Experts have identified the threat of so-called "loose nukes" -- nuclear warheads or fissile material that might slip out of government control -- as "one of the leading dangers of our time," Holum says. Ensuring that this never happens "will be an extremely complex task," he noted, "requiring us to call upon almost every arms control and non-proliferation tool we have developed over the last 35 years."

U.S. arms control successes have made the world safer. The overriding reality is, however, that we still live in a dangerous world, one still bristling with weapons of mass destruction, the persistent danger of proliferation by rogue regimes, convulsive nationalism, and terrorists. It is a world in which 40 countries now have the technical and material ability to develop nuclear weapons, should they decide to do so; more than 15 nations have at least short-range ballistic missiles -- and many of those are pursuing weapons of mass destruction; and some 20 countries have chemical weapons programs.

In light of these post-Cold War dangers, the United States, as the world's only remaining superpower, must continue making arms control a central element of its foreign policy and national security strategy.

President Clinton, in September 1996, was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty -- perhaps the most sought after goal in the history of arms control. The treaty now boasts almost 150 signatories. It will end nuclear explosive testing for all time.

When he signed the CTBT, the President outlined to the U.N. General Assembly six U.S. arms control and non-proliferation goals. One of them -- Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- already has been achieved. The president also called for a ban on unsafeguarded fissile material production for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, strengthening compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a global ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL), and continued reductions in nuclear weapons.

Chemical Weapons Convention

The Senate gave its consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 as a protection against chemical attack by rogue states and terrorists. The United States continues to call on other nations to sign and ratify the treaty without delay; 95 nations have now done so. Meanwhile, we are destroying our 30,000-ton chemical weapons stockpile, and Russia is committed to destroying its 40,000-ton declared stockpile.

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

We are urging the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would end forever the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom already announced that they have stopped fissile material production for nuclear weapons. An FMCT would lock a ban on production for weapons into place for the nuclear weapons states and threshold states and significantly contribute to the nuclear disarmament process.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a strengthening of the tools needed to ensure compliance with it is another goal cited by the president. This would include new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards such as environmental sampling and access to undeclared facilities. We are urging all nations that have not joined the NPT to do so without delay. Brazil announced in June 1997 that it will become a part of the NPT. Once Brazil joins, only four countries will remain outside this cornerstone of non-proliferation treaties.

Biological Weapons Convention

We also seek the means to enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) through such measures as mandatory declarations and on-site activities. The United States is an active member of the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

The United States is pressing in the CD for swift negotiation of a global ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, which maim or kill some 25,000 people each year. This is a leading priority of the second Clinton term. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues its own moratorium on the production and transfer of APL and urges other nations to join it. The U.S. also urges states that have not yet done so, to ratify the amended landmines protocol (Protocol II) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Nuclear Weapons Reduction

Finally, the United States continues to push for further progress in reducing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. Efforts by both the United States and Russia to dismantle strategic weapon delivery systems such as aircraft and missiles are well ahead of the schedule established under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). For example, limits for deployed strategic weapon delivery vehicles required by December 5, 1999, were met by the beginning of 1997. In addition, separate from START I, the U.S. has eliminated almost 10,000 nuclear warheads since 1990. Russia reports that it, too, is eliminating nuclear warheads. Kazakstan, Belarus, and Ukraine have turned over the thousands of nuclear warheads formerly located in their countries to Russia, and are now free of nuclear weapons.

The follow-on treaty to the START I Treaty -- the START II Treaty -- provides an orderly mechanism for the United States and Russia to dramatically reduce the resources devoted to strategic offensive arms, as well as enhancing stability and security. The U.S. Senate has given its advice and consent on START II; however, the Russian Duma has yet to approve the treaty. President Yeltsin has underscored the importance of the treaty's prompt ratification, and while we cannot predict when the Russian Duma will act, we hope that the Senate's positive vote, as well as the clear benefits START II provides, will encourage the Russian Duma to act in a similar fashion.

Russians workers cut apart pieces of a Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber aircraft for use as scrap material. Destruction of the Tupolev aircraft is part of Russian compliance with the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Credit: Department of Defense photo by R.D.Ward.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin during their March 1997 Helsinki Summit. START III will include reductions in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000 to 2,500 by December 31, 2007. Furthermore, the United States and Russia agreed to ensure that the benefits of the START Treaties are irreversible by seeking to resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration.

