TEXT: ROTH 3/24 REMARKS ON TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
(Act has been very effective over the past 20 years)
Washington -- The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has been very effective since its enactment 20 years ago, according to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth.
"Over the past twenty years, the TRA has not only helped to preserve the substance of our relationship with Taiwan, it has contributed to the conditions which have enabled the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan to achieve a great deal more," Roth said in March 24 remarks to the Woodrow Wilson Center and The American Institute in Taiwan.
"Twenty years ago, Taiwan was under martial law and human rights violations occurred with regularity. That Taiwan no longer exists," Roth said. "Today, to my great pleasure, human rights violations are no longer necessary topics of discussion. Politically, Taiwan has a vibrant democracy characterized by free elections, a free press and dynamic political campaigns. The 1996 direct election of the President and Vice President stands out as a particular highpoint, and Taiwan's competitive democratic system continues to mature."
"Taiwan's political metamorphosis has been profound and serves as an example of peaceful democratic change in the region and beyond," he continued. "The shelter of the TRA, made real by each successive administration's commitment to its provisions, helped make this transformation possible."
Roth stressed that the United States seeks a peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
"Dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan fosters an atmosphere in which tensions are reduced, misperceptions can be clarified, and common ground can be explored. The exchange of visits under the SEF/ARATS (Straits Exchange Foundation/Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) framework, currently rich in symbolism but still nascent in substance, has the potential to contribute to the peaceful resolution of difficult substantive differences," he said.
Roth added that Taiwan and the People's Republic of China must find the solution to the problem themselves.
"It is only the participants on both sides of the strait that can craft the specific solutions which balance their interests while addressing their most pressing concerns," he said.
Following is the State Department text of Roth's remarks:
(begin text)
"The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty - and Beyond"
Presentation to:
The Woodrow Wilson Center and The American Institute in Taiwan
By: Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary East Asian and Pacific Bureau
U.S. Department of State
March 24, 1999
Introduction
Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon.
Thank you for the opportunity to address the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. I look forward to exchanging ideas and points of view, and to affirming that the U.S. is following the best possible path for an issue we all care a great deal about.
Before commencing, let me thank our hosts, the Woodrow Wilson Center and the American Institute in Taiwan, and in particular my old friends, Bob Hathaway and Richard Bush, for making this discussion possible and for inviting me to participate.
The TRA - A Home Run with Bases Loaded
Some twenty years ago, I was a new foreign policy specialist on Congressman Steve Solarz's staff. When President Carter decided to recognize the People's Republic of China, I found myself grappling with my first significant policy issue: the nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations in a fundamentally changed world. It was, in fact, the Taiwan question - how to preserve the long-standing friendship and common interests between the U.S. and Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations - that initiated my interest in Asia and shaped my life's work.
I vividly remember the confused and anxious atmosphere of 1979, as well as the sense of solemn urgency. Clearly, the challenge of what ultimately became the Taiwan Relations Act - the TRA - was to ensure that normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China did not result in the abandonment of Taiwan. This premise led to the articulation of the fundamental goals of the TRA as laid out in Section 2(a):
"...(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan."
I have no hesitation in declaring the TRA a resounding success. Over the past twenty years, the TRA has not only helped to preserve the substance of our relationship with Taiwan, it has contributed to the conditions which have enabled the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan to achieve a great deal more.
I wish to digress a moment and note that the TRA was not only the creation of Congress. Close working relationships among the Carter White House, the Departments of State and Defense, leading members of both political parties, and expert legal scholars, contributed to the fundamental soundness of not only the wording of the legislation but also to its underlying concepts. I am convinced that this close degree of cooperation was critical in distilling the essence of the TRA, and I believe it is an example we should seek to emulate more often when addressing the foreign affairs of our nation.
No Zero Sum Game
As I noted earlier, the TRA was born of the U.S. decision to normalize relations with the PRC. The U.S.-PRC relationship that followed that decision - for all of its ups and downs - has contributed enormously to stability and peace in Asia.
