TEXT: 10/27 HELMS/SHELBY LETTER ON U.S.-CHINA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT
(Implementation of 1985 agreement 'would be premature')

Washington -- The immediate implementation of an agreement to grant China access to U.S. nuclear technology would be inadvisable given China's "long record of proliferation," according to the chairmen of the Senate Committees on Intelligence and Foreign Relations.

"We believe that implementation of this Agreement (the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement), now or in the immediate future, would be premature at a time when China continues its destabilizing transfers of nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons technology, and advanced conventional weapons," Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (Republican of North Carolina) and Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby (Republican of Alabama) said in a letter to President Clinton October 27.

Following is the text of the letter:

(begin text)

October 27, 1997

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As Chairmen of the U.S. Senate Committees on Intelligence and Foreign Relations, we are disturbed by reports that the Administration intends to announce the implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Nuclear Agreement during the visit of President Jiang Zemin.

We believe that implementation of this Agreement, now or in the immediate future, would be premature at a time when China continues its destabilizing transfers of nuclear, missile, chemical and biological weapons technology, and advanced conventional weapons.

We are aware that China reportedly has agreed to end "significant" nuclear cooperation with Iran, and has offered assurances on other activities of proliferation concern. Such commitments -- if complete, unambiguous, in writing, and clearly applicable to all activities in question, to include activities under previous contracts, agreements, or other arrangements -- could, if compiled with, justify certification under the legislative requirements governing the 1985 Agreement. We further understand that the Administration maintains that China has complied with its May 1996 commitment not to provide nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Lastly, we are aware that China has reportedly promulgated regulations controlling nuclear exports, and joined the Zangger Committee.

Nevertheless, given China's long record of proliferation of the most dangerous weapons technologies -- frequently in violation of earlier commitments and international legal norms and obligations -- combined with a history of denial, deception, evasion and lying about these activities, we believe that it is too soon to conclude that China has changed its policies sufficiently to merit access to U.S. nuclear technology. Despite China's apparent last minute conversion, we simply have no track record on which to judge the sincerity of Chinese intentions.

On the contrary, as recently as June of this year, the CIA's Non- Proliferation Center reported that China was "the most significant supplier of (weapons of mass destruction)-related goods and technology to foreign countries.... China also was the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan, and a key supplier to Iran during this reporting period."

Further, we cannot understand why the administration would wish to take such a significant step without reference to China's ongoing sales of non-nuclear weapons and technologies that threaten U.S. troops, friends, and interests around the world. In addition to complying with all legal and other obligations, we believe that to merit implementation of the 1985 Agreement, China must demonstrate, by actions as well as words, that its leaders understand that the spread of dangerous and destabilizing weapons is not in China's interest.

Lastly, we note that the former senior officials from previous administrations most responsible for negotiating the 1985 Agreement have testified that, in their view, it is premature to implement the Agreement at this time. Therefore, we respectfully urge you to reconsider any plans to announce implementation at the summit or in the immediate future.

Should you nevertheless decide to proceed, you are required, pursuant to P.L. 99-183, to certify to Congress that China has met a number of conditions, including that:

1. Effective measures are in place to ensure that any U.S. assistance is used for the intended peaceful activities; and

2. China has provided additional information on its nuclear non-proliferation policies, and that based on this and all other information, including intelligence information, China is not in violation of paragraph (2) of Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, which inter alia bars U.S. nuclear assistance to any country that has assisted any non-nuclear state in attempting to acquire nuclear capabilities and has failed to take sufficient steps to terminate such assistance.

In order to exercise our responsibilities as Chairmen of the Committees with primary jurisdiction over the issues raised in such a certification, we request that the following materials be submitted to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations at the time you announce that you are certifying, or intend to certify, pursuant to P.L. 99-183:

-- the written texts of any agreements with respect to Chinese proliferation behavior upon which the Administration is basing its certification, to include both the authentic Chinese text and the official English translation;

-- all intelligence reporting and analysis on Chinese proliferation activities since January 1, 1996, to include the intelligence upon which the Administration is basing its certification, as well as all intelligence that may contradict or not support the Administration's conclusions;

-- any intelligence reporting on past Chinese diversions of any U.S. technology for purposes other than those for which it was provided, together with an assessment of the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor U.S. nuclear exports to China under the Agreement; and

-- the complete texts of Chinese nuclear export control regulations, to include both the authentic Chinese text and the official English translation.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Richard C. Shelby
Chairman, U.S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence

Jesse Helms
Chairman, U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations

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