TRANSCRIPT: STATE SPOKESMAN RUBIN AT FOREIGN PRESS CENTER
(Rubin says U.S., China must work together on solution)Washington -- President Clinton and China's President Jiang Zemin will discuss weapons proliferation, human rights, the environment, and potential Chinese membership in the World Trade Organization during Clinton's visit to China, State Department spokesman James Rubin told journalists at the U.S. Information Agency's Foreign Press Center June 25.
"Let's bear in mind that as Secretary (of State Madeleine) Albright has said to her Chinese interlocutors, right now the United States is the biggest emitter of greenhouse gasses, but very soon China will be the biggest emitter of greenhouse gasses. So in the interest of the people of China and the United States and the world, we need to start working together to combat this problem," Rubin said.
He noted that the presidents will also discuss U.S.-China cooperation in the area of international crime and in gaining greater support for the rule of law in China -- all topics, he said, which make the summit "very important because it means that we are in a position to regularize our engagement policy, to have meetings where problems can be talked about rather than a situation where there is a breakdown in the relationship as has been happening some years in the past. And we believe that by doing so, we can develop agreements that are in the interest of the people of China and in the interest of the United States."
A "very good example" of such cooperation, he said, was evidenced at the last summit held in Washington, when "the presidents agreed on a package that halted nuclear cooperation between China and Iran and involved agreement by the United States to work on cooperation in the peaceful nuclear energy area, which is a 'win, win, win situation.' It's a win for those who want to stop proliferation; it's a win for economic commerce between our countries; and it's a win for the world because of the potentially less polluting effects of nuclear energy."
Asked about opposition by some members of Congress to President Clinton's China trip, Rubin said the concerns they have about China's position on human rights and religious freedom, on weapons of mass destruction, and on trade are shared by the administration. On the other hand, he added, "We believe the best way to address those concerns is to engage with China, to seek not to isolate it through the cutoff of normal trade relations, and to promote improvements...by talking to them and making them see the benefit to them of making improvements."
That policy has borne fruit, he said, citing the release of prominent dissidents, signing of the international covenant on civil and political rights, and "the decision by China to make new commitments in the nuclear field -- to cancel programs of cooperation with countries like Iran and others."
These actions, Rubin added, are "concrete developments, concrete changes in China's policies that we believe are in the interest of the United States and the world."
He said President Clinton "is determined to put the national interest first -- and the national interest dictates that we engage with China; that we discuss our issues of disagreement; that we hopefully promote improved policies on the part of China, and that we expand the areas of cooperation."
As a recent example of the success of this policy, Rubin cited China's chairing of a meeting of the permanent members of the United Nations on the recent India-Pakistan nuclear tests. Calling China's actions "a remarkable development," he said China "came to that meeting with very forward-leaning instructions and developed a very concrete communique. Rather than simply going along or abstaining on the work of the other four (permanent members)...they were an active participant in making clear the opposition of the entire world to the decisions that India and Pakistan had made."
Following is the Foreign Press Center transcript:
(begin transcript)
Foreign Policy Overview
Jamie Rubin, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
and Department Spokesman4:03 P.M. EDT Thursday, June 25, 1998
MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Marjorie. It's good to be back here to see all of you again. As you know, you're always to come to our briefing at the State Department, and we had one today.
Let me start just by saying that with respect to the issues on China, we do have a very large contingent of media with the president and having flown in separately. And we have pretty much every senior official related to China policy there as well as some others. So I am going to be very circumspect in my replies with respect to China -- (source audio break) -- is there that is having regular press conferences to discuss that issue.
With that disclaimer, let us start.
MS. RANSOM: We'll start with India.
MR. RUBIN: Who knows? He might want to ask me about Bosnia. (Laughter.)
Q: Parasuram from the Press Trust of India. Maybe I'll go to China's neighbor. Can you just go beyond the present headlines and look at the future of Indo-American relations, because at this time both of us are making demands which the other is not going to meet. You want us to unconditionally sign certain things, like General MacArthur telling the Japanese "You sign unconditionally." We are not going to do it, nor are you going to give up your nuclear weapons as we say you should give up. So can you go beyond the present headlines and say where we are headed in Indo-American relations? And secondly, these days there is a lot of talk about strategic relationship between the United States and China. How does it impact on Indo-American relations?