In turn, this positive Asian environment, supplemented by the specific assurances of the TRA, has been conducive to the people of Taiwan developing and applying their great creativity and capabilities to bettering their lives. The result has been Taiwan's extraordinary economic and political development. The unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship has prospered accordingly.
Arguably, however, while the gains in the U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations have been formidable, the Beijing-Taipei relationship has actually experienced the most dramatic improvement. The trade, personal contacts, and dialogue now taking place across the strait were unimaginable twenty years ago.
In reviewing the past twenty years of these three intertwined relationships, what becomes absolutely apparent is that gains in one relationship do not dictate a loss in either of the other two. In fact, the reverse is true: gains in one have contributed to gains in the others.
U.S.-PRC Relations
Twenty years ago, immediately prior to normalization of our relations with the PRC, Asia looked like a very different place to the U.S. With our crushing experiences in Vietnam fresh in our minds, the U.S. was unsure of its future role in Asia, saw the advent of communism throughout the region as a distinct possibility, and viewed China primarily in terms of the global anti-Soviet struggle. With a stroke of a pen, normalization opened up channels of communication with China's government and its citizens. Tensions in the region decreased, and China embarked on an ambitious effort to reform and open its economy. The stability that ensued engendered years of unprecedented economic development throughout Asia as well as in China itself. Our relationship with the PRC grew and developed. The unfolding of the U.S.-PRC relationship not only did not harm Taiwan, it significantly contributed to Taiwan's ability to reach the degrees of democracy and prosperity it enjoys today.
Over the last two decades, China's remarkable economic achievements, increasing diplomatic prominence, and gradually increasing military strength have affirmed our decision to begin constructing a relationship with the PRC by normalizing relations. Built on the foundation of normalization, six U.S. administrations of both parties have engaged Beijing in order to promote U.S. interests and to encourage a responsible PRC role in the world.
Positively, our efforts have resulted in a situation where U.S. and Chinese officials now regularly conduct a genuine and candid discourse on some of the most pressing geopolitical issues confronting our two nations. Last fall China worked closely with the United States to bring North Korea to the negotiating table and now sits with us at the four party talks in the common pursuit of a permanent peace. China and the US have worked similarly well together on South Asia, with both nations seeking to reduce escalating nuclear tensions on the Indian subcontinent.
On the other hand, as Secretary Albright's most recent trip to Beijing bears witness, we also engage in genuine and candid discourse on pressing bilateral issues where we clearly disagree. Human rights is an important case in point, as are the recent allegations of theft of nuclear technologies and the questions of missiles and potential missile defense systems in Asia.
U.S.-Taiwan Relations
We should frankly acknowledge that Taiwan would prefer official diplomatic relations with the United States to unofficial relations. However, that said, the fact that our relations are unofficial has not harmed Taiwan's interests.
Twenty years ago, Taiwan was under martial law and human rights violations occurred with regularity. That Taiwan no longer exists. Today, to my great pleasure, human rights violations are no longer necessary topics of discussion. Politically, Taiwan has a vibrant democracy characterized by free elections, a free press and dynamic political campaigns. The 1996 direct election of the President and Vice President stands out as a particular highpoint, and Taiwan's competitive democratic system continues to mature.
Taiwan's political metamorphosis has been profound and serves as an example of peaceful democratic change in the region and beyond. The shelter of the TRA, made real by each successive administration's commitment to its provisions, helped make this transformation possible. In close consultation with Congress, U.S. administrations have implemented our obligation under the TRA to provide articles and services necessary to Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. We have provided Taiwan with F-16s, Knox class frigates, helicopters, and tanks as well as a variety of air-to-air, surface-to-air, and anti-ship defensive missiles. We continually reevaluate Taiwan's posture to ensure we provide Taiwan with sufficient self-defense capability while complying with the terms of the 1982 Communique.
