

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

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*Preventing Conflict:  
Military  
Engagement in  
Peacetime*

*December 1999*

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

## *Preventing Conflict: Military Engagement in Peacetime*

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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*“America’s military engagement promotes regional stability and deters aggression and coercion on a daily basis in virtually every region of the world....Our wisest and most cost-effective actions are those that create an environment that encourages peace, discourages violence and instability, and builds confidence. At the same time, we also use resources to help diminish threats, counteract factors that lead to instability, and lessen the potential severity of conflicts that may arise.”*

— Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen

This issue of *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* addresses how the U.S. Armed Forces help shape the international environment through peacetime activities, including contacts between the U.S. military and the armed forces of other nations, designed to promote trust and confidence and increase U.S. security and that of our allies, partners, and friends. By increasing understanding and reducing uncertainty, such engagement fosters transparency and encourages the development of democratic institutions. Key U.S. officials outline the scope and significance of military engagement in peacetime and explain how this strategy is factored into the development of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. The diversity of peacetime engagement activities around the world is highlighted in a series of articles focusing on U.S. initiatives in Africa, East Asia, the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean.

# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the  
U.S. Department of State*

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## PREVENTING CONFLICT: MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN PEACETIME

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Media Relations Officer, Bright Star 99/00*

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International Policy Specialist, Office of the Coast Guard Commandant*

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*Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda  
Political Security — IIP/T/PS  
U.S. Department of State  
301 4th Street, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20547  
United States of America  
E-mail: ejforpol@usia.gov*

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## CREATING AN ENVIRONMENT FOR PEACE, STABILITY, CONFIDENCE

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*By Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen*

This past October, I witnessed one of the largest and most dramatic displays of peacetime military cooperation in the world. In Egypt, roughly 74,000 service members from 11 nations participated in the biennial Bright Star training exercise, sponsored by the United States. I watched as an Italian ship offloaded a British troop transport under American air cover, for a mock amphibious assault that included Egyptian, French, Greek, Dutch, and Jordanian forces, among others. The size and complexity of such an operation requires far more than the ability to surmount differences in language. It requires far more than the ability to coordinate the movement of forces or share and operate complex weaponry and equipment. Indeed, exercises such as Bright Star require the forces of participating nations — from the front-line soldiers to the commanding generals to the civilian ministers of defense — to develop an understanding of their allies' plans, their tactics and techniques, and their behavior in stressful battlefield situations.

The lessons from Bright Star are invaluable to achieving the interoperability that is so essential to the readiness of any coalition. Readiness, in turn, is the core of deterrence. However, Bright Star and similar exercises also yield increased levels of trust, confidence-building, and rapport that far outlive any operation. Those are the intangibles that often prove helpful to America's diplomacy during times of international tensions or crises. In the Department of Defense (DoD), we refer to them as "force multipliers," and they can make substantial contributions to success during times of war. In fact, they can spell the difference between success or failure — victory or defeat.

The recent victory of Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo conflict is tangible proof of the value of military-to-military engagement. Half a century of training and preparation by NATO forces allowed our alliance to mobilize and prepare with unprecedented speed and efficiency, and to execute a war plan that

was versatile, precise, and devastating. Despite efforts to divide the alliance, our forces and our nations maintained a united front, and we prevailed convincingly. Fifty years of multinational joint exercises gave us those force multipliers — shared resolve, a tradition of robust dialogue, and a deep commitment to cooperation — that resulted in an alliance victory.

America's military engagement promotes regional stability and deters aggression and coercion on a daily basis in virtually every region of the world. To do so, DoD employs a wide variety of means, including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and international arms cooperation. Our wisest and most cost-effective actions are those that create an environment that encourages peace, discourages violence and instability, and builds confidence.

At the same time, we also use our resources to help diminish threats, counteract factors that lead to instability, and lessen the potential severity of conflicts that may arise. Such preventive measures include:

- Reducing or eliminating nuclear, biological, or chemical capabilities through our support of diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework and technical assistance programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan;

- Discouraging arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through monitoring and enforcing arms control agreements such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime;

— Preventing and deterring terrorism and reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorist acts through DoD efforts to enhance intelligence collection capabilities and protect critical infrastructure;

— Reducing the production and flow to the United States of illegal drugs by means of DoD support to the joint interagency task forces operating along our coasts and southern border.

Relatively small and timely investments in targeted endeavors such as these can yield disproportionate benefits, often mitigating the need for a more substantial and costly U.S. response later.

Finally, military-to-military engagement also works through the power of example. In his famous speech at West Point, General Douglas MacArthur said that “the soldier above all prays for peace, for he must suffer and

bear the deepest wounds and scars of war.” We want our counterparts to know that America believes in being ready for war, but never eager. America believes in resolving disputes through diplomacy and international institutions whenever possible. America believes that stability is served by transparency and civilian control of the military. America believes in the use of international norms and regimes to encourage peace and stability, such as nonproliferation, freedom of navigation, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

All Americans can be proud of both the professionalism and the readiness of our armed forces. Our military men and women are indeed impressive, and I consider them America’s finest ambassadors. They let our foes know that America is a formidable and dominant foe. They let our friends know that America is a strong and reliable ally. ●



*U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen (left) confers with the former head of the Egyptian Department of Military Officers’ Affairs General Ahmed Abdel Hamid (right) at a reception in Cairo, Egypt, in October 1999. They are accompanied by an interpreter (center).*

## SHAPING A BETTER WORLD: MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN PEACETIME

*General Henry H. Shelton*



*Tremendous possibilities exist for all nations to build a better future, says General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “but only if we are wise enough and determined enough to do the hard work necessary today to create a peaceful international environment.”*

*Peacetime military engagement, he writes, “can be a valuable tool for shaping this environment and preventing conflicts from occurring.”*

*“The legitimate object of war  
is a more perfect peace.”*

— General of the Army William T. Sherman,  
20 July 1865

Today, the military forces of the United States are working together with friends and allies from all over the world, not in combat operations but in promoting peace, stability, and the rule of law. These military endeavors are part of a national security strategy aimed at shaping the international environment through military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives to help reduce tensions. Through peacetime military engagement efforts with other nations, we help foster institutions and international relationships that can help stop crises from occurring, and if they do occur, prevent them from escalating into conflict.

The three components to current peacetime military engagement activities are overseas presence, a vigorous joint and combined exercise program, and direct military-to-military contacts.

The foundation of peacetime military engagement is the presence of American military forces deployed outside of the United States. Maintaining a substantial overseas presence promotes regional stability by providing concrete form and substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments. The troops

forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific also deter potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions by demonstrating the determination to defend U.S. interests, allies, partners, and friends. Forward units also allow the United States to respond rapidly to crises and are a critical contribution to the “shaping” element of America’s national security strategy.

Exercises are the second pillar of peacetime military engagement. Conducted with allies and friends, these endeavors improve the combat readiness of the units involved and demonstrate the ability to form and operate effectively as a coalition. Annually, the United States conducts nearly 200 exercises with allied and friendly militaries, demonstrating both capabilities and resolve to friends and potential adversaries. For the armed forces of emerging democracies, these exercises also afford them an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the relationship between military and civilian leaders, including the fundamental principle of civilian control of the military.

Military-to-military contacts, the third component of peacetime military engagement, involve regular and periodic visits between senior leaders, visits by lower ranking officers at the working level, educational exchanges, and international military education and training programs. When combined with other programs such as the Partnership for Peace, defense cooperation activities, and foreign military sales, the combined effect is a long-term professional relationship between our armed forces and those of another country. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor

confirmed foes, military-to-military contacts help build constructive security relationships where exercises are not feasible. These contacts can also promote additional avenues of communication that can pay dividends when a crisis occurs.

While peacetime military engagement activities are an important investment in preventing war and destruction, these efforts are not cost-free. In the past four years we have conducted some 48 major operations, and today we have 125,000-plus service members “away from home” in the Balkans, the Sinai, Haiti, the Asia-Pacific region, Southwest Asia, and many other places, plus another 200,000 forward deployed in Europe and the Pacific.

The number of deployments needed to support peacetime military engagement efforts, respond to various crises around the world, and continue the rigorous training needed to maintain combat readiness creates a level of effort that is challenging. With

combat forces some 40 percent smaller than just a decade ago, the United States must carefully prioritize the tasks assigned to the military in order to insure long-term readiness. Continuing military engagement as a key part of the national security strategy requires a clear understanding of the demands such a strategy places on our military forces.

The future offers tremendous possibilities for all the nations of the world to build a better tomorrow, but only if we are wise enough and determined enough to do the hard work necessary today to create a peaceful international environment. Military engagement in peacetime can be a valuable tool for shaping this environment and preventing conflicts from occurring. Cooperative military efforts between the United States and other nations can complement the political and economic measures aimed at strengthening ties with our allies, partners, and friends. Through these efforts we can help create what General Sherman termed “a more perfect peace.”



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## SECURITY ASSISTANCE: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN DIPLOMACY AND USE OF FORCE

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*By Eric D. Newsom*



*“Rather than viewing diplomacy and force as opposing ends of the spectrum of national policy — with one used when the other fails — it is important to recognize that each must seamlessly support the other,” says Eric D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. And for the bureau that he directs, “this has meant seeking the right balance between foreign policy and defense interests and strengthening defense relations through such foreign policy ‘tools’ as security assistance, military education and training programs, arms transfers, security dialogues, and confidence-building measures. All of these efforts pay off with stronger security relationships with allies and other countries.”*

As a global power, the United States is faced with the need to meet new challenges that threaten the growth of democracy and regional stability. The key political-military questions we now address are: 1) how to discern what U.S. national interests may be at stake in ambiguous, remote, and, at least in Cold War terms, peripheral regions of conflict, 2) how to determine the willingness of Congress and the American people to take the risks necessary to secure those interests, and 3) how to calibrate the diplomatic and military instruments of power for maximum effect should we decide to act. Rather than viewing diplomacy and force as opposing ends of the spectrum of national policy — with one used when the other fails — it is important to recognize that each must seamlessly support the other, thereby achieving a greater effect.

For the Political-Military Bureau, this has meant seeking the right balance between foreign policy and defense interests and strengthening defense relations through such foreign policy “tools” as security assistance, military education and training programs, arms transfers, security dialogues, and confidence-building measures. All of these efforts are force multipliers that pay off with stronger security relationships with allies and other countries — which in turn have proven critical in international responses to conflicts such as those in Iraq and Kosovo.

We also must contend with a growing number of new challenges that increasingly affect all militaries worldwide. These include dealing with a growing

number of intra-state conflicts; fostering more multinational peacekeeping; identifying the role of militaries in political, religious or ethnic conflicts; urging the protection of human rights and respect for democratic norms; and working for the professionalization of military forces and encouraging their acceptance of civilian authority across the globe.

In addressing these challenges, the State Department and Defense Department work together to identify where U.S. interests lie to ensure that our policies and planning processes are consistently connected. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the area of security assistance.

Security assistance is a military foreign aid program in which the State Department outlines policy and provides funding, the Defense Department carries out the program, and the U.S. government benefits from the interaction it creates. Interagency cooperation, particularly at the field level between embassies and the unified commands, is particularly crucial in defining precisely how our security assistance “tools” can best be utilized.

