Transcript: Digital Video Conference With Beijing
(U.S. policy toward East Timor, Indonesia)Following is the transcript:
(begin transcript)
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
DIGITAL VIDEO CONFERENCE WITH BEIJING
ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST TIMOR, INDONESIASEPTEMBER 28, 1999
MR. PALMER: (In progress) -- Dr. Clad (sp) to give a little bit of a historical background on East Timor, and maybe its relation with Indonesia. And then perhaps John could tell us a little bit about the situation as it is right now, like today, as far as we know, and a little bit about both the national force there, and the make up. Because one of the things we hope to achieve by this program is just to get across to the Chinese that this isn't a U.S. show. I mean, that would seem to be obvious from reading the U.S. press, but actually there's been very, very little about East Timor in the Chinese press, particularly in the last couple of weeks. So I don't think it's safe to assume they really know, even some of our guests really know what's going on there.
Q: I have a question, and that is what cadence and pace do you want us to speak our native language?
MR. PALMER: That's a good question. And I think it's a good idea to take it at a little bit slower than -- I don't know what your normal cadence is, but just in absolute terms to take it reasonably slow. I think we've got plenty of time to cover the ground, we're not doing consecutive translation, because supposedly everybody speaks English. I think if you speak slowly, chances of comprehension go way up to 90-100 percent. So I just wouldn't rush. I think we have plenty of time to cover the ground. So take it kind of slow.
Q: Are we going to see the participants, or are they going to come up to the mike one at a time?
MR. PALMER: What we're going to do, we have kind of an L shaped table here. Maybe we can scan around, scan it here for you before we start, so you can see it. We'll all be sitting down, and we'll just pan to them when they have a question. So you'll see whoever is speaking at the time. And the camera may pan around while people are talking, just at the whim of our controller there.
Q: That looks like Paul Blackburn, is it?
Q: Yes.
Q: Hi.
Q: Hi, how are you? You pop up in all sorts of places, don't you?
Q: Yes, for what about 15 years, I guess, James. We're delighted that both of you could make it today. It's going to be very, very useful, I know. And we really appreciate you staying up so late.
Q: It's our pleasure, really.
MR. PALMER: Let's perhaps begin our program formally, if you folks in Washington are ready. I'm Bill Palmer, I'm the information officer at the embassy in Beijing. And first let me thank our Beijing guests for getting out early this morning and coming to participate. We have a good sampling of important Beijing newspapers here today, People's Daily, Beijing Daily, China Youth Daily, Beijing Youth Daily, and we may have -- (microphone feedback) -- coming in later. But, I'd like to go ahead and start.
First I'd like to begin by asking John Aloisi and Dr. James Clad to introduce themselves. And then perhaps Dr. Clad could begin by giving us a little bit of historical background on East Timor, since I think it's safe to say that until it hit the headlines we knew very little about East Timor, and speaking for myself, anyway, I certainly did. And its relationship to Indonesia. And then from there we can go a little bit into the current situation and the multinational force that's arrived.
So, John, why don't you begin and introduce yourself.
MR. ALOISI: Thank you, Bill. I'm John Aloisi.
(Spoken in Chinese.)
I've already introduced myself, and will Professor Clad do the same, and then come back to me for the current situation.
MR. CLAD: Well, unfortunately -- (spoken in Chinese) -- and so I think we'll have to persevere with English. My names is James Clad, I'm professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Georgetown University. And I have just, in fact, come back very recently from East Timor and Jakarta, and have been one way or another dealing with Indonesia and with East Timor for about 20 years. So I'm very happy to see you all this morning, you're end. And I'm happy to work with you and try to describe the situation there.
MR. PALMER: Well, let's see, why don't we stay with Dr. Clad for a minute.
And, Dr. Clad, if you could just give us a little bit of, as I said, the historical background here, because as I say, for many of us East Timor just kind of popped up on the screen, fairly recently.
MR. CLAD: Sure. I first went to East Timor in 1979, and have been in a sense working with the issue for many years since then. I have an alter ego, a previous existence. I grew up in New Zealand, as well as the United States, and I was a diplomat for New Zealand in Jakarta in the late 1970s, that was my first time to visit East Timor. And at that first visit, and at the most recent visit, I'm struck by some of the terrible continuities.
