TEXT: A/S KRAMER 3/25 REMARKS ON SECURITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
(U.S. China policy integral to regional stability)Washington -- America's policy toward Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) is integral to the overarching goal of preserving peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, according to Franklin Kramer, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.
"Comprehensive engagement with Beijing represents the best way to promote our interests and to encourage a positive and constructive PRC role with the world," Kramer said in March 25 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "This policy has served the interests of the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, and regional security and prosperity. It has enabled us to pursue engagement with China and strong, unofficial ties with Taiwan. It has enabled Taiwan's people and leaders to maintain their security, produce one of the world's economic miracles, and consolidate its democracy."
Kramer noted that the premise of the Taiwan Relations Act "is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC."
"In all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will continue to support Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only because it is required by U.S. law, but also because it serves the wider interests of peace and stability in the region," he said. "We also have made clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful means, or any other action that threatens regional stability, to be contrary to our security interests."
Kramer stressed that improvements in relations between the United States and the PRC do not harm relations with Taiwan.
"Any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum; they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to dampen possible PRC misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency, and promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive Washington-Beijing relations. We believe the Taiwan people share this view," he said.
"Ultimately, however, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is for the Chinese on both sides of the Strait to resolve," Kramer said. "This is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful and durable solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia."
Following is the text of Kramer's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
PREPARED STATEMENT OF
MR. FRANKLIN KRAMER
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEEGood afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. It is especially important to address these issues on the eve of 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. In the interest of reserving time to answer any questions you may have, I respectfully request that the following statement be entered into record. I have prepared a brief statement that specifically addresses your interest in the views of the Department of Defense toward the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
Let me first say that the overarching U.S. goal is to preserve peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy of the United States toward Taiwan and the PRC is integral to this goal. We maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act, but also because it is good policy to do so. We also maintain a policy of comprehensive engagement with the PRC, also because it is good policy to do so. These two approaches are complementary to one another and support our often-stated interest that the PRC and Taiwan work out their differences peacefully. To that end, we are encouraged by the resumption of cross-Strait talks. A constructive and peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interest of all the parties and is a major element in achieving long-term regional peace and stability.
Our commitment to peace and stability is further bolstered by the maintenance of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the region, a policy most recently reaffirmed by Secretary Cohen in DoD's 1998 East Asia Strategy Report. There have been times when more than simple dialogue and presence have been necessary to maintain stability. America's enduring commitment is well-known and widely appreciated throughout the region, and contributes to our overall approach to the cross-Strait issue. Our commitment to take the necessary actions was visibly demonstrated in March 1996 by our deployment of two carrier battle groups to the region in response to provocative PRC missile exercises.
U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan
Now, let me specifically address our policy toward Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S. policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. Section 2(b) states: It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.
Section 3 of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."
We take our obligation to assist Taiwan in maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously. We do so not only because it is mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but also because it is in our own national interest. We understand that as long as one has a capable defense, the security environment will be more conducive to peaceful dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable.
Let me also call attention to an aspect of the August 17, 1982, Joint Communique between the United States and the People's Republic of China that is extremely important to Taiwan's security. In this document, the PRC stated that its "fundamental policy" is "to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question." Based on that PRC assurance, the United States Government made reciprocal statements concerning our arms sales to Taiwan -- that we would not increase the quantity or quality of arms and, in fact, intend gradually to reduce these sales. At the time the Joint Communique was issued, we made it clear that our intentions were premised upon the PRC's continued adherence to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan.
While the PRC adheres to the 1982 Communique, we also recognize that the PRC has not renounced the option of overtaking Taiwan by force. Accordingly, we carefully monitor the PRC's military modernization program, especially as it relates to Taiwan, to determine how best to provide Taiwan an appropriate "sufficient self-defense capability."
U.S. Defense Assistance to Taiwan
We continually reevaluate Taiwan's defense posture and self-defense capabilities and consult with Taiwan about its needs. [Assessing] these needs, the Department of Defense has dedicated significant intelligence resources over the past two decades to monitoring the military balance in the Strait. We also have an active dialogue with Taiwan's defense establishment to keep current on their defense needs.
Consistent with our obligations under the TRA, we have helped Taiwan achieve a formidable capacity to defend itself and to maintain a strong defense posture. Taiwan has acquired several defensive systems from the U.S. in recent years, including E-2T airborne early warning aircraft, NIKE, HAWK and CHAPARRAL ground-based batteries, and 150 F- 16 fighters to enhance its air-defense capability; Knox-class frigates for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and to protect its sea lines of communication (SLOCs); and M-60A tanks and armed helicopters to counter an amphibious invasion. We have also provided support for Taiwan to construct for itself the more advanced Perry-class frigates to assist in ASW and protection of SLOCs; sold F-16-launched HARPOON missiles for ASW; and provided the Modified Air Defense System, a Patriot system derivative.
