Text: American Institute in Taiwan Director on Election, Peace
(New Taiwan presidency opportunity for restored cooperation)At this sensitive time in cross-Strait relations between Beijing and Taiwan, the best thing the United States can do is to maintain a consistent and predictable set of policies, according to Richard Bush, managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan.
In remarks before the Center for Strategic and International Studies March 29, Bush said all the elements of U.S. policy concerning Taiwan are designed to foster an environment in the Taiwan Strait region that is conducive to peace and stability and are therefore good for both China and Taiwan.
The U.S. government, Bush said, believes that the inauguration of Taiwan's new president can open a window of possibility for restoring cooperation across the Strait.
"This should be seen as a time for seizing opportunities, not erecting obstacles. This is a time to focus on a future based on shared interests, rather than a time to be haunted by the divisions of the past. This is a time to offer incentives for progress, rather than to feed paranoia and reinforce the inclinations for stalemate," he said.
Peace and stability are more likely to be assured if the two sides of the Strait summon the creativity to address their differences, Bush said. "Each side may be confident that the permanent objective of U.S. policy is to build an environment in which positive changes can occur peacefully through dialogue. Neither should fear that the United States is acting to undermine its fundamental interests."
Following is the text of Bush's remarks:
(begin text)
"Electoral Change on Taiwan, Building Peace in the Taiwan Strait"
Richard C. Bush
Chairman of the Board and Managing Director
American Institute in TaiwanCenter for Strategic and International Studies
March 29, 2000
It was some months ago that I accepted Gerrit Gong's invitation to speak to you today. At that time, I had no idea that I would have to travel to Taiwan during the week after the election, along with my former boss, Lee Hamilton. Spending less than forty-eight hours last week in Taipei is too short a time to get a full appreciation of the dynamic change that is occurring. The Taiwan participants in this conference can provide that better than I. But it was valuable to gain a more immediate sense of developments and exchange views with President-elect Chen, President Lee, and others. I am sorry that my colleague Ken Lieberthal had to prolong his trip to East Asia and so cannot offer you a report on his travels.
Today, I would like to address three issues: the domestic implications of Taiwan's presidential elections; trends in cross-Strait relations; and U.S. policy. It goes without saying that with the election of Mr. Chen Shui-bian we are moving into uncharted territory, and some people worry about the possibility higher tensions. I tend to believe that whoever had won the election, the complexion of Taiwan politics and of cross-Strait relations would have changed. And I think that along with that change there remain important elements of continuity.
But before I launch into my analysis, I suggest that we step back for a minute and marvel at what has occurred and what will be occurring before our eyes. -- Taiwan is the only Chinese political system in the world that chooses its top leader by direct popular vote: neither the PRC, nor Hong Kong, nor Macau, nor Singapore permits such a choice. Even in Japan, the longest continuous democracy in East Asia today, it is the leaders of the majority party who pick the prime minister.
-- Even in Taiwan this is a fairly new phenomenon. This is only the second direct election of the president and vice president since the constitutional amendment of 1994.
-- Although this election, like most elections in Taiwan, was fiercely contested, it did not undermine the island's fundamental stability. The limited violence we saw occurred after the election and was not really over the conduct of the campaign or of the balloting.
-- This exercise in popular rule took place in a neighborhood that is not exactly tranquil. Missile and other exercises by the PLA punctuated the 1996 election campaign. This time, we had the White Paper and other truculent statements.
-- During the campaign, Taiwan's armed forces were neutral and pledged once the ballots were counted to obey their new commander in chief.
-- Finally, we are about to witness the first transfer of power ever in a Chinese political system resulting from a free and fair election. Leadership succession in Chinese political systems is usually the product of war, assassination, a coup, or the natural death of the leader. In this case, it reflects the cumulative result of each of more than twelve million voters indicating on a paper ballot who they thought would be the best president for the next four years. There is, moreover, no reason to expect that this transfer of power as in evolves over the next few weeks will not be peaceful and orderly.