It is a remote part of the Indonesian archipelago. It is a resource poor island. Its most valuable export is coffee, a very, very good quality coffee by the way. And the reason it exists as a separate entity, both as a separate province now within Indonesia, and very soon through a process we can discuss later, as possibly an independent state, is that the Dutch and the Portuguese divided the Indonesian archipelago in the early phase of European imperialism. And the Portuguese over a period of years concentrated on East Timor, which is the eastern part of this long island of Timor, and gradually surrendered their claims to other islands around Timor. And in the 1850s, the government of The Netherlands, the Dutch, and the Portuguese made an agreement, and the island was divided formally.
And when the Indonesian revolution began in 1945, and during the period of the first Indonesian president, President Sukarno, there was never any Indonesian intention to take over this small, remote, poor Portuguese colony. Indonesian attention was focused on obstructing the creation of Malaysia in the early 1960s, it was aimed at acquiring the western half of the island of New Guinea. So the Portuguese remained in control of East Timor up to 1974-75. There was a revolution in Lisbon, led by the army, who were influenced by Marxism at the time. They changed the government, and very quickly the Portuguese empire began to disintegrate.
The Portuguese were fighting colonial wars in Angola, in Mozambique, and in Guinea, I believe, or parts of West Africa, a smaller state. And Timor was virtually abandoned by this new government in Lisbon. Meanwhile, inside East Timor, various factions formed themselves. One faction favored integration with Indonesia. One faction favored association with Portugal. And a third faction favored independence under a left leaning political ideology. Now, this brings us to 1975.
These factions began to quarrel with one another. There was a brief civil war from August to November of 1975. The Fretilin, that is to say the independence group were armed by the departing Portuguese army, it was only several hundred Portuguese soldiers there, and they succeeded in their civil war, which brings us up to November. And in the meantime, the government of President Suharto, which was primarily a military government had been worried a great deal by having a small independent state, which appeared to be very well disposed toward a Socialist ideology, and I think we know that the government of President Suharto was very strongly anti-Communist. In fact, it destroyed the world's third largest Communist Party in 1965-1966, after a mysterious coup, the details of which are still unclear.
In 1975, Suharto and his generals conceived a plan, the plan was to invade East Timor, to quickly take it over, to support the pro-integrationists, and to incorporate the island into Indonesia. This succeeded, but it succeeded after a very tough policy of repression and control. And East Timor never really accepted its incorporation into Indonesia. One of the many, many ironies of the Indonesian invasion in 1975 was the way in which it was conducted. Had the Indonesians proceeded more gently, had they spent the time to persuade, rather than to shoot people, which is what they did in comparatively large numbers, and then dislocated populations, and there was a famine in the late 1970s, if the conduct of the occupation had been different, arguably there would have been more support.
But, the Indonesians were never able to assert complete control. They were never able to completely eliminate 700 to 800 insurgents who were fighting against them in the mountains. And every once in a while there would be something highly visible, highly embarrassing for the Indonesians, such as the spontaneous demonstrations to support the Roman Catholic church, such as a massacre of people protesting in 1991, such as the awarding of the Nobel Prize to a Catholic bishop, and to a man called Jose Romal Schwerte (sp), who is in Washington, by the way, tomorrow, speaking with people, members of Congress.
So this inability to completely win the Timorese over just became an ongoing problem in country's relations with Indonesia, especially Western countries, the United States, Australia, Western Europe. By comparison, the countries in ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, generally supported the Indonesians, although small countries like Singapore and Brunei did so reluctantly.
You know the recent history. After the resignation of President Suharto in Indonesia, in May 1998, the new president who has a very weak base, who is not accepted as a legitimate president by many Indonesians, he was persuaded by a change in Australian policy in December and January of this year, to go very much further than people expected. People expected an offer of autonomy, instead President Habibie promised a vote to choose between remaining within the unitary Indonesian state, as an autonomous region, or to choose independence. This decision was resented, even hated by the Indonesian military. It's resented by the nationalists. But, a plan was devised in May 1999, this year, between the Secretary General of the United Nations, between Portugal and Indonesia, to do two things.