MR. RUBIN: Well, thank you for that question. Let's bear in mind here that the United States and India were developing quite a strong relationship prior to the events of recent weeks. Secretary Albright went there in her first year very consciously. The president had been planning to go there some time this year. As you know, the president's trip is now under review. We had engaged in a very serious dialogue with the Indian government and a number of high level officials -- Ambassador Richardson, other cabinet members. And as I said, Secretary Albright had been there. So we were working very closely, very cooperatively on a whole series of issues of interest to the Indian people and of interest to the world. And we clearly saw the prospect of enhanced cooperation with India as to the benefit of both countries. Nevertheless, the Indian government decided, in our view wrongly, mistakenly, and for reasons that have never been compelling, to break the taboo that had existed for many years and to set off a nuclear explosion. That decision set back our relations, and frankly, it set back India's relations with the entire world, and the condemnation came from the entire world. It did not just come from the United States.
As you know, the P-5, the permanent members of the Council made clear that they condemned this decision and made clear what was necessary for India to win back some of the international respect that it lost. That view was shared by the members of the G-8, that view was embodied in a resolution of the Security Council, and it was embodied in a series of statements by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Joint Council and the Organization of American States.
So, roughly 100 countries in one form or another found themselves supporting or signing up to or endorsing statements of condemnation for India's decision. That is simply a fact. Now, I am sure the Indian government and the people of India wished that hadn't happened and wished that it would go away, but it won't go away. It's a reality, and it's a direct result of a decision that we (sic) made that has harmed the security of India and harmed its standing in the world.
We have imposed a set of sanctions, we have made quite clear what those sanctions are. They are very significant, and in the absence of humanitarian activities, the international financial institutions, the World Bank, the IMF, and others are going to not consider loans. And that decision was taken by the G-8, not just the United States. So, that is the reality. The best way to get beyond where we are is for India to turn towards making some positive decisions, which is supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which I believe was endorsed by all, with the exception of India and, if I'm not mistaken, Libya. And that was the company that India found itself in. And that is a function of India's decisions in this area, not a function of American policy. It is a function of international opinion on this excruciatingly important matter.
Do we want to get beyond this? Yes, we would like to see India rejoin the international regimes. We'd like to see them commit to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, commit to not weaponize their missiles and begin to develop commitments to not transfer nuclear or missile technology or equipment to other parties, and not weaponize their nuclear capability. These are very practical things that India can do if India wants to get beyond the situation.
It's not a case of General MacArthur or Uncle Sam, or any other figure, telling India what to do. It's a case of the whole world, in a united fashion, making clear to India that it made a decision that we disagree with, that we have condemned. And the only way to turn the process around is for India to make some new decisions that will bring it back into the international norms. That is the pathway to return India to the status of support and cooperation and respect that it had prior to the testing.
MS. RANSOM: (Off mike.)
Q: I know that you would rather I direct this question about China to those in Beijing. But since this event took place in Washington today, so I really hope that you can shed some comments for me. (Laughs.)
We both know that, before President Clinton left for China, the Congress has significantly raised its voice of criticism against Clinton's China policy and even against China. But today, the House Ways and Means Committee by a voice vote, voted to extend China's MFN.
I'd like to know what is your reaction to it? And also, in general, what is your interpretation of the congressional sentiment of China?
MR. RUBIN: We welcome the fact that there are still enough members of Congress who understand that a decision to revoke MFN would be tantamount to a decision to contain China and change the policy that every administration has adopted in recent years.
We believe that the concerns that members of Congress have, whether they be on human rights, whether they be on missile or weapons of mass destruction proliferation, whether they be on trade, whether they be on religious freedom, we share those same concerns.
The fact is, we believe that the best way to address those concerns is to engage with China, to not seek to isolate it through a cutoff of normal trade relations, and to promote improvements in our relationship by talking to them and making them see the benefit to them of making improvements. We think that policy has borne fruit, whether it's in the release of prominent dissidents, whether it's in the decision by China to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, whether it's in the decision by China to make new commitments in the nuclear field, whether it's decisions by China to cancel programs of cooperation with countries like Iran and others. These are concrete developments, concrete changes in China's policies that we believe are in the interest of the United States and, frankly, the world.
And there are members of Congress who disagree with that. There are members of Congress who see the value of using China policy as a club. But the reality is that President Clinton is determined to put the national interest first, and the national interest dictates that we engage with China, that we discuss our issues of disagreement, that we hopefully promote improved policies on the part of China, and that we expand the areas of cooperation.