The principal objective of security assistance is to cultivate foreign government support of democratic ideals by providing a range of U.S. military resources, services, and training. The “tools” for implementing this objective are embodied in several key programs, including the following:

## **FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)**

Of particular importance is the FMF program which enables key friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities and helps them become capable partners by financing the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. To date, the FMF program has been instrumental in the formation of several coalition forces working collectively to achieve common security objectives in Central Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America. Assistance also is provided to support multilateral peacekeeping operations that do not fall under the United Nations mantle. This support not only improves the ability of other nations to participate in regional peacekeeping operations, it also helps to lessen the load for the United States.

## **INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING (IMET)**

The IMET program has a particularly significant impact on shaping peacetime engagement between U.S. and foreign militaries. A relatively low cost program, IMET is a highly efficient component of U.S. security assistance that provides training on a grant basis annually to over 8,000 students from allied and friendly nations. Principally, IMET establishes military-to-military relationships that are beneficial in coordinating regional stability activities with recipient nations. It does so by exposing foreign students to U.S. professional military organizations and procedures. An important element within IMET is the “Informational Program” that introduces students to the vast cultural and civic aspects of American life.

Another important element is the IMET English language prerequisite. The IMET program alone has been responsible for teaching tens of thousands of foreign students English language skills. English language proficiency not only provides the basis for our militaries to communicate in peacetime and wartime, but also is widely viewed as a fundamental element in advancing U.S. ideals on democracy, human rights, and civil-military relations. From a broad perspective, English language proficiency goes well beyond comprehension of subject material in a particular course. The net result facilitates understanding of U.S. values, institutions, and political processes.

The key to IMET’s success has been the opportunity for foreign military students to learn advanced military leadership concepts arm in arm with their U.S. counterparts. Foreign military students also learn a variety of tactical and strategic force employment concepts consistent with U.S. military doctrine that can result in effective international operation partnerships. For example, foreign students may learn how to support and maintain ships used in maritime protection missions or how to employ the principles of U.S. military airpower doctrine. As a result, they are better equipped to participate, alone or with U.S. forces, in peacekeeping activities.

Of equal significance are the personal relationships forged during these courses. Students are encouraged to work closely with their U.S. military counterparts to comprehend better the course material. The resulting close friendships have played an instrumental role in how the U.S. has dealt with foreign militaries in times of unrest. Numerous examples exist where former students have been able to work beyond political differences to resolve difficult problems under exceptional conditions. Often overlooked, but also important, is how former U.S. and foreign students have collaborated to introduce important civil-military and justice reforms to other militaries.

## **EXPANDED IMET**

Notwithstanding the success of the IMET program, in 1991 Congress expanded the program to address concerns about human rights abuses by some military officers, civil-military conflicts, and better management of military resources. The Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was developed to provide training in such areas as defense resource management, civilian-military roles and responsibilities, and military justice. A key component of this training is the provision for civilian leaders to attend E-IMET classes. This offers civilian leaders and their military counterparts the opportunity to have candid discussions on sensitive subjects — often for the first time. Many E-IMET courses are specifically tailored for the country in question and presented in the host country. One of the most important impacts of E-IMET has been improving the foreign military students’ understanding of their role and responsibilities within a democratic government. The results of these courses can be measured by the

number of foreign military justice laws and codes of conduct passed, the greater respect for civilian control that has been engendered, and the benefits of cooperative and mutually supportive civil-military institutions.

Although E-IMET initially got off to a rocky start, its acceptance and utility have since grown immeasurably. Over 30 percent of IMET funds are used for E-IMET courses and over 25 percent of the students are civilian leaders. As acceptance for E-IMET has grown, so has the range of courses offered. Foreign nations have actively solicited development of courses specifically designed to solve some of their more compelling problems. Examples include courses in environmental cleanup, medical resource management, and disaster preparedness.

## **THE WAY AHEAD**

Through these types of security assistance programs, the U.S. gains critical regional access and develops alliances absolutely essential to our national security. Incidental to the assistance is the promotion of U.S. cultural and political ideals on democracy, internationally-recognized human rights, and civil-military reforms. The success of security assistance to help address the rise of new challenges will be reliant upon our continued foreign policy leadership and assistance. If we are to be resolute in our commitment to enhance military-to-military cooperation, to promote the values of democracy and respect for human rights, and to ensure that capable, trained allies are able and willing to support us when needed, then Congress must be equally resolute in providing the resources needed to continue to use these “tools” to promote our foreign policy goals and protect U.S. national security. We believe there is no better investment than contributing to the vitalization of allies and friends in order to achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. ©

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## SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN PEACETIME: A POWERFUL TOOL IN SHAPING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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*By General Peter J. Schoomaker*



*U.S. Special Operations Forces are known as the quiet professionals, ever ready to respond anytime, anywhere to assist U.S. diplomats and military teammates, as well as foreign military personnel and local and national government officials around the world, according to U.S. Army General Peter Schoomaker, Commander-in-Chief of the Florida-based U.S. Special Operations Command. These American soldiers, sailors, and airmen, equipped with cross-cultural skills and special language capabilities, are helping foreign militaries daily, while at the same time enhancing “the stature of the United States” and promoting U.S. national security interests, he says.*

Culturally aware, skilled in the language of the local population, mature and self-reliant, and low profile when needed, the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of the U.S. Special Operations Command and the regional Special Operations Commands supporting each geographical theater are uniquely qualified to make a significant contribution to U.S. ambassadors and their country teams as they seek to enhance the stature of the United States and further U.S. national security interests around the globe.

In a typical week approximately 7,000 Special Operations Forces personnel are deployed to 60-70 countries worldwide on missions that support U.S. foreign policy objectives, enhance theater military engagement efforts, develop enduring relationships with host nations, and carry out important training for U.S. personnel. In 1998 alone, Special Operations Forces deployed to and supported the U.S. diplomatic and military teams in 152 countries, successfully completed over 280 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) operations, conducted 123 counter-drug missions in 104 countries, and trained host nation personnel in demining operations in 17 countries.

Special Operations Forces’ participation in this diverse range of exchanges, exercises, training programs, and humanitarian activities helps us to establish and maintain important personal and professional relationships with our host military forces — relationships built on mutual respect and trust. Time and again, those relationships have proven to be invaluable to both U.S. ambassadors and military

commanders in regional theaters of operation during times of crisis and conflict.

Equally important, the presence of Special Operations Forces helps to demonstrate clearly the U.S. commitment to the host nation while promoting the institutions that contribute to local and regional stability.

A unique feature of Special Operations Forces — a trait that often appeals to U.S. diplomatic and military teams overseas, our theater commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs), and, in many cases, host nations — is that they routinely deploy in small teams. Be they soldiers, sailors, or airmen, these small teams lack the large footprint often associated with conventional forces. This allows them to conduct their missions with a low profile and in a way that is relatively transparent to most of the local population whenever that is desirable.

Without a doubt, the true strength of these teams lies in the carefully screened officers, the highly seasoned Non-Commissioned Officers, and the enlisted personnel who are meticulously selected for the missions in which they will serve. Special Operations Forces leaders spend a great deal of time in screening applicants to locate just the right caliber of professional. After that, we then invest a great deal of training and resources to produce a mature, poised individual whose substantial military expertise is complemented by appropriate language skills and regional and cultural awareness for the area in which he will operate. We believe it is crucial to maintain such a standard because, today, even basic tasks carried out at a fundamental

level can have broader strategic ramifications. Therefore, it is imperative that Special Operations Forces continue to be mature, savvy operators who understand the implications of their actions and their link to the environment in which they operate.

U.S. ambassadors and their country teams, as well as the geographic CINC's, are increasingly aware of how the unique capabilities of Special Operations Forces can lend significant support to their regional and country objectives. As a result, the global demands on Special Operations Forces have steadily increased. Identify a "warm spot" anywhere in the world today and chances are that Special Operations Forces already are there and engaged in a number of important activities.

The ability of Special Operations Forces to conduct these activities is a direct result of training they receive for nine principal missions. In fact, when we deploy to support an ambassador's or theater CINC's objectives, the results are most often a "win-win-win" in our view. The host nation benefits from the training and support we provide, the objectives of the ambassador and/or CINC involved are advanced, and the Special Operations Forces benefit by enhancing their cross-cultural and language skills, and employing the expertise they have worked so hard to develop. Here are some examples to illustrate this "triple win" outcome:

Foreign Internal Defense, that is, helping U.S. allies organize and train their forces to enhance their own defense and contribute to overall regional stability, is a "principal mission" of U.S. Special Operations Forces. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a State Department program to mobilize African nations to respond to regional crises, is a classic example of the application of Special Operations Forces skills in the area of foreign internal defense. Special Operations Forces units are helping to organize and train indigenous military forces in the nations of Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali as a positive step towards greater regional stability.

In the area of counter-drug activities, Special Operations Forces are currently working in unison with the U.S. country team in Colombia to assist the Colombian government in training units of its military counter-drug force in the organization and field skills

they need to help combat their country's pervasive drug production and distribution problem. Special Operations Forces have been similarly engaged in other Andean Ridge nations such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. In addition, Special Operations Forces patrol coastal ships are maintaining a continuous presence in the Western and Eastern Caribbean where they are working with the law enforcement efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard in support of the U.S. Southern Command's detection and monitoring endeavors. All of these Special Operations Forces activities have a direct impact on U.S. efforts to reduce the corrosive impact of narco-trafficking on friendly nations as well as the United States.

U.S. demining training activities have taken small Special Operations Forces teams to virtually every corner of the world with a history of conflict. In places like Africa, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, Special Operations Forces train indigenous forces to recognize, mark, and safely destroy the tens of thousands of mines that remain. Special Operations Forces also help host nations organize nationwide demining action strategies and public awareness campaigns. This humanitarian effort is designed to help these governments reduce and eventually eliminate the insidious and deadly threat posed by these mines to their civilian populations.



*During 1998, U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in demining missions in 17 countries — including several African nations, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia where indigenous forces are trained to recognize, mark, and safely destruct thousands of mines that remain.*

These examples illustrate how Special Operations Forces peacetime engagement activities produce a “win” for the U.S. ambassador and the theater CINC; a “win” for the host nation; and a “win” for the U.S. Special Operations Command. As a result, it should be apparent why “regional engagement” is good for Special Operations Forces and will continue to be so in the future.

An added benefit of regularly scheduled global deployments of Special Operations Forces is that when crises do arise, in many cases, Special Operations Forces are already on the ground or nearby. The chaos of the early moments of unfolding events in a crisis situation is often made more challenging by the absence of detailed information. Special Operations Forces who are present on the scene often provide the U.S. ambassador and theater commander additional immediate reporting from people who are engaged in the culture, speak the language, and can provide an element of truth at a critical time without having to wait for forces to flow in from somewhere else. While Special Operations Forces teams are rarely equipped to resolve a crisis by themselves, they can play an essential role in enabling the smooth and effective introduction of crisis resolution elements.

