Transcript: Holbrooke/Roth November 21 Jakarta Press Availability
(Officials stress accountability, Jakarta-Aceh dialogue)Indonesia's democratic efforts have lead the country to a turning point, according to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth.
"The United States has placed enormous emphasis on demonstrating to the government and people of Indonesia that we want to strengthen and facilitate this democratic transition in every way we can," Roth said during a November 21 press availability in Jakarta.
"One of the firm messages we are sending here by coming is that we are here to try to help Indonesia during this period of democratic transition. We want to work with Indonesia to overcome the many very formidable problems that it faces," he added.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, who also participated in the press availability, praised Indonesia's resolution of the situation in East Timor but urged accountability for human rights violations.
"Accountability is one of the two or three keys to democracy," he said. "You cannot deal with the future unless you also come to terms with the past."
Holbrooke also called for the rapid return of refugees to the area.
"We hope to encourage a significant increase in the return of refugees from West Timor," he said. "We see no reason for continued delays in their return. We see no reason for international relief efforts to spend their money on camps in West Timor instead of spending those same resources on allowing the refugees to return to their homes and villages in East Timor."
In Aceh, a part of Indonesia where separatists are demanding independence, Holbrooke said Jakarta "faces a new and additional challenge."
U.S. officials "heard President Wahid, Gus Dur, say to us clearly he does not wish to have martial law declared in any way, limited or otherwise, in Aceh. The United States supports that view," Holbrooke said. "The United States supports dialogue between the government and the people of Aceh which is also what President Gus Dur is seeking."
"We want to see dialogue, peaceful resolution of the differences among different elements within the Indonesian population," he said. "We encourage those ministers who are seeking dialogue, and we are very strongly against the use of violence by either side in Aceh."
Following is a transcript of the press availability:
(begin transcript)
AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE STANLEY O. ROTH
AT AMBASSADOR ROBERT S. GELBARD'S RESIDENCE
JAKARTA, INDONESIA
NOVEMBER 21, 1999HOLBROOKE: I'm delighted you're all here. We also have some of our most distinguished ambassadorial colleagues in the background, who are not allowed to ask any questions. I think you all know the British ambassador, the Singaporean ambassador, the Australian charge, I think I see the Canadian ambassador, and the Finnish ambassador representing the EU. You're welcome to talk to them afterwards, separately. We've just had a very good discussion with them. We're concluding two days of very intense talks in Jakarta. We leave immediately after this meeting for Kupang and Atambua and then tomorrow to Dili.
Secretary Roth and I have been sent here by the Secretary of State and the President on what is the highest level American trip since the government changed hands. I come not only as the American ambassador to the United Nations but as a member of the cabinet and will report to the Secretary of State and the President. Stanley, who is my friend and colleague for over twenty years, now has the best job in the U.S. government. I say that because I used to have it -- Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is spending as much time on Indonesia as any one of the major issues in his vast and exciting portfolio.
I'd like to cover three things today. The Timor situation, the overall U.S.-Indonesian situation and Aceh.
First, let me talk about our trip to West Timor and tell you a little bit about what we hope to accomplish. We will visit a refugee camp this evening in Kupang and then we will go on to Atambua tomorrow. In Atambua we are going to try to bring together on the border -- we will drive from Atambua to the border. We read that there is going to be some problems but that's just words, we're not going to be intimidated. We're going to go ahead and do our job which is to go to the border. We hope to encourage a significant increase in the return of refugees from West Timor. We see no reason for continued delays in their return. We see no reason for international relief efforts to spend their money on camps in West Timor instead of spending those same resources on allowing the refugees to return to their homes and villages in East Timor.
When I hear the phrase "orderly return," I'm not entirely happy because the word "orderly" means to me, it becomes a euphemism for "slow." We want rapid return. And by the way, what is orderly about refugees to begin with, the whole process is disorderly? Let's just call it what it is, a rapid return.
