Text: Senator Biden July 14 on National Missile Defense, China
(Biden tells colleagues to consider implications of NMD)

Just as the United States has concerns over what China is doing in the field of weapons proliferation, so too does China have worries about the implications of a U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system, according to Senator Joseph Biden (Democrat of Delaware).

China fears the United States could exploit its status as "the world's only superpower," while U.S. officials concern themselves with China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and "its intimidation tactics against Taiwan," Biden said in a July 14 Senate speech.

"Let me put it bluntly," Biden told his Senate colleagues, "China does not believe that National Missile Defense is oriented against North Korea."

The Delaware Democrat questioned the idea that North Korea's leadership would seriously consider risking their survival by threatening the United States with nuclear weapons.

"Who can blame China for questioning this rationale for a national missile defense? I question it myself," he added.

The Chinese know that if North Korea presses ahead with its missile program, the United States is "almost certain to deploy a national missile defense against that threat," Biden said.

Even a limited U.S. anti-missile system would "seriously undermine China's tiny nuclear deterrent," he said.

The Beijing regime, Biden said, "calculates that any U.S. system sufficient to deal with 10-12 North Korean missiles could also handle 10-20 Chinese ICBMs. And guess what? Notwithstanding our repeated protests to the contrary, they are probably right."

Biden said the Senate had not yet "taken the time to consider the implications of deploying a limited national missile defense for our broader strategic interests in East Asia."

Following is the text of Senator Biden's speech from the July 14 Congressional Record:

(begin text)

CHINA AND NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
(Senate - July 14, 2000)

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, 3 years ago I came to the Senate floor to talk about China and how the United States can best achieve its national interests in the Far East.

I spoke then on the eve on two summits which went a long way toward putting the U.S.-China relationship on a firmer foundation. I called for a patient, principled engagement strategy designed to win greater Chinese compliance with international norms in the areas of human rights, nonproliferation, and trade.

Three years later, there has been some progress, but also some setbacks.

U.S.-China relations remain dogged by uncertainties--each side harbors doubts about the other's intentions, doubts reinforced by allegations of Chinese espionage and the tragic mistaken U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. China's fear of how we might exploit our position as the world's only superpower is matched by our concerns over China's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its intimidation tactics against Taiwan. China's leaders decry U.S. `hegemony' and `interference in their internal affairs.' We worry about whether the Dragon will breathe fire at its neighbors, or just blow smoke.

So today I rise at what I believe may be a pivotal moment which will determine our Nation's future in Asia not just for this year, or next year, but for 10 years, 20 years, and into the world my grandchildren will inherit.

Three decisions--on national missile defense, on invoking sweeping new unilateral sanctions on China, and on extending permanent normal trade relations to China--will help shape U.S. strategic doctrine and irrevocably alter the security landscape in East Asia for decades to come. They are decisions which must be made in the context of revolutionary changes underway on the Korean Peninsula and an awakening China which wants to play in major leagues, but is not sure it wants to abide by all the rules of the game.

Today I wish to address the first of these three major decisions--national missile defense--as it relates to China and recent developments on the Korean peninsula.

Mr. President, I rise with optimism--my mother calls me a `congenital optimist.' Not the optimism of a Phillies fan--a blind, fervent optimism born each spring, matured each summer, and dashed against the rocks by fall. No, I speak with the confidence which flows from the enormous capacity and good will of the American people. I am optimistic because we now enjoy an unprecedented opportunity to shape the future in ways which will enhance our national security and preserve our prosperity.

I reject the path of unrelieved pessimism and lack of common sense which, to me, underlies much of the thinking of those who believe China must be an enemy of the United States, and that North Korea can neither be deterred nor persuaded to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear missile capability.

I reject the pessimism which says that American idealism and the dynamism of American markets are somehow incapable of handling the opportunities which will be ours as China joins the World Trade Organization and opens its markets to the world.

But my optimism is informed by realism.

Let me put it bluntly: China does not believe that National Missile Defense is oriented against North Korea. According to those who justify a limited national missile defense on the basis of the North Korean threat, North Korea is ruled by a nutcase who by 2005 will be in position to launch an ICBM with weapons of mass destruction against the United States, and will do so without giving one thought to the consequences.

Who can blame China for questioning this rationale for a national missile defense? I question it myself.

The notion that North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il is going to wake up one morning and decide to attack the United States with long-range missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction is absurd!

The notion that 5 or 10 long-range missiles would deter us from defending South Korea is equally bogus. Did the Soviet Union's ability to devastate the United States prevent us from defending Europe for a generation and West Berlin in 1961, even in the face of superior Warsaw Pact strength on the ground? No.

Did it stop us from forcing the removal of missiles from Cuba in 1963, or from supplying Afghan mujaheddin in their successful struggle against Soviet forces? No.

Has China's ability to deliver a nuclear strike against a dozen or more U.S. cities prevented us from defending Taiwan? No, again.

