TRANSCRIPT: 3/1 BRIEFING BY STATE SPOKESMAN EN ROUTE TO BEIJING
(James Rubin: China going wrong way on human rights)En route to Beijing -- China is going the wrong way on human rights, says State Department Spokesman James Rubin, but the United States has not yet decided whether to call the Beijing regime to account in Geneva.
"There has been a turning in the wrong direction," Rubin told reporters in a briefing March 1 while en route to China with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
"We deplore yesterday's detention of Wu Yilong, and the sentencing of democracy activist Peng Ming for running a debate forum for intellectuals," Rubin said.
"Unfortunately these arrests fit a pattern of crackdown on political dissent and discussion that were spelled out in the human rights reports that signaled that China has been going in the wrong direction on key human rights concerns," Rubin said.
The United States Senate in a 99-0 vote on the eve of Albright's visit to Beijing urged the Clinton administration to introduce a resolution at the upcoming U.N. Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva faulting the Beijing regime for its human rights abuses. Asked if the United States was planning to submit such a resolution, Rubin said: "We have not made a decision on Geneva. ... Some say if you just put a sanction here or a resolution there we're going to solve the problem. And we think it is much more complex than that if you are going to really change attitudes in China."
In addition to human rights issues, Rubin said Albright's discussions with Chinese leaders would include conditions for that country's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO); the situation in North Korea; China's military buildup vis-a-vis Taiwan; theater missile defense; and Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji's upcoming trip to the United States.
Rubin stressed that the trip was not taking place in a crisis atmosphere, noting that the range of issues being discussed were part of the on-going relationship with the People's Republic of China.
Following is the official transcript of the briefing:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
(Beijing, China)
For Immediate ReleaseMarch 1, 1999
BRIEFING BY
SPOKESMAN JAMES P. RUBIN
(en route Beijing)MR. RUBIN: The Secretary hopes to conduct a lot of business on this trip. This is all on the record unless otherwise stated, including some very hard issues, but from her perspective this trip is part of a continuing strategic dialogue she has developed with Foreign Minister Tang and Vice Premier Qian Qichen. The two of them and the Secretary will be spending many, many hours together over lunch and dinner.
By strategic dialogue we mean foreign policy issues, not bilateral issues, where we can try to identify shared interests where we either can or should be working together. North Korea is an obvious example. India/Pakistan is an obvious example. Iraq where we would want to work together, is an obvious example. And then obviously there are examples where there are problems, UNPREDEP being an example of that.
But it is her experience that over time we can narrow differences by talking them through. And there have been stark, stark changes in the level of conversation, the extent of conversation, and the substance of conversation on subjects like North Korea and South Asia from when the original discussions she had and currently.
Nevertheless we know that there are a number of news items out there that give an impression of this trip as being crisis related. We don't see it that way. This is not a crisis related trip. These kinds of issues -- satellite problems, human rights problems, questions about China and Taiwan -- have been part and parcel of U.S.-China relations all along. And we don't feel like we are in a crisis atmosphere.
I think certainly one of the subjects that will come up is the fact that we are working to try to create a WTO agreement on commercially viable terms that would allow China to enter, and that Ambassador Barshefsky's trip will follow us by a day or two.
More broadly I think she would be explaining to the Chinese, and to Zhu Rongji specifically, that if he and the Chinese want their trip to be a success to the United States it's got to go beyond economic issues; that the nature of the U.S.-Chinese relationship is broader than simply the WTO. And so if he wants to have it perceived as a success they are going to have to work on a lot of things in addition to WTO.
Our expectation is that some of the tough issues are going to come up, and Secretary Albright will do what she has always done, which is tell it like it is on the subject of human rights. And we would expect that the Chinese would raise the subject of theater missile defense, especially as it relates to Taiwan.
On those two issues, before I go to your questions, clearly the Chinese will have concerns about this, and the Secretary will try to address Chinese concerns on TMD by focussing both on process and substance. On the process side, she will emphasize that no deployment decisions have been made other than the protection of our own forces. And the fact that the Congress has mandated a report about regional TMD architecture (inaudible) does not mean that any decision on either regional architecture or sales of specific TMD to third parties is imminent. And I would expect her to make abundantly clear to the Chinese how our TMD technology systems are in the early development stage and years away from deployment. Consequently, we have many, many years before decisions have to be made.
