Introduction
Democracy is based on the notion that a people should be
self-governing and that the representatives of the people should
be held accountable for their actions. The legislature, which
represents the people and acts as their agent, is therefore at
the core of the Western democratic tradition. But what does a
legislature really do, and what role does it play in a democracy?
In a simple sense, a legislature makes laws. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines a legislature as "a body of
persons invested with the power of making the laws of a country
or state." But this definition only begins to address the broad
range of activities and responsibilities performed by a
legislature, and it does not account for the many kinds of
legislatures that exist in the various countries of the world.
This paper will begin by describing the basic functions that
all legislatures in democracies share. It will then show some of
the ways in which legislatures can differ, focusing mainly, but
not exclusively, on the United States Congress and the British
Parliament, which have served as models for many of the world's
legislatures. These differences involve the form of the
legislature, the role of the majority and opposition parties, the
role of outside groups, and internal organization.
For any democracy, deciding how to form the legislature, how
to elect its members, what powers to invest in it (and in the
other branches of government), how to provide rights and channels
of expression for minority parties, and how to organize its
internal functions and deliberations are crucial issues in
determining how the government, and the democracy, will function.
There are no simple or universal answers to any of these
questions, because cultural considerations, historical
experiences, and political realities affect the evolution and
development of legislative bodies. Some countries work best with
at-large election systems; others work best with geographically
confined, single-member districts. Some legislatures have a
strong role in foreign policy; others, no role at all. Some have
well-developed and defined committee systems; others have no
sophisticated division of labor. Some have two parties; others,
many parties. But one thing is clear: no country can long have a
workable democracy--with voices of opposition, accountable
government, and adequate avenues for citizens to be
heard--without a vibrant and meaningful legislature and
legislative process.
What Legislatures Do
Although legislatures are known primarily as lawmaking
bodies, it is important to recognize that these institutions have
many other important responsibilities. Despite what the
dictionary says, legislatures are not the only governmental
bodies that make and implement laws. Those in positions of
executive authority, courts of law, and bureaucracies may at
times perform these same functions. What is it then that
distinguishes legislatures?
The first and foremost characteristic of a legislature is
its intrinsic link to the citizens of the nation or
state--representation. As John Stuart Mill wrote in 1862,
in a representative democracy the legislature acts as the eyes,
ears, and voice of the people: "[T]he proper office of a
representative assembly is to watch and control the government:
to throw the light of publicity on its acts, to compel a full
exposition and justification of all of them which any one
considers questionable; to censure them if found
condemnable....In addition to this, the Parliament has an
office...to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances, and
its Congress of Opinions."
In addition to gaining their legitimacy by representing the
public will, legislatures have other distinguishing features.
For instance, most consist of a rather large group of individuals
who come together, at least in theory, as equals. While some
members may assume leadership positions or special
responsibilities, each member's vote is customarily weighed
equally. Thus, legislatures operate under a system of
collective decision making.
Legislatures adopt policies and make laws through the
process of deliberation. While usually based on some broad set
of principles contained in written and unwritten constitutions,
decisions need not proceed from the rule of law or specific legal
precedents. In this way legislatures differ from the courts.
In addition to their official lawmaking capacity, most
legislatures perform a unique educational role.
Individual legislators simplify complicated issues and define
policy choices. They use their resources and expertise to filter
information from many sources and to resolve conflicting
ideological positions, ultimately presenting their constituents
with clear-cut options. This educational function has become
increasingly important as societies have become more complex, as
the scope of government activity has become more extensive, and
as the public has gained increased access to legislative
proceedings, particularly via television.
Another defining characteristic of most legislatures is the
dual role of the legislators. On the one hand, the legislature
makes laws that affect the entire nation and are presumably
intended to be for the good of the nation as a whole. On the
other hand, its individual members, the legislators, have a duty
to represent the interests of their individual constituencies.
This inherent tension is unique to representative forms of
government that have districts.
The British House of Commons, like many other parliaments
and like the U.S. Congress, has single-member districts, designed
by geographic boundaries. Other legislatures, like the Dutch,
operate through proportional representation. Members might have
geographically defined districts, but they are chosen through a
national election process where seats are allocated by national
percentage votes for parties. In some systems, a party needs 5
or 10 percent of the votes cast nationwide before it gets seats
in the parliament. In others, only 1 percent is required.