And the most recent example of that, taking off on the last question, was in the area of India and Pakistan. It was a remarkable development that China not only chaired a meeting of the permanent members, but came to that meeting with very forward-leaning instructions and developed a very concrete communiqu, rather than simply going along or abstaining on the work of the other four, that they were an active participant in making clear the opposition of the entire world to the decisions that India and Pakistan had made.
MS. RANSOM: (Off mike) -- from Turkey.
Q: Hi. Hurun Kazaz, Turkish Probe. I have a question relating to Cyprus. You have been skillfully answering Cyprus questions on daily briefings, and --
MR. RUBIN: Most of the time.
Q: -- but I want to push my luck today a little bit more because I don't get the chance to come to your daily briefings.
First of all, is there any new appointment to replace Ambassador Holbrooke's position on the books?
And second and more importantly is, upon to this point, all of the policies and efforts of all these wonderful diplomats are based on three year experience of Cyprus as we know of and recognition of the Cyprus as we know of. However, in the island there is 23 years of experience of two separate governments whether or not we recognize it or not. Now, I was wondering, maybe as a turn over new policy, would the United States consider leveling the playing field by recognizing Turkish northern Cyprus as well so they can go on?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly, Ambassador Holbrooke, as you can see from his current trip to Serbia, Montenegro and to Kosovo, is going to be a very busy diplomat. This is even before he's begun his duties at the United Nations, which we hope will be soon -- advice and consent of the Senate willing. And it's also clear that he is not going to be able to perform the duties of special presidential envoy on Cyprus. We have not selected a new person for that task, but let me say that we place a high priority on resolving Cyprus. We continue to support the U.N. in its efforts to achieve a settlement based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We fully support Cypriot accession into the EU, which can offer important economic and security benefits.
As you know, Ambassadors Holbrooke and Miller engaged in an intensive series of meetings, culminating in a May visit to all the parties. At the end of those meetings, it was clear that the Turkish side was not prepared to begin serious negotiations; they included preconditions, such as the one on recognition, to which you referred. That, in our view, is not in the cards; it's not a serious proposal. And when it becomes a precondition, it suggests that the talks are precluded and that the proposal is being made in an unrealistic fashion -- it's simply not in the cards.
Q: You gave me your daily briefing answer! (Laughter.)
MR. RUBIN: Well, I think I tried to spice it up a little bit.
MS. RANSOM: Your next question is from Egypt.
Q: Can we can go on if it's Balkans?
MR. RUBIN: We'll come back to you right after.
MS. RANSOM: We'll come back --
Q: It's a short one.
MR. RUBIN: Yes?
Q: Thomas Gorguissian, Al Wafd, Egypt.
MR. RUBIN: But let me add, I certainly would hope that you know our policy on Cyprus is consistent. And you, therefore, would expect me to have a consistent answer to an important policy. (Laughter.)
Q: Yes. Thomas Gorguissian, Al Wafd, Egypt.
Jamie, since today's regular briefing, did you have the chance to check the wire story about the Moslem groups that have been arrested in Egypt, threatening to harm U.S. interests, either people or corporations?
MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I have seen the wire, but it's hard to know exactly what it means. Let me say this; that we categorically reject any groups' threats to harm the United States, U.S. interests or U.S. personnel. This kind of terrorist statement is something that's unacceptable to the United States and has been demonstrably unacceptable to the world. And no country in the world believes that groups for whatever their political purposes, should be killing innocent civilians.
Q: Is there any possibility of a new warning or some major security measures?
MR. RUBIN: We regularly examine our travel warnings, based on the situation at the time. Egypt has had incidents in the past with respect to tourists with which you're familiar. And we are very cognizant of the importance to us of the protection of American citizens. And if we believe that this statement is a harbinger of some genuine new threat, we would act accordingly.
Let's go over there since we promised --
Q: (A follow-on ?).
MR. RUBIN: -- and then we'll move to that side of the room, okay?
MS. RANSOM: Yeah. And then we have him after her.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
Q: Bosnian Radio and Television, (Amirah Seminovic ?).
I have to admit Mr. Rubin became really skillful to avoid (the) unavoidable. But I'd like to ask you about Kosovo --
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
Q: -- and Bosnia, of course.
In a recent interview to the Bosnian Radio and Television, Ambassador Holbrooke said that it's a deadly serious situation over there. And how would you define what you did till now, considering that on-the-ground situation, it's not getting better. And, on the other hand, how would you define the correlation with the Bosnia in that?