On the substantive side, she will be emphasizing what I think is the most important point which is that China has an opportunity to influence the future security of the region. And that countries have a right to defend themselves against threat. For example Japan has every reason to be putting money into joint research and development on theater missile defense in light of the very real North Korean missile threat. It is simply not credible for China to argue that Japanese acquisition of theater missile defense is aimed at China rather than North Korea. And sure, if China wants to try to dissuade Japan from pursuing theater missile defense it should focus on the threat that is creating that need and urge North Korea to end its long range missile program. Similarly, it is unrealistic for China to expect that Taiwan's leaders will not want to pursue theater missile defense if China continues a military modernization program that results in a large military build up with many of the missiles deployed in provinces closest to Taiwan. In other words, Chinese restraint in missile deployment would change the environment in which Taiwan makes its decisions about theater missile defense. And, particularly since the reconvening the so-called Wang-Koo talks, it is a promising hope for progress in the cross-straits dialogue. We certainly hope that neither side would take steps that could disrupt the prospects for progress in these important talks.
Let me just turn to human rights and then take your questions.
We recognize the recent crackdown in China, and Secretary Albright has spoken very, very clearly about that-- most recently at the Chinese embassy, and I am sure you are all familiar with those remarks. These crackdowns unfortunately are part of a recurring pattern in Chinese history based on internal Chinese political and economic considerations. It is not the U.S. government that ends up being a determinant of these crackdowns. There are inherent limits to our ability to influence Chinese actions during these crackdown periods. Nevertheless, because of who we are and what we believe, we will focus on our views of human rights and explain to the Chinese in clear terms our positions. And despite the difficulty in achieving short-term progress in human rights, we will accord high priority to raising the issues. We consider human rights as integral to the U.S.-Chinese relationship, and that until human rights problems are solved we will never have a fully normal relationship with the Chinese. This Administration recognizes that we... it would be a mistake for us to ignore human rights violations, even when we have a lot of strategic business to do with another country as I described.
And that is why Secretary Albright told the Chinese at the Embassy - in their very home - that we were profoundly distressed by China's jailing of political activists. At the same time we need to take into account the fact that China is a huge and complex country as we formulate our policy. Changing attitudes in China is not as simple as a sanctioning here or a Geneva resolution there. We need to apply an integrated approach which operates through many channels simultaneously. Changing attitudes in China towards human rights is not as simple as a sanctioning here or a Geneva resolution there. We need to apply an integrated outside/inside approach which operates through many channels simultaneously. And that is why we are combining vigorous external focus on the human rights situation in China. That is the outside tools, with equally strong support for the positive trends underway in Chinese society. That is the inside tools like the Rule of Law initiative. We use every occasion we can to speak frankly. We tell it like it is. We visit frequently and support access to China for international observers. We enlist the support of our allies plus regional and global institutions in exerting that external pressure. But we have to persuade, we have to have dialogue in a normal way. We don't just threaten to try to persuade; a powerful person to change his or her conduct. So we have this dialogue not only to register our deep concern, but to urge significant concrete steps by the Chinese to follow up on requests for information, and to clarify misunderstandings. It is our view that supplying outside pressure while encouraging positive trends already underway is the best way to promote democracy around the world. The bottom line is until China does have a human rights policy in practice that is within the accepted international norms, we will never have a completely normal relationship with them.
With those opening remarks, I would be delighted to take your questions.
Q: Your reference to Geneva does that mean you've taken a decision on ? ...
MR. RUBIN: We have not made a decision on Geneva. There was a rhetorical point that some say if you just put a sanction here or a resolution there we're going to solve the problem. And we think it is much more complex than that if you are going to really change attitudes in China.
Q: At the briefing the other day, Stanley said that the decision on Geneva would be made after the Secretary meets with Jiang Zemin. Is there something specific she's looking for?
MR. RUBIN: What I think will happen is that we will have a chance to talk to them very clearly, openly, and forthrightly about the concerns we have, including just the events of yesterday, where additional dissidents were arrested. And, you know, let me say we deplore yesterday's detention of Wu Yilong and the sentencing of democracy activist Peng Ming for running a debate forum for intellectuals. Unfortunately these arrests fit a pattern of crackdown on political dissent and discussion that were spelled out in the human rights reports that signaled that China has been going in the wrong direction on key human rights concerns.