The well-known political theorist and lawmaker Edmund Burke
eloquently expressed the tension between the roles of trustee and
delegate in a speech to his constituents in the city of Bristol
in 1774. Discussing whether a representative should be a
delegate, who simply reflects the views and interests of his
constituency, or be a trustee, who offers his own independent
judgment of what is best for the nation, even if it conflicts
with the interests or desires of his constituency, Burke came
down firmly on the side of the legislator as trustee: "Certainly,
gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and the glory of a
representative, to live in the strictest union, the closest
correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with his
constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him;
their opinions high respect; their business unremitted
attention....But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his
enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any
man, to any set of men living....Parliament is not a congress of
ambassadors from different and hostile interests, which interests
each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other
agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliberative assembly
of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole--where not
local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the
general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.
You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is
not a member of Bristol, but he is a Member of Parliament."
The tension Burke described between the trustee and delegate
roles exists for all legislators. It can be a tension built
around the needs of a smaller geographic constituency versus the
needs of a nation, or around the needs of a narrow ideological or
ethnic group versus the needs of a nation, depending on the base
of representation.
Each country and each legislature has to decide how best to
channel and balance those tensions. If the minimum number of
votes required to gain representation in the legislature is too
low, small and narrow groups can wield inordinate power and the
desires and needs of the majority can suffer. But creating
districts that are too large or holding elections only at the
national level can disenfranchise minority ethnic and interest
groups and leave them feeling powerless and bitter.
The U.S. system was set up the way it was in part as a
reaction against the British parliamentary system. The framers
of the U.S. Constitution derived the concept of representative
government from the social-contract theories of John Locke and
other political philosophers that held that legitimate authority
ought to be based on the consent of the governed. Furthermore,
the nature of colonial society, where there were few if any
claims to hierarchical or hereditary privileges, facilitated a
form of representation based on direct popular election. In
colonial America, there were no claims to royalty, nor were there
clearly drawn lines among social classes. Land ownership was
based more on individual initiative than on wealth or status, and
vast amounts of land were available for the taking. All of these
factors helped to place colonial Americans on relatively equal
footing and contributed to the spirit of self-government and the
ideal of equality.
Over time, members of Congress have acted as trustees for
the nation rather than as direct agents of their constituents.
They most often adopt this role in response to personal
philosophy or the urgency or complexity of a particular issue.
However, their commitment to constituent interests remains
strong, and when issues of local interest arise, members usually
vote accordingly.
Forms of Legislatures
As the brief description of the U.S. system showed, the
characteristics of an individual legislature are often varied and
related to the historical and cultural traditions of a nation or
state. Indeed, legislatures do not exist only in democracies.
They often play a role in nondemocratic regimes as well. One
example is the Supreme Soviet of the former Soviet Union. Such
legislative bodies simply act as rubber stamps for government
policy. They lend legitimacy to the ruling government and
thereby contribute to the stability of the political system as a
whole. They do not serve as a means of popular participation,
direct or indirect, although they do provide an entree into the
upper echelons of government for a select few.
In open, democratic regimes, legislatures take a variety of
forms. One major way in which legislatures can differ concerns
their relationship to the overall political system of which they
are a part. For instance, a legislature may be part of either a
parliamentary system or a system of separated powers--usually
known as a presidential system. This distinction is rooted in a
system's constitution and has a major impact on the role the
legislature is equipped to play.
In a parliamentary system, the executive and the leaders of
the administrative bureaucracies are chosen from and are
accountable to the majority in Parliament. Where separation of
powers is the rule, as in a presidential system (such as that in
the United States), the executive and the cabinet are entirely
separate from the legislative body. Consequently, separate
resources, goals, and responsibilities exist for the legislature.
No one (an exception is the vice president in the U.S. case) can
be a member of both the executive and the legislative branch.
Depending on party dynamics, the two branches can be at odds over
policy priorities and legislative agenda.
The legislature in a parliamentary system is a parliament;
the legislature in a presidential system is a congress.
Although the distinction goes beyond mere names, the names do
reflect some of the differences. As political scientist James Q.
Wilson has pointed out, the root of the word parliament is the
French word "parler" (to talk), whereas the root of the
word congress is the Latin "congressus" (to come together,
or assemble). While most legislatures fall into one or the other
of these categories, the names of individual legislatures are
sometimes misleading. For instance, the Hungarian legislature is
akin to a parliament, yet its name, the National Assembly, might
suggest otherwise. Similarly, in Russia, the word "soviet" means
"council" in English; nonetheless, the legislature is part of a
presidential system.