In addition to these hardware sales, we are increasingly focusing on enhancing functional areas in Taiwan's defense system to enable Taiwan to better apply the equipment at hand, and optimize and integrate its capabilities for its key missions of air defense, anti-amphibious invasion, anti-submarine warfare and protection of sea lines of communication. We conduct functional exchanges and host programs under FMS and IMET to address such areas as personnel, training, logistics management, development of joint service doctrines, and C4I. The contribution of such "software" assistance will add measurably to Taiwan's overall defense posture.
The United States has abided by its commitments to Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan's security will also be enhanced as we work to improve relations with the PRC.
U.S.-China Engagement Policy
The Administration remains firmly committed to our engagement strategy with China. This strategy is consistent with and appropriate for relations between two major countries with both vital mutual interests and profound differences in outlook and beliefs.
Indeed, engagement and pursuit of a cooperative relationship are not to gloss over the very critical differences we have with Beijing's leaders on a wide range of issues. Our broader security dialogues with China aim at narrowing differences on key foreign policy issues. Yet we continue to have divergent perspectives on Taiwan, U.S.-Japan security ties, and overall U.S. regional security strategy.
On the other hand, we are developing important common global and regional security interests. Key among these is the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. We also share concerns about nuclear testing in India and Pakistan and a range of non-conventional transnational security threats, including terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and the spread of infectious diseases. China is also becoming increasingly committed to the maintenance of global WMD nonproliferation regimes.
Ultimately, our policy is designed to pursue cooperation with China where appropriate while opposing Chinese actions and policies with which we disagree.
U.S. Military-to-Military Relationship with China
The relationship of the Department of Defense with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is an integral part of the overall Administration strategy of comprehensive engagement with the PRC. Sustained senior-level dialogue and interaction at all levels will enable us to develop better mutual understanding of capabilities, commitments and intentions; enhance confidence; and promote trust in order to avoid miscalculations and misperceptions that can lead to conflict. The principles of transparency, reciprocity and pursuit of mutual interests inform our military engagement activities. Through this approach, DoD has advanced several objectives in its relationship with the PLA:
-- Reduce the possibility for miscalculations and accidents between operational forces through development of a variety of confidence-building measures (e.g., 1997 Military Maritime Agreement, ship visits, informational exchange on military. environmental security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief cooperation)
-- Gain operational insights into the PLA through bilateral functional exchanges (e.g., military medicine, military law, defense university exchanges, language programs)
-- Ensure open communications during times of tension through routine senior-level defense dialogues (e.g., annual SecDef meetings, vice-ministerial level discussions (Defense Consultative Talks), service chief visits, CINC visits)
-- Monitor PLA influence in PRC internal politics and foreign policy decision-making
-- Expand PLA participation in appropriate multinational and multilateral military activities (e.g., conferences on military law, management, medicine)
-- Enhance understanding of China's strategic doctrine through continuing Sino-American security dialogue
We will continue our dialogue with the Chinese national security community to articulate our vital interests, cooperate in those areas where we share common security interests, and to minimize differences in those areas where our interests differ. Such dialogues do not harm Taiwan's interests.
Indeed, in all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will continue to support Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only because it is required by U.S. law, but also because it serves the wider interests of peace and stability in the region. We also have made clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful means, or any other action that threatens regional stability, to be contrary to our security interests.
Finally, it is important to reiterate our belief that any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum; they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to dampen possible PRC misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency, and promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive Washington-Beijing relations. We believe the Taiwan people share this view.
Ultimately, however, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is for the Chinese on both sides of the Strait to resolve. This remains the best approach and our policy must remain consistent in this regard. Indeed, this is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful and durable solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia.
Mr. Chairman, it is particularly important to note that six administrations of both parties have understood that comprehensive engagement with Beijing represents the best way to promote our interests and to encourage a positive and constructive PRC role with the world. This policy has served the interests of the United States, the PRC, Taiwan, and regional security and prosperity. It has enabled us to pursue engagement with China and strong, unofficial ties with Taiwan. It has enabled Taiwan's people and leaders to maintain their security, produce one of the world's economic miracles, and consolidate its democracy. Our relations with Taiwan and the PRC are likely to be one of our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come. Indeed, the global political and regional environment is very different today than at the time the three Communiques and Taiwan Relations Act were formulated and implemented. Nonetheless, these documents have served U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for more than 20 years and remain the best framework for guiding U.S. policies into the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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