The first, to hold a plebiscite, to hold what they called an act of popular consultation. It's important, it's not an election, it was an act of consultation, to take the view of the East Timorese people. The view, the vote, would then be given to the supreme legislative authority in Jakarta, which meets in November, and then they would decide whether to accept the people's sentiment, and to repeal a law, and to enable East Timor to become an independent state. And we're right now in between the first and the second acts, and it's important the people understand that on the basis of this tripartite agreement in New York, in May, this year, there is no automatic granting of independence to East Timor.
That may happen, it may happen unilaterally, but right now we're in a very difficult phase when this result, which embarrassed and surprised the Indonesians, 78.6 percent chose independence, and I was there watching this in the interior of the country with a number of other people working at U.N. observers, this result has elicited, has provoked a very strong and murderous response, and it has become part of this very difficult presidential succession. And the arrival of the U.N. troops, especially the Australian troops, has provoked a nationalist backlash in Jakarta, which opportunistic politicians are using and manipulating.
So that's more or less where we are in a kind of chronological sense. I'm sure my colleague here will have another view, perhaps a more detailed viewpoint of some of those elements. But, I think that broadly captures it.
MR. ALOISI: I'd just like to add some of the details about how we got from the decision by the Indonesians to allow a vote, a popular consultation on an autonomy plan, to the situation now where we have a multinational force, authorized by the United Nations Security Council, to restore order in East Timor.
As Professor Clad said, after Habibie, President Habibie made his decision to allow this process to develop, negotiations between Portugal, which is in the eyes of the U.N. still the sovereign in East Timor, a representative of the Secretary General, and Indonesia took place. They had many meetings between the first month of the year and the signing of the agreements, international agreements in May. On the basis of those agreements, the Security Council, including China and the United States, and all the other members, met and came up with the authority for a sanctioned U.N. operation in East Timor, to administer the consultation, including sending hundreds of people to East Timor to prepare for the consultation, to register people, to ensure that the consultation was free and fair.
And actually, during the summer China and the United States and other members of the Security Council voted repeatedly to first set the mandate of this mission, which is known as UNAMET, U.N. Mission in East Timor, U-N-A-M-E-T, and then to change the date of the consultation, and to tweak, or to change the mandate in very minor ways. Anyway, during the summer there were elements in East Timor, supported by some local officials, and some in the military, which were intent on disrupting the free and fair vote in August. The vote was on August 30th. And there were protests by the U.N. authorities, and by national authorities, including my government, during that time, designed to ensure that an environment was created and maintained in which the East Timorese could vote in an election that was completely supervised and administered by the United Nations, under a mandate of the Security Council.
What happened after August 30th is very interesting. The day of the vote was peaceful. There were incidents, security incidents before the day of the vote. But, the day of the vote was peaceful. And these groups, these undisciplined, or militia we call them, pro-integration militia, were not a factor in the actual vote, which resulted in this overwhelming result for independence, in effect. But, as soon as the secretary general announced the results of the vote on September 3 in New York, September 4 in Indonesia, the security situation deteriorated rapidly.
These groups, which had support from some elements of the military, went wild. It resulted in hundreds of thousands of people just this month, hundreds of thousand of people being dislocated, hundreds of deaths, if not thousands of deaths, and a period within a week where every foreigner was chased out of East Timor, in effect, almost every foreigner, including the entire U.N. mission, that was sanctioned by the United Nations, with the vote of China and the United States as permanent members of the Security Council.
So it was in that environment of chaos, of stark humanitarian crisis, of killings on CNN, that the Security Council acted with the invitation of President Habibie, who admitted in effect that they had lost control of the situation, to authorize a multinational force. And that multinational force was authorized by a vote of the U.N. Security Council, I think, on the 15th of this month. And the Secretary General asked the Australians to lead the force, because the Australians were willing to do it. And they have put together a 15 nation force, which has since the 20th of the month been deploying throughout East Timor. It now just controls a small part of East Timor.