A parliament's main function is to debate policy. Its core
activity is the question period, during which time members
of the government answer pointed inquiries from members of
parliament, mainly of the opposition. A congress, on the other
hand, has as its main function the passage of laws. It turns
ideas or proposals into public policy through debate, bargaining,
and compromise.
Writing in 1975, Nelson Polsby, a renowned scholar of the
U.S. Congress, put this distinction in a different form. Polsby
argued that legislatures can be separated into two basic types:
arena legislatures and transformative legislatures. Arena
legislatures are forums for discussion of ideas and policies:
"[They] serve as formalized settings for the interplay of
significant political forces in the life of a political system;
the more open the regime the more varied and the more
representative and accountable the forces that find a welcome in
the arena." By contrast, transformative legislatures actively
translate ideas into laws: "[They] possess the independent
capacity, frequently exercised, to mold and transform proposals
from whatever source into laws. The act of transformation is
crucial because it postulates a significance of the internal
structure of legislatures, to the internal division of labor, and
to the policy preferences of various legislators."
The British Parliament is a good example of an arena
legislature. The U.S. Congress is a transformative legislature.
In the British system, the executive/prime minister and the
legislature/Parliament are linked and are necessarily controlled
by the same party. As a result, there is less need or
opportunity for transformative activity in the area of
policymaking. The Parliament is, in essence, an arena where
policies are aired and refined through debate and where conflict
within the bounds of the party, compromise among differing
viewpoints, and entrepreneurial instincts on the part of
individual members are largely absent. Michael Ryle, former
clerk of the British House of Commons, provided an apt
description: "The British Parliament has not exercised power
directly for many, many years. It provides a forum where the
public exercise of power by the government must be portrayed and
displayed....In other words, it is through Parliament that power
is exercised, not by Parliament."
The U.S. Congress, on the other hand, is a much more
activist legislature. Conflict, compromise, and individualism
can all be found in the U.S. legislature. There is constant
give-and-take at work, as inputs from throughout the political
system are transformed into legislative output.
The Role of Political Parties
In Britain, political parties dominate the political system.
A government is formed in Britain when the monarch, at the
request of the sitting prime minister, dissolves the Parliament,
and calls for an election. The election is held, pitting the
prime minister (or the majority leader in Parliament, should the
prime minister decide not to run) against the leader of the
minority party; the winner then has the responsibility of forming
a new government. He or she chooses cabinet members and other
government officials from among the majority party in Parliament.
The government then rules until the next dissolution of
Parliament is called for.
The policymaking process in the British system is relatively
smooth: the government of the majority party sets policies and
the majority in Parliament affirms them. In fact, during the
period from 1895 to 1972, with one minor wartime exception, no
government with a working majority in the House of Commons had
any legislation of real substance defeated. This stems from a
whole host of factors: the willingness of the government to make
concessions in order to avoid party revolts, the desire of
"back-benchers" for eventual promotion to ministerial office, the
fear that the electorate will not support a disunited party, and
a unique sense of loyalty to the party and its causes. An
additional factor is undoubtedly self-interest on the part of
individual members of Parliament. Each member realizes that
voting against the government risks bringing down the government,
thus forcing a new election that could result in defeat for the
member and his or her party.
Not only does the party shape and control policy options,
but it also defines and carries public opinion to a large extent.
Hence, members of parliament do not necessarily need the autonomy
or the resources available to members of the U.S. Congress,
because they can rely on the strong party apparatus for
information and support. Indeed, the party system is deeply
ingrained in British history. Various attempts to reform the
political system have been scuttled precisely because of the
strength and solidity of the party system.
Although the majority party dominates the parliamentary
system in Britain, the role of the opposition party should not be
overlooked. Whereas some consider the opposition merely "the
government of tomorrow," others have recognized the important
role it plays. Gerhard Kunz, a former member of the German
Bundestag, has said that the opposition actually serves an
important function for the Parliament as a whole. This is true,
he says, because the government simply presents and passes bills.
It is therefore up to the opposition to think critically, forcing
the government to justify its positions and even at times to
amend its legislation.
In the British Parliament, the opposition plays a vital role
in the lively floor debates that characterize that body. The
opposition must clarify and articulate its positions clearly and
be ready to present a united front if and when the majority
stumbles or falls out of favor with the public.
