TRANSCRIPT: ALBRIGHT 11/13 PRESS CONFERENCE ON APEC MEETINGS
(Secretary of State briefed on APEC at State Dept.)Washington -- Meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum give the region "a chance for the region to embrace policies that are pro-growth, pro-prosperity and pro-people that will help restore confidence and dynamism to the world economy," says Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
Albright made her remarks shortly before leaving Washington to attend the APEC Ministerial Meeting to be held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia November 14-15. President Bill Clinton is scheduled to attend the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting November 17-18.
The Secretary noted that Asia's financial crisis of the past 18 months "has underscored the need for financial sectors that are clean, accountable and transparent; and for political systems that are answerable to the people; for international financial institutions that are better equipped to prevent and cope with crises; and for stronger social safety nets to help vulnerable populations adjust to change."
She acknowledged that "these are not goals we can achieve in a weekend, but we hope at APEC to affirm the need for steady progress towards each."
Albright said U.S. goals at this APEC meeting are "to renew the region's commitment to open economic policies."
"We believe that the answer to the challenges posed by the global economy is found not in retreat into the closed world of zero-sum, no-growth protectionism," the Secretary said. "On the contrary, it requires that we go forward on the basis of sound management, honest government, economic inclusion and the rule of law."
Albright said that during her stay in Kuala Lumpur, she plans to meet with the wife of Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.
Anwar, a critic of Mahathir, has been jailed by the prime minister. Albright said the United States is "very concerned about what is happening to Anwar," describing him as someone "who has made very clear his own dedication to democracy and a market economy."
The Secretary also plans to visit Thailand and Indonesia.
Following is the State Department transcript:
(begin transcript)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
November 13, 1998
PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
Washington, D.C.
ALBRIGHT: Good morning. There is no better way to prepare for a 19-hour non-stop flight to Kuala Lumpur than by meeting with the press. So I am delighted to see you all here.
Before moving to questions, I want to make two points. First, the United States attaches high importance to the upcoming meetings of the forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. We see these sessions as a chance for the region to embrace policies that are pro-growth, pro-prosperity and pro-people that will help restore confidence and dynamism to the world economy.
The crisis of the past 18 months has underscored the need for financial sectors that are clean, accountable and transparent; and for political systems that are answerable to the people; for international financial institutions that are better equipped to prevent and cope with crises; and for stronger social safety nets to help vulnerable populations adjust to change.
These are not goals we can achieve in a weekend, but we hope at APEC to affirm the need for steady progress towards each.
More broadly, our purpose at APEC will be to renew the region's commitment to open economic policies. We believe that the answer to the challenges posed by the global economy is found not in retreat into the closed world of zero-sum, no-growth protectionism. On the contrary, it requires that we go forward on the basis of sound management, honest government, economic inclusion and the rule of law.
The second point I want to make concerns Iraq. The United States' position was stated succinctly and eloquently by the President during the Veterans' Day ceremony on Wednesday. America wants a peaceful outcome that gets UNSCOM back on the job, but we are prepared to act if that doesn't happen.
For months, we have said that every option was on the table. Unfortunately, one by one, the diplomatic options have been rebuffed. Iraq has a simple choice reverse course or face the consequences.
I have been asked in the past whether the United States has the right to act in the face of Iraqi transgressions. The answer is that every law-abiding nation has not only the right, but also the responsibility to do what it can to see that Saddam Hussein does not again threaten world peace.
This is reflected in four unanimous Security Council actions taken since last August. The Council has repeatedly offered to give Iraq what it has requested -- which is a comprehensive review of its obligations -- provided it first rescinds its decision publicly and resumes full cooperation with UNSCOM. Members of the Security Council have tried to persuade Saddam to reconsider his rash policies and to understand the simplicity of what he is being asked to do. But still he refuses to comply. In addition to Egypt, Syria and the six Arab states that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council issued a statement yesterday that explicitly holds Saddam responsible for his defiance of the international will; and here, too, the vote was unanimous.
I've been in frequent contact with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. We all want a peaceful outcome. But it was Saddam Hussein who forced the UN inspectors to stop their work; and only he can put them back on the job. It's up to him whether he chooses at long last to do what the world has been asking Iraq to do. Any action the United States takes will be motivated by our desire to counter threats to peace and by our hopes for a future of stability, prosperity and respect for human rights in Iraq.
In closing let me just say that I am looking forward to my trip, including planned visits to Thailand and Indonesia, and I now would be happy to respond to your questions.
Q: Madame Secretary, you say diplomatic options have been rebuffed. But is there any remaining room for diplomacy before the bombs start flying -- not necessarily by the US, of course, but by people like Kofi Annan?
ALBRIGHT: I think that the point here is that, as I said in my statement, Saddam can publicly rescind his non-compliance -- his decision to kick UNSCOM out or not allow it continue its work. Frankly, I think Kofi Annan did a very important piece of diplomatic work when he was there in February. He worked out an agreement, and Saddam violated that agreement. I don't see that there is much that can be done if, in fact, Saddam violates agreements that he makes. But the essential point here is that he needs to rescind publicly his decision.