And a couple of other things to keep in mind. And I know that you have a lot of questions -- (spoken in Chinese)-- and a couple of other things to keep in mind. This displacement of people, hundreds of thousands of people, in some cases took the people across the border into West Timor, and unfortunately a lot of the armed militia that caused such destruction in East Timor went to West Timor. And we have a situation there of great lawlessness, and a security problem that is preventing organizations like the world food program, UNICEF, UNDP, and national aid organizations from reaching the people in need there. So that's another element of the current situation.
So we have a multinational force deploying. And it's very important to note what China, the United States and others decided to authorize this force to do. The first and most important, in my mind, objective of the force is to restore order in East Timor, just to stop the killing and to restore order. The second is to allow UNAMET to resume its work. And the third is to aid humanitarian efforts to the people in East Timor who are in need.
That's the situation on the ground now. There's a multinational force, several thousand troops, including Thai, a Thai general is the deputy commander of this force, Malaysian, a small contingent from Malaysia, a larger contingent from the Philippines, a small contingent from Singapore, Koreans, New Zealand has a force there, and some British troops and others. So that's on the ground. We're working very hard with China, with other members of the Security Council now to decide how to redeploy the UNAMET force, whose mandate now is to go in and fill a security vacuum, because when order was lost in East Timor, and the international force went in, another thing that happened was that the Indonesians left. So we have a country that's devastated, with over half of its population, probably well over half of its population, moved from where they lived, many hiding in the mountains, and no civil administration. So it's a tough task. It's going to be expensive, it's going to be difficult. This multinational force is costing the international community hundreds of millions of dollars. And reconstructing East Timor, and going through a transition to prepare it for independence will cost billions, I'm sure, by the time we total it all up.
But, we're in this together, China and the United States have cooperated very well on the Security Council. We are conscious of the difficulty that Jakarta is experiencing, because of East Timor. But, the humanitarian crisis there was so immediate, and it challenged the U.N. process that we are all part of, so I think that explains why in my government, at the top levels, since September 4, 1999, this has been one of the hottest policy issues that we've had to wrestle with.
MR. PALMER: Thank you both very much for that introduction, which give us the context which helps us really understand, I think, what's going on there now.
What I'd like to do is, since our guests here have been listening carefully, but also waiting patiently, and we're up to 6 Chinese guests now, is invite them to begin with some questions.
Okay. Yes, from Beijing News Daily.
MR. LI: Yes, my name is Jiao Li (sp) from Beijing News Daily. And I think in the last two days the protestors are burning the flag of Australia, since they think the main reason for sending troops into East Timor is caused by the Australian government. And also, the relationships between the two governments has declined sharply. What do you comment on this? Another question is, do you think any back points for one country as the core for the peacekeeping work? Are there some back points for this? Do you think the main reason for this is caused by the Australian government, not other countries?
MR. CLAD: Well, I'll hazard an answer to that, and then invite John also to say something. I think it's important to understand that it's probably one of the most unusual relationships in the world today, between this large, sparsely populated continent of people who came mostly from the British Isles about 200 years ago or less, and the Indonesian archipelago, which is the world's fourth most populous country, the fourth most populous country. And the relations have been strained and difficult, really, throughout much of the diplomatic history between Australia and independent Indonesia. For example, the Australian labor union supported the Indonesian revolution in the 1940s and '50s. Then the Indonesians were seen as going very revolutionary, they conducted a campaign against Malaysia, which was a member of the British Commonwealth, and still is, and the Australians actually fought as part of a Commonwealth group of soldiers against Indonesian infiltrators into Borneo, and even across the Strait of Malacca.
In the '70s and '80s, the Australians sought to have closer relations. In particular, they became the only major Western country to accept completely the incorporation of Timor into Indonesia, as a legitimate act. The labor governments of Geoff Witlam (sp) and then the conservative liberal -- the name of the party, Liberal Country Party, governments accepted that Timor was de jure, that is to say legally a part of Indonesia. And then during the '80s the Australians have tried very hard to become a closer partner in Asia, with the East Asian economies. And their policy was guided by this direction.
In December 1995, with very little notice to our country, the United States, the Australians announced that they had a special strategic, rather vague arrangement with President Suharto's government, which essentially set out a kind of broadly strategic relationship and some vague promises to consult one another if there was a common danger.