The potential benefits of Special Operations Forces peacetime engagement activities are tremendous when disasters occur. In instances where the United States is called upon to provide emergency humanitarian relief, Special Operations Forces can help shorten the U.S. response time in situations where it is most critical.



*Vietnamese soldiers and police officers help Technical Sergeant Enos Porche, of the 353rd Maintenance Squadron, and Staff Sergeant Scott Splinter, of the 17th Special Operations Squadron, arrange a pallet after unloading 19 tons of flood relief supplies at Hue, Vietnam.*

Just recently, tropical storms caused devastating floods in Vietnam and prompted U.S. Ambassador Douglas B. “Pete” Peterson to ask the U.S. Department of Defense to help airlift critical relief supplies. With the nearest conventional forces days away, the call was made to the Special Operations Command, Pacific headquarters, which had two MC-130 TALON II aircraft and crews already in-theater conducting training. They were able to respond within a matter of hours. These crews airlifted more than 9,900 kilograms of critical relief supplies into the ancient city of Hue where representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Vietnamese soldiers worked together to unload the supplies from the aircraft and facilitate the distribution of the materials.

In this instance — and in so many others around the globe — Special Operations Forces provided a unique, agile, capable, proven, and highly relevant set of tools to help foster regional stability and promote understanding among nations. ●



## KEEPING OUR PRIORITIES WHILE KEEPING THE PEACE

*By Senator Max Cleland*



*Peacetime — like the United States is now enjoying — is the very time when we must be most vigilant in pursuit of our national security policies, lest that peace be lost or national interests compromised, says Senator Max Cleland. He calls for regularly scheduled Senate debates to help define what those national interests are. Cleland, a Georgia Democrat, has been a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee since his election to the Senate in 1996.*

As we approach the end of the 20th century, the dread certainties of the Cold War have given way to the unsettled and uncertain, but also hopeful, era in which we find ourselves today. As in any transition period, we are feeling our way for the most appropriate strategy and policies with which to maintain and enhance our national security interests.

In the Cold War days, our diplomatic and military policies were directed at countering the world's communist regimes through NATO and other mechanisms designed to help us deal with the realities of the bipolar model. Now, the United States bears the heavy burden of "keeping peace" around the world by virtue of having the strongest, best-trained, and best armed military in the world.

While our direct involvement will not always be either required or desirable in regional conflicts around the globe, the U.S. can be indirectly, and effectively, involved in peacekeeping missions through a strategy of appropriate international engagement by our armed forces. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Henry Shelton, recently testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The U.S. is a hammer, but not every conflict is a nail." Through education and engagement, we can ensure a more favorable outcome in cases which do not involve our vital national interests, but are certainly in our interests as a member of the international community where peace and respect for human rights benefit us all.

Military engagement in peacetime activities is of considerable importance to the United States today as

we enter the 21st century. Since 1989, we have had to reevaluate and reshape our national military strategy several times. In all of the reshaping and examination, a constant, and largely unmet, need has been for a national consensus on a cohesive engagement policy for our national foreign policy makers, as well as our national military personnel and leadership.

As has been true throughout history, the American military, as with any country's military, is a significant part of our own national power structure. Very few nations have been lasting world powers, either economically or politically, without a military of significance to reinforce their philosophical goals. The principal goal of our armed forces, of course, is to protect our national interests by deterring attacks on those interests, as well as to be able to prevail in any conflict which arises, should deterrence fail. The key is appropriately defining our interests and then devising the best means, military or otherwise, for ensuring those interests.

It is not always the case that use of military means is the best or preferred method of advancing our interests. Indeed, diplomatic, cultural, or economic efforts will very often be more cost-effective than military engagement or intervention. In addition, our armed forces can be, and in fact have been, asked to do too much, given the resources that have been made available to them. An overstretched military is a recipe for serious operational, morale, and budgetary problems, and is a problem that must receive priority attention from both our political and military leadership.

Having said that, in my opinion we should and must continue such efforts as military education for our allies through the Marshall Center in Europe, the School of the Americas, and similar programs. It has always been my belief that those who understand war, including the true costs of war, understand peace and all of its blessings. Today, we train our military in the strategy of war and the art of peace. U.S. military personnel are well schooled as students of (Karl von) Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, (Alfred Thayer) Mahan, and the best known writers of conflict and engagement. At the same time, they also receive thorough and effective training in such fundamental American principles as subordination of the military to civilian control and respect for human rights. While our foreign military education efforts have not always succeeded in instilling such values, I believe that recent reforms will eliminate any such shortcomings in the future.

As we work with other nations through our military, Congress must also be involved. My hope and my goal is for us to approach these issues in a more bipartisan manner. Since I have come to the Senate, I have been deeply disturbed by the tenor of our debates in the Congress on a host of important national security issues. The Senate has made monumental decisions on our policies in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, as well

as the future of NATO and the United Nations, all without a comprehensive set of American goals and policies. Simply put, I do not believe we can afford to continue on a path of partisanship and division of purpose without serious damage to our national interests. For these reasons, I announced plans this fall for a major initiative to bring debate to the floor of the Senate next year to discuss America's goals in national security issues.

The plan calls for debate between Senators every four to six weeks on topics including the United States' relationship with NATO and the UN, the proper role of the United States in peacekeeping missions around the globe, and a definition of "national interests" to help determine when American troops are deployed abroad. We must prove that we are more concerned about *foreign policy* than *foreign politics*. The stakes are too high, and the results too important for the American people, the American military, and the international community, for us to do anything less.

Although "peacetime" connotes no military activity, it is in fact the time when I believe the United States must be most vigilant in its national security policies, to ensure the continuation of the peace and the protection of our national interests. ©



## ACRI: WORKING WITH AFRICAN NATIONS TO BUILD REGIONAL STABILITY

*An interview with Ambassador Aubrey Hooks*



*The principal challenge for the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as it enters the next millennium is “trying to respond to the growing interest” on the part of African countries that would like to participate in the program, says Ambassador Aubrey Hooks, Special Coordinator for ACRI, U.S. Department of State. ACRI’s primary missions, the ambassador explains, are “to enhance the capacity of African countries to participate effectively in peacekeeping operations and in humanitarian crises” and “to build a more stable future for themselves and the continent as a whole.” He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Susan Ellis.*

**QUESTION:** How would you define ACRI’s current role and key objectives?

**HOOKS:** The role of ACRI is the same as it has been from the very beginning, which is to enhance the capacity of African countries to participate effectively in peacekeeping operations and in humanitarian crises.

**Q:** Where is ACRI most effective and why?

**HOOKS:** We are a training program, and I think we’re most effective in training peacekeeping skills and also in training command and control. That is, how do you take the various elements, various contingents, bring them together, and translate a political mandate into a military presence on the ground? I think this is where we have gained our reputation, which I think is a very good one now on the African continent.

**Q:** Do ACRI’s country-to-country and regional contacts influence instruments of diplomacy?

**HOOKS:** In terms of diplomacy, there has been a very definite impact. USEUCOM (U.S. European Command) and USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), the theatre commands that deal with various parts of Africa, describe ACRI as the flagship in their military-to-military relationship with African countries. What we see is that there is tremendous interest in ACRI. And, in the military context, this has helped to open many doors.

I think also, of course, in terms of our embassies in Africa, this is another engagement on the part of the United

States that broadens our contacts with a number of countries and has paid dividends. We provide equipment, and we provide training. This also means that the relationship between the United States and a partner country is much deeper than it would have been otherwise.

**Q:** So you believe that ACRI represents a good example of public diplomacy?

**HOOKS:** Exactly. And Malawi, one of the earliest supporters of our program, is an excellent case to demonstrate this.

Malawi is in the southern part of the continent, and we are delighted to have the Malawians as participants in the program. They have been enthusiastic supporters from the very beginning, and they are probably the most advanced in terms of where the program has evolved, because they started early, have been consistent in staying with us, and have progressed significantly. We have heard many compliments on the qualifications of Malawi’s troops. For instance, when they participated in the Blue Crane exercises — organized in South Africa by the subregional organization SADC (Southern African Development Community) — their performance was duly noted by other participants who were there.

**Q:** In what ways does public diplomacy advance ACRI’s objectives?

**HOOKS:** ACRI is a program that from the very, very beginning has put strong emphasis on transparency and

openness. And we welcome attention and public discussion of ACRI. We think that this is an excellent program that shows further U.S. engagement on the African continent, and it is probably now the best known and most successful initiative in Africa of this administration. We think that we have a great story to tell, and we are always delighted to be able to do that in the press so that we can reach the maximum number of people. We think that this has opened many doors not only in our military relationship, but also in broad political terms, because I think people have come to respect the program for what it offers and to see that it responds to a significant need.

When this program was first launched in 1996, peacekeeping was viewed differently on the continent. Now, more and more governments — and I think Kenya is perhaps an example of this — have come to see that peacekeeping is, indeed, an important mission for the military and offers them a mission beyond the boundaries of their country. It is seen as a good thing. It burnishes the prestige of the military as an institution. It enhances the prestige of the country as a country that is engaged in a good humanitarian cause. ACRI, at the same time, has earned an excellent reputation since it was launched three years ago. Part of this is attributable to the public exposure that we have received. I believe that media exposure and public diplomacy go hand-in-hand. Therefore, I believe that public diplomacy has contributed to the success of ACRI.

**Q:** What is the process by which ACRI determines when and where it will become involved?

**Hooks:** ACRI is a training program. We look at various countries in Africa where we have a number of contacts. We give briefings about the program throughout the continent. Where we find countries that are interested in the program, and that have expressed an interest in participating in peacekeeping operations, we pursue the possibility of a partnership.

We have three broad parameters that are required: (1) a democratic civilian government, (2) respect for human rights, and (3) a significant military capacity. And when countries that meet these three criteria express an interest in the program, we then pursue the possibility of providing training.

**Q:** I understand that you hope eventually to have ties with Nigeria?

**Hooks:** We would love to have a relationship with Nigeria, as we would with South Africa. These are very large countries. In the case of Nigeria, no other country on the continent has had the experience in peacekeeping that Nigeria has had. Nigeria has played the role of lead country in a number of peacekeeping operations. It is a large country with a large population, the largest in Africa, with significant military capacity and the economic wherewithal to participate in peacekeeping operations. We think that it would be a tremendous asset to have both Nigeria and South Africa in the program and to benefit from their experience.

Partnership is a word that I think reflects the way we see the program and its effectiveness. Before ACRI was launched, we consulted very carefully with our African friends and we took their suggestions and advice and re-oriented this program to reflect their suggestions, even changing the name of the program. Originally it was ACRF for African Crisis Response Force, and that was subsequently changed to ACRI, with the word “initiative,” to reflect those consultations. To have countries like Nigeria participate in the program would be a tremendous boost for our program. But I also believe that we could offer something significant to Nigeria.

**Q:** Other than the direct and obvious benefits of military-to-military contacts in peacekeeping training and operations, what are some of the other long-term and perhaps less well understood benefits of contacts and interactions between U.S. military and foreign military forces?

