TEXT: ROTH SENATE TESTIMOMY ON U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS
(Taiwan issue is for PRC, Taiwan to resolve -- peacefully)Washington -- U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the people of Taiwan are likely to be one of America's most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come, according to Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth.
"This Administration, like the five Republican and Democratic Administrations before it, firmly believes that the future of cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to resolve," Roth said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 25. "No Administration has taken a position on how or when they should do so. What we have said, and what I repeat here today," he said, "is that the United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful."
Over the last 20 years, Roth said, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has served U.S. interests well. "In reviewing the past twenty years of these three intertwined relationships -- U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Taiwan, and Beijing-Taipei -- what becomes absolutely apparent is that gains in one relationship do not dictate a loss in either of the other two. In fact, the reverse is true: gains in one have contributed to gains in the others," he said.
Roth acknowledged the ongoing debate over the question of Taiwan and a theoretical theater missile defense (TMD) strategy, but suggested that such discussions are premature. "TMD," he said, "is a defensive system for which no deployment decisions, other than for protection of our own forces, have been made. This high-altitude system technology is in the early stages of development with potential deployment at least some years away."
The assistant secretary of state noted, however, that it is critical to emphasize that the PRC's actions are a key factor in the region's -- and Taiwan's -- interest in TMD.
"We have urged the PRC to exercise restraint on missiles, to work toward confidence-building measures with Taiwan, and to press North Korea to forgo its missile ambitions," Roth said. "These factors are under the PRC's direct control or considerable influence, and the PRC's actions can affect future perceived need for TMD."
"Put differently," he continued, "we do not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to TMD. Our decisions on this will be guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our decisions to date on the provision of defensive capabilities to Taiwan."
Following is the official text of Roth's testimony, as prepared for delivery:
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TESTIMONY OF
STANLEY O. ROTH
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
MARCH 25, 1999"TWENTY YEARS OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT"
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address this committee on the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. I look forward to exchanging ideas and points of view, and to affirming that we are following the best possible path for an issue we all care a great deal about.
As many of you may know, some twenty years ago I was a new foreign policy specialist on Congressman Steve Solarz's staff. When President Carter decided to recognize the People's Republic of China, I found myself grappling with my first significant policy issue: the nature of U.S.-Taiwan relations in a fundamentally changed world. It was, in fact, the Taiwan question -- how to preserve the long-standing friendship and common interests between the U.S. and Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations -- that initiated my interest in Asia and shaped my life's work.
I vividly remember the confused and anxious atmosphere of 1979, as well as the sense of solemn urgency. Clearly, the challenge of what ultimately became the Taiwan Relations Act -- the TRA -- was to ensure that normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China did not result in the abandonment of Taiwan. This premise led to the articulation of the fundamental goals of the TRA as laid out in Section 2(a):
"...(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan."
I have no hesitation in declaring the TRA a resounding success. Over the past twenty years, the TRA has not only helped to preserve the substance of our relationship with Taiwan, it has also contributed to the conditions which have enabled the U.S., the PRC, and Taiwan to achieve a great deal more.
No Zero Sum Game
In reviewing the past twenty years of these three intertwined relationships -- U.S.-PRC, U.S.-Taiwan, and Beijing-Taipei -- what becomes absolutely apparent is that gains in one relationship do not dictate a loss in either of the other two. In fact, the reverse is true: gains in one have contributed to gains in the others.
As I noted earlier, the TRA was born of the U.S. decision to normalize relations with the PRC. The U.S.-PRC relationship that followed that decision -- for all of its ups and downs -- has contributed enormously to stability and peace in Asia.
In turn, this positive Asian environment, supplemented by the specific assurances of the TRA, has been conducive to the people of Taiwan developing and applying their great creativity and capabilities to bettering their lives. The result has been Taiwan's extraordinary economic and political development. The unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship has prospered accordingly.
Arguably, however, while the gains in the U.S.-PRC and the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship have been formidable, the Beijing-Taipei relationship has actually experienced the most dramatic improvement. The trade, personal contacts, and dialogue now taking place were unimaginable twenty years ago when propaganda-filled artillery shells were still being traded across the strait. Today, economic figures tell a much different story.
In the five years from 1993 to 1998, cross-strait trade has grown on average by over 13 percent per year, and stood at $22.5 billion at the end of 1998. In fact, trade with the PRC accounted for over 10 percent of Taiwan's trade with the rest of the world in 1998, making the PRC Taiwan's third largest overall trade partner surpassed only by the U.S. and Japan. Imports from the PRC to Taiwan are growing even faster -- by an average of over 40 percent per year over the last five years -- albeit from a lower base. 3.9 percent of Taiwan's global imports came from the PRC in 1998.
