinance on religion for consideration by the National Assembly.16 The draft law apparently contains provisions similar to the 1999 Religion Decree. One addition in the proposed ordinance is that religious organizations may apply for recognition by the state. However, the proposed definition of a religious organization - "an organization founded with a religious objective, endowed with a Charter in conformity with state law and a leadership approved by the State" - essentially precludes the recognition of religious organizations that are not controlled by the government.17

2. State Control of Religious Activities

In Vietnam, as one witness before the Commission testified, "there is no freedom of religion, because the freedom of religion is controlled by the governmental authorities at all levels."18 The preconditions of official recognition constitute the primary mechanism for this pervasive state control of religious communities and activities. The utilization of this mechanism as a means of control reportedly stems from the Vietnamese Communist Party's fear, due in part to historical factors, that independent, organized religions and religious communities could serve as alternative bases of loyalty, social organization, and political power.19 Hence, religion "is controlled by its incorporation as an organ of state and by denying it any autonomy."20

a. Officially recognized religious groups

The Vietnamese government officially recognizes Buddhist, Roman Catholic, Protestant, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Muslim religious organizations. The recognized Buddhist, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao religious organizations were created and are operated by the government. The official Buddhist organization, the Vietnamese Buddhist Church, was created by the government in 1981 to put into place an officially controlled Buddhist organization that would subsume the popular Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), which has been effectively banned since that time. Hoa Hao organizations were dissolved after the fall of Saigon in 1975, and no Hoa Hao institution was recognized by the state until 1999. At that time, the government created the Committee of Hoa Hao Representatives (CHHR). This organization is made up almost entirely of Communist Party members and apparently is not recognized as legitimate by the vast majority of Hoa Haos. Nevertheless, the CHHR has sought to control all Hoa Hao religious activity, particularly at the Hoa Hao village, which is the center of Hoa Hao religious life.

Although the government has recognized some Cao Dai denominations, the large majority of Cao Dai organizations and their followers reportedly are opposed to the government-appointed committee that manages all Cao Dai affairs.21 Indeed, the government continues to control the official Cao Dai denominations tightly and to suppress the unofficial ones through this committee. A number of independent Cao Dai followers reportedly have been imprisoned for their opposition to government interference.22 In October 1998, two Cao Dai followers apparently were arrested and imprisoned after attempting to meet with the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance during his visit to Vietnam.23 The government also prohibits spiritist practices, which are key elements in the religion's leadership selection process.24 Finally, the Vietnamese government reportedly confiscated much of the Cao Dai religious properties after 1975.25

Although the Roman Catholic Church has generally fared better than other religious communities, they continue to face significant government restrictions. For example, the government controls the organization, agenda, and publications of the annual Pastoral Assembly of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Vietnam (CBCV); intervenes in the selection process of bishops, priests, and seminary students (resulting in a shortage of bishops and priests); influences the content of seminary instruction; and prohibits CBCV publications at the national or local levels.26 The government has reportedly imprisoned or detained a number of Catholic priests who have carried out pastoral activities without government permission or who were ordained without government approval. The government has confiscated thousands of Catholic Church properties, including churches, schools, hospitals, and seminaries in the north (since the 1950s) and in the south (since 1975). A great number of these properties have not been returned and have been converted into meeting halls, storage facilities, and Communist education centers.

The state-controlled Buddhist organizations and the Protestant Evangelical Church of Vietnam (the officially recognized Protestant community in northern Vietnam) share many of the problems the Catholic Church faces, including government influence over the selection of religious leaders and the management of religious properties, prohibitions on religious publications, and the failure to return confiscated property.

In April 2001, the Vietnamese government reportedly recognized the Evangelical Church of Vietnam in the south and its member churches.27 Legal status would be granted to 300 individual churches, which apparently represent just a fraction of the Protestant churches in the country. The government would not recognize the majority of the ethnic minority Protestant churches in the Central Highlands. It has been reported that not all southern Protestants support the government's planned recognition for fear it would mean the end of the Church's autonomy, a concern that has been substantiated by reports that the Church's new constitution must be approved by the Vietnamese government.28

b. Unrecognized religious communities

Notwithstanding the extensive state control over recognized religious communities, the Vietnamese government's harshest repression is reserved for members of unrecognized communities, including the UBCV, the Hoa Hao, and independent Protestant churches.

