TRANSCRIPT: GINGRICH 4/1 Q & A SESSION AT JAPAN PRESS CLUB
(Free press important part of "two systems in one China")

Tokyo, Japan -- The preservation of a free press in Hong Kong will be an important part of its transition to Chinese sovereignty under the "two systems in one country" model, according to Newt Gingrich (Republican of Georgia), Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives.

"In the modern world, in the information age, the press is a force in its own right," Gingrich said in an April 1 question-and-answer session with reporters at Japan's National Press Club. "I believe that the hardest thing the Chinese leadership will face in Hong Kong is understanding that the press is a fact. That in a free society it exists, and that any government in the future has to respect freedom of the press as a first step under the rule of law and free elections."

"All of us should keep reminding them (the Chinese) you have to tolerate people you don't agree with when they're on television and the radio and newspaper and magazine, because that's the heart of two systems in one China," he continued. "They can't say we want two systems but no free press in Hong Kong or only free press we like. That will not work."

Gingrich pointed out that Taiwan will be watching Hong Kong's transition to Chinese sovereignty very closely.

"Hong Kong is a key experiment," he said. "If two systems in one country works in Hong Kong -- and by works I mean the rule of law, free elections, freedom of the press, free independent honest civil service -- if people see that actually happen, then it seems to me you'll have a very different dialogue (between Taiwan and China) in four or five years, than if they see Hong Kong fail."

Gingrich stressed that the United States believes in a one-China policy and encourages dialogue between China and Taiwan.

"The United States made very clear in the Shanghai Declaration of 1972 that we favor a one-China policy with voluntary cooperative discussions," he said. "We are prepared to be very patient as that one-China policy works its way through. But it requires voluntary cooperative discussions."

The U.S. also reaffirmed this position in the Taiwan Defense Act of 1979 and the 1982 statement by President Reagan, Gingrich said.

Following is the official transcript of Gingrich's remarks:

(begin official transcript)

SPEAKER OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NEWT GINGRICH
JAPAN NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Tokyo, Japan
April 1, 1997
Q&A SESSION

Q: You are going to visit Taiwan.....The Joint Declaration between China and the U.S. -- it said that a declaration of two Chinas will not be taken. What is the relationship between your visit to Taiwan and the position of the U.S. vis-a-vis China?

GINGRICH: First of all thank you for that question. I think it's a very helpful one, since obviously Taiwan is a question of great concern.

The United States made very clear in the Shanghai Declaration of 1972 that we favor a one-China policy with voluntary cooperative discussions. We are prepared to be very patient as that one-China policy works its way through. But it requires voluntary cooperative discussions. The Taiwan Defense Act of 1979 reaffirms our commitment to Taiwan's ability to defend itself and the fact that we would view with grave implications any effort to coerce Taiwan militarily. The 1982 statement by President Reagan re-emphasized that we are for a one-China policy -- with the explicit understanding that it would be voluntary discussions without coercion. And the position I took in Beijing was that we are for a one-China policy with voluntary discussion without coercion. We were very clear about that, and I think the United States as recently as last year -- when we moved aircraft carriers into region -- communicated our sincerity in being for a one-China policy with voluntary discussion without coercion.

Q: This is also a related question on Taiwan. You are the first Speaker (of the House) in office ever to visit Taiwan. What is the political significance of this trip? What are the main issues you will be discussing with President Lee?

A: Well, let me say first that it is a very great honor for me to be able to visit Taiwan. I guess it's fairly unusual for an American to visit Beijing and Taipei in the same trip. I also visited Hong Kong. So I've now visited one China three times -- and I think that's the way we should view it.

We believe over time that the people of China will find a way to develop a system which will protect freedom and democracy in Taiwan, and hopefully part of that process will be the people of the mainland ultimately having the same freedom and the same opportunity as Hong Kong and Taiwan. But I regarded it as perfectly natural as an American to visit a country with which we have very powerful, close relations and to visit all of the key areas of that country -- to recognize that we have an interest in Hong Kong; we have an interest in Taiwan; and we have an interest in Beijing. As long as we are respectful and clear in our position, no one in Taiwan or Beijing or Hong Kong should take offense at the fact that we have an interest in all three areas.

Q: Freedom of press in China is the question. We are engaged in press reporting and we are very much interested in freedom of the press. We are concerned about the restrictions on freedom of the press in China. Mr. Speaker, what is your evaluation? What do you think of the present status of the restricted freedom of the press in China?

A: That's a very good question about freedom of the press, and I appreciate somebody raising it. Certainly at the Press Club it's the right place to raise it.