Q: (inaudible)...China in the international ...(inaudible).. I mean, why not do it?
MR. RUBIN: Well again, we're going to discuss that. I don't want to preview the thinking on that in one direction or another. We are discussing what our options are with friends and allies, and we'll be discussing with the Chinese what our concerns are on human rights, and after that we will be making a decision.
Q: Have you given any thoughts to the possibility that those arrests and this sentencing might have been in some way related to a retaliatory show of strength -- we're unbending and we are not going to yield to anything during this visit?
MR. RUBIN: Well I think unfortunately it is part of a pattern that preceded the visit by many weeks. There has been a turning in the wrong direction, and this kind of crackdown on peaceful dissent that we deplore has been going on for many weeks now and so if this had occurred in isolation, one could perhaps draw direct signals to the Secretary's trip, but since it is a pattern of behavior that we have deplored all along, it is hard to make that conclusion.
Q: Is she going to spend much time on this WTO business? (inaudible)...impression.
MR. RUBIN: No, I think she will be making the point, she will talk-- that will be the primary topic of her conversation with Zhu, whom she will see, and he is the prime decision-maker. I think the point is on the detailed negotiations -- just the way Bob Einhorn and John Holum negotiate the details of non proliferation, and Harold Koh negotiates the details of, you know, the forums on international human rights -- that what she will be trying to do is making clear to him that the reasons why it is good for them to be in this, that principles will be applying, and then leaving it to Charlene to negotiate the details. But she will get a clear signal from him whether they have a newfound flexibility in trying to get an agreement.
Q: (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: Well there is a new round of the WTO that is going to start, I believe -- I'll find out where -- in the summer, and Zhu is certainly the person in the Chinese government we think has been given the task of working on the subject. And so that lends itself to a natural sense of urgency, but it will require them to understand that it has to be on commercially viable terms.
Q: Do you expect any announcements or anything out of this? Is this just laying the groundwork for April?
MR. RUBIN: I would not see it as laying the groundwork for Zhu's visit, nor would I see announcements. The idea of regular trips by Secretaries of State and Foreign Ministers to China, and Chinese Foreign Ministers to the United States is something that we believe is important to have as part of our engagement policy. That gives us an opportunity to work on the issues of concern: North Korea, India/Pakistan, missile sales, Iraq, other matters. If we don't have a regular relationship, a regular dialogue with the Chinese, those things can more easily become problems. So this is part of regular U.S. - Chinese Foreign Minister level meetings , and not setting up his trip particularly, because his trip is you know is going to basically be determined by some decisions the Chinese make about what they want to happen there. But this kind of a trip is something you want to see happen more regularly. The President had two summits, this is her first trip there since the summit, and now we're going to try to, you know, have more regular, high level meetings to work through issue we have on the bilateral agenda, as well as where we want to work together internationally.
Q: Jamie, in the last week there was the cancellation of the Hughes contract, the Senate resolution, the Pentagon report, the human rights report, missiles, etc. If this isn't a crisis then how would you describe it?
MR. RUBIN: Look, there are issues in the U.S.-Chinese relationship that are going to pop up. If they do at the same time, it will give a sense of coincidence that might give that impression. But let's go to each issue one at a time. It is no secret and it is not new for the United States and China to have huge differences about human rights, although last year's report was an improvement. Every other year there were reports that were very critical. So to factor in the critical, human rights report doesn't mean that we are in a crisis. We've had those kind of reports before.
Secondly, the missile problem is not a new problem. A report was asked for; a report was discussed publicly. For all of you, therefore, there were new things to focus on in the missile area. From our perspective the fact that China has been modernizing its missiles has been going on all along, and has been doing so in provinces near by to Taiwan and it is not a new phenomena to us. Thirdly, the Hughes satellite - this decision does not change our plans to have satellite launches and cooperation done by the Chinese in the future. This was a specific problem we had with the safeguards and the PLA, People's Liberation Army, potentially getting unnecessary or undue access but not approve this license. But we fully expect to approve other licenses.
