TEXT: ENERGY SECRETARY RICHARDSON MAY 25 REMARKS ON COX REPORT
(Richardson: Energy Dept. has already strengthened security)Washington -- The recent House Select Committee report on China's efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology, also known as the Cox Report, underscores the importance of the aggressive actions the Department of Energy has taken to strengthen counterintelligence and security at national laboratories, according to Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson.
In May 25 remarks, Richardson said that the Department of Energy has been working on a complete overhaul of its counterintelligence program ever since President Clinton's February 1998 Decision Directive on counterintelligence.
"President Clinton ordered wholesale counterintelligence improvements at the Department of Energy in February 1998, before the Cox Committee was even formed," Richardson said. "We have undertaken a total overhaul of the Department of Energy counterintelligence program. In fact, we've made so much progress that the report's six-month-old findings about the Energy Department's counterintelligence and security are now outdated."
According to Richardson, the Department of Energy has instituted more extensive security reviews -- including polygraph tests, expanded financial disclosures programs and forensic financial investigations for employees working in sensitive programs -- and has increased the budget for counterintelligence from $2.6 million in 1996 to $39.2 million in 2000.
The Department of Energy has also "identified and corrected weaknesses in cyber security, including strengthening firewalls, developing additional intrusion detection devices, tamperproof devices to prevent the transfer from classified to unclassified systems and accelerated these measures by standing down computers for two weeks," Richardson said.
Other security measures include strengthening the screening process for foreign scientists who visit labs -- including background checks on visitors from sensitive countries -- and initiating the reorganization of security and emergency operations at the Department of Energy to enhance accountability.
"We support the majority of the recommendations made by the Cox-Dicks Committee and we are committed to working with the Congress to further strengthen and ensure adequate funding to implement these measures," Richardson said.
Following is the official text of Richardson's remarks, as released by the Department of Energy:
(begin text)
Congressmen Cox and Dicks have produced an in-depth report that underscores the importance of the aggressive actions we have taken to strengthen counterintelligence and security at the national laboratories. This is a landmark report, and we commend the committee for their work.
The national laboratories, as the world's premier national security research facilities will always be a target of foreign intelligence services. To counter that threat, we are putting in place strong measures to prevent the kinds of security breaches outlined in this report.
President Clinton ordered wholesale counterintelligence improvements at the Department of Energy in February 1998, before the Cox Committee was even formed. We have undertaken a total overhaul of the Department of Energy counterintelligence program. In fact, we've made so much progress that the report's six-month-old findings about the Energy Department's counterintelligence and security are now outdated.
I want to caution against oversensationalizing the conclusions of the report. Not every allegation is a proven fact. For example, the report discusses the possible theft of neutron technology discovered in 1996. This allegation is based on one piece of intelligence reporting and the FBI has been unable to identify a logical suspect. The most detailed intelligence of the PRC stealing neutron bomb data is a likely loss of classified information in the late 1970s. The Chinese then tested a neutron bomb in 1988.
I also want to put this report into proper perspective. There is no evidence of a 'wholesale' loss of information. The intelligence community has concluded that classified information obtained by China 'probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons.' But they don't know whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were acquired and they can't determine the full extent of weapons information obtained.
It is also important to note that despite the potential loss, the United States still maintains an overwhelming nuclear weapons superiority; we have some 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads whereas China has less than two dozen strategic missiles.
The Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent modernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear weapons deployment.
It would be a mistake to attempt to use this report for political gain. The report details suspected espionage that allegedly spanned over three decades, beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1990s. In fact, there are three confirmed instances of theft, one in the late 1970s, one in 1984-85 and one from 1984-88. And we believe that China as well as other countries will continue to try to steal U.S. military secrets.
The committee's report identifies serious issues that require bipartisan solutions. And despite the fact that we may never know exactly how much information was compromised, we have based our remedies on a worst-case scenario.
In February 1998, President Clinton issued a Decision Directive to bring the full force of the intelligence and law enforcement community to protect Energy Department labs from espionage. Since coming to the department last fall, I moved aggressively to strengthen counterintelligence and security, approving sweeping counterintelligence reforms.
To date, we've completed 85 percent of the key reforms. We're instituting more extensive security reviews, including polygraph tests, expanded financial disclosures programs and forensic financial investigations for employees working in sensitive programs. We've increased the budget for counterintelligence from $2.6 million in 1996 to $39.2 million in 2000.
We've identified and corrected weaknesses in cyber security, including strengthening firewalls, developing additional intrusion detection devices, tamperproof devices to prevent the transfer from classified to unclassified systems and accelerated these measures by standing down computers for two weeks.
We've strengthened the screening process for foreign scientists who visit the labs, which includes background checks on all visitors from sensitive countries. And I have initiated the most dramatic reorganization of security and emergency operations at the department to bring about more responsibility and accountability.
We support the majority of the recommendations made by the Cox-Dicks Committee and we are committed to working with the Congress to further strengthen and ensure adequate funding to implement these measures.
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