Text: Senator Lugar at U.S.-China Business Council
(Calls China important U.S. foreign policy challenge)Declaring that "dealing with China will be among the most difficult and most important foreign policy challenges ahead" for the United States, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (Republican from Indiana) told the U.S.-China Business Council February 1 "we must be as attentive to our relations with China now, as we would be if we were in a crisis situation."
"For now, our policy of 'cautious engagement' holds the best prospects for encouraging China to be cooperative," Lugar said.
Lugar stressed the need for a high-level strategic dialogue with China on U.S.-China relations in order to provide a forum for airing grievances, clarifying intentions, facilitating problem-solving, and keeping both sides informed of priorities and expectations.
"China's objections to [U.S. plans for] national and regional missile shields will create a difficult foreign policy challenge for the new administration," he said.
"This will place a premium on initiating a serious strategic dialogue with China soon," he added.
Lugar said the United States must convince China to tighten its export controls and to strengthen its commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime, for "failure to do so will embolden those [in the United States] who advocate stringent sanctions on China."
Lugar promoted increased trade with China, explaining "if China's stake in the global economy is enhanced through trade, foreign investment, and membership in the WTO, it is more likely that its behavior will be more responsible."
At the same time, Lugar said, the United States should sponsor and push hard for the passage of a resolution this spring at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva criticizing China's human rights record.
"There is nothing inherently incompatible in the active promotion of human rights or democracy and the active pursuit of a viable trade relationship," Lugar said.
He said the Bush Administration must enunciate a policy that the United States opposes any effort to use force to resolve the future status of Taiwan as well as unilateral moves towards independence by Taiwan, but added that the policy must also enunciate that the United States will assist Taiwan in the face of an unprovoked attack by China.
Lugar said U.S. President Bush will have to work with Congress, the media, and interested groups to fashion a "constructive policy" for U.S.-China relations.
"In the end, we should cooperate with China where we can and compete with or oppose China where we must," Lugar said.
Following is the text of Lugar's remarks:
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Lugar: U.S. should cooperate with China if we can, oppose China if we must
U.S. Senator Dick Lugar delivered the following paper today to the U.S.-China Business Council meeting in Washington, DC.
Although China is still negotiating accession to the WTO and President Bush must certify that China's agreement with the WTO is no worse than the U.S.-PRC agreement, before the PNTR goes into effect, we are entering the "Post-PNTR" period with China.
Once China joins the WTO, the annual raucous debate in the Congress on MFN/NTR should be behind us. Apart from those who will insist that China will never comply with WTO rules, our debate will shift from commercial priorities to traditional foreign policy, national security and human rights concerns.
Given the level of trust and the history of our relations, these concerns are likely to be contentious. Dealing with China will be among the most difficult and most important foreign policy challenges ahead.
Just how manageable or difficult U.S.-PRC relations will be will depend on a number of policy choices by China and the U.S. towards each other and how each defines its respective role in East Asia.
Policy Directions
.The Chinese Course. China must choose between cooperation or hostility, confrontation or accommodation with the U.S.. It can aspire to regional domination, act aggressively towards Taiwan and in the South China Sea, continue to repress internal dissidents, and proliferate weapons of mass destruction; or
It can cooperate with other countries by integrating further into the international system, open its political system, halt the spread of sophisticated weapons systems, and accommodate on regional security matters, including the status of Taiwan.
The U.S. Course. Our actions will shape China's behavior just as China's behavior will influence our actions. If China opts for regional primacy and resists internal political liberalization, we will shift to active opposition, even containment. Our bilateral relations could resemble cold war attitudes and behavior.
If China chooses a cooperative course, refrains from hostile acts against Taiwan and gives space for internal dissidents, we will continue our policy of cautious engagement, initiate a serious strategic dialogue with China and look to expand areas of mutual interest beyond commercial ties (e.g. military-to-military ties, regional disputes, narcotics, and smuggling).
For now, our policy of "cautious engagement" holds the best prospects for encouraging China to be cooperative. That is in our national interest and in China's interest as well.
-- In the end, we should cooperate with China where we can and compete with or oppose China where we must.
