Text: Rep. Christopher Smith on China Trade Relations
(China systematically violates human rights on massive scale)

Representative Christopher Smith (Republican of New Jersey), Chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, told the House Ways and Means Committee February 16 that granting permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) to China would mean "surrendering one of our last important means ... to affect Beijing's conduct."

"The possibility of [NTR] revocation -- even if it is only a distant possibility -- is critically important leverage that we must not surrender," Smith said.

The Clinton Administration's willingness to apply unilateral economic sanctions against China when U.S. business interests are concerned, such as to punish copyright violations, led Smith to "conclude that some business interests and U.S. officials understand full well that unilateral economic sanctions (and the threat of such sanctions) can and do work to change the conduct of the PRC government."

Smith added that the Administration's unwillingness to use such sanctions to punish the Chinese government for human rights abuses, however, coupled by its desire to grant China permanent NTR while human rights abuses there were rampant, "appears to reflect an implicit prioritization of profits above fundamental human rights."

"Regardless of whether permanent [NTR] is required as part of China's World Trade Organization accession package -- and this assertion is vigorously disputed by some experts on international trade law -- the United States of America must stand for more than the corporate bottom line," Smith said.

Citing recent religious persecution such as the arrest and imprisonment of 7,000 Falun Gong practitioners, Protestant house church pastors, the 80-year-old Catholic Archbishop John Yang Shudao, and the 10-year-old Panchen Lama, Smith said human rights conditions in China "are probably the worst they have been since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre."

He also maintained that the Chinese Communist government "systematically violates other human rights on a massive scale." Smith cited as evidence the summary executions of Uighur Muslim prisoners by Chinese authorities; the harvest and sale of internal organs of executed prisoners; the repression of political dissent; government programs of forced abortions and sterilizations; the brutal abuse of the indigenous peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang; the use of slave labor to manufacture products for export; and the outlawing of independent trade unions.

Smith concluded that granting permanent NTR would send Beijing the message that "[a]lthough we speak many words about the importance of freedom and human rights, when it comes to our actions, American ideals are not worth nearly so much as corporate profits and feel-good diplomacy."

Following is the text of Smith's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

Statement by Rep. Christopher H. Smith
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations
and Human Rights
February 16, 2000

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In addition to my prepared statement, I would ask the Committee's consent to insert in the record a brief letter from Harry Wu, the prominent Chinese-American human rights activist, on the subject of forced labor in China.

Mr. Chairman, a few months ago, I and some of our colleagues appeared before you to argue against another annual extension of Most Favored Nation status to the People's Republic of China. Today's hearing will touch on some of the same issues. Nevertheless, the proposal before the Committee today is radically different from the MFN legislation we have considered in the past.

This year, Congress is no longer being asked whether it objects to another one-year extension of MFN. Rather, we are considering whether we should sign away our right to ever object to MFN for the Beijing regime. We are being asked to surrender our discretion in the matter. We must resist that temptation.

We are all familiar with the history of the annual MFN review for China. Whether we like it or not, everyone has come to understand that China's annual MFN renewal is a safe bet, barring some unforeseen outrage by the Chinese government. A couple of years ago the official name of MFN was even changed to "normal trade relations," to spare Members of Congress from having to vote in broad daylight for a policy which still legally entitles Beijing to "most favored" status under our customs and trade laws. But even after this emergency cosmetic surgery, MFN or NTR is still such an embarrassment that many of its fondest supporters would prefer never to have to vote on it again.

Mr. Chairman, the possibility of MFN revocation -- even if it is only a distant possibility -- is critically important leverage that we must not surrender. At an appearance before my Subcommittee shortly after his expulsion from China, former prisoner of conscience Wei Jingsheng explained the importance of the annual review to the status of human rights in China. He stated: "[T]he Chinese Communists will only tolerate anything as a result of pressure. Once the pressure has lifted, then there is no question of any tolerance." He further explained that, "in the view of the Chinese Communist authorities," the first foremost area where the U.S. Government can exert real pressure is "in the field of trade."

Wei went on to explain the personal implications of the trade linkage for prisoners of conscience in China:

"Generally speaking, when there is a worsening in the relationship between China and the United States or other Western countries, we tend to get a bit more protection inside the prisons. For example, when there is a turn for the better in the Sino-American [relationship] . . . specifically [in 1997] when the United States declared its intention to establish this strategic collaborative partnership with China, immediately the prisoners [were] beaten and received other abuses.... At the same time, the Chinese Communists stepped up [their] purges generally."