Q: Can I ask you a quick follow-up? On the power of Congress, the constitutional authority, the sole responsibility to make war, declare war -- some of us are old enough to remember the Vietnam War -- wonder why the Administration doesn't simply ask. I know about consulting, but why doesn't the Administration ask Congress to join them. It's the people who say you should do this, say they support you anyhow -- people like Senator Specter. Isn't it in the spirit of the Constitution before Americans are sent into combat, not in an emergency situation, that Congress have a say in it?
ALBRIGHT: The President has the inherent constitutional authority to go forward; plus an earlier decision by Congress, which allows us to make sure that Resolution 687 is implemented. So we have the authority and we have been consulting extensively with members of Congress, who, as you know, most of them are not here. So we are consulting them.
Q: Madame Secretary, what is the nature of the threat from Saddam Hussein? What can you tell us about what kinds of weapons of mass destruction he still may have and his ability to reconstitute them? And to follow up, what do we know about reports out of London that the Foreign Minister as well as Tariq Aziz are part of this committee of concealment that has helped keep these weapons hidden from the UN?
ALBRIGHT: First of all, let me say that we have been concerned all along about -- the files include what has happened in their nuclear program, biological, chemical and their ability to deliver those via missiles. So in all the areas, we continue to have questions. The area that has been the closest to being completed has been in the nuclear area, but questions have remained in that also on some technical issues. Basically, there are questions in all those files.
That is why we agreed to a comprehensive review; so that Saddam Hussein would understand what more needs to be done. That is what Richard Butler went to Baghdad with in August, was a road map of how he could resolve the remaining questions.
What bothers me is that in Tariq Aziz's press conference yesterday, they are yet again denying the fact that they have ever been or are in violation, when we know full well that they are and have been. Therefore, blaming everybody else but themselves for concealing what is going on or not allowing UNSCOM to do its work, I think is completely disingenuous and dishonest and despicable.
So I think the point here is, it is Saddam Hussein's responsibility to come clean and he needs to rescind his decision and then a comprehensive review which would outline where he needs to take additional action would permit him to know what steps to take in order to get sanctions lifted.
The problem here is a very simple one, and President Clinton stated it and I will restate it -- Saddam Hussein cannot have two incompatible goals, which is to have sanctions lifted and retain his capability to have weapons of mass destruction. Those are incompatible goals.
Q: What do we know about Tariq Aziz's possible involvement in this concealment mechanism the committee that hides weapons?
ALBRIGHT: I don't know about that; I can't respond.
Q: Madame Secretary, you say that Saddam Hussein must publicly rescind his policy of non-cooperation; but what guarantees beyond that would the United States require before you begin to unwind yet another military build-up?
ALBRIGHT: Part of the discussion about the comprehensive review is that they have to allow UNSCOM to get in and begin to do its work. I think that we would have to see it's not just saying that there is compliance we would have to see some action that would indicate a movement towards compliance.
Q: If I could ask you about another brewing crisis or what appears to be a brewing crisis; it's been out of the limelight. That's the one in North Korea. Will the United States really pull out of the framework accord, as one of your senior aides said on a background basis the other day? And what are the diplomatic and military ramifications of that if you all are not given access to the site that you say is a new nuclear weapons development site?
ALBRIGHT: First of all, let me say that we obviously are following events in North Korea very closely. We are now seeking access to the suspect site. We believe that the agreed framework is doing what it's supposed to do, which is to freeze their nuclear materials program. But if it is not, then we will have to we are examining this all the time.
As you know, we have asked Dr. Perry to come and help us review the entire policy. But we are, at this time, satisfied that KEDO that the agreed framework is doing what it is supposed to do. We are examining this issue all the time and are seeking access, as I said, to the suspect site.
Q: Just a follow-up and then I have my own question the fact, though, that you've asked Perry to do a complete review of North Korea policy suggests, though, that you have some doubts about whether the way you're approaching Pyongyang is actually working.
ALBRIGHT: I wouldn't put it that way. I think that what has happened is that clearly the issue of what is going on with North Korea is one that is of great concern to us. We have felt that our approach is the correct approach. But the situation has evolved considerably in terms of what they have been doing. There clearly was concern about the missile test and about the discovery of this suspect site.
I think that we think that because this is one of the major challenges of it's a remnant of the Cold War, a very serious problem and one that all of us that are members of the Principals Committee I, especially have been very concerned about. So I thought it would be a very good idea to ask someone who is very familiar with the subject and someone that we have worked with all of us in the past to come in and give us his views along with us. He is going to be very much a part of what we're doing. Because we do consider this such a serious problem, we want to keep assessing what we're doing.
Q: Are you planning to meet Anwar Ibrahim's wife on your trip; and if so, what is your point in doing that?
ALBRIGHT: I am planning to meet her. The purpose of it is to signal the fact that we are very concerned about what is happening to Anwar, who is someone, I think, who has made very clear his own dedication to democracy and a market economy. So I am planning to see her.
Q: Madame Secretary, I have another question on North Korea, if you'll permit me. At one of these pre-trip briefings, we were told that the President expects to discuss North Korea with the Japanese and with the South Koreans, not only on the subject of the agreed framework but on the subject of missile proliferation and the potential threats to Japan. I wonder if you could sort of preview those talks for us, especially with regard to the missile threat. Are we talking reassurance or prevention or interdiction or what's the line of discussion there?