So I'm spelling this out, because it's important to understand that Australia-Indonesia relations have been difficult. Australian parliaments have identified Indonesia as a potential threat. The country feels guilty about the incorporation of East Timor under very bad circumstances. So this is a powerful political dynamic inside Australia. Now, it's probably unusual also to see how quickly the Australians have spent their political capital in this current crisis. Any special relationship has vanished. And when I was in East Timor speaking to Australian military liaison officers with the United Nations operation, with UNAMET, they were telling me that their country was now seen with some suspicion, and their Indonesian colleagues suspected Australian intentions.
I think we have to be realistic and accept that whoever will lead, or is leading this operation, is leading an operation which is seen as a great humiliation to Jakarta, no matter what the conduct of its military, and its political leaders. Whoever leads this operation will attract criticism. And Australia is a very convenient target. It is a neighbor to the south, it's not that large in population, and the relationship has been strained.
The problem now for Australia is that there is a real risk that some of its personnel, and the personnel of other contingents may be targeted by a very tough, territorial command structure that the Indonesians created in Timor over 25 years. It's important that you understand that the structure that the Indonesians created to retain this territory is a structure that identified local East Timorese, took them to Java, the main island, the most populous island of Indonesia, took them to Java for training and sent them back, and gave them a stake in the coffee production, and some economic advantages, too. So that these people would fight tenaciously to retain their position. And I think that some of the violence and cruelty is related to that effectiveness It's a terrible effectiveness, but it's an effectiveness of a system created after 1975.
Beyond that, Australia must deal with a society in East Timor that is full of vendettas. I hope you know the word vendetta, it means revenge, and people remembering revenge for a long time. And some of the families that fought one another in the 1970s are now fighting one another again. And it's a very difficult situation for any country to try to handle.
So it's a rather thankless job for Australia, but they were ready. Australia has forces that are highly mobile, and it has a political will in the form of a population that is suspicious of Indonesia, and feels guilty about Timor in 1975, and also remember in 1942-43, the Timorese people helped Australian soldiers fight against the Japanese. And when the Australians left there was also some revenge by the Japanese, and 60,000 Timorese were killed, it's estimated. So this is a strong feeling inside Australia.
MR. ALOISI: I think you're getting a sense of how complex this issue is. The history is not easy to grasp in an afternoon, or even a class of Dr. Clad's at Georgetown University. But, just to answer your question from my perspective, in very few words, and then we'll get to the next one. You see CNN pictures of people burning Australian flags in Jakarta. You hear about demonstrations there. But, Jakarta is not seized with anti-Australian sentiment, as you might think from watching those video clips. In fact, there were huge demonstrations in Jakarta last week that had nothing to do with Australia, but had to do with domestic politics, and the convening of parliament which will select the next president.
Indonesia has a lot of problems. East Timor is not even the only place in the country where there's bloodshed now. It's a country in economic crisis. It's a country going through a very exciting, but very risky political transition. And on top of this, it's a country that's now condemned by the international community for its treatment in East Timor. So there's a lot going on, and some of it is anti-Australian, or anti-Western even. But, the important thing to focus on about the force is that the force is not Australia. Australia is working at the request of the international community to do a very messy, potentially messy job. And as Dr. Clad said, they're potentially facing violent, armed, military supported local forces. And it's a difficult situation. So one of our messages with the Indonesians, one of Kofi Annan's messages, the Secretary General of the United Nations, and one of the Security Council's --
(Interruption to tape.)
MR. ALOISI: Okay. So one of the messages that the United States is passing Indonesia, and our Secretary of Defense will be there this week, and our Secretary of State is meeting the foreign minister tomorrow in New York, one of the messages that Kofi Annan, the Secretary General is passing, and the entire international community, including China through the Security Council, is that this is a U.N. force, a U.N. mandated force, even though it's not under a Chapter 7 -- I mean, it's not under U.N. administration. And any attack on that force will lead to further discussion of next steps in both the Security Council, and in capitals around the world.
MR. PALMER: Okay. Thank you for that explanation, which I think makes quite clear the U.N. -- the Australian role under the U.N. mandate.
Do we have another question?