Over the past three years, the Vietnamese government has adopted what one witness who testified before the Commission called "a subtle, insidious strategy" to isolate UBCV clergy and followers.29 Although no longer in prison, several prominent UBCV leaders, including Venerable Thich Huyen Quang and Venerable Thich Quang Do, are under house arrest or strict police surveillance and are denied the ability to register their respective temples as their place of residence, thereby making their stay at their own temples illegal. Even when UBCV leaders manage to travel, they suffer from police harassment (including detention and strip searches).30 The Vietnamese government also prohibits works of charity and humanitarian relief by UBCV clergy; it blocked a recent attempt by UBCV leaders to provide relief to flood victims in the Mekong Delta. Moreover, the government continues to "demolish religious buildings, architectures, and statues; and confiscate church properties, some of which were then used as storage or transformed into government buildings."31 In February 2001, UBCV monk Thich Thai Hoa (who submitted written testimony to the Commission hearing) organized a weeklong interfaith religious event near the city of Hue. Local officials reportedly set up roadblocks, forced students to attend school on the weekend that fell during the event, and engaged in other forms of harassment to prevent people from attending the gathering. Local officials reportedly also placed Father Ly under temporary house arrest in order to prevent his attendance at the event.32

The Vietnamese government restricts the activities of the unofficial Hoa Hao Buddhist organizations and their members. Many Hoa Hao Buddhists cannot obtain permits to visit Hoa Hao village, the birthplace and center of the religion. The Vietnamese government also interferes with the Hoa Haos' efforts to conduct charitable works (including recent attempts to provide relief to flood victims), which apparently is one of the four central principles of Hoa Hao Buddhism.33 Moreover, the government prohibits the public celebration of major ceremonies, such as the ceremony to commemorate the disappearance of the religion's founder, as well as the public display of important religious symbols, such as the Hoa Hao Buddhist flag.34 The government actively harasses and arrests Hoa Haos who seek to participate in religious celebrations or appeal for religious freedom. For example, in September 2000, five Hoa Hao Buddhists were sentenced to prison terms of one to three years for appealing to the central government against local police brutality that occurred during a December 1999 meeting to plan for the celebration of the founder's birthday. In March 2001, local police officials arrested Le Quang Liem, a Hoa Hao leader in Ho Chi Minh City. It was reported that he was severely beaten and that the arrest was in anticipation of the planned March 19 commemoration of the Hoa Hao founder's disappearance. Liem was released shortly after his arrest; however, he reportedly was later placed under "administrative surveillance," which went into effect on March 17 and restricts his ability to travel in Vietnam for a period of two years.35 The government has not returned any of the hundreds of Hoa Hao properties confiscated after 1975.36

The government continues to repress forcefully the activities of Protestants who are ethnic minorities or who are members of independent house churches (these groups make up the large majority of Vietnamese Protestants). Official documents recently published by Freedom House indicate that the Vietnamese government is conducting a campaign to co-opt and suppress the growth of the Protestant community, especially among the Montagnards, the Hmong, and other ethnic minorities.37 Independent Protestants face constant harassment from the Vietnamese authorities, including police raids on homes and house churches, detention and imprisonment, confiscation of religious and personal property, physical and psychological abuse, and fines for engaging in unapproved religious activities (such as collective worship, public religious expression and distribution of religious literature, and performing baptisms, marriages, or funeral services).38 In addition, it is reported that ethnic Hmong Protestants have been forced by local officials to agree to abandon their faith.39 Finally, none of the 398 Montagnard Protestant Church properties seized by the Communist Party after 1975 have been returned.

The ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and the northwestern provinces of Vietnam have a long history of strained relationship with the ethnic Vietnamese and successive governments, including during French rule and during the Vietnam War. After 1975, the relationship between the Communist regime and the Montagnards in the Central Highlands was further strained by the mass migration of ethnic Vietnamese (at times encouraged and approved by the government) into the region. These migrants came to occupy lands traditionally held by ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the fact that ethnic minorities constitute approximately two-thirds of the Protestant population in Vietnam introduced another volatile element into the already tense relationship. Indeed, the tenuous nature of the relationship between the government and ethnic minorities was demonstrated in February 2001, when thousands of Central Highlanders protested, seeking the return of ancestral lands and the freedom to practice their religion.40

D. The Bilateral Trade Agreement and Normal Trade Relations Status

For three consecutive years, from 1998 to 2000, President Clinton granted Vietnam a waiver from the requirements of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 that restrict economic aid to countries with non-market economies that also have restrictive emigration policies. Each year, congressional efforts to disapprove the presidential waiver have failed.

In July 1999, the United States and Vietnam announced an "agreement in principle" on a bilateral trade agreement (BTA). The agreement was not officially signed until a year later (due to internal divisions among the VCP leadership) and must be ratified by the U.S. Congress. If the Congress approves the BTA, the United States would extend temporary normal trade relations (NTR) status to Vietnam, which would significantly reduce U.S. tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. In addition, it would grant Vietnam access to U.S. government financial facilities that extend credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees. In return, Vietnam agreed to undertake a wide range of market-liberalization measures, including extending NTR treatment to U.S. exports, reducing tariffs on goods, easing barriers to U.S. services, committing to protect certain intellectual-property rights, and providing additional inducements and protections for foreign direct investment. The agreement does not address the Vietnamese government's interference with the distribution of literature, multi-media broadcasts, and other forms of transmission into Vietnam, for example Radio Free Asia broadcasts.

However, notwithstanding an approved BTA, Vietnam would be still subject to the Jackson-Vanik restrictions, unless they are waived by the President (and the waiver is not overturned by Congress). In other words, even with the BTA in place, the President can suspend NTR by not promulgating a Jackson-Vanik waiver or the Congress can suspend NTR by overturning a presidential waiver.

E. Commission Recommendations

With a new administration in place and as Congress prepares to consider the ratification of the Bilateral Trade Agreement, the time is ripe for the U.S. government to assess how the promotion of religious freedom factors into U.S. policy toward Vietnam. The Commission believes that approval of the BTA without any U.S. action with regard to religious freedom risks worsening the religious-freedom situation in Vietnam because it may be interpreted by the government of Vietnam as a signal of American indifference. We note that after approval of Permanent Normal Trade Relations status for the People's Republic of China, unaccompanied by any substantial U.S. action with regard to religious freedom in that country, religious freedom in China has declined markedly in the past year. With this background in mind, the Commission makes the following recommendations:

1. The U.S. Congress should ratify the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) only after it passes a sense of the Congress resolution calling for the Vietnamese government to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom or after the Vietnamese government undertakes obligations to the United States to make such improvements. Substantial improvements should be measured by the following standards:

1.1. Release from imprisonment, detention, house arrest, or intimidating surveillance persons who are so restricted due to their religious identities or activities.

1.2. Permit unhindered access to religious leaders by U.S. diplomatic personnel and government officials, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, and respected international human rights organizations, including, if requested, a return visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.

1.3. Establish the freedom to engage in religious activities (including the freedom for religious groups to govern themselves and select their leaders, worship publicly, express and advocate religious beliefs, and distribute religious literature) outside state-controlled religious organizations and eliminate controls on the activities of officially registered organizations. Allow indigenous religious communities to conduct educational, charitable, and humanitarian activities.

1.4. Permit religious groups to gather for annual observances of primary religious holidays.

1.5. Return confiscated religious properties.

1.6. Permit domestic Vietnamese religious organizations and individuals to interact with foreign organizations and individuals.