One of the things we kept trying to explain to the government in Beijing is that in the modern world, in the information age, the press is a force in its own right. I gave a speech at the Diplomats College in which I described information diplomacy as the necessary counterpart to information warfare in the 21st century. And I cited Lord Macaulay's essay of 1828, which is when he first said that the press had become the fourth estate. Some of you may remember from your history lessons that the fourth estate was originally a French term in the French Revolution. But in 1828, Lord Macaulay said it was the press gallery and the power of the press was not an independent force.

I believe that the hardest thing the Chinese leadership will face in Hong Kong is understanding that the press is a fact. That in a free society it exists, and that any government in the future has to respect freedom of the press as a first step under the rule of law and free elections. Thomas Jefferson once said that if he had to choose between a free government and a free press, he would choose a free press because then he would eventually get a free government. The Chinese will have to learn what every Japanese and American politician has had to learn -- that is you don't have to like them, you don't have to agree with them, but you have to have a respect for the importance of reporters and editorialists and commentators existing in a free society.

And I believe that is the greatest single challenge that the Chinese leadership will face in Hong Kong. It is the greatest challenge they now face in Beijing. Over time I believe you will see a steady growth in the free press in China itself. For the moment, all of us should keep reminding them you have to tolerate people you don't agree with when they're on television and the radio and newspaper and magazine, because that's the heart of two systems in one China. They can't say we want two systems but no free press in Hong Kong or only free press we like. That will not work. And I think I would strongly respectfully disagree with the Singapore model of an authoritarian state in that sense. I think that it's important to have genuine freedom -- that includes tolerating a free press, particularly when you like it least and are angriest at it most.

Q: ......said in South Korea he said North Korea's system is collapsing. What do you think about what he said?

A: I'm sorry who said that?

Q: Mr. Gore, Vice President of the United States.

A: I have no interest in disagreeing with Vice President Gore. He may well have better sources of intelligence than I do and have more information that I do. So I won't comment on his statement. Let me simply say that based on the briefings we got and on my background as a history teacher, dictatorships can have amazingly long periods of surviving despite the repression of their people. Dictatorships that are isolated -- as the Kim Jong Il regime ia -- can in fact manage to convince people that things are OK when they are desperate.

I would not overestimate the speed of collapse, nor underestimate the danger that North Korea might do something militarily if it does decide that its future is limited. Clearly the regime is in great pain. But people who are used to democracies should not transfer to a harsh dictatorship the standards which would lead to democratically elected officials being fired. Because in dictatorships they have a capacity to kill those who dissent, and that tends to limit the amount of resistance people have. So I would just be very cautious. This regime could easily last for many years, or as in Romania, it could collapse this evening. And we don't have enough information and to the best of my knowledge the Chinese don't. I've asked members of your government -- they don't. This may be one of the least understood governments in the world.

Q: Moving to the new USTR report criticizing Japanese trading practices. The Japanese Government called the report one-sided and simplistic. What do you think?

A: Well, I think that from the Japanese Government's viewpoint, it may be one-sided and simplistic. Probably from the American viewpoint, the Japanese Government's report is one-sided and simplistic, and so that's where we begin the discussions. I am somebody who has watched with great admiration for many, many years the emergence of modern Japan. This is the most elegantly sophisticated protectionist society in the world. And that the ability of the Japanese business community to say we are so glad you're here and we so wish you would buy something, and that we could buy something and we would like to buy something very soon, but we can't quite figure out how to buy something, but we really are glad you're here, and soon we're going to actually make progress on something where you and we agree, but we can't quite explain yet, but it will happen in the not very distant future, but we're really delighted you're here and would you like some more tea. It is -- I believe -- done with such elegance and such charm that it has taken Americans almost 30 years to break the code.

I would simply urge the government -- whether it's on the port problems with the work rules or whether it is on NTT's purchasing behavior or whether it is on the paper agreement which almost worked, but didn't quite work, but therefore it's already done because it almost worked, so we don't need it again, or autos as Mr. Dingle reminds me. And again, some of this is our fault. When American manufacturers in autos don't produce cars with right-hand drive, they can hardly complain that people don't buy enough. On the other hand, if we can't penetrate the distribution system the fact that we're allowed to land at the dock doesn't help. So I think we just have to work together. We will be cheerful and pleasant and pushy if you will be cheerful and pleasant and pushy back and we'll get there. But I do think many of you know in your hearts that your country has been remarkably effective at lowering barriers without lowering barriers. It's something we admire, but wish we could sort of have less of.

Q: In your meetings with Director-General Kyuma of the Japan Defense Agency, did you discuss theater missile defense for Japan? Any insight on whether Japan is more willing than (before) to participate?

