U.S. Dept. of State -- IIP: U.S. Support for Human Rights and Democracy in Burma

Text: Report to Congress on Conditions in, U.S. Policy Toward Burma
(Burma regime made no progress in past six months)
President Clinton transmitted to Congress April 20 a required report on conditions in Burma and on U.S. policy toward Burma for the period from September 29, 1999 to March 27, 2000. A U.S. statute (Public Law 104-208) requires that such reports be given to Congress every six months.
"The people of Burma continue to live under a highly repressive, authoritarian military regime widely condemned by the international community for its serious human rights abuses," the report says. "During the past six months, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's ruling military junta, has made no progress toward greater democratization, nor has it made any progress toward fundamental improvement in the quality of life of the people of Burma. The regime continues to repress the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma's largest opposition party, and attack its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in the state-controlled press."
According to the report, the United States has responded to the regime's "continued failure to end its repression and move towards democratic government" with strong measures, including: suspension of economic aid and withdrawal of Burma's eligibility for trade and investment programs; an arms embargo; blocking assistance from international financial institutions; downgrading U.S. diplomatic representation to Charg��d'affaires; visa restrictions on senior officials and their families; and a ban on new investment by U.S. persons.
Following are the texts of the President's transmittal memorandum and the report:
(begin memorandum text)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
April 20, 2000
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT:
Report to the Congress Regarding Conditions in Burma
and U.S. Policy Toward Burma
Pursuant to the requirements set forth under the heading "Policy Toward Burma" in section 570(d) of the FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, as contained in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act (Public Law 104-208), a report is required every 6 months following enactment concerning:
1) progress toward democratization in Burma;
2) progress on improving the quality of life of the Burmese people, including progress on market reforms, living standards, labor standards, use of forced labor in the tourism industry, and environmental quality; and
3) progress made in developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma, including the development of a dialogue between the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and democratic opposition groups in Burma.
You are hereby authorized and directed to transmit the report fulfilling these requirements to the appropriate committees of the Congress and to arrange for publication of this memorandum in the Federal Register.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
(end memorandum text)
(begin report text)
Plan for Implementation of
Section 570 of Public Law 104-208
(Omnibus Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1997)
CONDITIONS IN BURMA AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD BURMA
FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 29, 1999 - MARCH 27, 2000
Introduction
The people of Burma continue to live under a highly repressive, authoritarian military regime widely condemned by the international community for its serious human rights abuses. During the past six months, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma's ruling military junta, has made no progress toward greater democratization, nor has it made any progress toward fundamental improvement in the quality of life of the people of Burma. The regime continues to repress the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma's largest opposition party, and attack its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in the state-controlled press.
The military junta dominates the political, economic and social life of the country in the same oppressive, heavy-handed way that it has since seizing power in September 1988, after harshly suppressing massive pro-democracy demonstrations. The regime's economic mismanagement is the chief cause of the continuing downward spiral in Burma's economy. New foreign investment has virtually dried up, and foreign firms continue to withdraw from the country due to the poor business climate. The SPDC has demonstrated little will to implement economic reforms or to respond substantively to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank recommendations.
U.S. policy towards Burma seeks progress in three key areas: democracy, human rights, and counternarcotics. The United States has engaged in sustained multilateral diplomacy to encourage the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other European and Asian nations to work in concert to pressure the regime to address these key areas of concern. The United States has responded to the regime's continued failure to end its repression and move towards democratic government with strong measures, including: suspension of economic aid and withdrawal of Burma's eligibility for trade and investment programs; an arms embargo; blocking assistance from international financial institutions; downgrading our diplomatic representation to Charg��d'affaires; visa restrictions on senior officials and their families; and a ban on new investment by U.S. persons. Each year since 1989, the United States has not certified that Burma has cooperated sufficiently in counternarcotics efforts.
The European Union (EU) has implemented a range of sanctions similar to ours, including an arms embargo, visa restrictions, and the withdrawal of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits. Japan has maintained the suspension of much of its bilateral aid program. With strong U.S. backing, the International Labor Conference, in June 1999, passed an unprecedented resolution that barred Burma from participating in any International Labor Organization meetings, seminars and symposia and from benefiting from any ILO assistance until it implements recommendations of an ILO Commission of Inquiry related to core labor standards.