Contracted Taiwan investment in the PRC now exceeds $30 billion. With 30,000 individual Taiwan firms having invested in the PRC, over three million mainland Chinese are now employed with firms benefiting from that commitment of funds. Economic ties have led to increasing personal ties. Up to 200,000 Taiwan business people now live and work in the PRC. Since the opening of cross-strait travel a decade ago, more than ten million Taiwan residents have visited the mainland.
This greater economic interaction is positive. Taiwan's security over the long term depends more on the two sides coming to terms with each other than on the particular military balance. Much like Adam Smith's invisible hand of the market place, myriad individual economic and social ties across the strait will contribute to an aggregate self-interest in maintaining the best possible cross-Strait relations.
Politically, gains are also apparent. One of the most salutary developments in East Asia during the early 1990s was the emergence of a dialogue between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation, or SEF, responsible for Taiwan's unofficial relations with the mainland, and the Mainland's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, or ARATS. The dialogue, cut off by the PRC after the Lee Teng-hui visit in 1995, has begun to be revived this past year. As I am sure you are aware Mr. Chairman, in late 1998, SEF Chairman Koo Chen-fu led a twelve-member delegation on a five-day "ice-melting" visit to the mainland. In addition to meetings with ARATS Chairman Wang Daohan, the visit also included a meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin and other ranking PRC officials. In a good will gesture, Chairman Koo was invited to stay at the PRC's official Diaouyutai State Guest House; an offer he accepted.
Koo's October visit was able to reach a four-point consensus which includes:
(1) a return visit to Taiwan by ARATS Chairman Wang, a visit now scheduled for Fall;
(2) further dialogue on political, economic, and other issues;
(3) more exchanges between SEF and ARATS; and
(4) greater assistance (on personal safety and property) for people visiting the mainland, and vice versa.
Chairman Koo's meeting with President Jiang Zemin was the highest level contact between Beijing and Taipei since 1949. As such, it substantially improved the climate for cross-strait exchanges. The consensus that was forged provides an excellent framework for developing the approaches necessary to resolve the difficult issues between the two sides.
Assessing the Effectiveness of the TRA
We should frankly acknowledge that Taiwan would prefer official diplomatic relations with the United States to unofficial relations. However, that said, the fact that our relations are unofficial has not harmed Taiwan's core interests in achieving security, prosperity, and freedom.
Twenty years ago, Taiwan was under martial law and had significant human rights violations. That Taiwan no longer exists. Today, to my great pleasure, human rights violations are no longer necessary topics of discussion. Politically, Taiwan has a vibrant democracy characterized by free elections, a free press and dynamic political campaigns. The 1996 direct election of the President and Vice President stands out as a particular highpoint, and Taiwan's competitive democratic system continues to mature.
Taiwan's political metamorphosis has been profound and serves as an example of peaceful democratic change in the region and beyond. The shelter of the TRA, made real by each successive administration's commitment to its provisions, helped make this transformation possible.
Taiwan's immediate security was a major concern twenty years ago. There were those who feared that absent formalized defense arrangements with the U.S., Taiwan would be subject to military intimidation by the PRC. Clearly, the provisions of the TRA have been critical in enhancing Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
The Department of Defense's recent assessment of the security situation in the Taiwan Strait concludes that, except in a few areas, despite modest qualitative improvements in the military forces of both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan Strait has not changed dramatically over the last two decades. This assessment means that for twenty years the TRA has been effective.
Consistent with our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and in close consultation with Congress, U.S. administrations have provided Taiwan with a range of defensive weaponry including F-16s, Knox class frigates, helicopters, and tanks as well as a variety of air-to-air, surface-to-air, and anti-ship defensive missiles. We continually reevaluate Taiwan's posture to ensure we provide it with sufficient self-defense capability while complying with the terms of the 1982 Communiqu��
The question of Taiwan and a theoretical theater missile defense -- TMD -- strategy, has of course been a topic of much discussion recently. First, let me set out some important technical points. TMD is a defensive system for which no deployment decisions, other than for protection of our own forces, have been made. This high-altitude system technology is in the early stages of development with potential deployment at least some years away.