Q: I'm from China Youth Daily. I have four questions for you. In a Cold War times Indonesia was a Western ally, and also Suharto's -- also Habibie, he is also on the wake of the democracies. In this situation, I want to know why the U.S. does not participate in the international interventions in East Timor, under the leadership of the world? Just like the U.S. did in Kosovo. Does this mean that if next time the --
(Interruption to tape.)
MR. PALMER: Please forgive us, the picture was very patchy, and we do need to hear you repeat your second question.
Q: My second question is, this time the U.S. did not participate in East Timor, under the leadership by U.S., instead of the Australian leadership under U.N. troops. Does this mean that next time that the U.S. still does not participate in this kind of action, then on the contrary ask other countries like Australia to do for the U.S.
MR. CLAD: I think it was four questions, but I think we should answer two of them right now, and then perhaps proceed to the next two, does that make sense? I think the first question, as I understand it, is about the discrepancy between this close relationship between the United States and Indonesia, an ally, now there is Habibie apparently in a process of democratic transition. So with all of these American interests, and endorsement of democratic transition, why is not the United States directly participating in the force, or leading it? I think the answer here is that, to be honest with you, I think the Australians have described themselves to us as understanding the local situation, in a sense, rather better. The Australians have devoted large efforts over many years, investment of personnel, intelligence and other things to try to understand Indonesia. Secondly, domestically in the United States, it's difficult to persuade the country to send the people to a part of the world they do not understand very well, and moreover at a time when the United States is rather heavily involved in Southeastern Europe. So it was a case of a very close ally of the United States indicating a willingness to proceed, and having the capability we think, or at least thought, to do so.
MR. ALOISI: I'd like to just add, the United States is participating in the force. By the time that this deployment, the multinational forces, called Interfet, by the time Interfet wraps up its job, and we transition to a peacekeeping operation under a different U.N. mandate, the United States will have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to support the force. This fiscal year, just this month, we're anticipating spending $55 million. So it's not an insignificant monetary contribution. We're also providing key elements of the force. We're providing logistics help. We're providing some civil affairs teams. We're providing communications. We have ships off East Timor in support of the force. So it's not an insignificant contribution in any case.
But, I think, to answer your question on a policy level, there was a job to be done here. The United Nations had a job to be done, restore order in East Timor, restart and continue the work of UNAFET, and aid in getting humanitarian supplies to people in need. And there was a country that had the political will, as described by Dr. Clad, to do it. The United States didn't have to take the lead in this case. I guess that's my answer. The international community is handling it in a different way.
And so to answer your question about what would happen in a different situation, we can't deal with that in this discussion, because in a different situation the circumstances would be different. But, you know, you can get from USIS background materials which give details of the U.S. contribution, which we're providing to the Australian led force. It's not insignificant in any way.
MR. PALMER: I think the gentleman had a follow on question, which was --
Q: I have another two.
MR. PALMER: Please.
Q: I was told that Australia, to persuade the U.N. peacekeeping mission in East Timor, from Australia's side I find it very interesting in East Timor, why is it strategically that East Timor is the stretching point from the Australia continent into Asia. Second, around the East Timor area there are rich in resources like oil, or petroleum, and is this also economic or military interest, which downgrades Australia's peacekeeping mission in East Timor. And during the peace keeping mission period, how is the U.S. to establish cooperation relations between Australia and the U.S. on East Timor?
MR. CLAD: If you ask any Australian whether Australia intends to go into and colonize, or re-colonize Eastern Indonesia, I think the first thing you'll do is they'll think you're joking. Australia is a big continent, but a small population. It has a power projection capability, a good small navy, and good small army, and good small air force, but it's all pretty small. The very last thing that Australia wants to do is to go up there and essentially confront the Indonesian state, and confront the Indonesian military. It's their greatest single fear.
So I would find that a difficult proposition to accept. In fact, Australians are in an agony of indecision, because caution suggests that they stand back. They have a strong public opinion, they're a highly democratic country, that insists that Australia cannot do nothing while this killing is going on. It's a very strong motivation. But, that's not the same thing as finding some kind of opportunity and exploiting it in order to re-colonize parts of Eastern Indonesia.