U.S.: What Next?
There is no U.S. consensus on how to deal with China. Some see China as inherently hostile, politically repressive, and bent on regional primacy. They counsel active opposition, reduced interactions with China and are disdainful of what they see as the primacy of U.S. commercial interests over all else, especially human rights.
Others see signs of positive, if slow, change through enhanced contacts and exchanges, economic reform and forthcoming membership in the WTO. They want to expand contacts and deepen China's integration in the global economy.
Much of the U.S. debate on China will take place between these two camps and among those who share their respective beliefs. The debate will be within and between party and ideological lines.
Let me review a number of the concerns we will be confronting this year in our relations with China:
1. Taiwan Strait. The most sensitive issue remains the future of Taiwan. It is arguably the most dangerous issue in East Asia and the one that could ignite a direct confrontation between the U.S. and the PRC. The current impasse between Beijing and Taipei cannot be sustained and is unhealthy. Even minor developments can disturb the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
The Administration must enunciate a policy that: (a) we will assist Taiwan in the face of an unprovoked attack by the Mainland; (b) that we oppose any effort to use force to resolve the future status of Taiwan; and (c) that we oppose unilateral moves towards independence by Taiwan. We should (d) encourage the re-starting of the cross-strait dialogue and seek to bring both parties to the table with the "one-China" formula as a given. Finally, we should (e) support Taiwan's democracy and encourage Beijing to emulate Taiwan; and we (f) should support programs that will promote the rule of law and democracy in the Mainland.
2. Taiwan Arms Requests. Taiwan will include advanced weapons systems in its arms request this Spring. It will likely include diesel submarines, destroyers, early warning radar, command and control technology and other arms. There should be little that is new in the request. Reports indicate we will offer 2-4 Kidd-class destroyers which our Navy believes meets Taiwan's air defense requirements and are available sooner and at lower costs than the Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. A timid U.S. response to Taiwan's arms request will infuriate avid Taiwan supporters. Agreeing to the entire arms request could precipitate a diplomatic crisis with Beijing.
-- Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. The TSEA was shelved last year in the Senate after passing in the House. I understand the bill is being re-drafted this year. As formulated last year, the TSEA would move the U.S. closer to state-to-state relations with Taiwan, provide sophisticated arms to Taiwan and would formalize much of what already exists in the relationship with Taiwan. Beijing would view it as a provocative and hostile decision. I expect a serious debate on this again this year.
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction/Export Controls. We dodged the bullet on Chinese proliferation of WMD and missile technology last year because we considered sanctions on China during debate on the PNTR. It was defeated overwhelmingly. I expect it will be introduced this year in some form. It is a serious national security issue and debate on it would proceed without the constraint of the PNTR debate. We must convince China to tighten its export controls and to strengthen its commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Failure to do so will embolden those who advocate stringent sanctions on China.
4. Congress-Executive Commission on the PRC. When we passed the PNTR last year, we included the Levin-Bereuter amendment establishing the "Congressional-Executive Commission on Human Rights." Eighteen of the 23 member Commission will be selected from the Congress (9 from each Chamber). Other members will come from the Administration and the private sector. The selection of Congressional members -- which has taken place to date -- will provide an indicator of how vigorous the Commission will carry out its mission of monitoring and making recommendations about human rights in China.
5. Human Rights. Everyone agrees that China's human rights record is deplorable. Its harsh treatment of Christian, Buddhist, Moslem believers and Falun Gong members -- and the suppression of other basic freedoms -- will compel us to sponsor a resolution this Spring at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. This will gather considerable attention in the Congress and among human rights organizations. We should push hard for its passage despite anger from Beijing. There is nothing inherently incompatible in the active promotion of human rights or democracy and the active pursuit of a viable trade relationship.
-- Tiananmen Papers. The publication of the Tiananmen Papers provides an inside account of the decision to crush the democracy movement inside China in 1989. Assuming authenticity, many will conclude that China's "economic first" policy means total resistance to political change. Publication will reinforce those who doubt engagement with China. We will observe, however, if the publication of these papers -- and they will be read in China -- will put China back on the path to political reform.