Entry into force and implementation of START II and achieving START III will make a major contribution toward the ultimate goal of the United States and all NPT Parties of a world free of nuclear weapons and the threat of war. This process cannot occur overnight, however. The U.S. continues to hold that progress on disarmament can only be accomplished on a step-by-step basis, carefully taking into account the legitimate security concerns of all states.

Also at Helsinki, the two leaders affirmed their nations' commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and confirmed that both sides must have the option to establish and deploy effective theater missile defense systems.

Cooperative Threat Reduction

Through funding provided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (also known as the Nunn-Lugar program because it was proposed by Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn), the United States has helped Russia and the New Independent States transport, safeguard, and destroy their nuclear weapons. For example, the U.S. in currently providing design and construction assistance to Russia for a facility to store safely and securely fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak.

Negotiating and ensuring the elimination of nuclear warheads and their fissile material will be an extremely complex task. The threat of "loose nukes" -- nuclear warheads or fissile material that might slip out of government control -- has been rightly identified by many experts as one of the leading dangers of our time. Ensuring that this never becomes a reality is one of the greatest challenges we face.

There are four essential elements in a global approach to reducing this aspect of the Cold War's legacy. First, states must work cooperatively to stop nuclear smuggling in its tracks and to ensure that all weapons-usable nuclear materials are secure and accounted for. In June 1996, at a nuclear summit in Moscow, participating states agreed on a "Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material," to ensure increased cooperation in all aspects of prevention and detection, exchange of information, investigation, and prosecution. The Moscow Summit also reaffirmed every state's fundamental responsibility to ensure, at the national level, the security of all nuclear materials in its possession -- which includes effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control, as well as physical protection.

Second, states must work together to build security through transparency. Effective monitoring and verification regimes influence compliance by all parties with arms control agreements. Such measures as data exchanges and mutual inspections build confidence in the stability and irreversibility of reductions and ensure control of both warheads and fissile materials. The exchange of such information is not altruism, but a practical necessity to reduce the ambiguity, uncertainty, and ignorance that impedes the prompt completion of nuclear reductions.

Third, we must do everything in our power to prevent excess stockpiling of fissile materials. As mentioned, we should pursue a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, to cut off production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium or plutonium and thus cap the amount available for weapons. The growing accumulation of separated civilian plutonium around the world poses proliferation risks of its own. The United States believes that each nation -- whatever its fuel-cycle choices -- should not accumulate excess stockpiles and should begin reducing these stockpiles over time. The Moscow agreement is heartening in that, at least in the context of managing excess weapons material, the aim is to reduce all stocks of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium through peaceful use of non-explosive, safe and final disposal as soon as practicable.

Fourth, we need to dispose of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium -- both to confirm that arms reductions will never be reversed and to ensure that this material will never fall into the wrong hands. The United States strongly supports the Moscow Summit decision to initiate broad multilateral cooperation to dispose of excess fissile materials. Long-term disposition options are being examined evenhandedly -- taking into account non-proliferation, safety, technical, environmental, and economic factors. However, uncertainty about the ultimate disposition of fissile materials from dismantled weapons must never be an impediment to the prompt completion of nuclear reductions.

Conventional Arms Control

In addition to these arms control priorities, the United States continues to press ahead on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, has resulted in the elimination of more than 51,300 tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters and more than 2,700 on-site inspections. CFE remains the cornerstone of European security and a model for conventional arms control in other regions of the world.

Under the mandate of the 1996 CFE Review Conference, which assessed the treaty's operation and implementation during its first five years, the 30 states parties have begun a process of adapting the treaty to the post-Cold War era. In this process, the U.S. and its NATO allies will ensure that the treaty continues to promote security and stability in Europe. Also, the U.S. will continue its efforts to ensure that arms control in the Balkans is fully complied with and contributes to stability in the entire region. We also need to bolster international efforts to promote transparency and restraint in transfers of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use items.

Regional Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Finally, the United States is intensifying efforts to develop, foster, and support regional confidence- and security-building measures in Eurasia, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and Africa. Regional arms control has become increasingly important in the post-Cold War world as we enter a new international security environment marked by regional instability and tensions generated by political, military, ethnic, and religious antagonisms. One way to enhance U.S. national security and regional stability is to promote adoption of arms control measures worldwide. This is a significant area of future arms control efforts by countries affected by such tension. Such efforts will reduce tension, promote or maintain peace, and remove incentives for arms races or development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The United States has an ambitious agenda. But given the challenges the world faces, an agenda any less ambitious would be less than responsible. We all must do everything we can to ensure that what had been our weapons of last resort become the least accessible weapons in the world.