TRANSCRIPT: DAVIS 11/5 PRESS CONFERENCE IN BEIJING
(U.S., China remain committed to nonproliferation efforts)

Beijing -- The United States and China remain committed to nonproliferation efforts, according to Lynn Davis, undersecretary of State for arms control and international security affairs.

"Our mutual goal in the coming year will be to build on China's commitments involving nuclear, missile and chemical nonproliferation, and to see that these are implemented through cooperative steps to put in place the establishment of comprehensive and rigorous export controls," Davis said at a November 5 press conference in Beijing.

Davis said that the United States is particularly interested in stopping the proliferation of long range missiles and sophisticated conventional weapons, preventing the possible transfer of weapons of mass destruction to Iran and other "rogue states," and slowing down the "potentially destabilizing nuclear and missile developments in South Asia."

"We urge China to join us in steps to insure that our two countries in no way contribute to dangerous developments in these parts of the world through the transfer of goods and technologies," she said.

Davis said that the United States and China are also working on early implementation of the 1985 U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, but stressed that "for this to go forward, the United States must certify under our laws to the United States Congress, that the country with whom we would be making this agreement is not assisting non-nuclear weapons states."

According to Davis, China's May 1996 commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities "will be the foundation upon which we will move ahead toward implementing that 1985 agreement."

"We will look towards the ability of China now to put in place the practical means to insure that that commitment is carried out as a basis for us making that certification," she said. "It is for the Chinese to decide the form and the manner to actually carry those through, but what we will be looking for is a comprehensive and rigorous system so that those commitments are carried out."

Following is the official transcript of the press conference:

(begin official transcript)

PRESS CONFERENCE BY DR. LYNN E. DAVIS
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
BEIJING, CHINA
NOVEMBER 5, 1996

DR. DAVIS: Thank you very much. I came to Beijing to prepare for the upcoming meeting of our foreign ministers and to expand our security and strategic dialogue with the Chinese through discussions of the full range of security and nonproliferation policies.

Over the past few years, the United States and China have cooperated in achieving a permanent extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in alleviating the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, in the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and in steps needed to bring into force the Chemical Weapons Convention. We have also taken steps to promote our nonproliferation goals through the 1994 joint statement on missile proliferation, and China's Agreement in May of 1996 not to provide assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. More recently, we have intensified our efforts towards the early implementation of the U.S.- China agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Our mutual goal in the coming year will be to build on China's commitments involving nuclear, missile and chemical nonproliferation, and to see that these are implemented through cooperative steps to put in place the establishment of comprehensive and rigorous export controls.

From the point of view of the United States, we are particularly interested in preventing the proliferation of: dangerous weapons to Iran and other rogue states which seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction; long range missiles; and sophisticated conventional weapons. We are also interested in encouraging restraint in potentially destabilizing nuclear and missile developments in South Asia. We urge China to join us in steps to insure that our two countries in no way contribute to dangerous developments in these parts of the world through the transfer of goods and technologies.

Our discussions also covered such policies as the efforts of the international community to move to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force, to insure the continued implementation of the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Nuclear Framework, and to enhance the safeguards put in place by the International Atomic Energy Association.

Let me conclude by saying how pleased we were by our discussions over the past few days, and we very much look forward to the upcoming meeting of our two ministers here in Beijing about two weeks from now, and then the follow-on meeting of our two presidents in the Philippines at the end of this month.

I'd be happy now to take your questions.

QUESTION: How would you characterize the Chinese response to your questions about Iran and Pakistan, and are you happy with the response they gave you?

DAVIS: As I said, we have been working closely with the Chinese to insure that our overall policies on preventing the spread of dangerous weapons are similar, and to ensure that the dangers posed by Iran and by potential developments in South Asia are met by a common response. And as I noted, we have already had some real successes in the commitments that China has made in the areas of missile nonproliferation and their nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities. So building on those foundations, we looked at the progress there and focused on the next steps, which in our view is to ensure the very practical implementation of those commitments, and I had a good response in that regard.

QUESTION: The May pledge by China not to transfer nuclear technology to unsafeguarded facilities came amidst a debate over a sale of ring magnets to Pakistan. I'm wondering if you could give a defense of the finding by the Secretary that the Chinese leadership had no knowledge of this, given that the sale was conducted by a state-run company that is run directly out of ministry under control of the State Council.

DAVIS: As you know, when we went through a consideration of this issue -- which took a number of months earlier this year and led to the statement that you've just described in which China committed not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities -- we approached this by having had concerns about earlier transfers, and we worked with the Chinese to come to an understanding of what might have happened in the past. And we came to an understanding that, indeed, these ring magnets, which are items that go into or can be used in the production of nuclear facilities, had been transferred. But we came to a view that, as you suggest, senior leadership in China had no knowledge of that.