In short, there is certainly a coincidence of news that may not sit well with the Chinese, but these are things that we have long said are part of our policy. We have long said we're going to speak openly about human rights. We have long said that if there are safeguards problems on a satellite we are not going to license them. And on the missile tech issue, you know -- Taiwan military issues are part of every conversation we have with the Chinese and I don't think it would be more dramatic because of that report. So it is a coincidence of factors that may make them uncomfortable, but we are not uncomfortable. We are going in; we've got our agenda; the agenda hasn't changed. We've got business to do. This is a business relationship. Doing the business of the United States means working with China on things that matter to the American people-- like North Korea, like non-proliferation in the Indian sub-continent, like preventing China from becoming a problem in the proliferation area, like narcotics, like law enforcement. And then there are bilateral issues that are always difficult--Taiwan, human rights. So that's the job, and we recognize that there are a lot of events that are converging at this very moment, but we don't see them as linked, and we don't see them as a crisis. We see them as the normal hurdles that we obviously will need to cross, what you do...overcome as we do our normal business.
Q. (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN. Believe me I'm not calling these - human rights a coincidence. If you think that's what I said, you will be misquoting me. You asked me about all of them. The satellites, and I didn't say there were coincidence, I said there were a coincidence of events, not that they were coincidence, okay, so if I am quoted as " Rubin says...oh these things are just a coincidence," that would be a mischaracterization of what I just said. Would everyone else agree with that or should I go back and amend my comments?
Q. (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: In response to his last question, what I said was that there has been a pattern, an unfortunate and deplorable pattern of crackdown on political dissent, and that is something that we have condemned, and something Secretary Albright spoke to at the Chinese Embassy. This pattern has been going on for weeks. Unfortunately, barely a week has gone by without some sort of crackdown on open - on parties that are trying to open the system up. And so I don't think it is a coincidence that it happened this week. I think it is a sad fact that it has been happening every week over the last months.
Q: (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: First of all nonproliferation hands never sleep. Just as you improve situations at the higher levels of technology or system level, you want to improve the situation at the subsystem level and the technology level. So, for example, we still are trying to get the Chinese to join fully the Missile Technology Control Regime. Right now they have made certain commitments with respect to not selling missiles or transferring missiles. But the Missile Technology Control Regime applies to technologies that can help other countries make missiles. They had said at the summit with the President that they would study the Missile Technology Control Regime. We are now going to try to push them to turn that study into a reality by actually joining that regime. That is not something that we expect to happen on this trip. But it is something that we want to work on.
Similarly, there are always cases of concern to us that we raise, and that is true of every foreign ministry level trip that I have been on, where the experts have the opportunity to raise specific issues that they are concerned about. So that would be a concrete example. In addition on the India Pakistan side we are trying to get moving towards the missile production cut-off so that nobody produces this material at all, and we need Chinese support on that. So that is another non-proliferation issue we'll be pursuing.
Q. What is the connection to China - (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: No. We would like to get a multilateral fissile material cutoff, where all the countries of the world that could make fissile material would stop, and so they would need to as well.
Q. Could we go back to the coincidence/non-coincidence thing? If you are saying that it is not a coincidence, you don't have to say it's on the record or whatever, but I mean is it part of, with the exception of the Senate resolution obviously, is there part of a strategy to kind of get to make the Chinese uncomfortable? To get an upper hand in any talks that happen?
MR. RUBIN. By releasing these people?
Q. The missile, I mean the satellite, the missile report, the human rights report? I'm prepared to say that the Administration doesn't have anything to do with the Senate voting the way that it did. But those three things.
MR. RUBIN: We never said that as we developed an engagement policy and improved on that engagement policy that there wouldn't be problems. Engagement is not the same at all as happy. Okay? All is not perfect in the U. S. -China relationship. That is why we are talking to them about things where we have problems. It's not a surprise that we have concerns about satellite technology, and it's not a surprise that we would have this human rights report. So we are going about our business doing what we think we need to do even while we want to work with the Chinese on those issues and work with them on the foreign policy issues that we need to.
Q. Some might suggest that it is not the exactly the best place. You did know that this trip was coming up in Washington. The Chinese know it, and two days, three days before she gets here bam, bam, bam the Administration releases this stuff.
MR. RUBIN: Yeah, I'm not going to speculate for you on our motives. All I'm going...
Q: Was there a motive? Other than it was just time for the report to come out?
MR. RUBIN: The human rights report's timing. It's got nothing to do with the trip.
