TRANSCRIPT: ACDA DIRECTOR HOLUM 10/9 BEIJING PRESS CONFERENCE
(U.S., China have common interest in arms control)

Beijing -- The United States and China have a broad range of common interests in the arms control area, according to John Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

"We find increasingly that China is a constructive partner on a number of our global arms control priorities," Holum said at an October 9 press conference.

Holum said that China "stood apart" from various nonproliferation efforts for many years but recently has taken a more active role in arms control negotiations and treaties.

"In 1992, China joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In 1993, they signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which they actively participated in negotiating. In 1994, they agreed to limit their missile transfers in line with the Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1995, they collaborated with us very closely in the effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to make it permanent. They also worked with us in that same period on the problem of the North Korean nuclear program, and their involvement was very constructive and very helpful in bringing about the Agreed Framework which has shut down that danger. And then, of course, in 1996, we have worked very closely together ... in achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing," he said.

Holum added that "there is a definite trend in the direction of greater collaboration, a greater commonality of interests and efforts that we are looking forward to pursuing in the context of the President's agenda for arms control that he announced at the United Nations.

"There are always questions in the application of policy, but I think China's position is evolving in a very positive, very constructive direction and that's why I think these discussions are so important," he said.

Holum said the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan came up several times in conversations with his Chinese counterparts, and noted he reaffirmed the Clinton administration's belief that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are consistent with the 1982 Communique.

Following is the official transcript of the press conference:

(begin official transcript)

PRESS CONFERENCE BY JOHN B. HOLUM
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

BEIJING, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OCTOBER 9, 1996

DIRECTOR HOLUM: I've been here since Monday for a dialogue on arms control issues. This trip was set up by Tony Lake's trip earlier this year and his discussions with Liu Huaqiu, and then by Secretary Christopher's conversations with the foreign minister, as part of a broader effort to renew our strategic dialogue with China on a number of issues, of which arms control and nonproliferation are parts.

This trip is the beginning of several in the very near future. In the next few weeks Undersecretary Lynn Davis will come for a strategic discussion of a variety of issues, and then, of course, Secretary Christopher is coming around November 19th or 20th, and that will lead up to the meeting that the two presidents will have at the APEC Summit in Manila.

We have a broad range of common interests with China in the arms control area, notwithstanding a number of differences which are narrowing on the nonproliferation front. We find increasingly that China is a constructive partner on a number of our global arms control priorities, including, for example, most recently our collaboration in achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which involved in the very endgame of the negotiations a number of compromises by China and a number of compromises by the United States and others, which in the end produced virtually a consensus in the Conference on Disarmament, and then a very successful vote at the United Nations in New York. Incidently, the test ban now has been signed by more than one hundred countries. The first two were the United States and China.

Our discussions here concentrated on general principles of arms control, exploring each other's perspectives on contributions arms control can make to global safety and to our own national security. And then we went through in some detail a number of the issues that President Clinton raised as our priorities when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24th. Those included: further progress on strategic arms control; the fissile material cutoff which will be pursuing in the conference on disarmament in Geneva; we in the United States as well as Russia and other countries need to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and bring that important treaty into force; steps to make the Biological Weapons Convention more susceptible to effective monitoring and enforcement; steps to strengthen and achieve universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and, in particular, focusing on the need for stronger safeguards to incorporate the lessons we learned from the undisclosed nuclear weapons program in Iraq so that won't happen again; and then finally, an effort to negotiate a global ban on anti-personnel landmines.

We agreed at the end of our discussion -- actually, we agreed at the beginning of our discussions and confirmed at the end -- that we would continue this dialogue on a routine basis. We've invited the Chinese counterparts to come to Washington next year at approximately the same time, and we also agreed that there would be expert-level discussions to help support that political-level discussion.

With that, let me turn to your questions.

QUESTION: Could you tell us did you touch on the issue of Pakistan and the Chinese nuclear sales -- missile parts sales --to Pakistan?

HOLUM: Those issues all came up -- a number of nonproliferation issues including China's relationship with Pakistan in this area. I don't want to go into the content of the discussion of that issue, but, as you can imagine, we have a continuous dialogue with China on nonproliferation issues, and so we routinely raise concerns that we may have about their programs.

Our concerns with respect to nuclear cooperation have been considerably alleviated as a result of the May 11, 1996 statement in which the Chinese have agreed not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and the confirmation that that includes ring magnets of the kind that had previously been transferred. So it is an important step forward.

QUESTION: I wondered if the subject of Taiwan came up at all and whether China said anything about American arms sales to Taiwan?

HOLUM: Yes, that issue came up several times in the conversations, and my response was to, of course, reaffirm the United States commitment to a one-China policy, and our belief that our arms sales to Taiwan are consistent with the 1982 Communique and that we are very careful to abide by that commitment.

