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Text: Ambassador Holbrooke to UN Security Council on East Timor
(Envoy expresses frustration on refugee camps)
Stressing that a climate of fear is still a reality in the East Timorese refugee camps in West Timor, U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke questioned Indonesia's ability to control the pro-Jakarta militia.
Speaking during a Security Council discussion on East Timor June 27, Holbrooke said that he is "deeply shocked by the continuing militia activities along and across the border into East Timor. The Indonesia government, its military, has failed to disarm and disband these militia," he said. Some militia members, he said, are now armed with more sophisticated weapons that they had previously. "No one quite understands why the Indonesian government, which is making such a tremendous effort to grapple with an immense panoply of issues, has been unable to get this particular problem under control," the ambassador said.
Special Representative of the Secretary General Sergio Vieira de Mello informed the Council that elections and possibly independence for East Timor will take place at some point between August 30 and the beginning of December 2001.
The date for East Timor's independence "is not the day in which the United Nations leaves," Holbrooke noted. "It is the day in which the United Nations continues a transition, but continues to assist the people of East Timor in a different way."
Following is the official text of Holbrooke's remarks:
(begin text)

USUN PRESS RELEASE
AS DELIVERED
June 27, 2000
Statement by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Open Meeting on East Timor
Security Council
June 27, 2000

This has been an extraordinarily busy month in the Security Council. This will be the last time I am able be with you this month because I am leaving for London and Geneva this evening. I want to thank you for your extraordinary stewardship under a month which rivaled China's month for the number of crises confronted and equaled China's achievement in steering us through these difficult times.
I want to thank the special representative for his briefing -- as well as for your leadership at the Lisbon Conference last week. You are, Sergio, a testament to the talent and capabilities of the United Nations at its best. I saw in Foreign Affairs quarterly recently that the UN had sent out the "A-team of international technocrats" to East Timor. I'm not sure that "technocrats" is always a compliment, but I think that you and your colleagues in Kosovo, in Bosnia, and elsewhere really are in that category. Although, maybe you don't appreciate being compared to "Mr. T" -- you've got less gold chains on and so on -- I think your job is tougher than anything people can imagine. I think you're doing a great job, and I have to say that you're still better dressed than I am, to my eternal embarrassment.
Mr. President, it's now ten months since we had our historic Open Meeting in this chamber to deplore the violence that was then raging in Dili. On one hand, I am struck by how much progress has been made, particularly as the focus has shifted from emergency needs to developing consultative mechanisms for interaction with the people of East Timor. This is what the UN should be doing, and in the midst of our enormous difficulties in other parts of the world, I think that we should note that here, as in an earlier era -- Cambodia, Mozambique and Namibia -- the UN is doing its job and, while it isn't cheap, let the world see that it is worth it. On the other hand, I am deeply frustrated at the situation of the refugees to which I wish to return in a moment.
But first, I want to comment on two absolutely critical operational issues. Despite the outrageous events in the camps, and I will mention those more in a minute, I want to say how pleased our government is to note that Mr. de Mello has reported that the overall security situation is stabilizing and UNTAET can downgrade its security classification.
We strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to downside the peacekeeping elements -- the troops -- in UNTAET. It is very important that these plans be codified and made precise and made public early. I would like to ask Mr. Vieira de Mello if he would, in the response period, be able to inform us when the first major downsizing will occur, what your plan for projections are and your recommendations. I want to state that the earlier and more visible you can make this, the better. I would further like to state that my own government hopes that you will draw down as quickly as you can and, at the same time, take into account the very legitimate question of a resurgence of violence by the militia and that the UN reserve the capability to reinforce on short notice if a crisis should hit.
You now have over ten thousand personnel in East Timor and while that is entirely appropriate up until now, it is equally important given the tremendous demands we are facing and all of us in this room know that we're about to meet to receive a new request for Ethiopia-Eritrea, on top of South Lebanon, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and the DRC; it is imperative that we try to plan long term for a draw down and I hope you will be able to inform us how you intend to do this.
We applaud your increasing shift in responsibility from peacekeepers to CIVPOL, and then from CIVPOL to the newly trained East Timorese police and, at some future date, I assume, an East Timorese defense force. This would allow an even faster and deeper reduction in size.