Mr. Wei's experience is not unique, and his analysis is confirmed by other testimony received by my Subcommittee. For example, in October 1997, a Uighur Muslim woman from Xinjiang Province testified that our annual MFN review even helps Chinese provincial authorities in that distant province decide whether to kill people or to let them live. Speaking about the killings and arrests that followed demonstrations sparked by China's arrest of Muslim religious leaders during Ramadan, she stated:

"After the demonstration, we were a little surprised about the patience of the Chinese Government in making open executions. Everything was clear. They were waiting for the United States to offer Most Favored Nation status to China. Right after MFN was approved by the Congress, the Chinese Government made the first open execution of seven Uighurs, and sentenced 23 demonstrators [to terms] ranging from 5 years to lifetime."

Whether or not we agree with how this Administration has used trade leverage (and I do not), the meaning of this testimony is clear: The Beijing dictators change their conduct when they know they are being watched by people whose decisions may affect their wallets. This makes sense, and is well understood even by those who argue for permanent MFN. For example, when big business and the Clinton Administration really want to get China to respect international copyrights, what do they do? They threaten economic sanctions -- the very same sanctions they say would be counterproductive as a means of promoting worker rights and political and religious freedom in China. On at least three occasions since 1991, the U.S. Trade Representative has threatened to impose billions of dollars in sanctions to vindicate U.S. intellectual property interests. In each of those cases, when faced with the credible and imminent threat of economic sanctions, the Chinese government changed its behavior.

I must reluctantly conclude that some business interests and U.S. officials understand full well that unilateral economic sanctions (and the threat of such sanctions) can and do work to change the conduct of the PRC government. But they also know that sanctions may be subject to a law of diminishing returns. For example, if a certain punitive tariff rate were already in effect because of egregious human rights violations, then it would no longer be useful to threaten the same punishment in order to vindicate intellectual property rights. Big business would prefer to conserve the limited resource of trade leverage for its own uses, under the auspices of the WTO. In other words, the selective use of rhetoric about "unilateral sanctions" -- demanding them to punish copyright violations, denouncing them when it comes to torture or forced abortion or religious persecution or abusive labor practices -- appears to reflect an implicit prioritization of profits above fundamental human rights.

Mr. Chairman, the permanent surrender of our MFN leverage ought to be unthinkable at this point in time. Conditions in the PRC are probably the worst they have been since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

The Chinese Government is at war with religious liberty. Around midnight last Thursday, approximately 150 agents converged to arrest 80-year-old Catholic Archbishop John Yang Shudao of Fujian Province. Chinese prisons hold numerous other religious leaders, ranging from the 10-year-old Panchen Lama to Protestant house church pastors. Chinese authorities summarily execute Uighur Muslim prisoners in the Xinjiang region. They continue their brutal crackdown on Falun Gong, a nonviolent, meditative spiritual practice, which Beijing has vowed to "smash." According to recent estimates, over 5,000 Falun Gong practitioners have already been sent to labor camps, and an additional 2,000 have been rounded up in the last week and a half alone.

The Communist government of the PRC systematically violates other human rights on a massive scale. It does not allow significant political dissent. It harvests and sells the internal organs of executed prisoners. It forces women who have "unauthorized" pregnancies to abort their children and submit to sterilization. It continues to brutalize the indigenous peoples of Tibet and Xinjiang. It uses slave labor to manufacture products for export. According to the State Department, "[i]ndependent trade unions remain illegal within China."

Gaining permanent MFN from the United States has been one of Beijing's top priorities for several years. Regardless of whether permanent MFN is required as part of China's WTO accession package -- and this assertion is vigorously disputed by some experts on international trade law -- the United States of America must stand for more than the corporate bottom line. Over the past five years, the Clinton Administration has engaged in unparalleled appeasement of that Communist regime. Permanent MFN would make that appeasement nearly complete, surrendering one of our last important means (short of military force) to affect Beijing's conduct.

I urge you, my colleagues, to resist this surrender. At the very least, leave the United States Congress with the possibility of a vote every year -- a real vote, with teeth. The Beijing dictators are not stupid. They understand the difference between window-dressing and real consequences. This is a time of crisis for freedom in China -- political freedom, freedom of conscience, of religion, of the press, of assembly. A grant of permanent MFN now would send an unequivocal message to the Beijing regime: We do not really care. Although we speak many words about the importance of freedom and human rights, when it comes to our actions, American ideals are not worth nearly so much as corporate profits and feel-good diplomacy.

I believe that we do still care, and I hope that our decisions in the coming weeks will reflect a continuing commitment to the promotion of democracy and the protection of fundamental human rights in China. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State -- www.usinfo.state.gov)


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