Ambassador Gelbard and I saw 800,000 refugees leave the camps in Albanian Macedonia and return to Kosovo in seventy-two hours. And the UNHCR didn't want them to go back that fast, but they just did. We would be delighted if the 150,000 refugees in West Timor just got up and went home. But they're prevented from doing so by intimidation, by misinformation, by gangs of people who call themselves militias but are thugs, and by a failure on the border, which we hope to clarify. To that end, we're not just going to make speeches, we hope to bring together on the border for the first time a high level group composed from the East Timor side of the border General Cosgrove, Sergio de Mello, and perhaps other people. And from the Indonesian side, the Indonesian Minister of Defense, and we're very grateful to him for this, is going to send with us some senior Indonesian military officers. And we hope to establish on the border, the beginning of a joint border commission which will enable more rapid passage on the border and less intimidation as they cross. And if some refugees wish to come out with us, that would be fine, too. So that is our hope on the border and Atambua tomorrow. I can't predict to you what will happen as it could all go wrong, it is simply our goal. You're welcome to come out there with us.
On Aceh and the situation here, Stanley Roth and I would like to begin by saying how deeply impressed we are by the efforts of President Wahid, who asked that we call him Gus Dur. It's difficult for me to call the president of a great country by his nickname. He is making an enormous effort to bring democracy and the rule of law to a country that has such vast potential, and we support that.
We conveyed President Clinton's personal regards, as a follow-up to last week's important meetings in Washington and reaffirmed President Clinton's public and private statements concerning his support for Indonesia across the board.
We also met with Vice President Megawati and with many members of the government, I think we met with six or seven ministers. We were struck with several things. First, there are clear differences within the government on some key issues. We did not have time to get deeply into the economic issues.
On the political issues, there was an extended discussion on the question of Aceh. I want to be very clear on this. We are not going to interfere in the internal affairs of another country. But Indonesia is of enormous importance to the United States and to all the countries represented here by their ambassadors. It's now the third largest democracy in the world. We've always said that it is the fourth largest country, now we can say the third largest democracy which is very exciting.
And after immense difficulties, the new government has cut the East Timor issue, which also deserves great credit. But in Aceh it faces a new and additional challenge. We heard President Wahid, Gus Dur, say to us clearly he does not wish to have martial law declared in any way, limited or otherwise, in Aceh. The United States supports that view. The United States supports dialogue between the government and the people of Aceh which is also what President Gus Dur is seeking. To stress, we would support his opposition to martial law, and we would support dialogue.
And, finally, there is the question of the Human Rights Commission. We met with members of the commission last night and also with the new attorney general and we are very impressed by their efforts. They are trying to bring accountability to Indonesia. Americans believe profoundly in accountability, as do all the other nations here assembled. Accountability is one of the two or three keys to democracy.
Another key, I want to underline, is a free press. Many of you in this room represent organizations that I have worked with in the past. I have many friends who have fought bravely for a free press in Indonesia for many years. I watched Tempo struggle over the last twenty years with this issue; and other magazines and newspapers, some of which were closed down. But accountability and a free press are critical. A free press also needs to be a responsible press, but a free press is key. We're glad to see there is a free press now and we hope to see accountability. The Human Rights Commission has put forward some legislative proposals which are not being fully supported by everyone else in the political system here. We would hope, again without interfering in the internal affairs of a great nation, that the Indonesian parliament will move to put into place a system of full accountability internally. We also support the international Commission of Inquiry but countries dealing with their own problems is always a preferable approach. So, that's where we stand.
ROTH: Ambassador Holbrooke indicated in his opening remarks that there were three themes. He's discussed two, so let me pick up the third which is as important, if not paramount, which is U.S.-Indonesian relations. It is critical. In our view Indonesia is at a turning point, having had this democratic transition. The United States has placed enormous emphasis on demonstrating to the government and people of Indonesia that we want to strengthen and facilitate this democratic transition in every way we can. There was a very early and very positive meeting between President Wahid and President Clinton. That's an unusual event to happen that quickly after someone comes into power. Secretary Albright called her counterpart Minister Alwi, Secretary Cohen called his counterpart. All this took place within seventy two hours as a demonstration of our support, followed up afterwards by President Wahid's visit to the United States, followed by Ambassador Holbrooke coming here at the cabinet level, as he indicated. One of the firm messages we are sending here by coming is that we are here to try to help Indonesia during this period of democratic transition. We want to work with Indonesia to overcome the many very formidable problems that it faces. And so it's in that context that we then start the trip and then of course once you do that you have to deal with the immediate issues which I think that the Ambassador explained at great length, the Timor set of issues and the Aceh set of issues. So that within that context, I think we can open it up to questions.