6. NMD and TMD. I expect that decisions on a national missile defense (NMD) will be made by the new administration in due course. This will affect U.S.-PRC relations significantly. China has threatened to accelerate its missile production and capability if we proceed. Decisions on theater missile defense (TMD) deployments in Japan or Taiwan would, in China's view, further disturb the regional balance. China's objections to national and regional missile shields will create a difficult foreign policy challenge for the new administration. This will place a premium on initiating a serious strategic dialogue with China soon.
7. Presidential Leadership. President Bush is best positioned to formulate overall relations with China. No one can build consensus, frame our relations or represent our national interest as well as the President. Presidential leadership will be needed to limit or close the political fissures over China and to inform the American public on the merits of engagement and the need for an aggressive human rights policy.
Many of these issues will be debated in the Congress, the media and among interested groups who will act to fill the void, if one is created by Presidential inattention. The President will have to work with all these groups, especially the Congress, to fashion a constructive policy.
8. Role of U.S. Business. Staunch opponents of U.S. engagement assert that our relations with China are driven primarily, if not exclusively, by profit-seeking and commercial gain. They assert that we are blind to human rights, to China's growing military force, to its quest for regional dominance and ultimately to our national security interests. They say we appease China because of our commercial interests. They also assert that China will never comply with the WTO or the PNTR.
I'm familiar with these arguments. We've heard similar points of views leveled against our legislative efforts for overall reform of our economic sanctions policy.
-- American business ranks among the most "internationalist-oriented" segments of the American population. American business is pro-engagement. If China's stake in the global economy is enhanced through trade, foreign investment, and membership in the WTO, it is more likely that its behavior will be more responsible.
-- The health of the U.S. economy is not merely an economic issue, it is a national security issue as well. It is important to the global economy and stability of other countries that our economy is healthy and growing. Opening markets abroad is a national security matter. So, too, is the active promotion of human rights and democracy. Both can and should coexist in American foreign policy. They should not compete.
9. China's Future. Most everyone forecasts that foreign policy has receded in importance as an issue area, and that may be true. But China has not receded in importance, and it will not. Whether China continues to rise as an economic, political and military power or fragments under the weight of ethnic, demographic and other strains is relevant to us and the rest of the world.
China will be forced to make monumental and difficult decisions if it hopes to complete the transformation into a market economy, maintain stability, and continue to grow economically. Just how the leadership balances the need to privatize its economy with its desire to retain one-party rule will tell us much about the pace of reform and its content.
China will be whip-lashed by enormous internal forces that will shape its future. These include:
(1) massive internal demographic shifts from rural to urban areas;
(2) demands for better diets and more energy as incomes rise and as income inequities develop;
(3) needs for greater economic efficiencies through privatization of state-owned and state-run enterprises as it seeks to hold down unemployment, particularly in rural areas;
(4) demands for political freedoms as exposure to the outside world increases through travel, trade, and access to new information technologies;
(5) demands by a growing middle class for more and better social and human services;
(6) adjustments to increased import competition in agriculture and others areas as the economy liberalizes;
(7) coping with environmental degradation as predictable side-affects of rapid economic modernization; and
(8) other fundamental changes, to cite just a few of the internal transformations underway in China. China is truly a work-in-progress.
I have summarized a number of major issues that we will confront in the next months and years that will affect our relations with China. China unquestionably will rank among the most important foreign policy challenges we will face. It need not be the most contentious.
For this reason we must be as attentive to our relations with China now, as we would be if we were in a crisis situation. It will not serve our interests to relegate our relations with China to a low priority.
Two weeks ago in a speech at the Hudson Institute in Indianapolis, I stressed the need for a high-level strategic dialogue on Sino-American relations. Such a dialogue can help clarify each others intentions, air grievances and provide a forum for problem-solving. It can help inform both sides about each other's priorities and expectations. I intend to convey this same view to Bush administration members as they assume the mantle of foreign policy leadership for the United State.
For my part, I will stay informed and attentive. The U.S.-China Business Council will play a vital role in keeping us all informed about U.S.-China relations -- as it has done since 1973 -- and we are most grateful for that. Thank you very much.
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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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