But working through that, we were able to take this very important step forward, which was a policy now by the leadership of China that is consistent with their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, that they won't assist unsafeguarded facilities, and that in the future, transactions such as the ring magnets transactions would not go forward. That was done after discussions and coming to an understanding of how this might have happened in the past. We are looking forward to the very important point that it not ever happen again.

QUESTION: Doesn't this mean that China has inadequate export controls? And what are the Chinese export controls right now, and what is being done to make them better?

DAVIS: One of the tasks following on from the very important commitment that China made in May of this year was to ensure the very practical implementation of that commitment. And through our own discussions and our own experience with putting in place export controls, we've been working with the Chinese to ensure what I call the very practical implementation. And so that's the task ahead, and I'm encouraged by the steps the Chinese have taken.

QUESTION: If, as you say, the Chinese said the last time that this sale took place the senior leadership had no knowledge that the sale had taken place, what reassurances were you given and how can you be sure that they will be aware of any such sales in the future?

DAVIS: Well, they have made now this very important commitment, and in making that commitment they have now gone to the various agencies that are responsible for the conduct of trade in order to ensure that they understand that commitment. And then the necessary next steps, if you follow along by the ways that we have done it in the United States, will be to ensure that there are licensing procedures and regulations and legislation.

It's for the Chinese to put in place in the form that they find best for their particular circumstances the exact details of that. But what we are looking for is an assurance that, in the future, government authorities review this kind of trade, and that those that manufacture it know precisely what it is that shouldn't be going forward. And, as I say, what we are working now to encourage the Chinese Government to do, is to ensure that, practically now, they will carry out this commitment. And that's where we are.

QUESTION: Did the Chinese make their unhappiness with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan known to you?

DAVIS: As I described in my introductory statement, we discussed the full range of nonproliferation and security issues, and in that context the Chinese raised American sales of arms to Taiwan.

QUESTION: Can you say what they said?

DAVIS: Well, I'll actually leave it to you to discuss that with those who were on the other side of the table from me. But I think the important point here is that the United States reiterated its commitment to the three communiques that define how we see our policy towards China, which is a one China policy. And consistent with those communiques, these sales go forward.

QUESTION: After having talks with the Chinese leadership or Qian Qichen and the Chinese experts, what are the main concerns that still remain on your side on weapons proliferation? Could you name two or three areas and the countries?

DAVIS: The United States has now for many years been particularly concerned with how Iran has been seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction, missile systems and sophisticated conventional arms. And we've worked with all the suppliers around the world, including China, to try to convince them of these dangers that we see in Iran and the importance that we have in coordinating our policies to prevent them from acquiring the wherewithal in order to carry out their goals. And we have had some real successes.

Over the past year, the thirty-three major suppliers of conventional arms have agreed not to sell conventional arms or arms-related technology to Iran. We have had real success now in putting in place the Chemical Weapons Convention, which commits the countries that have signed, and bring that convention into force, not to in any way assist countries in acquiring chemical weapons.

Of course, we were able to extend the Nonproliferation Treaty indefinitely and without condition, and moreover now -- and this I mentioned as one of the topics of our discussions over the past couple of days -- that the International Atomic Energy Association is working to enhance the safeguards that are put in place in countries to ensure that there is no diversion of nuclear materials.

So we have made some real progress here, but because Iran continues to work toward those goals, we have to be very vigilant and ensure that in no way do we contribute to what it is that Iran is seeking to do. So that is one of the areas of concern.

The other that I mentioned in my opening remarks had to do with the potentially destabilizing developments in South Asia, and that we very much encourage China and all other countries around the world to ensure that, again, that we try to do what we can to prevent destabilizing trade in various kinds of items that might promote either missile programs or nuclear programs in that part of the world. So those are two areas of particular concern if you are dealing with the proliferation threats around the world.

QUESTION: What kind of commitments did the Chinese make in these two areas?

DAVIS: Again, I am going to leave it to you to talk to those who sat across the table, but as I said earlier, we are encouraged by the steps that China is taking and the cooperative approaches that we have been able to find in dealing with these nonproliferation and security issues.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up please. Secretary Davis, does the United States have any reason to believe that Iran, excuse me, that China has sold arms to Iran in the last year or two?

DAVIS: It is a matter of public knowledge that China has sold some cruise missiles to Iran over the past year. And, as I earlier said, we have worked very hard over the past few years, when Russia and some other countries around the world were continuing to supply arms to Iran, to work with them and to convince them as to why it wasn't in their security interests to continue that arms relationship. And in particular we gained the agreement of Russia to close down its arms sales to Iran in the coming few years, and to enter into no new contracts with Iran. And so we built up an international norm around the world calling for an end to such arms sales to Iran. The 33 major suppliers of arms are now committed to such a policy, and we are urging the Chinese to join in that group.