A: Well, let me just say that I think that the Japanese Self Defense Force plays a very key role in regional security and in regional stability. I think that we should reassess how the United States approaches certain issues of defense and I believe that we should work closely with Japanese scientists and engineers, for example, not just in ballistic missile, but also cruise missile defense systems. But we should also do that in a framework where the United States should be prepared to build and field missile defense systems on its own, and to provide them as umbrellas for entire regions in a way that would then eliminate the need for the Japanese political system to have to deal with difficult and contentious issues. Let me emphasize that is my personal view. I don't believe the USG has clear firm policy on that yet, and I'm not announcing policy. I'm simply here saying as the Speaker of the House that would be my direction, that I would encourage the Administration to move toward.

Q: Last year the United States had an election and a Chinese lobbyist contributed illegal or illicit contributions. How is the House of Representatives in the United States going to deal with it? What is your stance? Are you going to form a special committee?

A: There are committees in both the House and Senate that will legitimately look into any allegations of inappropriate campaign fund raising behavior. But I think it's important not to emphasize the Asian part of this. I mean there have been reports that involve Paraguay; there are reports that involve a Russian industrialist. This should not in any way become an issue about Asians or about China or about Indonesia. The United States has to deal with its own domestic political system on its own terms. We have to solve problems inside the United States and they should not become an excuse for general comments that are inappropriate and wrong about entire regions.

Q: What would you say to those recent critics who are asking you to return to core conservative values or step down?

A: Actually, I don't say much to them. I have a very long public record of being committed to balancing the budget, to lowering taxes, to ending the Internal Revenue Service as we know it in the United States, to having a strong defense system -- including both theater and national missile defense capabilities -- to stopping the drug trade which is destroying our young, to reforming our education so we have a high level of achievement, to decentralizing power outside of Washington back home to states and local communities, to increasing volunteerism. These are the core conservative values.

And I think, as you know from your own society, very often you go through cycles. We went through a cycle in 1994 and 1995, where we had the Contract with America. People told me that I was too pushy, too aggressive, and tried to get too many things done. Now we've gone through six months where I was too laid back, too relaxed and didn't try to get enough things done. I think I'm the same person. There will be a time of great clarity. It will be obvious where we are going as a conservative movement in a Republican Party. I think people will find it is precisely where Ronald Reagan started and is exactly in the same broad general direction.

Q: In the United States, there's a very strict restriction on smoking. There are repercussions against American tobacco makers. (But you Americans) are very busy trying to sell tobacco in other countries like Japan. American tobacco companies' share in the market has increased by ten times. Japanese groups which are working for non-smoking are saying that they are polluting Japan. What do you think -- is this the export of pollution as they claim? What do you think?

A: I think if you're going to buy cigarettes, I hope you'll buy American cigarettes. My personal bias is I hope you don't buy any cigarettes. I don't smoke them. I don't believe in smoking. I think it is a health problem and I discourage people from smoking. But on the other hand, if you decide as a country that you like having cigarettes, then I hope you'll decide to buy American cigarettes.

Q: Before departing the United States you gave a press conference in Washington. You said that the United States -- vis-a-vis Taiwan -- if Taiwan is invaded by force from outside, whatever her reaction may be, the United States will protect Taiwan. I would like to ask about your statement. When you visit Taiwan or other countries, have you taken up this statement with the leadership of those various countries? When you visited China this time, when you met with the leadership of China, did you raise any question over the Taiwan issue? And what was their reaction?

A: Let me repeat what I said earlier. We believe in a one-China policy. That means that the process should be achieved voluntarily and through dialogue. There should not be coercion. That is binding on Taiwan as well as Beijing. There's a one-China policy that has implications for both governments.

What I've said consistently in Beijing and in Shanghai was that the United States had a deep interest in the issue of voluntary, non-coercive dialogue that we had indicated in the 1979 Defense of Taiwan Act. That we regarded it as vital that Taiwan have the weapons to defend itself and that we would take the gravest view.....I said that in my judgment as a historian and as somebody who is pretty aware of the mood in the United States, we had so consistently indicated that we would defend Taiwan, as I said earlier.

You noticed last year we moved aircraft carriers near Taiwan. I think that that was not said in a provocative way. The Chinese government leadership took note of what I said and reminded me that they had not renounced the use of force. We agreed that if they weren't using force, we wouldn't have to defend. And since they don't intend to use force we won't have to think about defending. I think that's a good place to leave it. We have a one-China policy based on non-coercive dialogue. There should be no use of force by the People's Republic (of China). There should be no adventurism by Taiwan. There should be a calm, steady process of solving the problem over a long time. Taiwan should not be invaded or militarily coerced, and the United States stands by that broad general policy.

Q: Could you please assess for us President Clinton's policies toward North Korea -- particularly on the nuclear question? And do you think that the United States should continue sending humanitarian food aid to North Korea?