Q: In the investigation of human rights violations in East Timor, how far up the chain of command do you think we should go?
HOLBROOKE: How far do I think it should go? I can answer you at two levels. It's for the Indonesians to decide how far up it goes. But when I talk about accountability, Americans mean full accountability. We had a crisis in our country twenty-five years ago and the question of accountability. And it started with five people who were caught burgling an apartment complex in Washington, called the Watergate. And the search for accountability ended up with the President of the United States, who then had to resign. So we believe in full accountability as the greatest internal scandal in our history proved. Indonesia has to settle this for itself.
Q: What about the UN investigation?
HOLBROOKE: The Commission of Inquiry?
Q: Yes.
HOLBROOKE: As I said earlier, we supported it, we continue to support it, and we think it should work closely with the internal investigation.
Q: Gus Dur claimed that when he met President Clinton, he offered a promise of helping with the conflict resolution in Aceh. I was just wondering if this is part of that?
HOLBROOKE: Several people here expressed interest in outside mediation. I think President Clinton and the U.S. in general is always pleased to assist whenever we can, but we have not been given a formal, specific request. If any request were forthcoming, we would certainly consider them. Right now, I think we are just waiting to see what the government does. I want to stress what our main message is here: no martial law, engage in intense dialogue as quickly as possible to prevent further deterioration in a potentially dangerous situation.
ROTH: Let me add to that, since I was present at the meeting between our two presidents, President Clinton made it very clear that of course the U.S. wants to be helpful to Indonesia, both in general, as I talked about in terms of facilitating a democratic transition, but also if our assistance can be helpful in helping to resolve disputes such as Aceh. He pointed out that there is a lot of experience that the international community has from dealing with conflicts in many other regions of the world, many other continents, some of which the two ambassadors here have been involved with, and that if we can help by putting together some of that expertise and making it available to the government of Indonesia, we would be happy to do so.
HOLBROOKE: We also need to make a distinction between East Timor and Aceh. The rest of the world may see these as very similar situations because they are both in the same country, but East Timor was an international problem from the beginning. Aceh has a very different character, and the U.S., and I can't speak for the other ambassadors assembled, but I think that all of us see a very critical set of differences between these issues.
Q: The President said that he didn't see a distinction, he said if you had a referendum in East Timor, you can have one in Aceh.
HOLBROOKE: President Clinton didn't say that. Oh, you mean President Gus Dur. You have to address your questions on what the president precisely said, and what it meant, to him. It is not my impression that, and you have to turn to the government for this, but it is not my impression that this government has in mind in Aceh the same kind of vote that took place in East Timor, and just for the record, it was not called a referendum in East Timor. But I take your point, and you have to ask the government what they meant. We asked that question, and got an answer which wasn't entirely precise.
Q: Did you say you've seen differences? Is the only difference the one over martial law, or do you sense...
HOLBROOKE: You mean between Aceh and East Timor?
Q: No, within the government, you said there were differences...
HOLBROOKE: Oh, I think there is a very wide range of views within this government, which by the way, is a sign of democracy. This country, which has not experienced that before, has got a lot of sorting out to do, and it will have the sympathetic support of our country, and I think of the rest of ASEAN, and the European Union, and Japan, and Australia and New Zealand as well. But we're in a very unusual period now, and let us not confuse differences of opinion with, let us not call differences of opinion a bad thing in a country which has all too much orthodoxy of thinking imposed on it over the last two cycles of history.
