Text: Defense's Campbell on Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
(Calls bill "unnecessary" and "counterproductive")

The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is "unnecessary" and could have a "counterproductive" effect on Taiwan's security, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Kurt Campbell said at an August 4 hearing on the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship.

"Taiwan's security rests not only on its defense posture but also on a continued, constructive cross-Strait dialogue," Campbell said in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

By abiding to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, the United States "is already addressing many of the provisions outlined in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act," Campbell continued. Although the United States will continue to abide by its commitments to Taiwan, he said, the best solution to the Taiwan issue is a peaceful solution involving two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

"We believe a cross-Strait dialogue that contains confidence-building measures is a critical ingredient to long-term stability across the Strait," Campbell said. "It is also a necessary element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia."

According to Campbell, the United States will continue its policy of "comprehensive engagement" and pursue a "constructive" relationship with China.

"Any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum," he said, "they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to prevent possible misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency, and promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive Washington Beijing relations."

These complementary approaches toward Taiwan and China support U.S. interests that the two sides of the Strait "directly and peacefully resolve their differences," Campbell said.

Following is the text of Campbell's statement, as prepared for delivery:

(begin text)

Statement of Dr. Kurt Campbell

Deputy Assistant of Defense for International Security Affairs

Asian and Pacific Affairs Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

4 August 1999

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak to you about the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship. It is especially important to address these issues now that we are well into the 20th year of the Taiwan Relations Act. In the interest of reserving time to answer any questions you may have, I respectfully request that the following statement be entered into record. I have prepared a brief statement that specifically addresses your interest in the views of the Department of Defense toward the security situation in the Taiwan Strait. (Oral text follows statement).

An o ' overarching national security interest of the United States is preservation of peace and

stability in the Asia-Pacific region. United States policy with regard to Taiwan and the PRC is integral to this goal. We maintain our obligations toward Taiwan as stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act, not only because it is law but because it is good policy. We have also maintained a policy of comprehensive engagement and pursue a constructive relationship with the PRC, also because it is good policy. These two approaches are complementary and support our interests that the PRC and Taiwan directly and peacefully resolve their differences. A constructive and peaceful Taiwan-PRC dialogue serves the interest of all the parties and is a major element in achieving long-term peace and stability in the Pacific.

Our commitment to peace and stability is further bolstered by the maintenance of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the region, a policy reaffirmed by Secretary Cohen in DoD's 1998 East Asia Strategy Report. There have been times when more than simple dialogue and presence have been necessary to maintain stability. America's enduring commitment is well known and widely appreciated throughout the region, and contributes to our overall approach to the cross- Strait issue. The deployment of two carrier battle groups to the western Pacific in response to provocative PRC missile tests in March 1996 was a visible demonstration of the U.S. commitment to preserve peace and stability.

U.S. Policy toward Taiwan

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 forms the legal basis of U.S. policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate Taiwan defensive capability is conducive to maintaining peace and security as long as differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. Section 2(b) states, in part, that it is the policy of the United States:

--to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

--to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

--to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.

Section 3 of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." The Act further states that "the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law." The TRA also asserts that a determination of Taiwan's needs "shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and Congress."

Let me also call attention to an aspect of the August 17, 1982, Joint Communique between the United States and the People's Republic of China that is important to Taiwan's security. In this document, the PRC stated that its "fundamental policy" is "to strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question." Having in mind this policy and the anticipated reduction in the military threat to Taiwan, the 1982 Communique outlined our intention to gradually reduce the quantity and quality of arms sales to Taiwan, At the time the Joint Communique was issued, we made it clear that our intentions were premised upon the PRC's continued adherence to a peaceful resolution of differences with Taiwan.

The Chinese deployment of theater missiles has the result of undermining confidence in the PRC's commitment to pursue peaceful means to resolve the long standing cross-Strait dispute. The United States urges restraint in PRC military operations and deployments opposite Taiwan and does not wish to see the development of an arms race in the region. The United States has abided by and will continue to abide by its commitments to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. Similarly, we believe that Taiwan's security will also be enhanced as we work to improve relations with the PRC.

The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act

Our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan will remain an important part of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We share the concerns that are reflected in many of the objectives in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. PLA modernization and a host of other factors could present Taiwan with an ever widening array of challenges in the coming years. We believe, however, that the Taiwan Relations Act provides a sufficient basis for U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan and that the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is unnecessary and could 'have a counterproductive effect on Taiwan's security. Moreover, Taiwan's security rests not only on its defense posture but also on a continued, constructive cross-Strait dialogue.