Measuring Progress Toward Democratization
During the current review period (September 1999-March 2000), the regime showed no sign of willingness to cede its hold on absolute power. It continued to refuse to negotiate with the NLD and other pro-democracy forces for a genuine political settlement to allow a return to the rule of law and respect for basic human rights. It also refused to cooperate with the efforts of the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy for Burma, who visited Rangoon in October 1999 seeking to achieve a dialogue among the regime, the democratic opposition, and ethnic minorities.
The regime continued its virulent personal attacks on Aung San Suu Kyi as well as its campaign against the NLD, coercing thousands of members to resign and forcing more than fifty party offices to close. In the past six months, the regime refused to release several political prisoners who completed their sentences, instead arbitrarily re-arresting them under a provision that allows indefinite detention. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which re-entered Burma in l999, has visited prisons and gained access to tens of thousands of prisoners, resulting in some slight improvement in their conditions.
The regime continues to maintain that the military-dominated National Convention is an appropriate forum for dialogue with the NLD and parties representing the country's ethnic minorities. However, the National Convention is not a democratic forum as currently structured and, in any case, has not met since mid-1996. The NLD withdrew from the National Convention in November 1995 because of its undemocratic nature. In September 1998 the NLD formed the "Committee Representing the People's Parliament" (CRPP) to fulfill the role of the Parliament that was elected in 1990, but was never recognized by the regime. The SPDC viewed the CRPP as an attempt to create a parallel government and responded with its ongoing effort to dismantle the NLD.
Counternarcotics
Burma remains the world's second leading producer of illicit opium and accounts for about 80 percent of Southeast Asian production. In 1999, poppy cultivation and opium production continued their three-year decline, falling 31 percent and 38 percent respectively. Although the government has conducted eradication and crop-substitution programs, the decline in opium poppy cultivation was largely attributable to recurring drought. Analysts fear that cultivation may return to past levels, or increase, when the drought ends. Methamphetamine production and distribution from Burma continued to increase over the past six months.
While there is no evidence that the government is involved on an institutional level in the drug trade, there are continuing reports that corrupt army personnel may be aiding traffickers. The government implicitly tolerates continued involvement in drug trafficking by ethnic insurgents who have signed cease-fire agreements. These cease-fires have the practical effect of condoning money laundering as the government also encourages former drug traffickers to invest their ill-gotten gains in the legitimate economy.
The United States and other donors continued working with the UN Drug Control Program to develop counternarcotics programs while insisting that the UN continuously apprise the NLD of its activities. In 1999, the U.S. obligated $555,000 to fund two UNDCP projects that target opium cultivation through demand reduction programs and infrastructure and extension services.
Measuring Progress on Improving the Quality of Life
The quality of life of the average Burmese citizen continued to deteriorate over the past six months. Severe violations of human rights continued, including credible reports that Burmese Army soldiers have committed rape, forced porterage, and extrajudicial killing particularly in ethnic minority areas. Disappearances and arbitrary arrest and detention of those who express dissenting political views continue. As of March 2000, about 1,300 political prisoners remained in detention, including more than 50 Members of Parliament elected in 1990. Prison conditions have improved slightly, though prisoners continued to lack adequate food and medical care. The ICRC, which began making prison visits in May 1999, reported that as of February 2000 it had seen over 30,000 prisoners. The ICRC began a series of visits to labor camps in March 2000.
The regime continued to reinforce its rule by means of a pervasive security apparatus controlled by military intelligence, which sharply restricts the rights of free speech, press, assembly, and association. It monitored and severely restricted the activities of the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi, although it allowed the NLD to hold some events at party headquarters. In January and February 2000, the NLD was allowed to commemorate two national holidays at its headquarters relatively unfettered. Recently, security forces and other officials harassed -- and in some cases blocked -- party members and diplomats seeking to attend court proceedings on a case brought by the NLD against the authorities.