In the U.S. Congress, political parties play a much
different role. While it is true that nearly all members of
Congress are aligned with one of the two major parties and that
party affiliation does have an effect on the members' legislative
voting decisions, parties in the United States show nowhere near
the level of cohesiveness exhibited by British parliamentary
parties. U.S. legislative parties embrace broad coalitions, they
are decentralized and largely nonhierarchical, and they are
relatively flexible over a range of issues. Thus, party
positions may not always be consistent from one policy area to
another.
The legislative system in the United States is designed to
encompass varied interests and produce legislation that
represents a compromise among them. When the legislature is
dominated by one party and the executive held by the other--as
has been the case in the United States since 1987--bipartisan
support of legislation is usually necessary to pass a bill. (In
the U.S. case, the president has the power to veto legislation
and can be overridden only by a two-thirds majority in each house
of Congress.)
Although members of the opposition party in the United
States often experience frustration over their inability to
control the legislative process, their power is significantly
greater than that of their counterparts in the British
Parliament. They can join forces with majority members in voting
on legislation that suits their individual interests. Also,
depending on their numbers in the chamber, they can exercise a
certain degree of leverage in legislative bargaining. And
finally, if all else fails, they can use their own individual
vote in visible defense of the interests of their constituents
back home.
The Role of Outside Groups
In addition to the internal dynamics of a legislature, arena
and transformative legislatures differ in how they handle and
relate to outside groups. In the British system, interest groups
exert some influence over the legislative process, but rarely in
a major or direct way. By contrast, in the U.S. Congress,
interest groups play a larger and more visible role. Shirley
Williams, a former Secretary of State for Education and Science
in Great Britain, offered an example of how outside interests can
exert influence there. The incident involved an effort to reform
Britain's nursery school education system. Apparently, the
government favored expanding nursery school education by
increasing the number of teacher's assistants employed and
thereby increasing the number of children who could be served.
The teachers' union made it clear from the outset, however, that
it would not accept such an approach, as such a move would
undoubtedly threaten the jobs of many members of the union. As a
result, the proposal was never even made public, in part because
the government did not want to disclose that this type of
pressure had been brought to bear. According to Williams, the
exercise of such influence is not uncommon across a range of
policy areas. She pointed to the "great corporate power" of such
outside interests as the trade unions, individual professional
groups, and big business. These groups, according to Williams,
have the power to scuttle legislative programs and initiatives
that they feel are not in their own best interest. The danger in
a parliamentary system is that the pressure brought to bear by
these groups is often hidden and subtle, because the system is
less open than in the United States. As a result, these
interests are rarely held accountable for their actions.
In the United States, outside interest groups are able to
play an active role in the legislative process because there are
so many points of entry into the system--Congress is
characterized by decentralization and a detailed division of
labor. No one party or member or committee can totally dominate
any given issue, and interest groups attempt to influence each of
these actors. They employ various tactics in an attempt to
introduce or derail legislation, alter its form or content, or
secure its passage; no member of Congress can avoid the daunting
task of dealing with a wide variety of interest groups from his
or her constituency.
Many critics of the U.S. system believe interest groups have
come to exert too much influence--largely through their
contributions to candidates' election campaigns; thus,
politicians are perceived as beholden to the interest groups that
have supported them. Attempts to reform the campaign-finance
system are aimed mainly at decreasing the power and influence of
monied interests in the political system.
Internal Organization of Legislatures
Legislative committees and staffs must also be taken into
consideration when comparing congresses and parliaments. A
strong committee system is a hallmark of a transformative
legislature like the U.S. Congress. For a legislature to be
independent of the executive, it must have internal mechanisms to
enable it to carry out the complicated task of policy-making.
Woodrow Wilson, a prominent scholar of Congress who was to
become a U.S. president, described the power of committees in the
U.S. Congress and the important role they play in the legislative
process: "The leaders of the House are the chairmen of the
Standing Committees....[These] chairmen...do not constitute a
cooperative body like a ministry. They do not consult and concur
in the adoption of homogeneous and mutually helpful measures;
there is no thought of acting in concert....
"Of course it goes without saying that the practical effect
of this Committee organization of the House is to consign to each
of the Standing Committees the entire direction of legislation
upon those subjects which properly come to its consideration. As
to those subjects it is entitled to initiative [that is, to
introduce legislation], and all legislative action with regard to
them is under its overruling guidance. It gives shape and course
to the determinations of the House."
