BYLINER: DEFENSE SECRETARY COHEN ON CHINA MFN, SECURITY ISSUES
(Normalized relations are foundation of engagement) By William S. Cohen U.S. Secretary of Defense

This piece originally appeared in the June 23, 1997 issue of The Washington Times.
Permission has been obtained covering republication/translation/abridgment of the text by USIS/local press outside the United States. On title page, credit author and carry the following:
Reprinted by permission from THE WASHINGTON TIMES.

The greatest transition now in progress in the Asia-Pacific region is the emergence of China. The United States wants a future where China is not only a great economic actor but a great contributor to regional and world stability; where China has preserved its unique cultural heritage but is more open about security matters, more open in its markets and more respectful of the rule of law and human rights.

No nation has benefited more from the regional stability provided by America's engagement in Asia and the Pacific than has China. As a result, none should have a greater interest in the U.S. sustaining and revitalizing those security structures that are the basis for the stability that underlies the region's economic dynamism.

One of the most important and difficult challenges in the coming years will be to integrate China not only into the world economy, but also into the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. This integration has just begun, and there are still areas where the U.S. and China's neighbors should expect more from China's leadership.

We look for China to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international norms; to be more transparent and open about military affairs; to stop the transfer of dangerous technologies to unfriendly nations in the Persian Gulf.

China has gone from being a net oil exporter in 1994 to a net importer today, and its reliance on oil imports, especially from the Gulf, is expected to rise rapidly. This gives China a strong interest in stability in the Gulf, and there are signs that Chinese officials increasingly recognize this.

We also support China's membership in the World Trade Organization based on commercially meaningful terms and on the WTO's principles; a transition that preserves Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, prosperity and civil liberties in line with the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and an institutionalization of the rule of law that enhances the freedom of China's citizens, the vitality of China's economy and the constructiveness of China's diplomacy.

The U.S. also understands that these goals are best achieved by constructive relations with China. That is why we are pursuing a strategy of engagement with China. Under the strategy we will work with China where we can, such as on the Korean Peninsula, and we will disagree where we must, as we do with Chinese arms sales and other dealings with Iran.

This strategy of engagement recognizes China for what it is -- an emerging power poised either to contribute to, or detract from, the tides of economic dynamism, cooperation and trust that are filling the Pacific Basin.

As part of our engagement strategy, the U.S. is building a relationship with China's military. The Chinese armed forces are a key player on issues that we care about: military transparency, regional security cooperation, proliferation. We seek both to understand and influence China's military. We seek to increase mutual confidence and decrease miscalculation.

That is why we are exchanging military personnel, working out procedures for U.S. Navy port calls to Hong Kong after it reverts to China and pursuing "rules of the road" for our ships as they operate in the same seas. That is also why we are engaging in high-level strategic discussions. Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Beijing in May to meet his Chinese counterparts. And I hope to go to China in the fall.

It is in this strategic context that we must view renewal of MFN trading status for China. MFN is not a favor to China or any other nation. It is simply a recognition of normal trading relations. Some MFN opponents argue that MFN "hasn't worked" because trade engagement has not produced political liberalization and, the carrot having failed, it is now time to use the stick. This argument is flawed on several counts. Far from promoting political liberalization, denial of MFN could produce a backlash as Chinese leaders, focused on a post-Deng struggle for power, try to demonstrate their nationalist credentials. Moreover, while it is hardly realistic to expect Chinese political culture to change overnight, there has been political change. Changes in criminal proceedings are leading to greater assurance of due process, while civil law changes have meant that, of the tens of thousands of Chinese who sue their government each year, some two-thirds win outright or gain a settlement.

It will be some time before high profile dissidents can avail themselves of such reforms, but these reforms will lead to limits on the arbitrary power of the government to the benefit of most Chinese. At municipal, provincial and national levels, parliamentary bodies that long were mere rubber stamps have begun to assert ever greater claims on power at the expense of the party, rejecting party nominated candidates for high office and party-drafted laws.

China is a long way from democracy. But so were Taiwan and South Korea 20 years ago. The ongoing political changes in China are creating the basis for the kind of gradual transformation from authoritarian to accountable government seen elsewhere in East Asia. As was the case with other Asian countries, these developments are primarily internally driven, but American engagement supports and accelerates them. Normalized relations -- not only in trade, but in all areas -- are the foundation for such engagement and for promoting American national interests throughout East Asia. Denying MFN would undermine the essential effort to encourage China to be a responsible member of the international community. It would obviously hurt our economic interests.

But from my position as secretary of defense, it is equally obvious that denial of MFN to China would damage our strategic influence and interests. Our friends and allies throughout Asia would question our ability to carry out a coherent policy toward China and thus toward the region as a whole. And it would play into the hands of those who might wish to see U.S. power in the region displaced.

The U.S. and China each have a choice. We can work together toward our common interests, or we can work against each other in a zero sum game, driving our relationship into a spiral of confrontation.