Noting that the Agreed Framework with North Korea "may not survive 1999," the authors propose a conventional arms reduction treaty loosely based on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The proposal calls for a suspension of North Korea's missile tests, complete compliance with the nuclear reactor agreement, and creation of a mechanism for on-site inspections. In return, Pyongyang would receive significant economic aid over a five-to-ten-year period (mostly from Japan), and U.S. sanctions would be lifted.

Graeves, Rebecca K. RUSSIA'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT (Orbis, vol. 43, issue 3, pp. 479-492)

There is evidence of ongoing research and development in the area of bacteriological weapons in Russia, says Graeves. She cites the possible export to Iraq and Iran of materials that may be used in biological weapons production and the danger of defection by Russian scientists with BW expertise to rogue regimes. The United States must "verify once and for all the termination" of Russia's biological weapons program and force its dismantling, if necessary, by invoking Article VI of the BWC, she says.

Krepon, Michael. MISSILE DEFENSE: NOT SUCH A BAD IDEA (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 55, no. 3, May/June 1999, pp. 31-33)

The end of the Cold War has brought with it a change in nuclear realities that Krepon argues should also change the terms of debate on the deployment of limited national missile defense systems. Krepon says such systems could, in fact, "foster alliance cohesion, reinforce nonproliferation regimes, and counter coercive threats." He then seeks to refute the arguments of those opposed to such systems, concluding that "the crux of the problem...is an unchallenged, Cold War nuclear theology" that continues "to undermine efforts for deep cuts as well as effective defenses."

Parachini, John V.; Birmingham, Tom. THE CTBT SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON ENTRY INTO FORCE (The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 6, no. 3, Spring/Summer 1999, pp. 108-121)

The upcoming Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Entry Into Force (EIF) Special Conference is designed to "kick-start" the EIF process by raising the treaty on the global priority list, the authors say. However, "making the conference a success will require making wise choices about venue, participants, alternative routes to EIF, and measures to broaden norms concerning nuclear weapons."

A Report of the Committee on Nuclear Policy. JUMP-START: RETAKING THE INITIATIVE TO REDUCE POST-COLD WAR DANGERS (Arms Control Today, vol. 29, January/February 1999, pp. 15-19)

The Committee on Nuclear Policy (CNP), in this report, asserts that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) process "must be augmented with immediate, parallel, and reciprocal actions" to directly address the new nuclear realities of the post-Cold War period. The committee urges the Clinton administration to reduce nuclear forces to levels far lower than currently envisioned under a START III treaty. It also calls on the United States to "begin discussions among the five nuclear weapon states on verifiably removing all nuclear forces from hair-trigger alert."

Weiss, Kenneth G. DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY: THE UNITED STATES, NONPROLIFERATION, AND SOUTH ASIA (Comparative Strategy, vol. 18, no. 2, April/June 1999, pp. 137-151)

Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan presents both dangers and opportunities for the United States in South Asia, says Weiss. One danger is that "India and Pakistan could become sources for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related missile technology for other countries." This crisis, however, also creates opportunities for the United States to resolve festering nonproliferation problems in South Asia, strengthen nonproliferation and related export control regimes, and renew emphasis on arms control arrangements, he says.

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