ALBRIGHT: I think, generally, because we have had, all of us Secretary Cohen and I in our meetings with the Japanese, for instance, when we were meeting with them on our two-plus-two talks in New York, a concern that no one should think that there's business as usual on this. This was a test that is of concern to us, and we need to consider it in a proper context and decide how it fits in generally with our policy towards North Korea.
Both the Japanese and the South Koreans obviously have deep interests, similar to ours, about what is going on there. So I don't want to go into the kind of detail that you have in asking the question, but basically the point of having these kinds of talks and it goes back to what Carol was asking about is that clearly there have been a series of actions by the North Koreans that are of concern to us. These two countries are the ones that are as deeply concerned or involved as we are. Therefore, it's very appropriate to have consultations with them about what is going on.
Q: Madame Secretary, getting back to Iraq, can you discuss with us some of the concerns the Principals Committee may have with the possibility of civilian casualties, should military force be used?
ALBRIGHT: Well, let me say that we are obviously always very concerned about civilian casualties. I am not going to go into any discussion of targeting with you. But as we consider the possibility of the use of force, the President wants to make sure that there are as few civilian casualties as possible. I just want to assure everyone that that is something that we are deeply concerned about. We have considered that very carefully as we have looked at plans.
Q: Madame Secretary, there are reports out of Malaysia that President Clinton has canceled his trip. Can you tell us for certain that the President intends to meet up with you this weekend?
ALBRIGHT: The President is planning to meet up with me this weekend, yes. Or I'm planning to meet up with him.
Q: Madame Secretary, do you expect that any American military attack would weaken Saddam Hussein's regime politically? And is the United States planning to step up its support for opposition groups?
ALBRIGHT: First of all, let me say that what we are if we do use force also, let me just say our major concern here is the fact that he is threatening his neighbors and the region, and therefore, peace and security, with weapons of mass destruction. That, as I've said, is a major concern here. So if we were to use force, it would be to degrade his capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors.
I have said a number of times, as have others, that we would look forward to working with a post-Saddam regime, and that we have been and will even more actively work with opposition groups. Congress has passed and the President has signed a law that allows more intensive activity, and we will pursue that.
So the purpose, if we were to use force, as I've stated, is pretty clear. At the same time, we would look forward to working with somebody else.
Q: Madame Secretary, yesterday I think Senator Lugar was the one who said that American policy had moved, in the course of the last few months, from one of inspections and monitoring in Iraq to one of containment. Now there seems to be a possibility of moving to opposition to Saddam Hussein. Can you tell us, is this the policy now; is it actually already opposition, or is this about to happen? And if so, how much time is there before policy moves to the next phase?
ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I think I've made pretty clear what we're doing now which is that we are concerned about his weapons of mass destruction. That has been the purpose of the work of UNSCOM. That has been what we have been he made an agreement at the end of the Gulf War that he would get rid of his weapons of mass destruction. That is what we have been working on. UNSCOM is no longer able to do its job, and has not been able to for the last many months. Therefore, we have to consider how to deal with the threat of the weapons of mass destruction in some other way.
Our policy continues to be one where we are trying to deal with that threat and at the same time, as we've now been saying for two years and I just repeat it again that we look forward to working with a post-Saddam regime, and will be working even more actively with the opposition groups. That is our policy.
Q: A second part is that heavy bombing that goes on for days or weeks that destroys the infrastructure may very well destroy the center in Iraq. That has great implications for the north of Iraq and for the south of Iraq, for the Kurds and for the Shia. How are you thinking through what might happen after a military campaign, because there are real consequences?
ALBRIGHT: Our policy is we are committed to the territorial integrity of Iraq. Clearly, we will continue to pursue that particular goal.
Q: The Kremlin issued a statement that Russia is categorically against the option of force. Could you comment on that? And just as a follow-up, Jamie has told us that no further warning is needed. That being said, is an ultimatum of any kind going to be issued before military force is used, at least by the United States?
ALBRIGHT: I spoke with Foreign Minister Ivanov yesterday, and they have said that they would prefer a diplomatic solution. We would prefer a diplomatic solution. I think that what I have found interesting is the extent to which they are also frustrated with how the Iraqis are behaving and have been working with us in the Security Council.
What I have found important in the last months is our ability -- what we have managed to do through diplomacy. I think people have forgotten when they say let's have another diplomatic option -- I hope you all see that's what we've been doing diplomacy for the last year in some form or another. Last October, the coalition in the Security Council was frayed because we didn't get an unanimous vote on a resolution. We are back to getting unanimous votes, and that is a very important point.
So our diplomacy, I believe, has worked; and we have been working very hard at it to get support for the fact that Saddam Hussein has to rescind his decision. So we are comfortable with the fact that the Security Council has renewed its unanimity.
Actually, Jamie speaks for me, and when he said that no further warnings are needed that is our position -- no further warnings are needed.
Q: Thank you.
(end transcript)
Return to The United States and APEC.Return to IIP Home Page.