**Hooks:** We can cite a number of things. The U.S. military is trying to engage various African countries in a number of different programs. We have regional exercises such as Natural Fire that took place in the eastern part of the continent in 1998 and was extremely successful. It involved Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. And I think a program like that, where there was direct contact with the U.S. military, also figured very prominently in the decision of Kenya to welcome ACRI as a training program.

When militaries get to know each other, work together, and train together, they build up the contacts that

instill confidence, foster cooperation, and encourage long-term relationships that are in the interests of both the partner country and the United States.

**Q:** What international organizations are involved in ACRI's training programs?

**Hooks:** One of the things we have tried to do, from the very beginning of our program, has been to involve humanitarian organizations. When we were first developing the program, we went to the United Nations, for instance, to make sure that what we were prepared to teach corresponded to U.N. standards that had been developed for peacekeeping operations. They confirmed that it did.

Second, we have invited various organizations within the UN framework, such as the UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), and other humanitarian organizations including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to send representatives to participate in the training, because these are organizations that are on the ground in any peacekeeping operation wherever there is a humanitarian crisis.

We believe that to make the training realistic we need to incorporate the input of these organizations during the training, so that the military can become aware of the needs of the humanitarian organizations, and also so that the humanitarian organizations can realize the needs of the military and what the military can do for them. For instance, if they wish to deliver a convoy of food, they often will need protection to get it to its destination. This is an area where the humanitarian organizations can work with the military. Our program has been unique in bringing the humanitarian organizations together with the militaries to train together so that they can work better together.

**Q:** In what ways has ACRI improved the international community's ability to respond to potential or real humanitarian disasters?

**Hooks:** That's a great question, because the focus of ACRI is to enhance the capacity of African militaries to respond to crises. And that call, or that mandate, can come from the United Nations, the OAU (Organization of African Unity), or subregional organizations such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) or SADC.

It also can come from coalitions of the willing — that is, allies that have been brought together by a lead country to address a particular crisis. It is a capacity, therefore, that can be harnessed by a number of different organizations. Whether or not to deploy in a peacekeeping operation is always the sovereign decision of the country that participates in our program. Obviously, our focus is on Africa, but the troops that go through our program are fully qualified to participate in a peacekeeping operation in the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, or anywhere in the world.

**Q:** How would you assess the key concerns and challenges that ACRI faces in terms of interoperability with respect to equipment, communications, and doctrine?

**Hooks:** This is always, of course, the key question, and we try to address two issues: commonality and interoperability. To address the issue of commonality, we refer to the fact that we have a shared training experience according to common standards. So that when contingents from different countries and different traditions come together, they will more easily find a common approach to addressing problems.

Many see Africa as somewhat homogeneous. It isn't. It's very diverse. I recall working with the commander of the UN-mandated force in the Central African Republic called MINURCA. The commanding general, Barthelemy Ratanga from Gabon, pointed out that African contingents from different francophone countries sometimes operate quite differently, because they have their own local traditions. So, the commonality of our approach is that we have standards that are shared, a training experience that is shared — therefore the approach in dealing with problems also will be shared.

In terms of interoperability, the key issue is how to use contingents from different countries and make it possible for them to communicate with each other. And what we do, in addition to training, is provide equipment. That is the second component of our program. And much of that equipment has to do with communications. It includes radios that can be adjusted to many different frequencies so that contingents from different countries can have the same frequency and therefore be able to communicate with each other without difficulty.

**Q:** How are the functions of your office coordinated with the Department of Defense?

**Hooks:** ACRI is a presidential initiative that is managed by the Department of State. Even though it involves the training of military in Africa it is not managed by the Department of Defense. Nevertheless, there are several elements of the Department of Defense that are very close partners in what we are trying to do.

After all, the lead trainers in ACRI training are the U.S. Special Forces of the U.S. Army. And therefore we work very closely with the Joint Staff (staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and also with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on questions related to training, to make sure that we meet the highest standards; that our doctrine is militarily sound; and that the training itself is militarily sound and presented by the best U.S. trainers, who are in fact U.S. Special Forces. So, there is a very, very close symbiotic relationship between us and Department of Defense personnel.

**Q:** What have been ACRI's most significant achievements since its establishment some three years ago?

**Hooks:** There have been several significant achievements. One is launching a program of training in peacekeeping skills that has gained an excellent reputation throughout the continent. The evidence for that is that some countries — Senegal and Ghana, for example — are requesting additional training.

Second, countries, including Kenya, that initially had some reserve about the program, have requested ACRI training.

Third, we have trained military who have engaged in peacekeeping operations since they started ACRI training. And, from all accounts, their performance in these operations has reflected good training. This is evidence that we are, indeed, meeting our objective.

What are we trying to do? We are trying to train the military of countries that are willing to participate in peacekeeping operations. Of the seven countries that we have trained in so far, five have been, or are currently, engaged in peacekeeping operations. So, we are reaching the right people.

Since the ACRI program was launched — and there are other factors that also contributed to this — many African militaries have begun to view peacekeeping as a significant role for their national forces.

Of course, from the U.S. perspective, peacekeeping operations have increasingly occupied the time of our own military in recent years. And I think ACRI, certainly in the African context, has drawn attention to the fact that we can train military to be prepared to do that.

**Q:** How do you see the long-term effect of ACRI's initiatives? And do you believe the ultimate goal is to have no more need for the organization?

**Hooks:** That's an interesting question. One of the things that we are always concerned with is how to sustain training. Training, of course, is a perishable item, so to speak, so how do you sustain it over the longer period of time? In our particular case, we address it at several levels.

First of all, the training at the battalion level is six training exercises at six-month intervals; therefore, they cover a three-year period of time. So there is the initial training, and then five follow-up exercises to reinforce that training.

Second, our program is built around the "train-the-trainer" concept — not just training skills but training in how to manage a training program. So that, for example, in one exercise we have classroom exercises, what we call "Follow-On Training One." And "Follow-On Training Two" is designed to see how well those who participated in the first exercise have trained troops to participate in the second exercise.

Third, we believe that there are a number of programs and exercises that reinforce what we are trying to do. One example is JCET (Joint Combined Exchange Training), which is a training exercise of the U.S. military in African countries and in other nations around the world. These exercises conducted with local troops can complement the force protection skills that we are teaching.

Fourth, there are regional exercises, generally focusing on peacekeeping skills, for example Blue Crane which I

mentioned earlier. We organized one last year called Natural Fire. The French organized one in 1998 called Guidimakha, and they are organizing one in January or February next year called Gabon 2000.

All of these exercises actually involve peacekeeping skills, and, therefore, reinforce what we are trying to teach. The broadened relationship with the U.S. military — whether it is ship visits, JCETs, or regional exercises — contributes to a relationship that will help to sustain our training over a long period of time.

But I do not see ACRI as a program that will necessarily exist forever. Rather, it is a program that was launched to teach peacekeeping skills and to teach countries how to organize programs for training in these skills. Once this is accomplished, the training that we provide can be sustained in the long run by the other programs that the Pentagon has in its military relationships, and by the regional exercises that many countries organize in Africa.

**Q:** How would you characterize the key connections and differences between “peacekeeping” and “peacetime military engagement”?

**Hooks:** Peacetime military engagement refers, I think, to the whole gamut of our military-to-military relationships with, in this case, African countries, whether it is a JCET or a regional exercise or a ship visit or something else. Peacekeeping, of course, generally follows in the wake of violence — whether between states or within states — when countries deploy in an effort to try to assure a stable environment so that peace-building can occur. That is, there has been a conflict, and all sides agree to allow a peacekeeping force to come in. That force is there so that the institutions of government can be put back into place and can address the question of how to move the country toward stability over the long run.

Peacekeeping operations, of course, can go on for years and years, but generally exist for a shorter term. The military relationships established during peacekeeping, on the other hand, are something that will go on for years and years and years, and hopefully will become richer as the years go by.

**Q:** What are ACRI’s foremost challenges as we enter the next millennium?

**Hooks:** Our principal challenge is trying to respond to the growing interest in participating in the program. As more and more countries wish to come into the program, tremendous training assets are needed, in view of the number of exercises that we carry out. And, given the fact that we use Special Forces, whom we supplement with contractors, as the lead trainers, the question is: How do we manage those assets most effectively to provide training for the most countries, the most militaries? That is the true challenge: finding enough training assets among the U.S. military to respond to the expressions of interest in the program.

That, of course, is a problem associated with success. It is a wonderful problem to have but nevertheless one that has to be managed very, very carefully.

The real question is: Why have we launched this initiative? I think it reflects the concern about the conflicts that unfortunately have troubled the African continent in recent years, and the desire on the part of the U.S. government to help African countries as they seek to address the problems that take place on their continent. We are witnessing a growing willingness on the part of African countries to try to resolve the problems in their neighborhoods.

Therefore, the goal of our program is to enhance the capacity of African nations to build a more stable future for themselves and for the continent as a whole. ●

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## PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN MALAWI STRENGTHEN DEMOCRACY

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*By Vicki Adair*



*The southern African country of Malawi “is using a host of military programs offered by the United States to strengthen its young democracy and to improve the professional skills of its army,” says Vicki Adair, Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Lilongwe. “Programs range from traditional military training to strengthening peacekeeping and improving media relations.” Peacetime military engagement activities undertaken by the United States and Malawi demonstrate the bilateral benefits that can be derived from these initiatives, she says.*

Malawi doesn't often make international headlines. This small southern African country, surrounded by Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania, has not had a civil war in its 35 years of independence. And unlike the military in some other African nations, Malawi's army has never tried to usurp power from a civilian government. In fact, during the country's first multiparty elections in 1994, the military remained in the barracks and supported the country's transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Today the army continues to play a role in that transition, and Malawi is using a host of military programs offered by the United States to strengthen its young democracy and to improve the professional skills of its army. Programs range from traditional military training to strengthening peacekeeping and improving media relations.

Malawi is one of seven African countries — and the only one in southern Africa — currently participating in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) training. The program is designed to enhance the existing capacity for African troops to deploy as peacekeepers or to respond to humanitarian crises under the auspices of a multinational coalition or regional, sub-regional, or international organization. Members of the U.S. Third Special Forces Group (Airborne) of Fort Bragg, North Carolina, have joined with contractors, including computer experts, to conduct a series of battalion-level exercises for soldiers in each participating country. Using field training and computer-assisted exercises, the goal is to provide a

standard peacekeeping curriculum based on U.N. guidelines, but which is also tailored to the needs of each particular country. Malawi participated in initial ACRI training in 1997; its third follow-on training exercise is now scheduled for January 2000.

Malawi's experiences with peacekeeping predate its participation in ACRI. Malawi has sent observers and troops to Rwanda and guarded a vital trade route, the Nacala Corridor, during neighboring Mozambique's protracted civil war in the 1980s and early 1990s. Both of these experiences heightened the army's awareness of the importance of training in peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and conflict resolution. The commander of Malawi's army, Lieutenant General J.G. Chimbayo, believes ACRI training has helped to fine-tune his troops' skills. “Although we've had peacekeeping training in our curriculum for years,” he said, “we have benefited from ACRI's practical exercises such as handling civil disturbances, humanitarian relief, and using negotiation. Our own army has been unable to conduct such exercises due to financial constraints.”

