U.S. Dept. of State - IIP: The United States and China

TEXT: A/S ROTH 9/17 REMARKS ON CHINA POLICY ACT OF 1997
(Bill could have detrimental effect on relations)

Washington -- The China Policy Act of 1997 (S. 1164), as sponsored by Senator Spencer Abraham (Republican of Michigan), could have a detrimental effect on U.S.-China relations, according to Stanley Roth, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

"We do not believe that the unilateral sanctions and other unilateral steps laid out in this bill would help accomplish the intended goals, and we fear that some of the provisions would be counterproductive," Roth said in September 17 remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Roth cited Section 101 of the bill, the provision denying certain Chinese officials entry into the United States, as especially problematic.

"(This provision) would restrict our ability to engage these individuals in the very dialogue that has produced tangible progress toward objectives the Administration and Congress hold in common," he said. "The categories of individuals identified in this provision include the interlocutors who can determine the pace of change in areas such as human rights and nonproliferation.

"In addition, this provision of the bill represents a potentially serious encroachment on the President's constitutional prerogatives regarding the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States," he continued. "Decisions whether and when to issue visas to foreign government officials necessarily implicate the most sensitive foreign policy considerations, concerning which the Executive requires maximum flexibility."

Roth warned that the United States must "be careful not to demonize China."

"To treat China as an enemy risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that serves no one's interest, least of all the U.S.," he said. "A hostile China would be a destabilizing force in the region and globally, possibly invoking its UN veto to stymie our efforts to manage the Persian Gulf and UN reform issues; increasing, rather than reining in, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regimes unfriendly to the U.S.; and greatly complicating our efforts to peacefully solve the situation on the Korean peninsula and to maintain peace and stability in Asia."

Roth stressed that the Clinton Administration maintains a policy of comprehensive engagement with China.

"We pursue cooperation with China where appropriate while opposing those Chinese actions and policies with which we disagree. Our long-term goal of bringing China firmly into the international system as a responsible participant demands that we not only maintain but persistently expand our engagement with the Chinese," he said.

Following is the text of Roth's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

STATEMENT OF STANLEY O. ROTH

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1997

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND

THE CHINA POLICY ACT OF 1997

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to discuss United States policy toward China and the Administration's views on the draft legislation entitled "The China Policy Act of 1997." This hearing will make an important contribution to clarifying U.S. policy toward China and will help inform our policy decisions.

In my examination of the draft legislation, I was struck by the congruence between Administration policy and the "Declaration of Policy" enunciated by the bill's authors. For the past 25 years, six Presidents have sought a proper balance in our relationship with China, promoting our interests, cooperating where possible in areas of common concern, but also frankly confronting differences and trying to narrow them.

The Clinton Administration's strategy of comprehensive engagement toward China is based on the premise that it is profoundly in our interest to work toward the emergence of China as a great power that is stable, open and non-aggressive; that embraces political pluralism and international rules of conduct; and that works with us to build a secure international order as well as peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. That same premise underlies the Declaration of Policy in the bill we are discussing today, testifying to the common objectives the Congress and the Administration have in our China policy.

To achieve our objectives we must be careful not to demonize China. The truth is more complex than some popular assessments would lead one to believe. For example:

-- China was once our enemy; now it sits with us in the four party peace process striving for the common goal of a permanent peace arrangement to replace the Armistice on the Korean peninsula;

-- China once supported Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia; now it is a "dialogue partner", along with the U.S., of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a cooperative security grouping of Asian-Pacific countries;

-- China once maintained a wall of isolation and hostility that prevented all but the most minimal contact with the outside world, to the detriment of its people and our interests. Now we see a huge flow of diplomatic, commercial, and educational interchange.

In the area of non-proliferation norms we also see a positive evolution of China's attitudes and actions:

-- In 1992, China acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and a measure the Chinese originally condemned.

-- In 1993, China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which its National People's Congress approved in December, 1996.

-- In 1994, China stated that it would abide by the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and would not export MTCR-controlled ground-to-ground missiles.

-- That same year, Beijing played a constructive role with North Korea in promoting the October 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, under which the north agreed to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear weapons program.

-- Also in 1994, China joined with the U.S. in calling for the negotiation of a multilateral agreement banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

-- In 1995, China supported the successful effort to make the NPT permanent.

-- In 1996, China stopped testing nuclear weapons and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, perhaps the most difficult and noteworthy decision taken to date, considering that China had conducted far fewer nuclear tests than the United States or Russia.

-- On May 11, 1996, China committed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. We have monitored this issue carefully and have no basis to conclude that China is not living up to that commitment. China just last week announced issuance of a set of nuclear export controls, a step we had stressed to China was important for addressing our proliferation concerns.

-- In 1997, China joined with other members of the IAEA in negotiating and then recommending that the IAEA Board of Governors adopt a new safeguards arrangement that will strengthen the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities in states with comprehensive safeguards agreements.

These are not meant to be exhaustive examples, but rather to indicate that engagement has led to visible and significant changes in our relationship and in China. This is true even in the area of human rights, where we have some of our most serious differences with China. We are by no means satisfied with the pace of progress in this important area. China continues to deny or curtail many basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, association, and press. We have a long way to go in our human rights dialogue, but that is precisely why we need one. During the course of our implementation of comprehensive engagement, it is worth noting that China has:

-- instituted a legal reform effort, including 1997 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law which impose limits on police detention of suspected criminals, and the 1994 State Compensation Law which allows Chinese citizens to sue government officials and collect damages;

-- set up village elections, giving hundreds of millions of rural citizens access to a more democratic process for choosing local officials, an effort supported by U.S. NGOs, such as the International Republican Institute (IRI); and,

-- taken a decision to sign the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by the end of this year.