MR. RUBIN: Let me start with the second question first. As you from Bosnia radio and television know, the situation in Bosnia has been improving steadily and consistently. There is much greater economic activity throughout Bosnia. There is no war. The political developments have been quite positive, with the development of relatively moderate leaders in the Bosnian Serb areas, who are increasingly less dependent upon the support of anybody in Serbia, including the president of Serbia. And so that is moving quite well.
War criminals have been picked up. War criminals have turned themselves in. And those who haven't been picked up or haven't turned themselves in would be wise to look very carefully at what has happened so far, and realize that if they do turn themselves in, they will get a fair trial in The Hague, and that that is the course of wisdom for them rather than facing any other option, which we are considering on a regular basis.
Q: (Off mike) -- a message for Karadzic -- (off mike)?
MR. RUBIN: Including Mr. Karadzic, yes.
With respect to Kosovo, let's bear in mind that the United States nor any other country can control the events on the ground in Kosovo, just as the United States or no other country could control the events in Bosnia. It wasn't until the people of Bosnia and their leaders had decided that the course of war was worse for them than the course of peace that peace came to Bosnia. Unfortunately, it came very late, and unfortunately, the early period was not marked by the kind of pressure on President Milosevic that has occurred already in a few short months, including imposition of sanctions across the board, including accelerated military planning in NATO.
This week the NATO planners are narrowing their options and fleshing out the details of those options. And meanwhile, Ambassadors Holbrooke and Gelbard are at work. Ambassador Holbrooke has had his second meeting with President Milosevic today. Ambassador Gelbard met with Dr. Rugova and Mr. Bukoshi in Brussels. And we are pursuing intensive diplomatic efforts. There is in a sense a virtual negotiation going on, where you have Chris Hill, our ambassador in FYROM, who is shuttling, in a sense, between the Serbs and the Kosovar Albanians. You have Ambassador Gelbard talking to Dr. Rugova and Mr. Bukoshi. And you have Ambassador Holbrooke talking to the Serb leadership. And in the meantime, all those ambassadors are talking to each other. So we are trying to put the diplomatic effort into high gear.
But this is an excruciatingly difficult problem, which is different than Bosnia. There is one thing that's the same, and that is the responsibility of the Serb leadership for unacceptable and dramatic crackdowns and the use of military force against innocent civilians. But there's a difference, and the difference is that in the case of Bosnia, the international community recognized it as a state and we have no intention to recognize the same situation in Kosovo. And so it is in that sense different.
Nevertheless, the international community has decided, through a variety of statements and steps, that it is a dangerous enough situation that it does threaten regional peace and security and it is dangerous precisely because what is now an internal conflict could spread into the region, including Albania, former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, and in theory infect the success that we've had in Bosnia. In theory.
So that is why we're working on it, and that's why it's so important to us, and as far as what's happened in recent weeks, clearly there's been a deterioration in the situation and the blame for that rests primarily on the shoulders of President Milosevic.
Q: But sir, I don't want to oversimplify this, but critics say that the U.S. administration is talking too much, doing too little. Some other critics rather are saying that you have only cleared the sentence, "We don't want to see an independent Kosovo." What is other -- do you have any other suggestion, any other concrete suggestion to resolve the situation over there?
MR. RUBIN: First of all, the critics normally don't have a responsibility to consider matters like using military force, and so critics can very easily throw around these kind of threats and it has no meaning. If we are going to consider the use of military force, we believe it is our duty to consider that very carefully; to plan for it, to consult with Congress, and to take a whole number of steps that democracies take before they consider and actually, if ever, implement the use of force, if necessary. That is the way a democracy works.
The critics that I've seen think it's very easy to wake up one morning, write that we use force and then the next morning expect the bombing to start. That is simply not serious. So we are going about the planning that we think is necessary prior to any decision to implement such planning.
With respect to the political arrangements in Kosovo, we think that there needs to be an enhanced autonomy, a high degree of autonomy, within the FRY -- the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There are many different political arrangements that would fit that concept, and we believe that the Kosovar-Albanians should realize that that is what the international community believes and that they should not delude themselves into thinking that if they are successful in controlling part of the territory there, that that will yield any other result because it will not.
At the same time, we are beginning to work and talk about what the outcome will be. Clearly, President Milosevic has made massive tactical and strategic blunders, because all he's done is radicalize the population with this crackdown, and make it harder for autonomy, as opposed to independence, to be acceptable to the people of Kosovo. But it is our view that independence is not in the cards, it's not going to happen, and what is going to happen, we hope, is that both sides will avoid extremist actions and we will end up with a potential solution.
MS. RANSOM: The next question is this gentleman.