I'll answer the fourth, but I know John has some views as well. On the oil and gas, you must understand that while the middle part -- there are three zones under the Timor Gap Treaty, between Australia and Indonesia. The middle zone has good prospectivity. It's a word that I only learned a couple of years ago, so I'm not expecting you to know it. It means, potential for finding good oil and gas is there. But, it's very far from a market, and it's very far from a facility to condense it, to make it liquid and natural gas, LNG, or to extract the oil. So the problem is it needs political stability very, very much. And the next couple of months and even years could be an unstable time.
So to imagine that Australia, and maybe even America, the United States, wants an independent East Timor so that these companies can exploit this oil and gas is, to my view, quite wrong. The American and Australian companies would prefer to deal with Indonesia. So they don't like the new situation that's evolving. That's my view. And I do some work with energy companies, so I feel that I'm in command of my facts here. MR. ALOISI: I would just add, I agree very strongly with what you just heard from Dr. Clad. But, the basic interest, national interest of Australia in East Timor in September of 1999 is restoring stability. I think we share that view, that East Timor in crisis creates political problems in the rest of Indonesia, which could be destabilizing. And certainly from Australia's point of view, it's only a couple of hundred miles of water between East Timor and Australia, they're worried about refugee flows. It's not that calculated a policy, because there are very strong emotions, as were discussed.
But, if you boil it down to national interests. Our national interest in Indonesia, our premiere national interest is stability, because a destabilized Indonesia with 200 million people, threatens the stability of the entire region, Southeast Asia without question. And even further to the Asia Pacific region if it really fell apart. So East Timor is part of that, and the other element that makes East Timor special and different from other parts of Indonesia that are now in crisis, as well, or have problems, is the U.N. angle.
What happened in East Timor was a challenge to a United Nations process, that your country and my country worked very hard to get off the ground. So I think Australia was also very much involved in that process, and that's another reason why they care so much. As Professor Clad I think said very well, there is no way that you can make a logical argument that Australia gains from East Timor in crisis, or even an independent East Timor. The primary requirement from our strategic view for Indonesia, including East Timor, is stability.
MR. PALMER: I think first the Beijing Daily had a question. Then we'll go --
Q: (Inaudible) -- my English is not so good. Primarily speaking, I'm not much familiar with the issue of East Timor. So my aim to come here today was to learn something about this issue, and to grow in my knowledge. I will not have four questions, maybe two. Several years ago, Secretary of State Albright and our foreign minister Yungao Chanin (sp), had a meeting. Albright also sent out a thanks to China for the cooperation with the U.S. and other members in the U.N. on the East Timor issue. And today, Jiang, Mr. Jiang also mentioned several times that China and the U.S. cooperated in the U.N. very well.
My question is this, what does that mean, that China cooperated very well with the U.S. in U.N. -- could you please give us a more specific explanation on that? This is my first question. The second question is, you mentioned that there are 15 countries who have already sent troops to East Timor, including Australia, British, Thai, Philippines, New Zealand, something like that. I don't know whether the U.S. or China have already sent troops there or not. If they haven't, or if the don't, what's the reason for that?
MR. ALOISI: Okay. I'll try to address both of those questions, and I'm sure Dr. Clad has things to say, as well. Specifically in the United Nations what we've had, as I've explained, was a process in which the U.N. security council, with very close contact with the Secretary General, took an agreement that was worked out between Portugal, Indonesia, and a representative of the Secretary General, and basically decided how to put people into East Timor to run the consultation, the vote that was held on August 30th. And there were three resolutions in the Security Council this summer that dealt with that issue. And there was a fourth in September, on September 15th, which was significant in that it went beyond what was contemplated in those early agreements, and authorized the multinational force.
So we basically have daily contact in New York. And through high level discussions, such as Albright had, Secretary Albright had with Teng Jiou Shen (sp) in New York last week. And she also met with him in Singapore in July, as well. And East Timor was a topic of conversation in both of those. So it's basically through the United Nations, we have cooperated with China, worked together with China and the other members of the Security Council, to decide how best to pursue this U.N. process in East Timor, that was decided upon by Indonesia and Portugal.