We already are addressing many of the provisions outlined in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act. For example, DoD has a program of exchanges with Taiwan focused on such areas as planning, training, C41, air defense, ASW and logistics.

These non-hardware exchanges serve multiple purposes. "Software" programs attempt to address many of the shortcomings in Taiwan military readiness that were identified in the February 1999 DoD Report to Congress on the Cross-Strait Security Situation. They allow Taiwan to better integrate newly acquired systems into their inventory. These initiatives provide an avenue to exchange views on Taiwan's requirements for defense modernization, to include professionalization, organizational issues, and training. Exchanges and discussions enhance our ability to assess Taiwan's longer term defense needs and develop well-founded security assistance policies. Such exchanges also enhance Taiwan's capacity for making operationally sound and cost effective acquisition decisions.

We take very seriously our responsibility under the Taiwan Relations Act and have provided Taiwan with defense articles and services necessary for a self-sufficient defense capability. The U.S. has provided Taiwan with a range of advanced air defense systems, including E-2T airborne early warning aircraft, PATRIOT Modified Air Defense Systems; HAWK and CHAPARRAL ground-based air defense systems; and F-1 6 air superiority fighters. We continue to examine means to enhance Taiwan's air defense capacity.

Taiwan's interest in theater missile defenses is driven by China's past actions and its theater missile build-up opposite Taiwan. Future Chinese actions can have an influence on U.S. decisions with regard to the provision of theater missile defenses to Taiwan. We do not preclude the possibility of Taiwan having access. to theater missile defenses, but these decisions remain in the future when the technology is mature. Our decisions on this will be guided by the same basic factors that have shaped our decisions to date on the provision of other defensive capabilities to Taiwan. As noted previously, we believe that a cross-Strait dialogue that contains confidence building measures is a critical ingredient to long-term stability across the Strait.

Our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act include assisting Taiwan with countering surface and subsurface naval threats. The U.S. has provided Taiwan with Knox-class frigates; S-70C helicopters and modernized S-2T ASW aircraft. We are continuing to examine Taiwan's comprehensive ASW requirements. We have also provided Taiwan with systems to counter an amphibious to include M-60A tanks and armed helicopters.

The Department of Defense's relationship with Taiwan is unofficial in nature. U.S. policy has been effective in promoting Taiwan security for the last 20 years. Senior DoD officials interact with their Taiwan military counterparts on a regular basis during unofficial visits to the United States. The Administration's policy regarding high-level *visits to Taiwan is governed by the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review. We conduct responsible military interactions that are consistent with this 1994 Review within the context of the unofficial nature of our relationship with Taiwan.

U.S.-PRC Relations and Taiwan Security

In all our dialogues, we make clear to the PRC that we will continue to support Taiwan in its legitimate defense needs not only because it is required by U.S. law, but also because it serves the wider interests of peace and stability in the region. We also have made clear that we support only a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and regard any attempt to resolve the issue by other than peaceful means, or any other action that threatens regional stability to be of grave concern to the United States.

It is important to reiterate our belief that any improvements in the U.S.-PRC bilateral relationship are not zero-sum: they will not come at Taiwan's expense, but rather serve to prevent possible misperceptions, enhance mutual trust and transparency, and promote restraint. Taiwan will be a primary beneficiary of the regional peace and stability fostered by positive Washington Beijing relations.

Ultimately, the U.S. position is that the Taiwan issue is for people on both sides of the Strait to resolve. This remains the best approach and our policy must remain consistent in this regard. Indeed, this is the only long-term guarantee of a peaceful and durable solution across the Taiwan Strait. It is also a necessary element in guaranteeing long-term peace and stability in East Asia.

Our relationships with Taiwan and the PRC are likely to be among our most complex and important foreign policy challenges for many years to come. Indeed, the global political and regional environment is very different today than at the time the three Communique and Taiwan Relations Act were formulated and implemented. Nonetheless, these documents have served U.S. interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for more than 20 years and remain the best framework for guiding U.S. policies into the future.

The Taiwan Relations Act has been the most successful piece of legislative leadership in foreign policy in recent history. Its framework has contributed to an extended period of peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait and has promoted American interests in the western Pacific. This legislation, along with the three communiques has also secured the foundation for the complex political and security interactions among China, Taiwan and the United States. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act is unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. The Department of Defense opposes this legislation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


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