These developments are not sufficient. China must do much more to bring its human rights practices in accord with international norms. However, developments such as those I have noted represent progress. Looked at more broadly, the recent history of Asia shows that over time economic development leads to growth of an educated and aware middle class and of a civil society. This in turn leads, as it has in Korea and Taiwan, to democracy. This is the path we want to encourage China to travel.

Some Americans think that because China is not a democratic friend, it is necessarily an enemy, and must therefore be opposed universally. That is a false choice, and one we and the people of China would regret if we were to make it. To treat China as an enemy risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that serves no one's interest, least of all the U.S. A hostile China would be a destabilizing force in the region and globally, possibly invoking its UN veto to stymie our efforts to manage the Persian Gulf and UN reform issues; increasing, rather than reining in, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regimes unfriendly to the U.S.; and greatly complicating our efforts to peacefully solve the situation on the Korean peninsula and to maintain peace and stability in Asia.

That is not to say that we shrink from identifying differences between us and working to narrow them. In Secretary Albright's words, "engagement does not mean endorsement:"

-- we have been unequivocal in identifying fundamental disagreements with China's human rights and nonproliferation practices that fall short of international standards;

-- we remain committed to our unofficial relationship with Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the three communiqu��s we have signed with Beijing, and have made clear our expectation that the PRC will continue to adhere to a peaceful approach to the Taiwan issue;

-- in the economic area, we vigorously pursue China's adherence to international trade norms including reduction of protectionist barriers and heightened protection of intellectual property rights.

In sum, we pursue cooperation with China where appropriate while opposing those Chinese actions and policies with which we disagree. Our long-term goal of bringing China firmly into the international system as a responsible participant demands that we not only maintain but persistently expand our engagement with the Chinese.

Mr. Chairman, I have emphasized those areas where we agree with the broad objectives of this institution and the bill before us. While budget issues need to be addressed separately, the Administration endorses in principle the bill's call for increased Radio Free Asia and VOA broadcasting, and for expanded student, cultural, and legislative exchanges. Efforts such as these, which increase the flow of objective information into China and which deepen our engagement with the PRC are consistent with our approach to China policy.

However, the Administration is concerned that much of the emphasis of the bill is on unilateral sanctions and related measures. As a general matter I note that such sanctions must be used with the greatest restraint, and only after the most careful deliberation of their costs and benefits. This applies to the case of China and other countries. All too often, use of such sanctions shifts the international focus of the debate away from the policies of the other country that we are concerned about and toward the sanctions themselves as a tool of U.S. policy.

With regard to China in particular, we do not believe that the unilateral sanctions and other unilateral steps laid out in this bill would help accomplish the intended goals, and we fear that some of the provisions would be counterproductive. Such steps would be particularly ill-timed as we move toward the first of our two state visits with the PRC. President Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington and President Clinton's visit to China next year provide the opportunity to continue a positive dynamic in bilateral relations. We need to build on the opportunity these visits provide for concrete progress on issues of concern to us.

To cite a specific example of our concerns about this bill, the provision denying entry into the U.S. of certain PRC officials would restrict our ability to engage these individuals in the very dialogue that has produced tangible progress toward objectives the Administration and Congress hold in common. The categories of individuals identified in this provision include the interlocutors who can determine the pace of change in areas such as human rights and nonproliferation. For example, the head of the Religious Affairs Bureau in China is an individual we want to have visit the U.S. again and again. The more that Chinese leaders see of the U.S., the more they are exposed to our point of view and our way of life. We would do a disservice to the American people if we were to cut off our contact with such influential dialogue partners, especially those who are in a position to influence policies that we disagree with. In addition, this provision of the bill represents a potentially serious encroachment on the President's constitutional prerogatives regarding the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. Decisions whether and when to issue visas to foreign government officials necessarily implicate the most sensitive foreign policy considerations, concerning which the Executive requires maximum flexibility.

Along with human rights, nonproliferation and security matters are core issues on our bilateral agenda, on which we engage the Chinese frequently and at high levels. China now acknowledges our two countries' shared interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. China has come a long way, and we want to continue to build on this progress. Where we have serious difficulties, such as the sale of cruise missiles to Iran, we seek to persuade China that a more restrained policy toward exports of certain arms and dual-use goods and technologies would serve China's own security interests. Through cooperation we can also work to strengthen China's national export controls. We are making headway in both areas; engagement is paying dividends. One sure way to stop that progress in its tracks would be to mandate sanctions that cut us off from our current productive dialogue.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Committee to consider the proposition that we will be most effective in our diplomacy toward the PRC if we use our most effective tools. The period ahead will be an active one for U.S.-China relations. We will seek through a series of high-level meetings, including the exchange of State visits, to make significant progress on issues on which the Administration and the Congress share the same goals, including human rights, proliferation, and trade. Our relationship with China will continue to be one of the most complex policy challenges in the years to come. It will also be one of the most critical. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to share my views with this Committee, and for the opportunity to benefit from your insight and comments. Working together, it is my hope and expectation, the Congress and the Administration will continue to build on our achievements and reduce the differences between the U.S. and China to the benefit not only of our two countries, but for the sake of global peace and prosperity.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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