The items listed in Recommendation 1 above are standards by which the progress of the Vietnamese government in the protection of religious freedom can be measured. The Commission believes that the BTA should not be approved until the Congress calls on the government of Vietnam to make substantial improvements in protecting religious freedom or until that government has demonstrated its commitment to protecting religious freedom as measured by these standards.

The BTA does not currently include any provision that would safeguard human rights and religious freedom in Vietnam. The Commission believes that the seriousness and extent of religious-freedom violations in Vietnam warrant a commitment on the part of the Vietnamese government to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom. The Commission does not endorse a particular method of securing such a commitment, but notes that IRFA authorizes the President to "negotiate and enter into a binding agreement with a foreign government to cease, or take substantial steps to address and phase out, the act, policy, or practice constituting the violation of religious freedom."41

2. If Congress ratifies the BTA and approves conditional Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for Vietnam, it should review Vietnam's progress on the protection of religious freedom as part of an annual review of that status.

Upon ratification of the BTA, Vietnam's conditional NTR status would still be subject to review by Congress on an annual basis if and when the President issues a Jackson-Vanik waiver for Vietnam. Should Congress decide to approve the BTA, the Commission urges that it examine Vietnam's progress on the protection of religious freedom and human rights as part of this annual review.

3. The United States should withhold its support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank loans to Vietnam (except those providing for basic human needs) until the government of Vietnam agrees to make substantial improvements in the protection of religious freedom, as measured by the standards itemized in 1.1 through 1.6 above.

The IMF and the World Bank reportedly are considering loans to the Vietnamese government of up to $800 million to further Vietnam's economic reform programs. The proposed loan package would provide up to $400 million during the first two to three years of the program. An additional $400 million would be conditional upon the Vietnamese government making satisfactory progress in the implementation of its economic reforms during the program's initial period. While these loans are part of the two organizations' ongoing assistance to the Vietnamese government, they reportedly would represent the first set of IMF and World Bank loans to Vietnam in five years. Officials of the IMF and the World Bank apparently are hopeful that their respective executive boards will approve the loans in April 2001, with implementation to follow in May. As of the date that this report went to print, no decision has been made.

As mentioned above in connection with congressional approval of the BTA, the Commission believes that supporting economic aid through international financial institutions that primarily benefits the Vietnamese government without requiring that government to make a commitment to substantially improve its protection of religious freedom may be interpreted as a signal of U.S. indifference. The Commission recognizes that Congress has set down policy guidelines for the withholding of U.S. support for IMF or World Bank loans on human rights grounds in both the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 and IRFA.42 The Commission believes that the severity of the Vietnamese government's violation of religious freedom, and its apparent unwillingness to make sustained improvements in the protection of religious freedom, warrants the use of this sanction. The United States, as a member of the IMF and World Bank Executive Boards, should withhold its support for loans to the government of Vietnam until that government agrees to make substantial improvement in the protection of religious freedom. The U.S. should not withhold its support for loans made for the purpose of providing for the basic human needs of the Vietnamese people.43

4. The U.S. government should make the protection of religious freedom a high-priority issue in its bilateral relations with Vietnam, including in the annual human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government and in future trade negotiations, advocating substantial improvement in the protection of religious freedom as measured by the standards itemized as 1.1 through 1.6 above.

The U.S. Department of State should advise the office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on the state of religious freedom and other human rights in Vietnam, and should request that the USTR advance the U.S. government's interests in human rights in and through the negotiations and the provisions of any further trade agreement or companion agreement between the two countries.

The United States and Vietnamese governments have held bilateral human rights dialogues since 1995. The U.S. government should ensure that the discussion of religious freedom receives high-priority attention in these annual dialogues, as well as in other bilateral contacts. The United States should press vigorously for substantial improvement in the protection of religious freedom in Vietnam, as measured by the specific standards referred to above.

The State Department should ensure that the USTR, as the executive branch's interagency coordinator of U.S. trade policy and the lead trade negotiator, is advised of the state of religious freedom and other human rights in Vietnam prior to and during its trade negotiations with its Vietnamese counterpart. Furthermore, the State Department should request that the USTR advance the U.S. government's interests in promoting human rights and religious freedom in the conduct of its trade negotiations with the Vietnamese government and that such interests should be reflected in the provisions of any further trade agreement or companion agreement between the two countries.