So, whatever the future holds, let us not take for granted what has recently happened on Taiwan. The island's democratic system continues to mature. And the 2000 election represents an important step in the history of Chinese political development and a point of reference for other Chinese political systems. This election is another fruit of President Lee Teng-hui's efforts over a dozen years to open up Taiwan's political system.
Internal Implications
Of course, elections and transfers of power are not simply good for their own sake. They are important because over time they make leaders and parties more accountable to the public and provide a mechanism for the public will to be reflected in government policy. Because Taiwan faces fundamental issues concerning its future, it is particularly important, I think, that policy be shaped with public views in mind. Of course, leaders have a responsibility to mobilize public opinion when they think it is in the collective interest to do so. But leaders' definition of the collective interest inevitably will be shaped in turn by public opinion, and elections are one way of shaping it.
In this regard, the March 18th election has produced a somewhat ironic result, in that Mr. Chen Shui-bian won with only 39% of the vote. The principal reason for his victory was the KMT's difficulty in satisfactorily resolving the competition for the party's nomination. As a result, James Soong ran as an independent and the vote that might have gone to the KMT was split. This is not a new difficulty for the KMT and it is not unique to Taiwan. Other democratic systems face the same problem. The United States had major independent candidates in 1948, 1968, 1980, and 1992 and in each case they had a significant impact on the election. For example, Bill Clinton was elected in 1992 in part because Ross Perot drained votes from George Bush. In addition, Taiwan's electoral system for representative bodies encourages a certain amount of fragmentation within parties.
Moreover, it is important to remember that the DPP is not taking over the entire central government. As of now, the KMT still has a majority in the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly. Of course, the future of the KMT is a topic of intense discussion, to put it mildly, and I don't have a prediction on how that debate will turn out. But whatever happens within the KMT, the DPP may still have a minority in the legislature and the national assembly. As a result, it will have to reach out to other political forces in order to govern. The DPP leadership has understood for some time that this problem would emerge if Mr. Chen won the presidency. We are already seeing steps to address it.
In short, we need to look not only at the "who" of this election -- who becomes the next president -- but also at the "what": that is, what will be the new configuration of the Taiwan political spectrum and what are the consequences? Both have implications for policy and I believe we must contemplate a Taiwan political system in which, in one way or another, it will be more difficult for leaders to formulate policies in an authoritative way. More time will be needed to build a broad consensus and to fashion approaches that command a majority. This is not a trivial matter, since Taiwan faces a number of important challenges: How to preserve the island's economic competitiveness in an era of globalization and rapid technological innovation? How to ameliorate the negative effects of Taiwan's social change, such as crime and environmental pollution? How to improve Taiwan's democratic system so that it better reflects the people's will? And how to address cross-Strait relations and ensure Taiwan's security? Formulating policies will not only take more time. The content of those policies will change because they will be defined by the interaction among political forces.
Let me comment in a historical vein about the future of the Kuomintang. I do not know how the KMT will survive this defeat and what role it and its members will play in Taiwan's future politics. Those questions will be answered in the weeks and months ahead. But I would observe that the KMT has responded to disaster several times in the past and re-made itself to adjust to a new environment. In the 1920s, Dr. Sun Yat-sen transformed it from a basically conspiratorial organization into a Leninist-style party-army that was able, for a time, to capture much of China and undertake some reforms. After the defeat on the Mainland, the party leadership undertook a major organizational change and embarked gradually on policies that released the economic energies of Taiwan's people (even, of course, as their political energies were repressed). In the end, the social forces which economic development unleashed fostered demands for political change as well. In the 1980s, confronted with a difficult international environment and domestic pressures, first President Chiang Ching-kuo and then President Lee Teng-hui opened up the political system and so prolonged KMT rule. My point is that the KMT has proved to be a resilient organization that has talented people in its ranks. It still has a majority in the legislature and a strong presence at lower levels. I don't think we can count it out.