Malawian soldiers have received praise during a variety of regional peacekeeping exercises. During Exercise Blue Crane in South Africa in the spring of 1999, Lieutenant General Chimbayo observed his ACRI-trained troops in action and later said, “I was gratified to see my soldiers contributing equally, perhaps even more than equally, among servicemen from various defense forces.” The training is also being put to good use outside Africa. Malawi currently has an ACRI-trained observer in Kosovo.

ACRI may be the most high-profile military-to-military training program imported to Malawi from the United States, but it is not the only one. Since 1994 the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program has provided small-scale unit training exchanges between U.S. Special Forces units and the Malawi Army. JCETs in Malawi have included light infantry and weapons training, a jumpmaster refresher course for paratroopers, and training in mountaineering, patrolling checkpoints, land navigation, and mine-field clearing, as well as peacetime applications of military skills. One of the early JCET programs offered training particularly well-suited for African participants: teaching National Park rangers better ways to detect and deter poachers of protected big game.

Most of the army's senior officers have participated in International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs providing training both in Malawi and in the United States. Lieutenant General Chimbayo, for example, is an alumnus of the Command and General Staff Officers Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This year's IMET programs, according to U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Marcia Bernicat, will emphasize planning and resource management skills and will further strengthen civil-military relations and the rule of law.

IMET funding will support an Integrated Health Resources Management Regional Seminar which will help Malawi develop ways to make the best use of limited health resources in the fight against HIV/AIDS. The spread of this disease is one of the most significant challenges facing Malawi today, with estimates of an approximately 16 percent infection rate among the adult population. The IMET program will allow the Malawi Army to play an important role in confronting the challenge.

One of the most recent programs in the wide range of U.S. military-sponsored training in Malawi addresses the need to strengthen civil-military relations and the rule of law. It is conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) as part of the Expanded International Military Education and Training Program (E-IMET). The program is designed to provide tailored education programs for foreign countries in military law, criminal justice systems, the rule of law, and the relationship of law to disciplined military operations.

Input from the host country on course content is an integral part of the DIILS program. Malawian military and government officials visited the United States to help plan the first seminar. Seminar courses in March and September 1999 in Malawi focused on civilian-military relations, military justice, military and the media, and human rights, using group problem-solving and discussions to encourage civilian-military dialogue. The September course also included a session on women in the military, an innovation Malawi contributed to the DIILS curriculum as it prepared to induct its first women into the army. While the majority of participants in the first seminar were military, the participants in the second included more civilians, such as the Speaker of Parliament, high court judges, and other members of the government, the human rights community, and the media. In addition to the seminars in country, DIILS has provided overseas training for the Malawi Army's only legal officer and plans a study tour to the United States for selected members of the newly appointed Parliamentary Defense Committee. The group will visit the U.S. Congress to learn more about the relationship between the military and the elected government in the United States.

U.S. Navy Lieutenant Sandra Jamison, the DIILS course coordinator for the programs with Malawi, appreciates the local response to the courses. The participants, she says, "have been extremely enthusiastic, focused, and engaged during the DIILS seminars. We often cite Malawi as an excellent example of military and civilian cooperation."

That cooperation is particularly important with the media, which can often influence the public's perception of the military. Compared to many other African countries, Malawi's military enjoys a relatively good working relationship with the press. Colonel Roderick Chimowa, the Ministry of Defense's Public Relations Officer, admits that relations were not always so cordial. "In the past, they (journalists) tended to write whatever they thought about the army, because there was no channel open to them for information. But today that channel is open, and we are able to talk to the media freely and share ideas. When they are not sure of their facts, we encourage them to come to us, which they now do in many cases."

Some members of the media are a little less enthusiastic, though. "The military is opening up to us," says

Martines Namingha, editor of *The Chronicle*, one of Malawi's newspapers, "but not as much as we would like, nor as much as we expected." He adds that more dialogue between the military and the media is needed, a sentiment shared by others in the media. A newspaper editorial during the most recent DIILS seminar, written by a participant, applauded the continuing effort by the press and the army to improve their communications with each other. This is an area where training will continue to focus. The next DIILS session in Malawi is scheduled for March 2000.

Peacetime military engagement activities undertaken by the United States and Malawi reflect the bilateral benefits that can be derived from these initiatives. The United States enhances its overall relations with friendly nations, and countries such as Malawi, with limited defense budgets but significant experience, are able to receive both needed military training and assistance with a number of country-specific problems. ●



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## U.S. MILITARY'S PEACETIME EFFORTS REACH TIMBUKTU, OTHER CITIES IN MALI

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*By Michael Macy*



*The U.S. military's efforts to help the people of Mali are a direct result of an ongoing relationship between U.S. and Malian forces that began shortly after the West African nation became democratic and committed itself to participate in peacekeeping, says Michael Macy, Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Bamako. Outlining a broad range of peacetime engagement activities in Mali in recent years, Macy says that nation "has continued to develop democratic institutions, and U.S. training has encouraged an appropriate role for the Malian military in the new democracy."*

Many people believe that Timbuktu is a mythical place, a symbol for the end of the earth. However, Timbuktu is real, a city in Mali, West Africa. It is the legendary place where camels from the Sahara Desert meet canoes arriving on the Niger River — the highway that has carried the trade of West Africa for at least two millennia. It is also the site where U.S. military personnel are now working with Malians to improve health care and education in their nation.

Mali is one of the world's least developed countries. Landlocked, its heart's blood is the Niger River that dissects the country. The Niger provides the water that sustains Mali's people and nourishes its agriculture. Timbuktu lies at the northernmost bend of the river, where it meets the Sahara. It was there that the grain, fish, and gold brought by boat were traded for the salt and goods from throughout the world that were carried by camels across the desert. This trade continues today when the salt caravans arrive in Timbuktu to trade with the Bozo boatmen who bring rice, fish, and grain.

Timbuktu was the elusive goal for European explorers for hundreds of years, only becoming truly accessible during this century. In 1998 General James Jamerson, Deputy Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), followed the footsteps of those earlier explorers to Timbuktu. That visit led to U.S. military assistance for humanitarian and development projects in Timbuktu.

The U.S. Army's involvement in initiatives to help the people of Timbuktu was a direct result of an ongoing relationship between U.S. and Malian military forces.

That relationship began shortly after Mali became democratic and committed itself to participate in peacekeeping.

The Malian army was instrumental in the overthrow of the dictatorship of Mousa Traoure in 1991. The officers who led that coup promised to hold free and fair elections, and they kept that promise in 1992. When civilian control of the Malian military was established, the U.S. Army began to provide assistance. Almost as soon as U.S. troops arrived in Mali, they began to include development projects as part of their training programs and volunteered to provide assistance to the communities they visited. The first contingents of U.S. troops in Mali were elements of the National Guard, who conducted two Civic Action Programs.

A U.S. Army National Guard unit from Tennessee held "sick calls," during which they offered medical services for civilians in 10 villages in the Sevare region in central Mali. The medical team provided vaccinations, vitamin supplements, and basic medical treatment to all of the residents of those villages. In the second initiative, elements from the Alabama Air National Guard reconstructed a kindergarten on a Malian military base in the same region. This school served both the base and civilians living in the area.

Malians and Americans are involved in peacetime engagement in other ways. In 1993 the first Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, conducted by U.S. Special Operations Forces, took place in Mali. The JCET exercises have been held every year since then. During this program, the Malian

Army participated in light infantry and peacekeeping exercises. In 1994 the U.S. Department of Defense made a major donation of equipment to Mali with the gift to the Ministry of Health of a field hospital including x-ray equipment, beds, exam tables, refrigerators, and other items.

As more U.S. military personnel became familiar with Mali, they wanted to increase efforts to promote the country's development, and another Civic Action Program was launched in 1995. As part of the initiative, 30 members of the Minnesota Army National Guard provided medical services in 10 villages in the Senou region near Mali's capital city of Bamako. That same year the Arkansas Air National Guard worked on a joint project with the Malian Air Force in which 20 U.S. airmen worked alongside 20 Malian servicemen to construct a new clinic at the Malian Air Force base in Senou. The project took a month and engendered even closer ties between U.S. and Malian military personnel. In 1995 the United States also conducted the first three phases of military justice training for the Malian armed forces under a program organized by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS). This involved training both in Mali and the United States and focused on the role of the military in a democracy, civilian-military relations, and methods to assist Mali in developing a military justice system.

A joint Army, Air Force, and Navy medical team from USEUCOM Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, went to Mali in 1996 for a MEDFLAG military medical exercise. The team provided emergency medical and crisis response training for the Malian military medical staff. The exercise included an enactment of a simulated train wreck that was so realistic that many people were convinced it was real. The team also provided sick call services to the local area. Phase four of the military justice training was held that year, and the U.S. Department of Defense also donated two fire trucks to the city of Bamako.

There was an even greater expansion of military engagement in Mali in 1997 when three training exercises were held: two JCET exercises and the first Flintlock exercise, conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense. The Flintlock program lasted for two months in Mali and involved one company of Malian troops and one company from Senegal. There also

were observers from Guinea, Gambia, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Benin, and Togo. The exercise included a development component, the construction of a school in Banankoro. The project was financed jointly by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Defense. Also in 1997 the U.S. Air Force provided transportation for the deployment of 680 Malian troops and 450 tons of equipment to Liberia to support peacekeeping. And the U.S. Foreign Military Financing program provided Mali with \$350,000 for the training of pilots and mechanics to operate two reconditioned DC3 aircraft purchased from a U.S. company by the Malian Air Force.

All of this activity inspired General Jamerson to visit Mali, and he could not resist the lure of Timbuktu. His visit there led to the U.S. donation to the city of two utility vans and two water trucks — gifts that symbolized the continuing close relationship between U.S. forces and the military and civilians of Mali.

In 1998, U.S. supplies including beds, surgical equipment, school items, and bicycles were donated to Timbuktu and Kidal. The U.S. Department of Defense also provided support for the renovation of the high school in Timbuktu and a clinic in Kidal and for the construction of a community school near Timbuktu. The work is scheduled to be completed in 2000. These projects are being carried out by two U.S.-supported charitable organizations — Africare, in Timbuktu, and CARE (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.), in Kidal — and are examples of the many elements of the American community working together in Mali.

Also in 1998, formal training began for Malian participation in the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a program to train and equip peacekeeping troops from a number of African nations. The initial training session ran from the beginning of February through March and involved a Malian battalion of 800 men and about 60 U.S. Special Forces instructors. During that time U.S. funding was provided to construct two clinics in the Sevare region. In November 1998, U.S. military personnel returned to Mali for a month to conduct sustainment training under the ACRI program. Phase five of the military justice training program also was held that year in Mali.

All of these activities culminated in the opening of a Defense Attache's (DAT) Office in the U.S. Embassy in Mali in 1999. It is expected that this will result in even closer ties between the U.S. and Mali. Along with the opening of the DAT office, there were a number of other activities in 1999. ACRI training continued, and Phase VI of the military justice training was held, along with a seminar on the role of the military in a democracy.