QUESTION: Did the Chinese side agree that the arms sales are consistent with the 1982 Communique?

HOLUM: I don't want to characterize their position or the internal discussions. Obviously, this is a matter of considerable concern to the Chinese, and it's something they raise.

QUESTION: Whom did you actually meet with?

HOLUM: My major interlocutor or principal interlocutor was Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. We met for the full day on Monday, beginning at 9:30 in the morning and going straight through a banquet ending at 8:00 at night with a break for lunch. So that was the most comprehensive discussion. I met yesterday with Vice Foreign Minister and State Councillor Liu Huaqiu. I had meetings at COSTIND, which is the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. I had discussions at the Chinese International Institute for Strategic Studies. I met some military leaders from the National Defense University. I'll have some further meetings with institute people in Shanghai tomorrow.

QUESTION: Can you give any details of your discussions on transfer of missile technology that you had with the Chinese?

HOLUM: Well, I cannot in terms of specifics. Let me put it in context. We, as you know, have had a continuous discussion with China on missile transfers. In August of 1993, the United States imposed sanctions on China as well as on Pakistan for missile technology transfers under our laws enforcing the Missile Technology Control Regime. Those sanctions were lifted in October of 1994 as a result of a Chinese undertaking not only to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime limitations, but to go somewhat beyond them. But since then, there have been reports in the press and elsewhere on further missile transfers and technology. I'm referring to the published reports, I won't talk about intelligence reports, obviously.

We routinely discuss those matters with the Chinese. We have not made a determination based on the information we have that any further sanctions are warranted. But we routinely raise our concerns about these issues with the Chinese. The whole range of proliferation issues will be a topic of Undersecretary Davis' discussions next week or in the near future -- in the next few weeks. And we're also engaging with the Chinese on a technical level on those issues. My discussions on those issues was in that broader context.

QUESTION: There is a lot of pressure in Taiwan and Hong Kong and China, popular pressure for China to do something with its Navy regarding the Diaoyu Islands. Given the United States' involvement in the resolution of the sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, did you discuss this at all, and if so, what is the United States' position?

HOLUM: We did not discuss that. It's beyond my areas of jurisdiction. It's more appropriate for both Secretary of State and Undersecretary Davis to discuss, as well as our military. But I didn't raise that issue. And it wasn't raised with me.

QUESTION: Did you discuss this U.S.-Japanese security pact with the Chinese side? Did they raise any concern about this pact?

HOLUM: We had some discussions, again, relating specifically to the arms control elements of the entire security environment in the region, which includes, of course, Japan. And we shared our perspectives on the U.S. relationship with Japan, the security relationship, the importance of that. We have somewhat different perspectives in that area, but it wasn't a topic, in my view, of sharp confrontation. It was, rather, an exchange of positions.

QUESTION: In what areas could you say there are potential for sharp confrontation and, I mean we have already talked about the missiles and the Pakistan nuclear technology, but how do you see the direction moving in this area?

HOLUM: I would say that the direction is very promising. Obviously, we have some arguments in the nonproliferation area. One that is of continuing concern is our view that no country should be cooperating with Iran, even in non-military nuclear technology, because it is very clear to us that the Iranians are interested in and in fact are actively pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, and that they are very likely to use the infrastructure, the capabilities that they've acquired through a non-military program to advance their military efforts.

That is an area where China continues, although not in a very large sense, to cooperate with Iran. They point out in response to our concerns that all of their exchanges with Iran in the nuclear field are under international safeguards, which is true, so far as we know. So we have a different point of view on that. The same issue comes up of course in our discussion with the Russians, who are engaged much more in substantial nuclear cooperation with Iran. But I continue to place these concerns -- and our differences in these areas are narrowing -- in the broader context that is very positive.

For many years China stood apart from the various nonproliferation efforts. In 1992, China joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In 1993, they signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which they actively participated in negotiating. In 1994, they agreed to limit their missile transfers in line with the Missile Technology Control Regime. In 1995, they collaborated with us very closely in the effort to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to make it permanent. They also worked with us in that same period on the problem of the North Korean nuclear program, and their involvement was very constructive and very helpful in bringing about the Agreed Framework which has shut down that danger. And then, of course, in 1996, we have worked very closely together, as I said, in achieving a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

So, I think there is a definite trend in the direction of greater collaboration, a greater commonality of interests and efforts that we are looking forward to pursuing in the context of the President's agenda for arms control that he announced at the United Nations.

Have we solved every problem? Obviously not. There are always questions in the application of policy, but I think China's position is evolving in a very positive, very constructive direction and that's why I think these discussions are so important.