Q: But what I mean is that the Chinese reaction...
MR. RUBIN: You're basically talking about the satellite waiver. All I can tell you though, is that the people who make those decisions, the technical people make it on their own grounds...
Q: But as you've seen...
MR. RUBIN: (inaudible)
Q: (inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: You're talking about the satellite waiver? Because the human rights report is timed at the normal time. We weren't going to delay it any further. I don't know what their calculations for that were exactly and when the license was first put forward. Whether there were commercial reasons, you have to tell (inaudible). I'll check on that.
Q: Do you think though that this gives the U.S., gives the Secretary and the rest of the people on this plane, a little more leverage, the fact that all these things have come out and the Chinese are getting more and progressively more and more pissed off as the week goes on? It started off with, "we resent this decision on the satellite" to -- I don't know if you saw the reaction to the human rights report that it's just done -- I mean they're not happy people right now.
MR. RUBIN: As I've said our relationship does not doesn't mean that either side is necessarily happy on every given week but we all have our jobs to do. The Chinese have their interests, we have our interests. Our interests were affected by letting a satellite license go, and so we didn't do it. Our policy has always included putting out human rights reports, so the Chinese read it for what they want but from our standpoint each of the actions was judged on its own merits, taken for its own reasons, at its own timing.
Q: Can you repeat
MR. RUBIN: Under its own timetable.
Q: Spell the name of the dissidents
MR. RUBIN: The spelling I have is Wu Yilong.
Q: Two words?
MR. RUBIN: Yeah, and Pang Ming. You'll check on the spelling.
Q: He was the one that was sentenced to 18 hundred years or something like that.
MR. RUBIN: East Hangzhou and the Central...
Q: Which one was that?
MR. RUBIN: That's for Wu Yilong. We'll get you some more in about -- I'll go get you the answer. We'll type it out for you. Just one second. Let me try to summarize, I almost got it right by the last time which is each of these decisions was taken on their own merits for their own reasons and on their own timetable. I was just getting warmed up, the sleeping pill is wearing off.
Q. Is there anything you can say about possible North Korean benefiting from Chinese technology? The United States has been under the impression for a long time that the Chinese are pretty much in the same wavelength as North Korea and proliferation. But these reports that have been coming out, there was one in the Washington Times a couple of days ago that said the Chinese have actually been on side assisting the North Koreans in some aspects of their nuclear and missile programs. Is that like a concern that that might come up?
MR. RUBIN: Well I would have to check on that specific story about an intelligence report and tell you what I could say about that.
Q. It was quoting White House sources.
Q. The White House did come out and make a statement that said there were basically satisfied with the Chinese policy on North Korea. Is there anything you could say about whether that issue will come up.
MR. RUBIN: North Korea will come up, Secretary Albright and the foreign Minister will discuss as will Secretary Albright and probably all her interlocutors. Our profound interest in seeing the North Korean problem resolved in a way that avoids the danger of a nuclear North Korea or a North Korea that is sending out missiles around the world. And that is a very, very high priority issue for us. And Secretary Albright will be discussing that with the Chinese. In general the work that the we and the Chinese have done on North Korea has improved with time.
Q: What is going to be the most contentious issue do you think.
MR. RUBIN: Well I think Human Rights is always contentious, I think the TMD is probably quite high on their minds. One on ours, one on theirs that is pretty good right?
Q: {Inaudible} So Human Rights is the number one priority on their list?
MR. RUBIN: No, the most contentious.
Q: Sorry, most contentious issue on terms of the Secretary, do think its going to be theirs?
MR. RUBIN: I think that our message the most contentious part of our message will probably be on human rights. And they will have the biggest, most strongly felt position will be on TMD.
Q: (Inaudible)
MR. RUBIN: The actual program is many years away, that if you are really concerned about the risks of TMD to you and stability in the region, then maybe you should start focusing on the problem that causes TMD which is North Korean missiles and nuclear missiles deployed near Taiwan. Those are the reasons why quite legitimately various countries and Taiwan are considering TMD, so lets go to the source of the problem rather than complaining about the solution.
Q: (Inaudible)
Q: I have a stupid little scheduling question. Who is going to be involved in this roundtable? I mean is this going to be??
MR. RUBIN: I will get you the details tomorrow. I don't have that.
(end transcript)
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