Throughout the past seven years, Mali has continued to develop democratic institutions, and U.S. training has encouraged an appropriate role for the Malian military in the new democracy. The Malian Army continues to build on its traditions of professionalism and has participated in a number of peacekeeping efforts throughout Africa. U.S. military personnel have played a supportive role in these efforts and have contributed to projects that have led to improved health care and education and other benefits for the people of Mali. Their helping hands have truly reached all the way to Timbuktu. ●

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## SEMINARS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE SPOTLIGHT RULE OF LAW, MILITARY JUSTICE

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*By Major D.J. Riley*

*In support of the U.S. commitment to assist new and developing democracies, the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) has sponsored seminars in 69 countries to provide professional legal education and training to international military officers and civilian government officials. In the following article, U.S. Marine Corps Major D.J. Riley, DIILS Country Program Officer, describes the institute's programs in Central and Eastern Europe where the focus has been "on topics that enhance international security and foster bilateral trust and confidence by emphasizing human rights, military justice, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military."*

Colonel Ion Didoiu, Director of Training for the Romanian Ministry of Defense, was quite pleased. The weather in Bucharest was unseasonably cold and rainy, but the joint U.S.-Romanian training program during the past two weeks had been a huge success. A team of military officers, lawyers, and other experts from the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) in Newport, Rhode Island, had conducted seminars in Bucharest and Brasov that focused on the theme, "Peace Operations and Disciplined Military Operations."

These programs in Romania in August 1999 were the 10th and 11th since 1995 in a series that might be called a "partnership for progress." The latest seminars examined the legal aspects of actual military operations. Earlier phases had dealt with topics ranging from military justice to methods in teaching human rights. The growth of the personal and professional relationships between the U.S. and Romanian officers during the past four years closely mirrors the development of similar DIILS programs throughout Eastern and Central Europe since 1993.

Originally founded in 1992 as the International Training Department (ITD) of the Naval Justice School in Newport, Rhode Island, DIILS has grown from a one-person office to an 11-member staff, including military lawyers from each of the U.S. Armed Services. All of the attorneys on the staff possess the desire to assist other countries in developing the "rule of law," as well as a willingness to travel to remote, often unfamiliar, places to carry out this mission. Created in support of the U.S. commitment to assist new and developing democracies, ITD quickly gained attention

as a result of its success in addressing difficult problems in difficult situations.

In October 1997, ITD was renamed DIILS to reflect more accurately the joint service nature of its mission. The permanent 11-member staff, representing both U.S. military and civilian personnel, serve in the U.S. Defense Department's lead agency for providing professional legal education and training to international military officers and civilian government officials in furtherance of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. As of November 1999, DIILS had conducted seminars in 69 countries with over 11,200 participants worldwide.

DIILS has been recognized by the U.S. secretary of defense as one of the most successful programs under the Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program, launched by Congress in 1991. According to DIILS Academic Director Walter W. Munroe, "[DIILS] respond(ed) to a world which had changed dramatically in a few years. The U.S. government had to initiate new relationships with the many emerging democracies that included the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, the former Warsaw Pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe...that were redefining themselves. In particular, the militaries in these foreign countries presented special legal training challenges, including: ill-defined military justice systems, human rights abuses, and a need to redefine the historic relationships between the military and civilian population."

DIILS initiates each program with an assessment trip to the partner country where a two-member team meets

with U.S. Embassy staff and members of the partner country's military, press, and non-governmental organizations, and also lawyers and civilian officials. Following the initial assessment, a delegation from the partner country attends a planning phase in the United States, during which the details for the follow-on seminars are worked out. As an integral part of the planning process, the delegation is introduced to the civilian and military justice systems in the United States. Following the U.S. visit, the seminars are scheduled in the partner country. The seminars focus on topics that enhance international security and foster bilateral trust and confidence by emphasizing human rights, military justice, the rule of law, and civilian control of the military.

Mobile Education Teams (METs) conduct the in-country seminars. A typical DIILS MET consists of a permanent staff member, referred to as the Country Program Manager (CPM), and three adjunct faculty members who are either military lawyers themselves or have expertise in the seminar topic. Adjunct faculty members are selected from active duty and reserve military officers and from the civilian sector. Adjunct faculty members are usually senior officers or officials such as judges, professors, or senior legal advisers. When possible, MET members have a proficiency in the language of the partner country, and their selection is based on their ability to develop and maintain professional relationships.

Since 1993, DIILS has worked with 18 Eastern and Central European countries in developing more than 100 programs. Most of these contacts have been as follow-on visits after the initial seminars. DIILS has returned annually to many of the countries to conduct seminars, which become more and more sophisticated as the programs evolve. In Hungary, for example, the seminars focused mainly on military justice for the first few years. However, the need arose to address the concept of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) because Hungary was participating in the Partnership for Peace Program before being admitted into NATO. The most recent seminar in Hungary — “Legal Aspects of Military and Media Relations” — was related to issues that arose during the recent events in Kosovo, and the Hungarian military's need to work effectively with the press. In fact, DIILS developed the seminar in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Budapest in

response to requests from the Hungarian government. DIILS has the ability to respond to the requirements of the different Eastern and Central European nations that have a great deal of knowledge and sophistication in certain areas, but lack the necessary infrastructure or institutions to develop the programs on their own.

In addition to conducting seminars, DIILS also has assisted various nations that are trying to develop military codes. Since 1995, DIILS has worked closely with military lawyers in Albania to develop a military code that reflects changes in the country's government and its more open view of the outside world. A delegation from Albania will travel to Newport early next year to complete the project.

While the United States is the world's oldest continuous democracy, it is one of the world's youngest cultures. Keeping that in mind, DIILS METs try to create seminars that provide opportunities for dialogues,



*DIILS team at conference site in Brasov, Romania. From left to right are Major Thomas Murrey, U.S. Air Force, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. European Command; Major D.J. Riley, U.S. Marine Corps, DIILS Program Country Manager; Professor Jerry Dillon of the Naval War College; Colonel Ion Didoiu, Ministry of Defense of Romania; Major Jeffrey Palmer, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California; and Commander Shackley Raffetto, U.S. Navy (reserve), Circuit Court Judge from Maui, Hawaii.*

rather than monologues, on ideas related to the U.S. legal system, civilian control of the military, and the rule of law. Representing a democracy that has had to learn many difficult lessons on its own, the teams offer the lessons learned over 200 years of U.S. history, often acknowledging that there have been mistakes along the way. The instructors also are keenly aware that what has worked for the United States may not work in every country. Indeed, the exchanges during these seminars have forced some DIILS team members to reexamine how they view the legal systems in the United States.

Ultimately, these seminars are an excellent forum for the kind of exchange of ideas that leads to a mutual understanding between nations and helps to foster bilateral trust and confidence. One of the ways that discussion is encouraged is through the use of discussion problems in which the team asks the seminar participants to work through a problem and answer questions using their own domestic law or procedures. The participants are divided into groups that separately develop answers. Later, during a debriefing period, each group presents its solutions. In this manner, different ideas about law and democracy are discussed by the participants and the DIILS team members. As a result of these discussion problem-solving exercises, all of the participants and DIILS team members gain a broader appreciation of the concepts of the rule of law and civilian control of the military.

DIILS METs have traveled to Central and Eastern European countries including Albania, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. During the year 2000, several other nations in the region have expressed interest in the seminars. DIILS stands ready to support any country in the region to develop programs that build on the foundation of the rule of law. The institute recognizes that these programs create the mutual trust and confidence that lead to international peace and security.

On that rainy night in Romania, Colonel Didoiu said something I have heard in many other countries: "So, now we can make plans for a seminar next year." Once more, important relationships had been maintained, U.S. foreign policy goals had been advanced, and a developing democracy had been given assistance through the efforts of an organization that prides itself on making a difference in a changing world. ●

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## SYMPOSIUM ON EAST ASIA SECURITY: FOSTERING REGIONAL CONFIDENCE

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*By John E. Lundin*



*The annual Symposium on East Asia Security, an intensive program for security and defense officials from the Asia-Pacific region, offers participants the opportunity to share perspectives on security issues of importance to their nations, says John E. Lundin, senior U.S. adviser for the program. The three-week symposium, sponsored by the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the Department of State, begins in Hawaii and then travels to two or three Asian nations. The initiative seeks “to identify emerging issues in regional security and areas of future cooperation among nations of the region,” says Lundin, Public Diplomacy Adviser, USPACOM.*

On an idyllic Hawaiian day in May 1999, 21 military officers and security specialists from 16 Asia-Pacific nations and the United States met in Honolulu on the island of Oahu, which is nicknamed “the gathering place,” to participate in the Symposium on East Asia Security. This annual three-week program, sponsored jointly by the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) and the U.S. Department of State, begins in Hawaii and then resumes in two or three Asian countries. An excellent example of peacetime military engagement, the symposium is one of the many ways USPACOM works toward the peacetime goal of making conflicts and crises less likely.

Three weeks after their first meeting in Hawaii, the 21 officials came together again on the deck of the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge at Yokosuka, Japan, for a remembrance photograph with their Navy hosts. They had shared many common experiences while traveling as a group, eating together, participating in many briefings, and visiting military facilities during their program. But, most importantly, they had listened to and questioned each other.

The 17 nations represented were: China, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Australia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and the United States. Each participant brought to the symposium his or her own country’s view of security issues in the region. And all of them carried away not only a better understanding of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific, but a broader perception of

security issues from a regional perspective and a better comprehension of the security concerns of their Asia-Pacific neighbors.

At the start of the symposium all of the military officers and civilian security specialists presented “country reports” in which they shared the security concerns of their nations. The informality and hospitality of Hawaii provided the perfect setting for helping the participants to start communicating with each other and begin frank and stimulating discussion. During the course of the symposium, which was reconvened in the Republic of Korea and Japan after the opening session in Hawaii, participants examined security from the perspectives of the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as from the viewpoints of the other countries represented by the participants. They explored the interrelationships of economic, political, social, and environmental factors, and also traditional and non-traditional threats. They listened to U.S. and host-nation views on the U.S. presence in the region and saw for themselves the forward deployment of U.S. forces in the Pacific.

As a result of the symposium, participants forged another important bond that stretches over the vast Pacific and the islands and continents of Asia: They became part of a network of security policy-makers who know each other and are able to consult in times of peace or times of crisis. Although the participants certainly did not conclude the program in complete agreement with each other on every issue, they began a dialogue that would continue long after their return home.





*Members of SEAS 99 pose with Navy hosts on the deck of the USS Blue Ridge at Yokosuka Navy Base in Japan.*

The Symposium on East Asia Security, often simply called SEAS, was first held in 1986 with 17 participants from nine countries, including the United States. During the past 14 years, as many as 19 countries and 28 participants have taken part in the annual symposium. To date, SEAS has an alumni of 292 professionals in 24 nations in the Asia-Pacific region. The intensive three-week program is designed for Asia-Pacific security and defense professionals, both military and civilian, who are in — or will enter — policy-making positions. The United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan — and usually a fourth country — are included on the program agenda. In the past the fourth stop often has been Singapore. The program allows participants to experience a visit to the DMZ (demilitarized zone) on the Korean Peninsula and to view firsthand forward-deployed U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea and Japan, thereby offering them the occasion to witness the U.S. commitment and capabilities in the region. Equally important during these visits is the opportunity to consult with host-nation defense officials and foreign ministry officials and to engage in discussions with representatives of security think tanks in the host countries.