A: I can't give you a detailed critique or analysis of the President's policies as they relate to North Korea. I think that the effort to maintain or expand -- I think maintain is the wrong word -- the effort to expand some contact with the North Korean government is probably the right general direction. I think all the information we got in South Korea from the Republic of Korea government was that they very much believe it's important to try to establish what some people describe as a soft landing, an ability to gradually see the system change rather than either to corner it in desperation or to have it collapse overnight. I think that we should be very rigorous in our looking at where does the aid go, when do we provide the oil. We should be monitoring how the oil is used, for example.

But I think the general direction right now of those policies is pretty rational. We ought to sustain them again. We have to be candid -- we do not know much about this government despite all of our efforts for some 40 years. The fact is this is a remarkably hidden government and so all of us are operating a little bit in the dark. We should recognize there's a genuine military threat that we should I think be more aware of than we are. And we should cautiously and carefully try to open up a dialogue and increase the potential that that regime will see an alternative to either total collapse or launching a preemptive war.

Q: I think part of my question earlier hasn't been answered yet. You'll be meeting President Lee Teng-hui tomorrow. What are the issues you'll be raising or discussing with President Lee? You sort of mentioned during your visit in China, you said if you have a chance you are going to encourage Chinese leaders not to declare independence. But I don't think independence is Taiwan's policy yet -- especially Taiwanese people don't feel they are a part of China. Taiwan existed before Communist China did. So how would the Taiwanese people want to be independent from something they don't really belong to?

A: I'm not sure I understood part of your closing comment there. If the people of Taiwan are not likely to declare their independence and are willing to have a long dialogue, but they don't want to be militarily occupied, and they don't want to be forced to join the dictatorship, over the long period they may find China evolving in a way which is positive. And Hong Kong is a key experiment. If two systems in one country works in Hong Kong -- and by works I mean the rule of law, free elections, freedom of the press, free independent honest civil service -- if people see that actually happen, then it seems to me you'll have a very different dialogue in four or five years, than if they see Hong Kong fail. So I think that we just want to have time. We'll be talking about a wide range of issues with the President and I'll certainly be sharing with him some of my discussions in Beijing. I look forward to hearing his views of the evolution of relations across the... (unintelligible). But if you look at the volume of investment that Taiwan is getting in the mainland and the potential economic opportunities right across the Straits, I think who knows what the next ten or twenty or thirty years will bear. I am simply willing to say let's be patient, let's keep talking. We're prepared to defend the implementation of a one-China policy on a non-coercive, voluntary basis.

Q: There is the Taiwan Act, the 1982 Defensive Export Control. There was a joint communique between the United States and China. Between these two events, which will supersede the other? Which is more effective? Thank you. Oh, the 1972 Shanghai Communique. There is another communique -- there are three communique which are the basis of American policy toward Taiwan. The Export of Defensive Weapons to Taiwan -- as far as the third communique is concerned, I believe there was an automatic change in that crisis of the Taiwan Strait. Is the Taiwan Relations Act overriding or superior to others? I would like to hear your view on this point.

A: Technically, under American constitutional law, a Law of Congress signed by -- a law passed by the Congress and signed by the President -- would take precedence over a communique that was not in treaty form approved by the Senate. So I think legally, if you're asking how our system works, legally a law would take precedent in the American system over a non-treaty. A treaty has the same effect as law and so a treaty could in fact -- a later treaty would supersede an earlier law. But we're talking about communiques not about treaties.

Second, I think President Bush's decision to sell F-16s gives you a framework within which to view this situation. If the People's Republic is benign and is not a threat and is not doing anything threatening, then one doesn't have to worry about selling Taiwan better weapons. If the People's Republic dramatically modernizes along the coast, then it is legitimate under the Defense of Taiwan Act of 1979 for the United States to help the people of Taiwan upgrade their defenses. So the People's Republic can ensure that we don't sell many weapons to Taiwan by not threatening. The more benign the People's Republic is, the less need there is to buy defensive weapons.

And so I think it's exactly proportional to each other. But what the United States has said clearly and we said it in the 1972 Shanghai Declaration, we said it in the 1979 Defense of Taiwan Act, we said it in the 1982 Ronald Reagan Communique and we said it in President Bush's decision in 1992 to sell F-16s -- what we said consistently was we will protect the one-China policy of a voluntary non-coercive relationship, and we will ensure that Taiwan is capable of not being militarily occupied. I think we proved (that) once again last year under President Clinton. We commended in the Congress President Clinton's decisive actions last year of communicating clearly by putting American warships directly in the way. I don't think you could have sent a clearer signal of our willingness to do our part. We don't want Taiwan to start trouble. We don't want the People's Republic to start trouble. We'd like them over a very long period of time to voluntarily discuss what does one China truly mean and how will it in fact become a reality.

Thank you.

(end transcript)