One of the KMT's liabilities in recent elections has been the so-called "black-gold" or corruption phenomenon associated with it. This refers both to the role of money in its campaigns and the bargains that it struck with local political groups that did not exactly qualify as humanitarian organizations. I raise this problem not so much for its own sake -- although it is an important issue -- but as one symptom of a much deeper issue. In theory, it is expected that any democratic political system should reflect the will of the people, as manifested in the leaders selected and policies that those leaders pursue. The political system, therefore, is a prism through which is refracted the people's desires and concerns. Of course, no democratic system is perfect in this regard. In all democratic systems, there are distortions of the popular will because of institutional imperfections and the role of special interests. These distortions give advantage to some groups and disadvantage others. Each democratic system inevitably will face calls from the disadvantaged to reduce the distortions in the expression of the people's will -- through reform of electoral systems, through changes in campaign finance rules, through adjustment in the balance of power between executive, legislative, and judicial branches, through improvements of administrative efficiency, through checks on abuse of executive power. This year in the United States, for example, Senator John McCain was the early vehicle for voicing Americans' desire for change. Such reforms may not be completely successful. Sometimes they create new problems. But when people are dissatisfied with the workings and output of their political system, the pressures to correct defects are almost unavoidable.
Now this might seem to be a rather theoretical and philosophical issue. But I would argue that it has a practical importance for Taiwan. The leaders and people of the island face fundamental questions over how to preserve Taiwan's freedom, prosperity, security, and dignity in the context of evolving cross-Strait relations. All political forces on Taiwan agree that the people of the island should have a say in those choices. President Clinton has said that the Taiwan Strait issue should be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan. The question remains, how well in fact does the island's political system reflect the views of the people on those matters? I don't necessarily have an answer to the question. But I am aware that the questions exists.
Cross-Strait Relations
With that background, I would like to turn to cross-Strait relations in the wake of the March 18th elections. It is premature to discuss this subject in detail, because President-elect Chen is still the President-elect. It will be another fifty-plus days until he is sworn in and takes full responsibility as Taiwan's top leader. All parties concerned, including the United States, should give Mr. Chen the opportunity to form his team and refine his policies based on a fuller understanding of the current government's past actions.
One must observe, however, that the earth did not stop spinning on its axis once Mr. Chen's victory was announced on the evening of March 18th, Taipei time. Prior to the election, of course, the PRC had issued its White Paper and made a number of statements about what might happen if Mr. Chen were elected. The Western media began to worry that there might be an early conflict if he won. Whatever the reason, the PRC appears to have taken something of a wait-and-see attitude since the election. This is certainly a welcome change from the pre-election rhetoric.
Also welcome are the number of prudent and conciliatory statements that President-elect Chen has made about cross-Strait relations and the importance of dialogue. I leave it to Mr. Chiou and others to discuss the details of these statements. I will say that they represent a good-faith effort on Mr. Chen's part to reduce tensions and extend the hand of goodwill and sincerity. Not surprisingly, however, some in the PRC remain suspicious of Mr. Chen's intentions.
But Beijing should understand the larger message of these elections, that Taiwan's democratization has transformed the cross-Strait equation in a rather profound way. Taiwan's willingness to move forward on cross-Strait relations is no longer just a function of the views of Taiwan's top leaders; it is also a function of the views of the public at large, the press, members of the legislature, and the leadership of opposition parties. The people of the island themselves will have to be convinced that any arrangements reached in cross-Strait dialogue are in their fundamental interests. And to the extent that Taiwan people interpret the actions of the Mainland side as hostile or bullying, it makes it that much harder for Taiwan's leaders to get support for cross-Strait initiatives. If, on the other hand, the people are convinced that cross-Strait arrangements are appropriate, then they will be more enduring because they enjoy broad support. Perhaps we need more carrots and less sticks.
U.S. Policy
At this sensitive time in cross-Strait relations, the best thing the United States can do is to maintain a consistent and predictable set of policies. All the elements of U.S. policy concerning Taiwan remain in place. Taken together, these policy elements are designed to foster an environment in the Taiwan Strait region that is conducive to our fundamental interests in peace and stability and are therefore good for the PRC and Taiwan as well. The elements of that policy are as follows: -- We will continue to reaffirm clearly and adhere consistently to our one-China policy as defined by the three communiqu¡¦ and the Taiwan Relations Act. This policy remains the cornerstone of Taiwan-PRC-U.S. relations and has fostered peace and stability in East Asia and facilitated the remarkable evolution on Taiwan itself.