QUESTION: Could you address the fissile materials question, especially in light of China's ambitious nuclear energy program which will continue to grow.

HOLUM: China is on record as supporting the negotiation of a cutoff, a global cutoff in the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards. That was one of the topics we discussed at some length. They have expressed that at the foreign minister level. They have also included that subject in their arms control white paper which was released in November of 1995 and has a very comprehensive discussion of China's positions on these issues. So we are looking forward to their cooperation and to working together to try to bring that agreement into being. It's the next item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva when they meet early next year.

QUESTION: I wonder if you could address two things. One is in relation to Iran, whether you consider or whether our government considers that the Qinshan reactor sale to Iran is basically dead or, has been abandoned, and have the Chinese given you any updated assessment from their side where that deal is?

HOLUM: I don't have a current one. We didn't discuss that issue.

QUESTION: Secondly, on theatre missile defense, the Japanese continue to tell the Chinese that they are only looking at the feasibility of cooperating with the United States on theatre missile defense. Is that an open-ended feasibility study or is the United States within the framework of the new security agreement or another framework have an expectation about a schedule in which Japanese cooperation would kick in beyond that state? And secondly, what is the status of the Patriot sales to Taiwan and the U.S. government position on Taiwan's interest in acquiring follow-on systems that would be more robust.

HOLUM: Both of those would have to be, in terms of timing and specific plans, addressed to the military, rather than to me. But I will say, first, on the theatre issue, we have, as you know, since the Gulf War, been very actively engaged in pursuing for our own purposes and for protection of U.S. forces abroad a much more capable, theatre defense system than the Patriots that were used in the Gulf War, anticipating that there will be theatre-range threats much more capable than the Scud missiles that the Patriots were not entirely effective in intercepting. That's the main focus of our theatre defense system. We have also had discussions of theatre defense with a number of countries, including Japan. As to their current status -- I'm just not up-to-date on that.

We have made clear to the Chinese that our work on theatre missile defenses is not aimed at China and that we are exploring these issues in this region and elsewhere, mainly to protect our security interest rather than to threaten anyone else's capabilities. These are, of course, entirely defensive systems we are talking about.

Now in the case of Taiwan, there has been a discussion of what is known as a modified air defense system which Raytheon is developing, I believe, in cooperation with the Taiwanese. That, as far as I know, is as far as discussions have gone with Taiwan. It's something comparable in capability to Patriot, but it's not a Patriot system. And our approach, as I said earlier, on arms sales to Taiwan, is to examine each possible transaction very closely in the context of the Taiwan Relations Act, and also the 1982 Communique.

QUESTION: Does that Raytheon-Taiwan cooperative system require a follow-on political approval in Washington, or does it effectively already have approval?

HOLUM: I don't know what the current status is ... It does require approval.

QUESTION: Now that both the U.S. and China have signed a nuclear test-ban treaty, are you considering offering China a simulation in testing technology, or did this subject come up at all during your visit?

HOLUM: No.

QUESTION: Could you bring us up-to-date on any progress you may have made in your discussions with the Chinese on the global ban on anti-personnel weapons, and why do you think China has been moving so slowly in the direction of a global ban?

HOLUM: Yes, we did discuss that issue, and we've also worked together with the Chinese in the review conference on the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which has succeeded this year in negotiating a ban on non-detectable, non-self-destruct, non-self-deactivating land mines. So we now have an international agreement under which the production of land mines that don't blow themselves up, or don't self-deactivate in a period of time, will be prohibited. That's a very important step forward, but we obviously want to go the next step and ban anti-personnel landmines completely.

During the course of our meetings here we discussed both the venue and the content of a possible treaty in this regard. China does have a different view from the United States. China has a great deal of land border and large stocks of anti-personnel landmines, so this is something we will have to continue to engage on. But I am hopeful that, in the end, we will come to a satisfactory resolution.

The United States also has some limitations on its ability to negotiate a complete ban because of our commitments on the Korean peninsula and the need for use of anti-personnel landmines there. We're actively engaged, and I hope China and other countries will actively be engaged, in the search for alternatives, so that landmines don't have to be used.

You could almost check your watch and if we were twenty minutes into this press conference probably somewhere around the world somebody has been killed or maimed by a leftover landmine, so this an enormous humanitarian challenge, and I hope we and China and other countries can work together to resolve it.

QUESTION: Did you touch upon the issue of North Korea and -- (inaudible)?