But, that said, I think it is critical to emphasize that the PRC's actions are a key factor in the region's, and Taiwan's, interest in TMD. We have urged the PRC to exercise restraint on missiles, to work toward confidence-building measures with Taiwan, and to press North Korea to forgo its missile ambitions. These factors are under the PRC's direct control or considerable influence, and the PRC's actions can affect future perceived need for TMD. Put differently, we do not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access to TMD. Our decisions on this will be guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our decisions to date on the provision of defensive capabilities to Taiwan.
Political development and military security have contributed to Taiwan's tremendous economic development over the past two decades. As a result, the U.S. and Taiwan now share a vibrant, mutually beneficial trade relationship. Taiwan is the 14th largest trading economy in the world and the seventh largest market for U.S. exports. It constitutes our fifth largest foreign agricultural market and a major market for U.S. automobiles. For our part, the U.S. absorbs one fourth of all Taiwan exports, and our annual bilateral trade exceeds $50 billion.
The economic partnership, moreover, continues to grow. Taiwan's sophisticated economy is largely withstanding the Asian Financial Crisis and acting as a support for the region. Taipei is now pursuing an ambitious, multi-billion dollar series of infrastructure projects -- projects for which U.S. firms are helping to provide professional services and equipment. Taiwan and the U.S. passed a milestone in their economic relationship last year with the successful completion of bilateral market access negotiations concerning Taiwan's application to the World Trade Organization. All indications are that Taiwan will continue to be an important export market for the United States.
Clinton Administration Policy
The Clinton Administration has been faithful to both the letter and the spirit of the TRA.
In 1994 the Administration carried out a lengthy interagency review of U.S.-Taiwan policy -- the first such review launched by any administration of either political party since 1979 -- in order to determine that all that could be done was being done. On the basis of that review, the Administration has undertaken a number of specific steps. While these steps were briefed extensively to the Congress at the time the decisions were made, I think it would be helpful to review some of the decisions.
First, high level U.S. officials from economic and technical agencies up to cabinet level, are now authorized to travel to Taiwan when appropriate. Last November, Energy Secretary Richardson traveled to Taipei to attend the annual meeting of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, following the precedents set in 1994 and 1996, when then Secretary of Transportation Pena and then Small Business Administrator Lader attended similar meetings. Cabinet-level officials have attended the Council's meetings in the United States in the alternate years.
Second, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement -- TIFA -- talks and the Subcabinet-Level Economic Dialogue -- SLED -- were established to promote bilateral economic ties. In 1998, under the auspices of AIT and TECRO, they were hosted here in Washington and addressed a large spectrum of economic issues. TIFA meetings have been led by the USTR and the SLED talks by Treasury. Since 1994, then Under Secretary and now Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers headed SLED for Treasury.
Third, it was decided that the United States would support Taiwan's participation in international organizations that do not require statehood as a basis for membership, and would support opportunities for Taiwan's voice to be heard where membership is not possible. Since then, Taiwan has joined some technical organizations like the Global Government Forum on Semiconductors. Frankly, however, movement on this front has not been nearly as rapid as we had envisioned. We have found that there simply are not as many opportunities as we initially estimated, and the PRC has been actively and adamantly opposed to many of Taiwan's attempts at membership or participation.
However, we view successful Taiwan participation in the Olympics, the Asian Development Bank, and APEC as clear examples of the contributions that Taiwan can make, and should be able to make, in international settings. These contributions are possible because Beijing and Taipei found formulas to resolve participation. In the future, we hope that improved relations in the strait that may grow out of enhanced cross-strait dialogue, can lead to similarly creative solutions to the issue of greater access for Taiwan to additional international organizations. Finally, let me emphasize one aspect of the Administration's policy that has not changed. The Administration continues to insist that cross strait differences be resolved peacefully. The depth and firmness of the Administration's resolve on this point was dramatically demonstrated in March of 1996, when President Clinton ordered two U.S. carriers to the waters near Taiwan in response to provocative PRC missile tests. The visible U.S. strength, and the obvious U.S. signal of continued support for peaceful resolution of issues between the PRC and Taiwan, was effective in counteracting the escalating tensions in the region.
Conclusion
U.S. relations with the PRC and the people of Taiwan are likely to be one of our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come. This Administration, like the five Republican and Democratic Administrations before it, firmly believes that the future of cross-strait relations is a matter for Beijing and Taipei to resolve. No Administration has taken a position on how or when they should do so. What we have said, and what I repeat here today, is that the United States has an abiding interest that any resolution be peaceful.
Over the last twenty years the TRA has served our interests well. I fully expect that it will continue to do so during the next twenty years.
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