(Source audio break).
Q: (In progress) -- what kind of subject do you think that the two presidents will discuss about? Can you predict the summit talk? Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Yes. Again, I will be somewhat circumspect, but I can certainly answer the question generally.
The topics that will be on the agenda include the topics that I spoke about earlier -- that is, weapons proliferation; that is, human rights; that is, making possible a Chinese entry to the World Trade Organization. It includes the environment. Let's bear in mind that as Secretary Albright has said to her Chinese interlocutors, right now the United States is the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. But very soon China will be the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. And so in the interests of the people of China and the United States and the world we need to start working together to combat this problem.
We're going to talk about international crime, the cooperation we need to pursue in that area. We're going to talk about the rule of law and how we can hopefully inspire greater and greater support for the rule of law within China. And I'm sure there are some other topics on the agenda. But we believe this summit is very important because it means that we are in a position to regularize our engagement policy, to have meetings where problems can be talked about rather than a situation where there is a break-down in the relationship, as had been happening some years in the past. And we believe that by doing so we can develop agreements that are in the interest of the people of China and the interest of the United States. And a very good example of that was in connection with the last summit, the presidents on a package that halted nuclear cooperation between China and Iran and involved agreement by the United States to work on cooperation in the peaceful nuclear energy area, which is a win-win-win situation. It's a win for those who want to stop proliferation, it's a win for the economic commerce between our country, and it's a win for the world because of the potentially less polluting effects of nuclear energy.
MS. RANSOM: The next question from the woman in the back row.
Q: Yeah. Tina Chung with Chinese TV System, from Taiwan. Can you tell us the venue --
MR. RUBIN: My effort(s) to deflect the Chinese questions are failing! (Laughter.)
Q: (Laughs.) I'm afraid it is.
Q: Can I ask one more question?
MR. RUBIN: (Chuckles.)
Q: Yeah. Can you tell us the venue by which you are going to brief Taiwan of the result of the summit? And also, can you confirm the report that Mr. Richard Bush (sp), chairman of AIT, is going to go over there immediately after the summit to brief the leadership over there?
MR. RUBIN: I have no information about that schedule, as far as a briefing is concerned. And all I can say is that, you know, we, in an unofficial way, have contact with the Taiwanese authorities, and we'll continue to do that. And I'm sure at the appropriate time we'll tell them what transpired, in general terms, with China.
Secretary Albright's only known briefing plan at this point is to go to Japan after the trip and to brief the Japanese government.
MS. RANSOM: And the next question is from Egypt.
Q: Yeah. I have five questions on China, but -- (laughter) --
MR. RUBIN: (Laughs.)
Q: -- but I will go to the Middle East first.
MR. RUBIN: Okay.
Q: Today you had some harsh words for Arab calls to convene the Security Council to discuss the recent Israeli announcement about expansion plans in East Jerusalem. Now we know that for five months you've been trying to convince the Israelis of your ideas, which the Palestinians have accepted in principle.
First, why are you not giving the U.N. a chance to intervene, even maybe to sweeten the ideas to the Israelis in one way?
And secondly, how might this U.N. intervention -- in your words, you said it will hurt the U.S. efforts to bring back the peace process to track -- how would this U.N. intervention, which most probably would be rhetorical -- how will it hurt your efforts?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to the first question, this is a very difficult enterprise, and there are people in the world who think one can wave a magic wand and make a public statement or twist a particular arm, and magic will ensue, and peace will break out. They're wildly unrealistic in their understanding of the subtleties of the Middle East peace process. This is very difficult exercise. It's been excruciatingly difficult to get Palestinians and Israelis to agree on the Oslo accords, and it's been difficult since then to get them to agree on how to proceed, let alone agree to meet with each other.
So we are in a unique role because both the Palestinians and the Israelis believe that it is only through U.S. efforts that there's any chance at all for the peace process, and both sides want us to continue to play this role. If they continue to want us to play this role, they should understand that we are going to have to make judgments about what it is that will best advance the peace process.
And with regard to your second question, following right up on that, the reality is, people can have, you know, fanciful theories about what -- the role the U.N. can play and how it will increase support for one side or another, and they can continue to pursue their theories or pursue interests based on domestic politics. But we're making judgments as to what actually is likely to yield a success that will open the permanent status talks, that will provide a further redeployment of territory to the Palestinians, and that will include enhanced security measures by the Palestinians. That is what both the Palestinians and the Israelis have asked us to do. It is a fact that in principle the Palestinians have accepted. We have been in regular contact with the Israelis and we have made progress in recent weeks. But as I've said before, until it's closed, an inch of difference is as good as a mile of difference in this business.