QUESTION: Do you have firm dates for Secretary Christopher's visit, and also are economic issues such as World Trade Organization entry, were they among the issues you were discussing with the Chinese? And thirdly, given the changes in the government in Pakistan overnight, is there any comment that you would like to make about the situation there, and whether that adds to your concern about the stability in the region?

DAVIS: In the first instance, I am not the one to announce the specific dates if they haven't been announced. They are about two weeks from now, and I think others will probably more formally announce the exact time of arrival and so forth. But the meeting is due to take place in about two weeks. And then, at the meeting in the Philippines, we expect our two presidents to be meeting as well.

In the course of my discussions, we had a rather full agenda of the security and nonproliferation issues and we didn't address the trade issues that you raised.

I have just learned of the events in Pakistan and I think it best that I not comment on those until I understand better what's happened.

QUESTION: There seems to have been certain intensification in the talks between U.S. officials and the Chinese side in recent weeks. We have seen several rounds of talks in the run up to the Secretary of State's visit. Should we be expecting some sort of new agreement or new arrangement or new commitment to be made public during the Secretary of State's visit, is that what this is about?

DAVIS: Well, as you know, planning for meetings is the task of experts and all of us to set the stage. The meetings can never have as much time as needed to fully look at all the issues that might need to be covered. We have been trying over the past months, now well into a year, to try to get a regular dialogue under way with the Chinese on the security and nonproliferation issues. And to have these be, as I said, regular, and a time in which we could share our understandings of what has been happening and look ahead to the goals ahead.

So part of what I was doing when I was here was regularizing the Global Security Dialogue that we now have underway with the Chinese, and I think that is a very important step as we build a bilateral relationship between the United States and China. And I will leave it to the ministers to tell you what it is that they will agree to when they get here.

QUESTION: You mentioned only Iran by name, but you had two days of meetings, and you must have gone beyond generalities. When you talk about issues of stability in South Asia, that is a pretty broad field. Can you specifically comment on which countries and which issues you were discussing as it pertained to South Asia issues, in terms of regional stability?

DAVIS: I did mention more than just one country as I went through the presentation, but I think that one of the important goals that we have now with India and Pakistan in South Asia is that we find ways that they will be willing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which has now been signed by, I think, close to 100 parties. So that's clearly a goal.

We are not, we don't have any specific steps in mind, but just generally to hope that, over the coming months, both of those countries would see, from their own security point of view, the value of that treaty in a regime that is global but covers South Asia that would not permit any further testing of nuclear weapons.

And again, as I suggested in my opening remarks, we also look at the destabilizing possibilities brought by the potential deployment of new missile systems in both India and Pakistan, and have called on both of those countries not to go ahead with the deployment of new missile systems. So we did get down into the specifics and we did focus on some of the problems.

We also, as I suggested in my opening remarks, look to the issues of how we ensure that the agreement between the United States and North Korea continues to go forward in its implementation. So we did have a broad set of issues and those were among the issues that we discussed.

QUESTION: There is a report that the U.S. and China are working on an agreement not to target nuclear missiles at each other. China has signed the same agreement with Russia. Is there this kind of negotiation between U.S. and China? And my second question is, did China promise that China will make an effort to convince India and Pakistan to join the CTBT, especially Mr. Jiang Zemin is visiting India at the end of this month?

DAVIS: On the second point, at the time that the Chinese and the United States signed the Comprehensive Test Band Treaty, we each committed to work towards efforts to bring the treaty into force and to make it as comprehensive in its membership as possible. And so that remains a very important goal of the United States and we share that goal with China.

On the issue of Nuclear Detargeting. The policy of the United States, of course, is not to target individual countries. We have made that clear, and we as a goal would wish that all countries join us in that, and we would hope that China would be prepared to agree to that as well.

QUESTION: Concerning this question about nontargeting. There is also another side that China has put in not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Is there any movement in that area? Will the U.S. agree to non-first use of nuclear weapons against China? And another question, recently in the Chinese press there has been some talk about their nuclear energy program and certain U.S. sanctions that are preventing U.S. companies from coming here to participate in China's nuclear power program. Will there, can you explain some of the U.S. policy on that concerning the economic trade offs with security concerns, and how close is China to addressing those security concerns now?