HOLUM: We did. One broad area that I didn't include in my opening statement that we covered was the subject of regional arms control and regional institutions, including the ASEAN regional forum in which China is playing an increasingly active leadership role, and the Northeast Asia security dialogue. We also talked about the status of implementation of the Agreed Framework, which is quite positive. I think the figure is roughly 42 percent of the nuclear fuel rods that were taken out of the reactor have now been canned for ultimate shipment out of the country, and that process is continuing. The five-megawatt reactor is shut down, and the other, bigger reactors that were under construction are inert and rusting, the reprocessing facility is shut down, the seals are all intact that the IAEA has emplaced in North Korea on their nuclear facilities. So we are quite optimistic about that program.

Obviously it's going to be complex in the implementation. Probably just as complex as the negotiation, which is to say very complex. But I'm quite optimistic that the program will be successful.

QUESTION: Two questions, the first is, could you just identify the three major issues of concern the United States has in terms of China's proliferation issues, and also do you envisage a time when China will start competing with the United States to be the world's major arms dealer? Thank you.

HOLUM: I think I've touched on the proliferation issues. The main concerns are the relations with Iran, the relations with Pakistan, in nuclear missile issues, and in the case of Iran, some convention arms transfers that are of concern to us, but those are all issues that we're discussing in a constructive way, and have made progress on.

In terms of conventional arms transfers, China's exports in this field are quite small compared to those of the United States. But I would also emphasize that, as compared to 1987, the peak year of international arms exports, everybody's exports are down, and I think that's a good thing. Even though our share has gone up rather dramatically, our actual arms exports have gone down, and that's because not only are we applying stringent export controls -- probably the most strict in the world in terms of the number of hurdles that have to be gone through in order to get an approval -- but also because the demand is going down. That's one of the reasons why I think it's important to stress regional arms control, because it gets at the demand side when countries are exchanging information about their military postures and purposes, when countries are notifying each other of troop movements, and explaining why they maintain the forces that they do. Over time, it drains the danger out of potential regional conflicts, and countries can agree among themselves at a regional level that they would rather spend their scarce resources on other things. I don't look on conventional arms transfers as a competitive environment. I think we and China both have an interest in working to limit this trade.

QUESTION: Is Syria ...(inaudible)

HOLUM: I don't have anything current on that.

QUESTION: I apologize if somebody already asked this question, but in light of the fact that many of the companies now that are dealing in either shipments of conventional arms or nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon parts are not necessarily directly linked to the Chinese government, what kind of reassurance, if any, were you given that the Chinese government is able to control this?

HOLUM: This is a subject that will come up more in Undersecretary Davis' discussions, but it is one of the reasons why we need to have more detailed technical-level, expert-level discussions on all of these various export regimes. It is a very important step in my view, especially given the Chinese habit of living up to principled positions, that China has taken the position it did in 1994 on missile technology transfers and missile transfers and also (inaudible) on assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. So those are important steps in principle, but it is obviously equally important to make sure that there is a capability to enforce those principles through effective export controls, and that means expert-level consultations which we have had and which we want to continue.

QUESTION: Do you mean the U.S. Government is giving China advice as to how to effectively keep these shipments from leaving the country?

HOLUM: That's part of it, what are the elements of an effective export control regime but also what specifically, in a case by case determination, these broad limitations mean. What do they mean with respect to judging a specific export? So it's both arriving at a more detailed understanding, common understanding of the content of export controls and how do you go about setting up an effective structure.

QUESTION: How big of a problem is this as far as the U.S. Government is concerned?

HOLUM: Well, it's very hard to quantify. It's a considerable challenge. We have in the United States a very difficult time applying export controls comprehensively, and it takes a very substantial bureaucracy, and a centralized commitment, and a lot of surveillance at ports through the Customs Service and so forth. So, it's a big undertaking. I'm not saying that China doesn't have anything. China does have some active export controls. It varies from area to area, depending on whether, for example, the subject production is directly controlled and managed by the government or whether it's done by smaller units or by the private sector. But we're making progress.

QUESTION: I don't want to sound obtuse. I want to make sure that I heard you correctly. You said that China has a habit of living up to its principled positions. What does that mean?

HOLUM: I think that when China says to us that they will not provide nuclear assistance to an unsafeguarded nuclear facility, that they will make a good faith effort to comply with that undertaking. And when we will raise a question that appears to conflict with that, they will make a very serious effort to make sure that they're in compliance.

QUESTION: China is hoping that the Europeans will lift the embargo of the arms sales to China, maybe in the next month or the next year, the embargo that was signed in 1989. Did you discuss this matter with them, and especially the change of the military balance that might occur if China was buying important arms from European countries?

HOLUM: I didn't hear the beginning of your question.

QUESTION: China is hoping that European countries will lift the embargo on the arms sales to China that was signed in 1989.

HOLUM: We didn't discuss that.

Any other questions? Well, thank you very much for coming.

(end official transcript)