Since Wilson wrote this description in 1885, little has
changed in terms of the power wielded by congressional
committees, except that the committees, roughly 15 to 20 each in
the House and Senate, have been supplemented in each chamber by
100 or more subcommittees, each with its own chairman and staff.
Committees may also exist in an arena legislature, though
they are rarely as strong or well-defined as those described
above. In an article in the Canadian Journal of Politics,
C.E.S. Franks offers some insight into why committees play only a
secondary role in that legislative body. The British model is
based on tough public scrutiny and debate on the parliament
floor, forcing an executive to sharpen its own positions and
improve its own legislation to avoid embarrassment and bad
publicity: "The parliamentary system is based on competition not
consensus. The argument against strong parliamentary committees
is that they submerge the distinction between parties and give
power to 'irresponsible' legislative committees rather than
responsible government."
By their nature, transformative legislatures will have a
more vibrant committee system than will arena legislatures. In
the former, as the term "transformative" suggests, proposals and
initiatives from various sources are transformed into law. This
process takes place internally and largely independent of the
executive; therefore, the internal structures and division of
labor within the legislative body are crucial to the outcome of
the legislative product. In arena legislatures, on the other
hand, there is less give and take in the legislative process, and
less of a need for consensus building. The party system
dominates, and although there is debate and competition, the
majority party usually works its will. As a result, the
government's legislative agenda is less reliant on the internal
structures of a parliament.
Over the years, the British have debated whether or not they
should strengthen their legislative committee system. During the
late 1970s, some reformers believed that in order to strengthen
the position of Parliament in relation to the executive, a
stronger system of select committees should be created. At the
time, the Parliament had two kinds of committees. Standing
committees dealt with specific pieces of legislation after they
had gained general approval on the floor, while select committees
examined government policy and activities more broadly. Under
this committee system, policy issues were addressed as they
arose. There were no permanent mechanisms in place to deal with
specialized policy areas, such as foreign affairs or the budget.
Many back-benchers--the rank-and-file members of
Parliament--supported the reform, hoping it would give them a
more active role in the policy-making process. Those who were
opposed to such a change feared stronger committees would
undermine the role of the parties.
In 1979 a new committee system was adopted: a set of
back-benchers' select committees was established to conform to
the various government departments. The committees, which were
to collect information, hold hearings, and report back to the
full chamber, were modeled on the U.S. congressional committee
system.
The new system has fared relatively well. Those committees
operating under strong leadership and with a clear mandate have
had considerable success. The Education Committee falls into
this category. In general, the new committees have had their
greatest success in dealing with technical matters while avoiding
controversial or politically charged issues. It is not clear how
much of an impact the committees have had on government policy,
but most observers agree that they have played a valuable role in
making the political system more open. They have provided
outside viewpoints an entry into the policymaking process and
have exposed the ruling government's positions and decisions to
increased public scrutiny.
Along with the call for a stronger committee system came
similar calls for increased staff and other resources for members
of Parliament. One former MP, who also happened to be a former
civil servant, described the "massive imbalance" that exists
between the resources available to ministers and civil servants
compared with those available to members of Parliament. Another
member recounted his early days in Parliament when he was without
even a desk or a secretary for five weeks. He said it was
"virtually impossible to run the constituency, to do the party
job and the parliamentary job, and to be an effective member of
the select committee, with enormous amounts of paper to handle,
with no staff and inadequate office facilities."
This state of affairs represents a stark contrast to the
staff and resources employed by members of the U.S. Congress.
Today members of Congress are served by professional staff
members, secretaries, administrative assistants, and committee
staff aides, not to mention pollsters, political consultants, and
campaign workers. Every member of Congress, whether of the
majority or minority party, is entitled to hire 22 staff members
and has a staff budget of nearly half a million dollars.
Of course these differences are related to the role of the
U.S. legislature compared with the role of the Parliament.
Members from each body have come to agree that a certain amount
of staff and resources are necessary in order to function
effectively.
In recent years, legislatures around the world have begun to
adopt similar organizational features. Certain common trends can
be identified among legislative bodies that traditionally have
had little in common. During the 1970s, the U.S. Congress
underwent some significant reforms. Power was decentralized,
resources were expanded, and congressional proceedings were
opened up to the public and the media. At the same time, other
legislatures throughout the Western world were undergoing
similar, though less dramatic, changes. Committee systems were
expanded (as we saw in the British reforms of 1979), staffs and
resources were increased, back-bench members began to demand a
greater role in the policymaking process, and legislative
proceedings were opened up to the media.