Now Mr. President, Mr. Vieira de Mello, let me now turn to the question of a date for independence. Last month, Jose Ramos-Horta visited us and we had the opportunity to hear from him how the East Timorese were feeling about the pace of reconstruction and transition. Many more people have had the opportunity to hear directly from the East Timorese during last week's important Donor's Conference in Lisbon. Mr. President, we have just heard from Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello about a possible timetable for independence to take place between August thirty-first and December of next year -- dates proposed by Mr. Gusmao and Mr. Ramos-Horta in Lisbon. I want to associate our government in the strongest possible terms with that timetable as proposed and assuming that the United Nations believes that is appropriate.
This would be a historic event, a single achievement for the United Nations and for the world community. I believe that it is very important to set the date publicly, clearly and early so that the people of East Timor can adjust to it, so that the challenges to it from West Timor can be dealt with swiftly and appropriately by the Indonesian government -- in this matter, we are not satisfied at this point -- and that everyone be prepared to work on this issue.
But I want to state again, and I know that Sergio agrees with me on this, that the independence date is not the day in which the United Nations leaves. It is the day in which the United Nations continues a transition, but continues to assist the people of East Timor in a different way.
The world should not expect a date in which the UN just disappears -- it would be highly against the interests of stability in all of the South Pacific and the ASEAN region. The UN, however, should not overstay its role as a governing power -- it should turn into an advisory power. In other words, the kind of role it's playing in places like Bosnia. This is entirely appropriate, and the United States should and, I hope, will support that. I say "I hope" because these decisions will take place under a different administration and, while I can't commit a future administration, I can certainly speak for this one in the strongest possible terms.
Mr. President, let me now turn to the question of the refugees. I've spoken in this Council many times about this since I returned from East Timor last December. I've described the climate of fear and I've expressed my government's outrage. Last February -- when Sergio was here last -- every member of the Council said we had to put an end to these militia incursions across the border. We all agreed that full and lasting reconciliation wouldn't be possible until this was done. But yet, and I say with a combination of sorrow and anger, the climate of fear is still a reality in these camps and just last week, one of the most serious of all incidences in the last nine months took place and the UNHCR had to cease its operations temporarily in the Noelbacki camp after seventy militia -- seventy militia -- attacked the brave UNHCR staff in that camp.
This is not excusable and although we support fully the government in Jakarta, we must ask again whether the Indonesian government can control the military officers on West Timor, who are certainly capable of preventing this.
Mr. President, in regard to the resettling of the East Timorese, we have heard plan after plan from Jakarta, and we support the new plan, which would resettle militia members, former East Timorese members of the Indonesian armed forces and former East Timorese civil servants outside of the island of Timor as participants in the transmigration program.
But let's get on with it. Jakarta's approval of this plan is a positive sign that the government of Indonesia is taking the international community seriously and, more importantly, that it wishes to bring stability to West Timor. This is essential if the project that we have been discussing today will succeed.
Mr. President, while we are encouraged by these decisions on resettlement, we are also deeply shocked by the continuing militia activities along and across the border into East Timor. The Indonesia government, its military, has failed to disarm and disband these militia, but some militia members are now armed with sophisticated weapons -- grenades and automatic weapons -- which they didn't have before. They used them, for example, against an UNTAET outpost in Bobonaro District on 21 June, just a few days ago. This attack followed a reported increase in cross-border militia actions during the previous two weeks, including an incident in which a UN peacekeeper was injured at the Nanura Bridge on the border.
We strongly believe that the UN forces should use force preemptively to make clear to the militia that this will not be tolerated. We do not believe that a draw down in forces is inconsistent with restoring order because the forces that can be withdrawn are way to the cast, in the eastern part of East Timor, where the situation is calm. The areas of difficulty are small and the people causing it are well known to the local authorities.
I feel very frustrated on this point, Mr. President, because I know that everyone in the Council agrees on this and no one quite understands why the Indonesian government, which is making such a tremendous effort to grapple with an immense panoply of issues, has been unable to get this particular problem under control. But we need to do it and we need to do it urgently.
Thank you, Mr. President.
(end text)
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