The Department of Defense's recent assessment of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait concludes that, except in a few areas, despite modest qualitative improvements in the military forces of both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades. This assessment means that for twenty years the TRA has been effective.
As you know, the U.S. maintains a significant forward-deployed presence in East Asia in connection with our alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other allies. This presence contributes importantly to regional stability, including the area around Taiwan, as was demonstrated in March 1996 with our deployment of two carrier battle groups to waters near Taiwan.
On the economic front, the U.S. and Taiwan share a vibrant, mutually beneficial trade relationship. Taiwan is the 14th largest trading economy in the world and the seventh largest market for U.S. exports. It constitutes our fifth largest foreign agricultural market and a major market for U.S. automobiles. For our part, the U.S. absorbs one fourth of all Taiwan exports, and our annual bilateral trade exceeds $50 billion.
The economic partnership, moreover, continues to grow. Taiwan's sophisticated economy is largely withstanding the Asian Financial Crisis and acting as a support for the region. Taipei is now pursuing an ambitious, multi-billion dollar series of infrastructure projects - projects for which U.S. firms are helping to provide professional services and equipment. Taiwan and the U.S. passed a milestone in their economic relationship last year with the successful completion of bilateral negotiations concerning Taiwan's application to the World Trade Organization. All indications are that Taiwan will continue to be an important export market for the United States.
Cross Strait Relations
As I mentioned earlier, even having just reviewed the enormous achievements in both the U.S.-PRC and the U.S.-Taiwan relationships over the past twenty years, I would nonetheless argue that the most remarkable transformation has in fact taken place in the cross strait relationship. Twenty years ago, the PRC and Taiwan were "trading" propaganda-filled artillery shells. Today, economic figures tell a much different story.
In the five years from 1993 to 1998, cross-strait trade has grown on average by over 13 percent per year, and stood at $22.5 billion at the end of 1998. In fact, trade with the PRC accounted for over 10 percent of Taiwan's trade with the rest of the world in 1998, making the PRC Taiwan's third largest overall trade partner surpassed only by the U.S. and Japan. Imports from the PRC to Taiwan are growing even faster - by an average of over 40 percent per year over the last five years - albeit from a lower base. 3.9 percent of Taiwan's global imports came from the PRC in 1998.
Taiwan investment in the PRC now exceeds $20 billion. With 30,000 individual Taiwan firms having invested in the PRC, over three million mainland Chinese are now employed with firms benefiting from that commitment of funds. Economic ties have led to increasing personal ties. Up to 200,000 Taiwan business people now live and work in the PRC. Since the opening of cross-strait travel a decade ago, more than ten million Taiwan residents have visited the mainland.
This greater economic interaction is positive. Taiwan's security over the long term depends more on the two sides coming to terms with each other than on the particular military balance. Much like Adam Smith's invisible hand of the market place, myriad individual economic and social ties across the strait will contribute to an aggregate self-interest in maintaining the best possible cross-Strait relations.
Politically, gains are also apparent. One of the most salutary developments in East Asia during the early 1990s was the emergence of a dialogue between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, or SEF, responsible for Taiwan's unofficial relations with the mainland, and the Mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, or ARATS. As I am sure you are aware, in late 1998, SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu led a twelve-member delegation on a five-day "ice-melting" visit to the mainland. In addition to meetings with ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan, the visit also included a meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin and other ranking PRC officials. In a good will gesture, Chairman Koo was invited to stay at the PRC's official Diaoyutai State Guest House; an offer he accepted.
Koo's October visit was able to reach a four-point consensus which includes:
(1) a return visit to Taiwan by ARATS Chairman Wang, a visit now scheduled for Fall;
(2) further dialogue on political, economic, and other issues;
(3) more exchanges between SEF and ARATS; and
(4) greater assistance (on personal safety and property) for people visiting the mainland, and vice versa.