Q: (inaudible) We've got lots of statements from President Wahid about what exactly he wants from Aceh. As you also pointed out, there's a difference in the political (inaudible). Did you get a sense that they are close to coming to some decision to set policy on Aceh?
HOLBROOKE: I can't answer that, Maria. It's a fair question. I wish I could give you an answer, but this is a work in progress.
ROTH: But come back to the Ambassador's key points about the principles that President Gus Dur laid out, in terms of the peaceful resolution, in terms of the dialogue process, and in terms of the opposition to martial law. I think those are crucial.
Q: What side does the U.S. come down on, if the interest of the U.S. is to see Indonesia maintain its territorial integrity. The only choice at one point may be that the military is the only alternative.
HOLBROOKE: I'm not a big enthusiast for hypothetical questions. If we actually have to face that question, in the form you describe, then the policies that are now being pursued will have failed. So let me reassert again our main point. In this argument over martial law, the United States is encouraged and supportive of President Gus Dur's stated opposition to such an action. But let me be very clear on something lest it be misreported. This should not in any way be read in any way as encouraging violence or intimidation or efforts to create confrontations in Aceh. It's not just opposition to martial law, it is the strongest possible support for peaceful dialogue. It would be very dangerous if our comments were misinterpreted as some kind of encouragement of violence or separatism in Aceh. This would lead exactly to the scenario you are talking about. So you all have a very strong responsibility to report both halves of the message lest you contribute to the very thing we are trying to avoid here. I cannot be too clear on this, because opposition to martial law should not be read by people on the extremes in Aceh as saying that they have a license to create chaos and confrontation. It is dialogue which the government is seeking, that we are encouraging.
Q: But don't you think actually President Gus Dur was facing the same problem as President Lincoln faced in 1861?
HOLBROOKE: That's too complicated for me (laughter)!
Q: What is your sense of the problems they're facing in returning refugees to East Timor?
HOLBROOKE: I don't know. I'd like to answer that question after we've been there. We've had a lot of briefings, from Washington to New York to Jakarta. The ambassadors here, some of whom like the British Ambassador who has just been at Atambua, I think after this press conference you ought to ask about his own views on that, or maybe you'd like to comment now, Ambassador, but we will reserve an answer until we've gotten on the ground. Do you want to offer your views on that (to British Ambassador, who demurs)? Well, ask him later. The Ambassador's just been there. We haven't been.
Q: Sir, you mentioned that refugees were being prevented from returning home to Timor (inaudible). Any other parties involved, you suspect?
HOLBROOKE: I don't know yet. We've heard a lot of stories. Everybody blames everybody else. All we know is that there is a situation, and the situation is that you have 100-150,000 or more refugees in West Timor, weeks, almost months after this thing ended. And you have internally displaced people still in East Timor, but that's a lesser problem for us. They should go home. Full stop. Let us get there and find out what has happened. We have heard some wildly different stories on the cause. Everyone blames everyone else.
ROTH: There's one point. Everyone who wants to go home should go home. The U.S. fully recognizes, as does the Indonesian government, that there will be some, not an insignificant number, who don't want to go home because of either what they've done or associations or whatever reason. We know that. Every piece of evidence we've had so far, and we're going out to find out personally, again, is that the vast majority do want to go back, and our efforts are concentrated on making sure that anyone who wants to go home is able to do so.
Q: Is it fair to say that military ties between Indonesia and the U.S. are dead in the water until such time as all the refugees go back and until such time as the officers in the Indonesian Army who are responsible for the rampage there after the referendum have been brought to justice?