On the multinational force. I'm sorry I wasn't clear enough before, but the U.S. does have troops in the force. It's just not one of the larger contingents. We have approximately 200 people who eventually will be in East Timor, logistics experts, communications experts and others. We have many, many more people who are committed, who are in support of those 200 people. We have ships at sea that are helping. Our Pacific command in Hawaii has been in daily contact with the Australians. And I think this was a question earlier by one of your colleagues, how has the U.S. and Australia worked. Well, we've worked very closely together on this force.
China has not decided to join the multinational force. But, China is going to send civilian police officials, we understand, to a U.N. force, which is a different type of operation. It's really not a force, but to UNAMET for the period after UNAMET resumes operations in East Timor. So those are the answers to your question. Basically, our cooperation is in New York, and it's close cooperation, and we thank -- I mean, it's not for us to thank. You thank us, we thank you, we're in this together. And on the multinational force, China could have participated if it had wanted to. Many countries didn't, 15 felt that it was in their national interests, and within their means to make a contribution, Australia making the biggest. But, the U.S. is there in key areas, helping in support of all the other nations in the force.
MR. CLAD: I'd like to add something to this, and begin by emphasizing that I am not working with the government, so one or two things I say may be provocative, or at least I hope something you will think about. The question of China's participation in this United Nations exercise is a very big issue in Southeast Asia, for reasons you must understand. China's active participation through an intended policing, that I've heard that give officers are now training in Darwin, that is Chinese police officials, there could be up to 50, I could be wrong in my facts. But, this is something that is noted in the region, and is seen as politically sensitive. You mentioned Australia being singled out for criticism. I can assure you that if there is a large Chinese presence, or a perception of a large Chinese presence in what Indonesians still regard as part of Indonesia, some of them do, then that is something which has inevitable political sensitivities. And it will be something that you should, as journalists, think about and write about.
I know that it has been expressed to me in my recent visit to Jakarta, that this operation, this humiliation in East Timor, this move by foreign military contingents, that it should include the Chinese is something that the Indonesians find difficult to accept. Now, I'm speaking as an analyst, I'm not speaking my own views. But, this is something which inside the Indonesian nationalist mentality, is important. So this is an issue in China's strategic objectives in East and Southeast Asia, and there are people who prefer -- who want to manipulate this fact for a narrow Indonesian nationalism. So that's my provocative comment.
MR. PALMER: It's 10:00, but with your indulgence I think we have one more question at the other end of the table.
Q: (Inaudible) -- so what do you think of the new concept that it's human rights over sovereignty? I want to know the American scholars opinion on it. Of course, in my opinion, I think for any independent countries sovereignty always comes first. We cannot guarantee human rights without sovereignty.
MR. CLAD: Thank you, a good question. I'm smiling because it is exactly the same question that one of my students asked me earlier today. So I have a ready answer for you. I do not see the two as being in conflict. I do not understand the argument that we must have a human rights orientation, which entitles us to interfere in matters that are appropriately sovereign. My view, my personal view is, I tend to be interested in a balance of power, between countries. I don't think that any country ultimately designs its foreign policy on the basis of a principle. The principle -- someone once said that a country has permanent interests, and not permanent friends or principles.
The interests are that you have a policy in which your values are expressed, but that they are expressed in the overall context of a relationship, whether with you, the Chinese, whether with the Indonesians. And I think that as long as the totality of the relationship is clear, and the understanding is there, then it is possible for us to express our views on questions of civil liberties, human rights, which I think are in conformity with broad directions of history.
So I do not accept that you have human rights, and that is automatically an affront, an attack on sovereignty. I think the two things go hand in hand. In fact, close attention to a good relationship with you, with other countries, enables us to talk about the other side, too. Was that satisfactory?
MR. PALMER: Well, let me end it by thanking both of you again. That was one of the most useful hours I've spent in a long time, and I hope our guests would agree with that. I think the next time we see the images on CNN of East Timor we'll be bringing a lot more knowledge to the situation there than we had an hour ago.
It's a beautiful, bright morning here in Beijing, as late September is famous for. But, I know it's late in the evening there, so once again we thank you for staying up late and giving us such a clear and good explanation of what's going on in East Timor, and what the U.N. is doing to try to help stabilize the situation there.
So John Aloisi, and James Clad, thanks very much.
MR. CLAD: Thank you.
MR. ALOISI: Thank you.
(end transcript)
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