Congress and Arms Control

Members of the 106th Congress hold a wide range of views on the role of arms control in U.S. national security and on the advisability of individual arms control agreements.

Several factors help shape those views. First, the demise of the Soviet Union reduced both the level of interest and the priority given to arms control as a component of U.S.-Russian relations and as a contributor to nuclear stability. Second, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, along with a sense that the United States is facing growing challenges from regional adversaries and rogue nations, have led many in Congress to conclude that military responses or economic sanctions, not negotiated limits on arms, can better address the emerging threats to U.S. security. Finally, many Republican Members who have held positions of leadership since 1995 opposed arms control efforts during the Cold War and remain suspicious of arms control. Consequently, only a relatively small number of Members focus on formal arms control agreements, and a growing proportion of that small number tends to view these agreements as detrimental to U.S. security interests.

Senate Consideration of Treaties

The U.S. Constitution states that the President "shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." Currently, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the only arms control treaty awaiting advice and consent in the Senate. President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate in September 1997. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, a North Carolina Republican, has refused to schedule hearings on the treaty. He and other critics consider the treaty to be unverifiable, harmful to the U.S. nuclear stockpile and U.S. national security, and irrelevant to nuclear nonproliferation efforts because nations seeking their own nuclear weapons could simply refuse to sign the treaty. (India and Pakistan are frequently cited as examples.)

Several Senators who support the CTBT recently called for action and vowed to press the Senate leadership to move the treaty forward. This group argues that a ban on nuclear testing will serve U.S. interests by slowing nuclear proliferation, and they fear the United States will not act in time to participate in the September 1999 conference that will consider how to bring the treaty into force. It is unclear at this time whether 67 Senators would consent to ratification of the CTBT.

Senator Helms stated, in a January 1998 letter to President Clinton, that he would not address the CTBT until the Senate had a chance to debate the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements, which were signed in September 1997. These amendments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty require the advice and consent of the Senate for ratification. The Agreed Statements on Demarcation outline the dividing line between theater missile defense systems, which are not limited by the ABM Treaty, and strategic ballistic missile defense systems, which are limited by the ABM Treaty. The Memorandum of Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty.

The Clinton administration has stated that it will submit these agreements, along with a protocol to the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), to the Senate after the Russian parliament approves START II, something it has so far refused to do. But Senator Helms would like to address these agreements immediately, in part because he reportedly believes their defeat would cement the demise of the ABM Treaty. Many in Congress believe that this treaty stands in the way of U.S. efforts to deploy a nationwide ballistic missile defense system to protect against long-range missiles from rogue nations or regional adversaries. They also argue that the ABM Treaty expired when the Soviet Union disbanded. Others, however, argue that the ABM Treaty continues to serve U.S. national security interests, contributes to stability between the United States and Russia, and permits deeper reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Many observers believe the new agreements would not muster the necessary two-thirds vote, so the ABM Treaty could falter if a vote were held in the 106th Congress.

Authorizing Legislation

Congress also evaluates arms control agreements and their effects on U.S. security when it authorizes and appropriates funds for U.S. military programs and arms control implementation. It frequently requests reports from the administration on the implications of existing or potential arms control agreements. For example, in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Bill, the Congress has requested a report on the advantages of a two-site national missile defense system, which, if deployed, would require amendments to the ABM Treaty. It has also requested a report on the effects that a prospective START III Treaty, which might reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces to around 2,000 to 2,500 warheads, might have on strategic stability between the United States and Russia and between the United States and other potential nuclear adversaries, such as China.

The 106th Congress also has legislated how the United States should structure its strategic nuclear forces while it awaits Russian ratification of START II. For the past several years, Congress has mandated that the United States maintain its forces at START I levels until START II enters into force; specifically, it has precluded the use of any funds to dismantle systems that would otherwise be retained under START I. But this restriction could require large expenditures for the Navy to refuel, modify, and retain four Trident submarines, for a total of 18, that it would otherwise dismantle under START II. Hence, this year, the Congress would permit the Defense Department to eliminate those submarines before START II enters into force if the President certifies that this would not undermine the U.S. deterrent or arms control efforts.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 and the 105th Congress passed implementing legislation for this treaty in October 1998. Some observers had expected the 106th Congress to revisit this legislation. The implementing legislation sets the requirements for the chemical weapons and production facilities the United States must declare under the CWC and outlines civil and criminal penalties for activities that violate the convention. But it also would permit the United States to block, on national security grounds, challenge inspections for verification and would prohibit sending chemical samples outside the United States for analysis. Treaty supporters argue that these provisions could place the United States in violation of the CWC, and many hoped Congress would alter them. The 106th Congress has not yet addressed any legislation dealing with the CWC. President Clinton issued an Executive Order implementing the existing legislation on June 25, 1999. Because the United States has been slow to implement the CWC, many observers argue that the United States is not in compliance with the convention.

Additional Arms Control Items

The Senate consented to ratification of the START II Treaty in January 1996; it will also have to vote on the ratification of the protocol that extends the treaty's elimination period -- the time available to both sides to draw down their deployed warheads to START II levels -- when the President submits that document for Senate consideration.

The United States has not signed the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines. In May 1999, however, the Senate consented to the ratification of the Amended Mines Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which tightens humanitarian constraints on the use of landmines.

Verification protocols to the Biological Weapons Convention and a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty remain under discussion in international fora, but they do not yet appear on the Senate's agenda.

Most international arms control issues have generated little attention or debate in the 106th Congress. Some vocal Members believe that certain agreements could possibly harm U.S. security interests. Some Members also argue that the United States would be better served by taking unilateral actions, such as building ballistic missile defenses or imposing sanctions on nations that contribute to proliferation concerns, than by participating in diplomatic efforts to limit emerging threats to the United States. Hence, although many Members continue to support arms control efforts, they may have difficulty mustering the broad and deep support needed to win approval for far-reaching new agreements that would limit U.S. military capabilities.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect positions held by the Congressional Research Service or the Library of Congress.