DAVIS: As I mentioned in my opening remarks, we have intensified our efforts toward the early implementation of the U.S.-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. This was an agreement signed or negotiated in 1985, and has not been brought into effect until this time for a number of reasons. But the most important reason is that, for this to go forward, the United States must certify under our laws to the United States Congress, that the country with whom we would be making this agreement is not assisting non-nuclear weapons states. And this goes to this issue and to the commitment of China in May of 1996 not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

This will be the foundation upon which we will move ahead toward implementing that 1985 agreement. And we will look towards the ability of China now to put in place the practical means to insure that that commitment is carried out as a basis for us making that certification. It is a somewhat more complicated set of issues and assurances that we will need. But I think that the point here is that we are working closely with China with the goal for the early implementation of that agreement.

On the issue of United States policy on the no first use of nuclear weapons, we have a policy in which we, for purposes of providing security and the alliance relationships that we have around the world, that we are not prepared to forgo the potential use under extraordinary circumstances of nuclear weapons. And so we have not been prepared to join China in the call for a convention on the no first use of nuclear weapons.

QUESTION: Did you have any discussions with the Chinese side about increasing Russian-Chinese military and nuclear cooperation? And, in case you did, can you give any idea about the American position towards this question in connection with the Chinese position towards the Spratly Islands and Taiwan?

DAVIS: I think the best way to answer your question is just to say that the specific issues of cooperation between Russia and China in any area really didn't come up in the course of our discussions.

QUESTION: As your meetings were mainly focused on weapons proliferation, but also as a preparation for Christopher's upcoming meetings in Beijing. Did you raise any specific names of Chinese dissidents like Wang Dan or Wang Xizhe, who is now in U.S., in discussions, and if yes, how was it raised?

DAVIS: In the course of our discussions, we reviewed the broad agenda that the two ministers would cover in the course of their discussions, which will include human rights as well as trade issues and nonproliferation issues and so forth. But we did not go into the details of that. I stuck to the task, and my task in the preparation was to look at the nonproliferation and security issues.

QUESTION: On the implementation of this peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, you said that there were a number of steps that would be required in addition to the commitment of May 1996 for this to be certified by Congress. Could you say what additional steps would be required for that certification and how long it would be likely to be before that certification could happen?

DAVIS: The task will be to be able to assure the Congress that China is not assisting in any way with the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of countries around the world, and that there is in place the practical means to ensure that, as well as a pattern of behavior consistent with that. And that is why I said the agreement in May was the important foundation. But now we had to go ahead and put in place the practical steps. I have learned in my job not to make predictions as to when things happen, but I have also learned that it is very important to set goals. And our goal is the very early implementation.

QUESTION: Sorry. Could you say, just for example, what those practical steps might be? I mean, what other things China might have failed to do, in addition to commitments?

DAVIS: It goes into, as I was saying earlier, how one puts in place the export control regime sufficient so that you have confidence that the commitments you make are being carried out. So in the United States, that involves legislation and regulations and lists of items to be controlled and a review process within the various agencies of our government. And so we put this in place in order to have confidence that when we make commitments then they are carried out by our manufacturers, and there is no question about that. And so it is those elements that need to be integrated into the Chinese system. It is for the Chinese to decide the form and the manner to actually carry those through, but what we will be looking for is a comprehensive and rigorous system so that those commitments are carried out.

QUESTION: I wonder if we could follow that up. What can the Secretary of State's visit do to push forward the early implementation of this agreement, or what would he expect the Chinese to present to him?

DAVIS: Each time our ministers get together, you know after we work hard they give us directions and mandates and tell us to go forward, and so what they will be doing, I assume, is reviewing the progress and making sure that we are on the right track and that we can carry out this goal. It is going to take some time. This can't happen too quickly, and we shouldn't expect it to happen too quickly. But the important is that we get this underway and that the commitment made in May is adhered to and carried forward, and that at a certain point in time we will have the necessary assurances for the President to be able to present this to the Congress.

QUESTION: You mentioned North Korea. Can you give us an idea of what you talked about on the issue of North Korea? There is an impression here that sometimes other governments leaders come here and talk with the Chinese about North Korea, and they are surprised about how little China knows about what is going on in North Korea. Did you have the same impression, did you believe it, or can you give us an idea of your impression?

DAVIS: We reviewed the implementation of the Agreed Framework, which, in our view, is on track, that is the freeze continues to be in place of the nuclear program in North Korea and the materials that had been removed from the reactors are being observed, continue to be observed by the IAEA, and steps are underway to go ahead with the provision of the light water reactors. There has been a brief pause due to the recent submarine incident involving North Korea, but we still believe that the North Korean framework provides the means for insuring the removal of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea to this region and to global security. And so we reviewed that implementation and agreed to continue to find ways to make sure that it stayed on track, by whatever means and influence that each of us have to make that happen.

Well I thank you very much and I appreciate your coming.

(end official transcript)