In keeping with the desire to stimulate frank and open discussion, the program is conducted informally, and all sessions are off-the-record. Uniforms are not worn and protocol is kept to a minimum. The 1999 group included very senior officials at the defense ministerial level, who were met at airports along the way by senior embassy and consular officials. But the symposium's camaraderie was such that these high-level officials opted to stay with the group and ride with them in the buses that had been provided rather than in the

embassy sedans that had been offered for the officials' private use.

The agenda for the 1999 symposium illustrates the substantive and diverse activities that the SEAS program involves. In Hawaii, the symposium began with briefings by senior commanders at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, USPACOM, and at the headquarters of the component commands — Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Participants also visited ships at Pearl Harbor and witnessed Marine demonstrations at Kaneohe Bay. Important aspects of the program were roundtable discussions on regional security issues at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu and a special session on traditional and non-traditional security issues, presented by James Kelly, president of the Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), and retired Navy Admiral Eric McVadon.

In view of diminishing traditional political boundaries and the impact of globalization, exploration early in the symposium of the wide-ranging issues that affect a nation's security planning — especially such issues as environmental and humanitarian concerns — was particularly useful to set the stage for later discussions. But the symposium was not all work, and the participants attended various social functions, including a Hawaiian luau or feast to sample the unique cultural traditions of Hawaii.

The trip to the Republic of Korea is always a key event in the symposium. Hosted by Republic of Korea and U.S. officials, symposium members visited military bases, think tanks, and the DMZ, making stops at



Panmunjom and an infiltration tunnel that had been built under the DMZ by the North Koreans. The heavily fortified DMZ always brings home the reality of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the potential horrors of conflict, often not fully appreciated in more distant parts of the Asia-Pacific region. During roundtable sessions in Seoul at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, the multinational composition of the symposium provided differing perspectives and very useful discussion for both the participants and their Korean hosts.

The final leg of the 1999 SEAS symposium was the visit to Japan, whose security alliance with the United States remains crucial to stability in the region. In both Japan and the Republic of Korea, symposium members met with the U.S. ambassadors who serve there for a review of U.S. security relations with the two countries and U.S. perspectives on regional issues. A highlight for the group was a briefing and lunch on board the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship USS Blue Ridge, where participants learned more about the role of U.S. forward-deployed forces in maintaining peace and stability in the region. Japan's efforts to build a more stable region were spotlighted in discussions at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) with

officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Defense Agency, and JIIA. At the National Institute for Defense Studies, discussions focused on the Korean Peninsula and the implications for Japan.

One of the highlights of the 1999 symposium was a Cooperative Decision-Making Game in which the participants took part while in Japan. They were divided into teams and presented with a hypothetical crisis that involved the nations of the region in a situation that required international cooperation to resolve. The extent of the participants' engagement in the problem-solving process, their thoughtful approach, and their ideas impressed all of the coordinators, especially the staff of the Gaming and Simulation Division of USPACOM, who conducted the exercise.

The Symposium on East Asia Security is one example of how USPACOM seeks to lessen the potential for conflicts and crises. Through this and other engagement programs, including those of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the command is working to identify emerging issues in regional security and areas of future cooperation among nations of the region. If initiatives like SEAS can help strengthen confidence and security among nations, the Asia-Pacific community will benefit and prosper. ©



*Republic of Korea Army officers lead SEAS 99 members on a tour across Freedom Bridge at Imjingak, South Korea.*

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## BRIGHT STAR EXERCISE IN EGYPT IMPROVES READINESS AMONG COALITION FORCES

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*By Captain Paula Jones*



*The Bright Star multinational training exercise — the largest of its kind in the world — “increases regional stability and provides opportunities to enhance military cooperation among Egypt, the United States, and other coalition countries with mutual interests,” says U.S. Army Captain Paula Jones. Bright Star 99/00, organized by the U.S. Central Command, includes a computer-aided command post exercise conducted in conjunction with a field exercise involving tactical air, ground, naval, and special operations forces. The combined coalition force is more than 70,000 troops and includes participants from 11 countries: Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States, says Jones, a media relations officer for Bright Star 99/00.*

The history of Bright Star is very rich and impressive. After Egypt signed the 1978 Camp David Accords, members of the U.S. Armed Forces began training side-by-side with their Egyptian military counterparts in the Egyptian desert. This small unit training evolved into an annual summer exercise known as Bright Star. It began in the summer of 1980 as a single service bilateral ground maneuver event, with only ground forces of the U.S. and Egyptian armies initially participating in the training. Bright Star in 1981 was a similar bilateral ground maneuver exercise, although the number of participating troops increased significantly. Due to the growing numbers of participating troops and the logistical demands, Bright Star became a biennial event starting in 1983.

In 1985, the United States and Egypt added the air force to complement the ground forces in Bright Star, and special forces and naval forces from both countries joined in 1987. Beginning in 1989, Bright Star was held in the fall, instead of the summer, to accommodate the fiscal year which begins on October 1. In 1991, U.S. forces were committed to the Persian Gulf region for the Gulf War, and, as a result, Bright Star did not take place in 1992. However the exercise resumed in 1994 and was larger and better than ever. Bright Star 1996 marked the first time that countries other than the United States and Egypt joined the exercise. The new participants that year included France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates, and, in 1998, Kuwait was added to the nations taking part in the exercise.

Bright Star 99/00 — the eleventh in the series and the most significant — is setting the foundation for future ambitious coalition operations. The coalition has increased with the addition of the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Jordan and now includes the armed forces of 11 nations and more than 70,000 troops. Thirty-three observer countries also are represented. While these countries do not have troops actively participating in Bright Star, they all have representatives on site to learn and see how the coalition operates. The nations with observer status are: Algeria, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, China, Congo, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Bright Star consists of three main segments: affiliation training, a computer-aided command post exercise, and a field training exercise. Affiliation training includes small unit training to familiarize participants with equipment, tactics, and training procedures in preparation for the field training exercise. The computer-aided command post exercise is designed to test the coalition leadership's command-and-control standard operating procedures at the operational level of war. The field training exercise is designed to practice coalition staff coordination with troops. The focus of this year's training is to improve readiness and interoperability among U.S., Egyptian, and other coalition forces.



*A U.S. Marine Corps KC-130 refueler deployed from Fort Worth, Texas, flies over the Great Pyramids of Giza, Egypt, during Bright Star 99/00 on October 25, 1999.*

There are several training exercise events during Bright Star, and the largest joint coalition event is the Amphibious Assault Demonstration. In October 1999 six amphibious units from Egypt, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in the demonstration, forming the Combined Amphibious Task Force commanded by Commodore Niall Kilgour, Royal Navy, United Kingdom. They received support from surface and air elements from five other nations.

The coalition forces trained together for a little over a week to conduct this precise demonstration by sea, air, and land units. It began with an inflatable raiding craft launch from amphibious units at sea as Egyptian F-16s soared overhead engaging French Mirage 2000 aircraft representing hostile intruders. The forces began their beach landing with Egyptian Rangers, Naval Special Operations Forces from the Egyptian Navy, and forces

from the U.K./Netherlands Landing Force hitting the sand, first, to carry out reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition. Close air support followed the landing with Harrier aircraft from the U.S. Marine Corps' 22nd MEU (SOC) (Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable) from the USS BATAAN. Then, aviation patrols with a pair of AH-1W (Huey) Cobra helicopters swept in from the 22nd MEU (SOC), followed by a Gazelle Light Observation helicopter and a Lynx TOW armed helicopter from the U.K./Netherlands Air Force.

It was then time to prepare the defense. The Royal UK and Netherlands Marines flew in on Royal Navy and Air Force helicopters, and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) flew in a platoon of Marines from the 22nd MEU (SOC) on CH-46 Sea Knights. The coalition efforts were in full swing as an Egyptian Airborne platoon was inserted by a USMC CH-53 Sea Stallion.

Finally, Italian soldiers of the San Marco Battalion and Greek Marines flew in on Italian Agusta 212s. The surface assault followed with U.S. combat rubber raiding craft and Italian and U.K. rigid raiding craft unleashing Greek, Italian, U.K. and U.S. forces from the sea. They were followed by a platoon of Egyptian Airborne Troops hitting the beach from a pair of British Landing Craft Vehicles from the helicopter carrier HMS OCEAN.

With the beach and immediate surrounding area secure, a wave of American and Egyptian Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) landed. As the demonstration neared completion, several U.S. Navy Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs) parted the waters making huge water sprays. The LCACs hovered to the beach amidst a sandy cloud and revealed Egyptian M-60A3 Main Battle Tanks onboard ready to hit the beach. Finally, a USMC M-1A1 Abrams Tank completed the initial deployment of combat power in the assault.

Addressing a press conference at the conclusion of the masterfully coordinated demonstration, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said: “What you saw today was a strong statement, a chorus of nations from the U.S. to Egypt, from Jordan to Kuwait and the U.A.E. These are nations building prosperity for their people, not palaces for their armies.”

“One country that is not represented here today,” Cohen declared, “should pay close attention to what Bright Star represents....Saddam Hussein remains an outlaw in his own neighborhood.”

Bright Star’s purpose is to help with coalition-building. It is designed to bring together a coalition of military forces and build better understanding, friendship, and cooperation through realistic training exercise scenarios, a computer-aided command post exercise, and in-depth affiliation training created to familiarize coalition forces with personnel, equipment, and tactics of the participating nations. The exercise also increases regional stability and provides opportunities to enhance military cooperation among Egypt, the United States, and other coalition countries with mutual interests. Finally, Bright Star provides military forces at all levels with unique opportunities to strengthen military relationships and gain experience through training with coalition counterparts. The exercise also increases awareness and appreciation for host nation and coalition forces’ cultures, customs, and professional military procedures. ©

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## U.S. COAST GUARD'S PEACETIME MISSIONS HAVE GLOBAL REACH

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*By Daniel Wartko*



*The U.S. Coast Guard's increasing global role in peacetime engagement takes the agency from the Arctic to the Tropics, from the Caribbean region to the Bering Sea, and to Europe, Africa, and Asia. In the following article, Daniel Wartko, International Policy Specialist, Office of the Coast Guard Commandant, discusses the Coast Guard's wide-ranging international activities and how it works with other nations to prevent conflict, promote democracy, enhance regional stability, and contribute to economic prosperity. Wartko outlines Coast Guard programs to aid Haiti in developing a national coast guard, to help Black Sea nations develop maritime standards, and to encourage discussion with nations in the Middle East on cooperative search and rescue operations and other maritime safety issues.*

Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has promoted U.S. security with its distinctive blend of humanitarian, civilian law enforcement, diplomatic, and military capabilities. The Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service within the Department of Transportation and is one of the five U.S. Armed Services.

The Coast Guard's unique civil-military character enables it to work effectively with a wide spectrum of international organizations and foreign governments. With military, law enforcement, and humanitarian missions, the Coast Guard is well suited to promote conflict prevention efforts around the world and is a valuable asset available for use by U.S. foreign policy and national security policy planners.