-- We will insist that the Taiwan Strait issue should be resolved peacefully. We reject and oppose the use of force or the threat of force to resolve the Taiwan Strait issue. Furthermore, to quote the Taiwan Relations Act, it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
-- We will maintain a confidence that the two sides have the creativity to resolve this issue through cross-Strait dialogue on their own. The United States will neither play the role of mediator nor pressure either side to negotiate or accept any arrangements that it does not believe are in its interests.
-- We understand that any arrangements between Beijing and Taipei should be on a mutually acceptable basis, and not be imposed on one side by the other. How specifically to define the "one-China" principle and how concretely to realize it are best left to the two sides of the Strait on a mutually acceptable basis.
-- We understand that because Taiwan is a democracy, any arrangements between the two sides ultimately have to be acceptable to the Taiwan public.
-- We are willing to support any outcome voluntarily agreed to by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
The U.S. government believes that the inauguration of Taiwan's new president can open a window of possibility for restoring cooperation across the Strait. This should be seen as a time for seizing opportunities, not erecting obstacles. This is a time to focus on a future based on shared interests, rather than a time to be haunted by the divisions of the past. This is a time to offer incentives for progress, rather than to feed paranoia and reinforce the inclinations for stalemate. It is not up to the United States to say how this opportunity should be seized. But Washington does believe that the best interests of all concerned, particularly the 22 million people of Taiwan, can be best met by exploring the prospects for dialogue and cooperation. In that regard, both sides appear to be acting carefully and with restraint.
The United States is well aware that the PRC is modernizing its armed forces, and that some elements of this modernization make Taiwan feel less secure. The United States will continue to provide defensive arms to Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. Yet ultimately, I don't think the PRC is going to achieve its political goals by awing Taiwan into submission with its growing arsenal. Not do I think Taiwan can preserve its security simply by buying more arms. The way out of this problem depends on the ability of both sides to promote an atmosphere that reduces tensions and makes military conflict unlikely and arms acquisitions less necessary.
By the way, I do not take seriously the complaints of the Mainland side that the United States bears some responsibility for the lack of progress in cross-Strait relations. It is not our objective to preserve Taiwan as an island aircraft carrier. And I can find no evidence to support the hypothesis that U.S. arms sales reduce Taiwan's incentive to negotiate. Indeed, it is my personal view that the Taipei side is more likely to engage the Mainland if it has a certain sense of security, which U.S. weapons help provide. I think PRC policies and behavior themselves have a greater impact on Taiwan's desire to creatively resolve cross-Strait differences than U.S. arms sales do.
Some critics of U.S. policy charge that the Clinton Administration is appeasing Beijing at Taiwan's expense. Appeasement is a very strong word; it is also the wrong word to describe United States policy. The PRC leadership does have more to learn about the complexities of the Taiwan situation, but I believe it understands full well the U.S. insistence on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. It is my impression that Ambassador Holbrooke reiterated this point last week in Beijing and that National Security Adviser Berger will do so this week. Nor is the United States going to tell Taiwan's new leadership to accept PRC terms for negotiations. That would go against our long-standing policy and be antithetical to our values. We do have a profound interest in the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region. But we are impressed at the post-election statements by each side. We hope that together they can find a mutually acceptable basis to resume dialogue and maximize areas for cooperation. The next few years will be extremely challenging. But peace and stability are more likely to be assured if the two sides of the Strait summon the creativity to address their differences. Each side may be confident that the permanent objective of U.S. policy is to build an environment in which positive changes can occur peacefully through dialogue. Neither should fear that the United States is acting to undermine its fundamental interests. As I said before, this is not a time to erect obstacles but a time to seize opportunities. This is not a time to be haunted by the divisions of the past but a time to focus on a future based on shared interests. This is not a time to reinforce the stalemate but a time to offer incentives for progress.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
Return to The United States and China.Return to IIP Home Page.