ROTH: I think Secretary Cohen spoke authoritatively on that subject during his visit here. I think he made it very clear that it would be the overall context of military reform to show that the military was different from what it had been preciously. He made it clear that among the factors that would be taken into account in assessing whether military reform was underway was behavior on the ground in Timor, both East and West. Now, since his trip, we are only talking about West Timor, since there no longer is a TNI presence in East Timor. In terms of securing the border, making sure there are no cross-border incidents to undermine the agreement in East Timor, in terms of permitting -- indeed we hope facilitating -- the rapid repatriation, in terms of disarming the militia, which we see as one of the problems, those are obviously going to be factors we would take into account in looking at the issue of military reform. He put a lot of attention during his trip on the importance of the principle of civilian supremacy, and I think obviously that is still a relevant issue, as we work through the Aceh issue. And there's the question of the military's behavior in other areas of Indonesia such as Aceh, where for example an encouraging sign is that most of the military is being withdrawn. At the moment, we are not seeing the kind of violence we had seen in the past. All this is to say there is a combination of factors that we're going to be looking at, rather than a rigid plan with 106 criteria that have to be checked before we move on. We fully recognize the importance of the military as an institution. We would like to be able to help strengthen the reform movement in the military, but there are certain types of behavior that we have to see, so we can get to that agenda.
Q: Does that include the police, since the police separated from the military?
ROTH: That's a very good question. One of the issues that we talked about briefly, because it wasn't our main topic on this trip, was the question of how does the separation of the police from the military proceed. It's been announced, but it hasn't been fully implemented yet. It doesn't fully go into effect, we were told, until next year, and so for legal purposes in terms of assistance, many still view the police as part of the military. Obviously, to the extent that the police are separated, that they're responsible for law and order, that the military does not get involved in demonstrations and can avoid some of the abuses of the past, that would be a major strength, a major change. We have an ambassador here who has some of the greatest expertise in the U.S. Government on police and the important role of police in these situations, training them, making sure they are professional, and we'll be working on that issue.
Q. (inaudible) in Aceh if peaceful measures fail, and the government takes any necessary means, will you support them?
HOLBROOKE: I think we've already addressed that repeatedly. President Clinton addressed it in Washington, we've already addressed it here, we're not going to get into hypotheticals, we want to see dialogue, peaceful resolution of the differences among different elements within the Indonesian population. The ministers are trying to stimulate a dialogue. We encourage those ministers who are seeking dialogue, and we are very strongly against the use of violence by either side in Aceh. Assistant Secretary Roth just said that there's been a significant absence of violence recently, but there were some very bad incidents in the past, which means that accountability is also a critical component. You cannot deal with the future unless you also come to terms with the past. That's why we so strongly support the Human Rights Commission in the investigations and parliamentary support of laws which enable this to proceed. This is no abstract theory about human rights. An essential part of the future is to deal also with the past. Let me be very clear on what we support here, lest you misinterpret it or get it out of balance.
Q: Sir, the militias say they plan to have a show of force for your visit. What are you prepared to say?
HOLBROOKE: Let's see what happens. Come with us. Wear your flak jacket.
Q: Since we have the experience in Yugoslavia, you know that once this secessionist sentiment gets going, it's very difficult to get it back in the bottle. I've been to Aceh, and it's my sense that it's past that stage that Yugoslavia was in 1991. Do you really think dialogue can solve this problem, that they can somehow offer enough...?
HOLBROOKE: President Clinton affirmed very clearly our support for the territorial integrity of Indonesia. That has been a long-standing American policy. With Bob Gelbard as ambassador, and me in my new job, I think any attempt to transfer Yugoslavian parallels to this region would be highly misleading. I do understand why people make the comparisons, but the differences are absolutely critical. I would just say personally that Southeast Asia is my "home," this is where I began my government career, this is the part of the world I love the most. Let me be very clear, the Indonesian culture, the culture of this region, could not be more different than the culture of the Balkans, and cultural factors matter. It is our hope, particularly those of us who believe in the special genius of the Indonesian people, that the similarities you refer to will be much outweighed by the unique cultural things that make this area of the world such a pleasure to visit and return to.
ROTH: Let me add to that, culture matters, and governments matter. Let us not overlook the fact that we have a new government which is committed to peaceful resolution, dialogue, and diplomacy as its core approach to this problem. So there's reason both on the cultural side as the Ambassador said, not to draw the immediate parallels. One should also look at the policies, what the government is trying to do.
HOLBROOKE: Thank you.
(end transcript)
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