5. The U.S. government should insist that the Vietnamese government permit domestic Vietnamese religious and other non-governmental organizations to distribute their own and donated aid.

One important aspect of many Vietnamese religious communities is their commitment, as a matter of conscience, to humanitarian relief and other works of charity. However, the Vietnamese government has prohibited indigenous religious groups and their members from providing relief and social services to the Vietnamese people.44 For example, in October 2000 the Vietnamese government barred UBCV leaders such as the Venerable Thich Quang Do and the Venerable Thich Khong Tanh from providing much-needed relief to victims of one of the largest floods in Vietnam's recent history, despite the fact that the Vietnamese government was incapable of providing sufficient relief and was openly courting international relief aid. The Hoa Hao Buddhists were also prevented from providing flood relief.

While the U.S. government should continue to provide humanitarian and relief aid to Vietnam should the need arise, the Commission believes that the United States should insist that the Vietnamese government permit domestic religious and other non-governmental organizations to distribute their own and donated aid.

6. The U.S. government should, through its foreign assistance and exchange programs, support individuals (and organizations, if they exist) in Vietnam that are advocating human rights (including religious freedom), the rule of law, and legal reform. It should also support exchanges between Vietnamese religious communities and U.S. religious and other non-governmental organizations concerned with religious freedom in Vietnam.

The United States currently gives Vietnam around $8 million in direct foreign assistance, primarily humanitarian aid and support for economic reform. Although there are individuals in Vietnam who advocate for legal reform and human rights (including religious freedom), the Vietnamese government generally prohibits independent human rights, humanitarian, and other such organizations. In order to promote religious freedom in Vietnam, the U.S. government should support such individuals (and organizations, if they exist) in these efforts. This could be done through direct support as well as educational and other exchanges with appropriate U.S. partners.

7. Until religious freedom significantly improves in Vietnam (as measured by the standards itemized as 1.1 through 1.6, above), the U.S. government should initiate or support a resolution to censure Vietnam at the annual meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights and should engage in a sustained campaign to persuade other governments to support it.

8. The U.S. government should continue to support the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Human Rights Working Group, and should encourage the Vietnamese government to join the working group.

In 1993, the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization adopted a Declaration on Human Rights that included a provision encouraging the ASEAN member states to form a regional human rights mechanism.45 Following this formal declaration, ASEAN - through consultations among representatives of the ASEAN member states, regional organizations, and Southeast Asian non-governmental organizations - established the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism (Working Group). The Working Group is comprised of national working groups in member states which in turn are made up of representatives from the academe, non-governmental organizations, government, business, media, and "national human rights institutions." To date, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have formed national working groups, and Singapore is in the process of forming one. In July 2000, the Working Group submitted to ASEAN a draft agreement that calls for the establishment of a permanent human rights commission.

The Commission believes that the U.S. government should continue to support the Working Group and its efforts to promote the creation of a permanent ASEAN human rights organization. The U.S. government should urge the Vietnamese government to join the Working Group and establish its own national working group as a sign of its commitment to protecting religious freedom and other human rights. The establishment of such an organization in Vietnam would lay the foundation for regular discussions on human rights between Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries. The Vietnamese government discussed with Working Group officials the possibility of forming such a national body in Vietnam during a recent visit to Hanoi.

9. The United States should continue to support Radio Free Asia (RFA) broadcasts into Vietnam as a vehicle for promoting religious freedom and human rights in that country.

It is widely reported that the Vietnamese government jams RFA broadcasts into Vietnam. The reported efforts by the Vietnamese government to block RFA transmissions reflect RFA's importance to the Vietnamese people as a source of news and information about Vietnam that is independent of the Vietnamese government. The Commission recommends that the U.S. government should continue to support RFA broadcasts into Vietnam not only as a source of news and information but also as a vehicle for promoting religious freedom and human rights in that country.

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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)


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