With respect to how specifically the rhetorical danger is, there is very clear experience here. There is a demonstrable pattern of when countries decide that they think it would be fun to bring issues to the Security Council to somehow isolate one of the parties, the result is worse for the peace process; the result is that one party or the other doesn't move forward in its negotiating posture but moves backward. So those who want to see the U.N. get involved in this are those who are shooting peace in the foot and harming the chances of getting peace in the Middle East.
The United States has played the honest broker role for a long time, and both parties want us to. And we've developed very clear judgments during that process for what will work and what won't work. And our experience demonstrates that we know what we're doing, and that we will exhaust every effort and pursue every avenue until we think there is no longer a chance. If we think that's true, we'll be the first ones to say so and explain why.
But until that we believe we have exhausted every avenue, the people of the Middle East, or other parts of the world, should realize that bringing issues to the United Nations will only make it less likely that peace will be brought to the Middle East, and they should bear in mind the consequences for them and for their interests if bringing it to the U.N. yields a setback.
Q: Are you talking about days, weeks or months? And how long should we wait for your announcements?
MR. RUBIN: We will make the decision based on what's going on. We've had a number of discussions. We are clearly in the final phase of this. It can't go on much longer. But we prefer to make the decision about timing ourselves rather than previewing it publicly.
MS. RANSOM: I think we have time for two more questions.
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
MS. RANSOM: This gentleman, and the gentleman over here.
Q: Bashir (sp) from Sudan. The famine and the civil war in Sudan are expanding by the minute. And according to some very conservative estimates, 1.5 million people have died so far. This is more than Bosnia, Ireland and Rwanda put together. This month, early this month, Mr. Tony Hall and Mr. Frank Wolf, representatives in the House, the Congress, sent an urgent letter to the president urging him to send an envoy of the same caliber like Mr. Mitchell and Holbrooke. They suggested -- as a matter of fact, they suggested Sam Nunn and James Baker.
And my question to you: How long this war is going to be invisible and forgotten and people are dying, and whether there is any inclination by the president to respond favorably to appoint an envoy?
MR. RUBIN: Clearly it is, in humanitarian terms, a very difficult situation, and we're quite aware of that. Let's bear in mind that the United States is the largest humanitarian assistance contributor in the world, over $17 million in fiscal 1998, and over a half a billion dollars in all. So we have spent considerable funds because we recognize the humanitarian catastrophe that this has become.
As far as how long the war will last, again let me say the United States cannot control the events all over the world. We can try to be of assistance. We can try to be of help. But when there are determined people who don't want to agree on anything or don't want to stop fighting, there's very little we can do.
Q: (Off mike.)
MR. RUBIN: And -- let me just finish answering the question. And with respect to this particular letter, you know, we'll consider this idea, but again, there is no magic mediator who's going to be able to solve this problem. It's a terrible problem that we have contributed assistance to, and we have supported with non-lethal assistance the opposition umbrella group to the government in Khartoum because we want to see a democratic Khartoum, a Khartoum in which all the -- a Sudan in which all the people can be represented and supported. But I'm not aware we've selected any new envoys.
MS. RANSOM: The last question is here. Yes.
Q: Yes. One year ago when Hong Kong's sovereignty was returned to China, many people worried about the future of Hong Kong. So one year has passed. Now how do you assess the changes in the past year? And what comment -- how do you comment on the situation in Hong Kong?
MR. RUBIN: I think that's a good question. It is true that about a year ago when I was here -- or I guess I was here a little after that. But a year ago journalists were asking about Hong Kong. And Secretary Albright made a decision to go there precisely to demonstrate the importance the future of Hong Kong would have to the U.S.-China relationship.
In general things have gone quite well. In general there has been a high degree of autonomy. Economic commerce continues. The freedom of expression continues. In the area of legislation reform, however, we have concerns about what the make-up of the existing assembly had been and what the rules were by which the new assembly was created. But clearly the voting was a strong endorsement of democracy. And those who were the strongest supporters of democracy received the most votes in many cases. So in that sense this Hong Kong is a success story for the future of democracy in Asia and the importance of Hong Kong to the U.S.-China relationship.
Thank you all very much.
MS. RANSOM: Thank you very much for coming today. We hope to see you again soon and often. Thank you.
MR. RUBIN: Thank you. (Laughter.)
(end transcript)
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