The Coast Guard's international engagement promotes democracy, builds trust and friendship among former adversaries, and contributes to economic prosperity. More than 40 of the world's 70 naval forces are, in essence, coast guards. As such, our forces and missions closely resemble those of many host nations' navies. This enables us to interact with a larger and more diverse number of foreign agencies.

The Coast Guard carefully coordinates its international efforts to ensure that its limited resources are best used to achieve U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. It is within this framework that the Coast Guard operates overseas and engages internationally for

the benefit of the United States and to execute Coast Guard missions. Plans are integrated with the other military services through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and regional Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). Coast Guard efforts in support of the CINCs are integrated into their respective Theater Engagement Plans.

The Coast Guard cooperates with nations around the world in a number of peacetime missions including efforts to save lives and property at sea, interdict illegal drugs, help the victims of floods and storms, protect the marine environment, provide a safe and efficient maritime transportation system, enforce laws and treaties, and defend maritime borders. Following are highlights of some of those efforts:

### **THE MODEL MARITIME SERVICE CODE — A COMMON COAST GUARD STANDARD**

In 1994, the Coast Guard developed the Model Maritime Service Code (MMSC) as a standard for nations that want to create or improve their maritime services. Many countries request Coast Guard training or equipment to help them address maritime problems. However many of these countries lack an adequate legal structure for their services. For example, some countries were requesting training in maritime law enforcement boarding procedures even though they lacked the legal authority to conduct these activities. The Coast Guard realized that without an adequate legal framework, training and material assistance would not produce sustainable benefits.



The MMSC contains draft generic legislation that is modeled on the U.S. Coast Guard's authority. It describes the fundamental legal authority that a maritime force requires to function effectively as a military service, a law enforcement organization, and a regulatory agency, and it guides nations to base their laws upon existing international norms. By promoting a common maritime service standard around the world, the Coast Guard helps reduce the chances of conflict between neighboring nations. It also promotes cooperation among maritime services by developing agencies with similar mandates and jurisdictions.

For example, the Coast Guard has provided MMSC assistance to the Black Sea nations in an attempt to encourage them to develop compatible maritime standards. Representatives from Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia have attended MMSC seminars during which they were able to develop personal connections as they discussed common challenges. As of December 1999, the Coast Guard has worked with eight countries to help them implement the MMSC standards for their own use.

#### **BUILDING TRUST IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

Since 1997 the Coast Guard, the lead U.S. agency in maritime and search and rescue operations, has supported the annual Middle East Maritime Safety Colloquium (MARSAF). The primary objective of MARSAF is to engage the nations of the Middle East in discussions related to search and rescue cooperation and other maritime safety issues. As a confidence- and security-building effort, this colloquium fosters cooperation on an issue with universal appeal — saving lives at sea — and lays the groundwork for future cooperation.

In November 1999, the Royal Jordanian Navy hosted MARSAF, which was attended by Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the Palestinian Authority, and Qatar. MARSAF has helped Jordan and Israel coordinate their cooperative efforts in search and rescue, and the colloquium led to the establishment of a joint Israel-Jordan Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) located on the border between the two nations. The RCC is the communications center for all search and rescue efforts in the region.

By encouraging other types of cooperation — for example, the development of a regional coastal management system — the United States hopes to create ties that will help combat the potential for future conflict among regional parties. Support in one area, such as search and rescue, leads directly to cooperation in others, including environmental protection and vessel navigation services. The MARSAF organizers hope to build on this existing cooperation to improve marine environmental protection and maritime safety in the Middle East — whether in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf. The Coast Guard is prepared to continue support for MARSAF as it expands into such areas as sub-standard commercial shipping and law enforcement issues including piracy.



*The U.S. Coast Guard rescues Haitian migrants in 1994.*

#### **HAITIAN COAST GUARD DEVELOPMENT**

Following the international intervention in Haiti that helped restore the elected government in 1994, the Coast Guard was asked to help Haiti develop the Haitian Coast Guard as part of that country's National Police. The political instability in Haiti had many causes, and its effects were felt throughout the region, as thousands of refugees fled to other nations in the Caribbean region. But the Haitian people suffered most intensely as a result of the collapse of governmental institutions, the lack of civilian oversight of the Haitian military, and devastating poverty.

By assisting in the development of the Haitian Coast Guard, the United States endeavored to develop a functioning government agency, with civilian oversight, that could address the maritime problems faced by Haiti. Working with the Canadian Coast Guard, the

U.S. Coast Guard has provided the Haitian Coast Guard with training and material assistance. The U.S. Coast Guard provides basic and intermediate training that focuses on maintaining a multi-mission maritime force; the long-term success of the Haitian Coast Guard requires the development of a cadre of mid-management. The U.S. Coast Guard trains Haitian Coast Guard personnel in schools in the United States, hosts Haitian Coast Guard officers as ship riders aboard U.S. Coast Guard cutters, and provides on-the-job training that they can use upon returning to Haiti. The United States also has provided the Haitian Coast Guard with patrol boats and other equipment and facilities needed to accomplish its mission.



*A U.S. Coast Guard helicopter crew practices hoist operations with the crew of the Haitian Coast Guard boat Marie C. Jeune.*

As a result of this program, Haiti has a functioning coast guard that already has conducted successful operations in search and rescue — saving more than 80 lives in 1998 — and maritime law enforcement. The Haitian Coast Guard also stands as a model of good government service for Haiti. By enforcing safety regulations, it is promoting the growth of maritime commerce in Haiti.

## CONCLUSION

As the world shrinks with advances in telecommunications and trade, the Coast Guard's national security role will continue to grow in relevance and importance. Growth in trade will continue as the world's economies become more closely linked, and this will lead to increases in both legitimate shipping and illicit trade.

As we enter the next millennium, swift and decisive multinational action will be needed in response to growing transnational threats. International solutions that have a significant maritime law enforcement component will be needed to combat drug-trafficking, arms smuggling, and money laundering. And in response to the ever present threat of terrorism — both international and domestic — the Coast Guard must be prepared to protect the ports and waterways along the 67,200 kilometers of U.S. coastline. In addition, there will be increased pressure on fisheries stocks worldwide and a greater demand to protect those stocks and the maritime environment that supports them.

The Coast Guard will be called upon in the future to continue its support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Whether in the daily conduct of Coast Guard missions or in military engagement, the United States Coast Guard stands *Semper Paratus* — Always Ready — to support and defend the interests of Americans and fulfill its role as a unique instrument of national security. ●

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*This article reflects the opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the position or policies of the U.S. Coast Guard.*

*Preventing Conflict: Military Engagement in Peacetime*  
ARTICLE ALERT

Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM Staff. SINGAPORE AIR FORCE PILOTS TRAIN IN U.S. SKIES (Asia-Pacific Defense FORUM, Summer 1999, pp. 24-30)

Over the past 10 years, the United States has provided the Republic of Singapore Air Force with a degree of training integration with U.S. Air Force combat squadrons that has fostered “a very close relationship between the two air forces,” the authors say. They note that the program — which includes training in weapons and tactics, air refueling procedures, search and rescue, and aircraft maintenance — is “a reflection of a larger picture of defense cooperation between the U.S. and Singapore.”

Collins, John. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN PEACETIME (Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 21, Spring 1999, pp. 56-61)

Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven to be of such tremendous value for security situations “short of war” that there is a tendency on the part of the U.S. military to overextend them, the author alleges. SOF, who are proficient in foreign languages and cross-cultural skills, are “ideally suited for many missions which conventional forces cannot perform as effectively or economically in the twilight zone between peace and war,” Collins writes. Because of their specialized skills and training, he says, they help shape the international security environment, prepare for an uncertain future, and respond precisely when assigned to missions ranging from unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, and counter-narcotics to inhibiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Collins notes that foreign internal defense operations, facilitated by SOF, help counter the effects of poverty, ignorance, and lawlessness.

Gray-Briggs, Abigail; MacIver, Michael. BOMBS, THEN BANDAGES (Airpower Journal, vol. 13, no. 2, Summer 1999, pp. 15-26)

Increasingly, U.S. armed forces are being called upon to participate in noncombat actions around the world. This new direction is known as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) — operations that require distinctly different behaviors and mindsets than traditional warfighting. In order for American soldiers to make this military cross-cultural transformation, they must be given the proper education, training, and preparation. This article is currently available on the Internet at:

“<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/sum99/briggs.html>”.

Groves, John R., Jr. PFP AND THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: FOSTERING ENGAGEMENT AND PROGRESS (Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Spring 1999, pp. 43-53)

Groves describes the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP), which was established to link the national guard units of various U.S. states with Partnership for Peace nations following the fall of the Soviet empire. The program has since expanded into Central and South America and Central Asia.

The SPP’s objectives include assisting in the development of democratic institutions, fostering open market economies to promote stability, and representing U.S. humanitarian values. In each host country, the Army National Guard maintains liaison teams that can assist in a variety of initiatives, such as promoting civilian control of the military and instilling a respect for human rights and the rule of law.

While using National Guard forces for peacetime foreign policy objectives may be beneficial, the author contends, the U.S. military must not lose its primary warfighting ability. If troops are used excessively in peace operations, he asserts, their military skills will atrophy and equipment will deteriorate.

Kitfield, James. THE STEPCCHILD STEPS OUT (National Journal, vol. 31, issue 40, October 2, 1999, pp. 2816-2817)

Kitfield interviewed Coast Guard Commandant James Loy to learn more about the recent dramatic growth in the mission profile of his agency, America’s fifth armed service. During the past five years, the Coast Guard has seen a significant increase in its role of enforcing fisheries legislation, controlling alien migration at sea, and interdicting drug traffickers. “Overseas, its ships routinely operate alongside Navy vessels to enforce maritime embargoes,” Kitfield adds. Nonetheless the Coast Guard, in spite of its “significant law enforcement and national security roles...finds itself under severe budgetary strain,” he says.

*The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered on the International Home Page of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State: “<http://www.usia.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html>”.*



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## *Preventing Conflict: Military Engagement in Peacetime*

### KEY INTERNET SITES

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*Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.*

#### **MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies  
<http://www.apcss.org/>

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, National Defense University  
<http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/indexmain.html>

Expanded International Military Education and Training (E-IMET)  
<http://www.ciponline.org/facts/eimet.htm>

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies  
[http://www.marshallcenter.org/table\\_of\\_contents.htm](http://www.marshallcenter.org/table_of_contents.htm)

Inter-American Air Forces Academy  
<http://www.lackland.af.mil/iaafa/english/main.htm>

International Fellows Program, National Defense University  
<http://www3.ndu.edu/if/homepage.htm>

International Military Education and Training (IMET)  
<http://www.ciponline.org/facts/imet.htm>

Naval Justice School  
<http://www.npt.navy.mil/commands/ju/>

Security Assistance Training Field Activity  
<http://www-satfa.monroe.army.mil/satfa.htm>

#### **REGIONAL COOPERATION**

African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)  
<http://www.eucom.mil/programs/acri/index.htm>

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