Chairman Koo's visit was the highest level contact between Beijing and Taipei since 1949. As such, it substantially improved the climate for cross-strait exchanges. The consensus that was forged provides an excellent basis for developing the approaches necessary to resolve the difficult issues between the two sides.
The TRA in the Future
Anniversaries call for us to commemorate the past, but they also cause us to look to the future and ask ourselves: Will our past decisions, choices, and preparations stand up to the unknown challenges that may lie ahead? With respect to the TRA, we can clearly answer: yes.
Insisting on peaceful resolution of differences between the PRC and Taiwan will remain U.S. policy in the future just as surely as it has been our policy over the past twenty years. Our belief, which we have stated repeatedly, is that dialogue between the PRC and Taiwan fosters an atmosphere in which tensions are reduced, misperceptions can be clarified, and common ground can be explored. The exchange of visits under the SEF/ARATS framework, currently rich in symbolism but still nascent in substance, has the potential to contribute to the peaceful resolution of difficult substantive differences.
Clearly, this will not be easy, but this Administration has great confidence in the creativity of the people of Taiwan and the people of the mainland, working together, to identify the necessary human contacts and the most comfortable processes to give the dialogue real meaning. Using a phrase that has garnered much favor in Washington of late, I could imagine that "out of the box" thinking within this dialogue might contribute to interim agreements, perhaps in combination with specific confidence building measures, on any number of difficult topics. But, as the U.S. has steadfastly held, we will avoid interfering as the two sides pursue peaceful resolution of differences because it is only the participants on both sides of the strait that can craft the specific solutions which balance their interests while addressing their most pressing concerns.
Military capabilities on both sides of the strait are obviously a mutual concern. From the PRC's perspective, it should be important to determine whether development or upgrade of any one type of weapons system will contribute to the PRC's security, or, conversely, whether it might actually detract from that security by fostering tension, anxiety, political instability, or an arms build up in the region. At the heart of this calculation is the explicit assumption that the PRC cannot expect to pursue its defense policy in a vacuum. Its decisions on military modernization will generate responses from other actors. Or, as Secretary Albright recently said in Beijing:
"Nothing would better serve China's interest than using its developing dialogue with Taiwan to build mutual confidence and reduce the perceived need for missiles or missile defense."
From Taiwan's perspective, the TRA's continuing guarantee that Taiwan will not suffer for lack of defensive capability will help to contribute towards Taiwan's confidence and counterbalance anxieties over PRC military capabilities.
In this age of highly sophisticated weaponry, I think we are all sometimes prone to equating security with military capability. This is a fallacy. Real security does not flow from arms alone and reliance on military measures in lieu of other approaches will eventually jeopardize the democracy, prosperity, and security that the people of Taiwan now enjoy and the people of the PRC expect to enjoy in the future. Of course, the United States Government will abide by the TRA and provide appropriate defense articles and services to Taiwan, first of all because it is the law, and second because such transfers will enhance Taiwan's confidence to engage the mainland. But a durable peace will rest less on arms than success in addressing differences through dialogue on a mutually acceptable basis. Thus, whereas such things as missiles and missile defense systems can ultimately not secure peace and prosperity, dialogue and difficult compromise can do so.
Dialogue and compromise cannot be wedded to an imposed timetable. Good faith is required of, and in the interest of, both sides. The provisions of the TRA and general U.S. policy in the region will continue to contribute to an environment conducive to dialogue and therefore to finding a lasting resolution to differences across the Taiwan strait.
Conclusion
U.S. relations with the PRC and the people of Taiwan are likely to be one of our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come. This Administration, like the five Republican and Democratic Administrations before it, firmly believes that the future of cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to resolve. No Administration has taken a position on how or when they should do so. What we have said, and what I repeat here today, is that the United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful.
Over the last twenty years the TRA has served our interests well. I fully expect that it will continue to do so during the next twenty years.
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