The regime continued to restrict education at schools and universities. It allowed some government technical schools to reopen briefly in the fall of 1999, but closed them again in February 2000 when students protested against the poor quality of education. A military-affiliated medical school and military academy remain open as of March 2000. Over the past twelve years of military rule, universities have been open for undergraduate students for a total period of less than three years. More than 400,000 students are waiting for the universities to reopen in order to continue their studies.
Tens of thousands of citizens of Burma remain in exile because of fear of persecution and poor economic conditions, placing a major burden upon neighboring countries. About 21,000 Rohingya Muslims from Arakan State remain in camps in Bangladesh. Approximately 119,000 Burmese, mostly from ethnic minorities, are in camps along the Thai-Burma border. Among them are thousands of new arrivals who have fled Burma army attacks on villages in areas controlled by the Karen and Karenni ethnic minorities. In addition to these refugees, there may be more than one million Burmese internally displaced by such army attacks.
Burma remains one of the world's poorest countries with average per capita GDP having fallen to approximately USD $300, according to World Bank figures. Economic fundamentals have become increasingly opaque as the government has ceased publishing data on the money supply and foreign exchange reserves. Analysts believe foreign exchange reserves have fallen below the S350 million level that the government reported to the IMF in June 1999. According to official figures, annual inflation was 49 percent in 1998/99, although the actual rate is likely higher. The official exchange rate of six kyat to the dollar overvalues the kyat at 54 times the market rate. Power outages have decreased somewhat since Burmese authorities increased electric rates eight-fold for companies and individual consumers in March and April 1999, although power supplies remain unreliable. Gasoline and diesel fuel are rationed to two gallons per vehicle per day. Onerous trade controls have made it difficult for many businesses to turn a profit. Access to external credit from the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank remains blocked.
The government restricts worker rights and uses forced labor on a widespread basis. The use of porters by the army, with attendant mistreatment, illness, and even death for those compelled to serve, remains a common practice. The military authorities continue to force ordinary citizens (including women and children) to "contribute" their labor, often under harsh working conditions, on construction projects in many parts of the country. Child labor continues to be a serious problem, and the armed forces conscript children as young as 14 to serve as porters in combat areas. The poor quality of life is also reflected in rising drug abuse and the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS. International organizations estimate that at least one million Burmese may be HIV-infected.
Development of a Multilateral Strategy
The goals of U.S. policy toward Burma are progress toward democracy, improved human rights, and more effective counternarcotics efforts. We continue actively to promote international pressure on the SPDC to enter into a meaningful dialogue on a democratic transition and improve its human rights practices. We pursue a multilateral strategy by consulting regularly, and at senior levels, with leaders of countries having major trading and investment interests in Burma or concerns over human rights practices.
The United States cosponsors annual resolutions at the UN General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights that call for democratic change in Burma through dialogue and for improved human rights practices. We also support the ILO's unprecedented action to restrict Burma's involvement in that institution's affairs because of forced labor practices. We continue actively to support the UN's "good offices" approach to encouraging dialogue between the regime and the democratic opposition and are committed to working with the UN Secretary General's new Special Envoy for Burma Razali.
The key to progress toward democracy and human rights is direct negotiations about the political future of the country among the SPDC, the NLD, and the ethnic minorities. In all our public and private messages to the SPDC, leaders of third countries, and other interested parties, we stress the importance of beginning such talks. Leaders from the ASEAN nations, the European Union, and other European and Asian countries have joined in urging the regime to move to dialogue with the democratic opposition and to curb drug production and trafficking.
While ASEAN shares many of our goals with regard to Burma, many members of ASEAN believe that "constructive engagement" with the SPDC is the most effective way to promote positive change in Burma. We will continue to raise our strong concerns about the situation in Burma with ASEAN and urge further steps by ASEAN leaders to encourage the SPDC to address the concerns of the international community. Secretary Albright has used and will continue to use multilateral meetings, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and Post-Ministerial Conference, to directly press the Burmese for positive change in the presence of fellow ASEAN members. We will continue to use our multi-faceted sanctions, and encourage others to adopt similar measures, as levers to secure the SPDC's agreement to enter into a democratic transition and end to its repression.
(end report text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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