Moreover, in the wake of the first North-South Summit meeting ever, the prospects for peaceful reconciliation between North and South Korea are better today than they have been in my lifetime. I'm not saying that peace on the Korean Peninsula is a `done deal.' Far from it. North Korea has not withdrawn its heavy artillery. North Korea has not abandoned its missile program. North Korea has not halted all of its support for international terrorist organizations. There is a tremendous amount of hard work to be done.

But look at the facts that relate to our decision on national missile defense.

The last time North Korea launched a missile, I remind my colleagues, was on August 31, 1998. On that day, a three stage Taepo-Dong missile flew over Japan. The third stage of the missile apparently failed to perform as the North Koreans had hoped, but the mere existence of the third stage surprised many of our experts and caused them to reassess the North's capabilities and to advance the date by which North Korea might develop an ICBM to 2005.

But since August 1998, North Korea has not launched a long-range missile. It recently extended indefinitely the test-launch moratorium it implemented 15 months ago. Negotiations are underway right now with the objective of curtailing North Korea's development and export of long-range missiles.

Now the pessimists say that North Korea will never agree to forego development, deployment, or export of long-range ballistic missiles.

But then, the pessimists also said that the North Koreans would never open their nuclear facilities to round-the-clock monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, would never stop construction on its heavy water nuclear reactors, would never permit World Food Program monitoring of food deliveries throughout North Korea, would never hold a summit meeting with South Korea, would never undertake economic reforms, and so on. Guess what? They have been wrong on all counts.

And what does Kim Dae-jung, the President of South Korea, have to say about the temperament of Kim Jong-il? All evidence points to a North Korean leader who is intelligent, rational, and coldly calculating. Not the type of guy who gets up on the wrong side of bed in the morning and decides to ensure the complete annihilation of his country by launching a few nuclear missiles at the United States.

How does all this relate to China? The fact is, North Korea is in a world of hurt since the collapse of the Soviet Union. China is the North's major trading partner and aid donor, and it has successfully urged North Korea to engage with South Korea and curtail its missile testing.

Why? Is it because China wants to be helpful to us? Perhaps. But I doubt it.

No. China is acting in its own self interest. China knows that if North Korea presses ahead with its missile program, the United States is almost certain to deploy a national missile defense against that threat. And if we do, even a limited system will seriously undermine China's tiny nuclear deterrent.

China has only a handful of old, silo-based, liquid-fueled missiles capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the United States. Beijing calculates that any U.S. system sufficient to deal with 10-12 North Korean missiles could also handle 10-20 Chinese ICBMs. And guess what? Notwithstanding our repeated protests to the contrary, they are probably right.

So how can we expect China to respond if we foolishly rush ahead with deployment of this unproven, expensive, national missile defense, for which the rationale is evaporating as I speak?

Well, for starters, China will have no further incentive to use its influence with North Korea to rein in the North's nuclear missile ambitions. And North Korea, with no reason to trust the United States, may opt to end its missile launch moratorium and proceed full speed with the testing, deployment, and export of long-range ballistic missiles. Second, if we rush to deploy limited NMD, China itself will surely take steps to ensure the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. They have made that painfully clear. We already know that they are planning to move from silo-based liquid-fueled rockets to mobile, solid-fueled rockets which will be much harder for us to locate and destroy. They are probably going to do that no matter what we do.

But they have not decided how many missiles to manufacture, or whether to MIRV them. Our actions will have a huge impact on their thinking. We already sent one unfortunate signal when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. If we want to guarantee that China will go from fewer than two dozen ICBM's to 200 or 2,000, then by all means, let's just forge ahead with a national missile defense without any consideration for how that decision will affect China's nuclear posture and doctrine.

And if China responds as I fear they might, how will India respond? Pakistan? Japan? And if in 5 or 10 years Japan feels compelled to go nuclear, how will South Korea respond?

Mr. President, there is a reason why our allies in East Asia are urging caution with respect to the deployment of a national missile defense. They understand that bad U.S.-China relations are bad for regional stability. Listen to what a leading strategist in South Korea, Dr. Lho Kyong-soo of Seoul National University, recently wrote about missile defenses, China, and implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance:

Needless to say, minus a clear-cut image of North Korea as the `enemy,' the security rationale underpinning the alliance is seriously weakened . . .

Much will depend on how the relationship between the United States and China evolves in the years ahead. If the relationship becomes antagonistic, Seoul will find itself in an extremely delicate position vis-a-vis Beijing, a situation that it would clearly like to avoid at all costs.

There appears to be little awareness in Washington, however, how its China policy, should it be mishandled, could have possibly adverse consequences in terms of alliance relations with Seoul, and, in all likelihood, with Tokyo as well. The cautious stance taken by Seoul with respect to the acquisition of even a lower-tier Theater Missile Defense capability is but one example of Seoul's desire not to unnecessarily create friction with Beijing.

So, Mr. President, this is a serious business.

I believe this body has not yet taken the time to consider the implications of deploying a limited national missile defense for our broader strategic interests in East Asia. I intend to raise these issues and others in the days ahead. If we are not to squander our material wealth and our world leadership, we must consider carefully whether a missile defense will maximize our overall national security.

(end text)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)


Return to The United States and China.

Return to IIP Home Page.