In 1986, the New Zealand Royal Commission issued a report
entitled "Towards a Better Democracy: Report on the Electoral
System." The report included a number of recommendations for
improving the parliamentary system. The commission's main
recommendation with regard to the legislative branch was that the
number of members of Parliament be increased as a means of
strengthening that body's ability to carry out its representative
and legislative functions. An increase in the general membership
of Parliament would have several probable consequences. First,
it would automatically mean an increase in the number of
back-bench members. This, in turn, might diminish the ability of
cabinet ministers to dominate the legislative process. Another
effect would be a larger number voting in the caucus and thus a
wider range of dialogue on important policy issues. In addition,
having more MPs would strengthen the caucus committees,
increasing them in size and number. Such an expanded committee
system would allow individual members to develop areas of
expertise. The new system would not only improve the quality of
parliamentary debates but also increase the relative strength of
the legislature in relation to the executive.
Although the proposals were not adopted at the time, it is
important to note that the debate was taking place and that these
issues were raised and taken seriously. This supports the
premise that there has been a worldwide trend toward
decentralization, specialization, and democratization of
legislative bodies. The debate over the size of New Zealand's
Parliament, as well as the manner in which its members are
elected, has continued since the Royal Commission made its report
in 1986. In fact, in September 1992 New Zealanders voted to
reform the system for electing members of Parliament, supporting
a system of proportional representation similar to that proposed
by the Royal Commission.
In Argentina, committees are an integral part of the
governing process. Most of the legislative work of the National
Congress takes place in the committees. In addition, the
committees act as a liaison of sorts between the National
Congress and the public. They provide points of access for
groups and interests outside of the legislature, solicit
information and input from myriad sources, and act as a sounding
board for public opinion.
Lessons to Be Learned
Every country's political system develops and evolves
according to its history, makeup, and political and social
conditions. When a country tries to graft another country's
political system onto its own, it rarely works. This was the
case, for example, when Nigeria tried to adopt the U.S.
presidential system some years ago. The system failed because it
did not provide a role or outlet for dissenting parties. As a
result, revolts in the form of military coups ensued. There has
been no sustained stability in Nigeria since. Countries need to
adapt structures and rules to fit their own cultures and
circumstances.
That said, it is still possible to draw lessons from the
experience of legislatures in democracies, mature and developing,
around the world. One is fundamental and particularly clear: a
democracy thrives best if it has an active, vibrant, meaningful,
and legitimate legislature. The other lessons flow from this
one:
- No legislature can be effective unless it has adequate
resources to conduct research on policy issues, develop models,
analyze data, and write laws. Staffs, libraries, and
expertise are all necessary, as are tools like computers,
telephones, and fax machines. Following the U.S. model of a
large staff for each individual lawmaker is not always essential,
however. Central research staffs can work very well--for
example, the U.S. Congress benefits from the services of the
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, the
Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology
Assessment. But some resources, including secretarial assistance
and research assistance, should be available to individual
members as well.
- Some division of labor is necessary in any meaningful
legislature. A committee system created to fit the policy
areas that the legislature will deal with is essential.
Committees may be given the responsibility to draft bills, hold
hearings, or air grievances. They can include chairmen from the
governing party or parties or from opposition parties. They can
be independently strong or weak. But committee systems are
increasingly being recognized in parliaments as a way to
facilitate the policy-making process, even though it is difficult
to define clear jurisdictional lines for subjects like energy or
the environment, and committees often squabble among
themselves.
- A major function of a legislature is to provide an
outlet for, and representation of, the legitimate opposition.
Striking a balance between an appropriate role for the minority
and the legitimate right of the majority to act is another one of
those inherent dilemmas in a democratic legislature. Finding a
meaningful role for the opposition, whether it is organized in
one party or several, or cuts across party lines into regional
and ethnic constituencies, is a key to the stability and
legitimacy of the political system.
- Outside interests, from trade associations to ethnic or
racial groupings, need access to the legislature. The
legislature in a democracy should be the most open and accessible
organization in the entire political process, for its role is to
listen to and represent all the forces, big and small, in the
society. Committees, staffs, party organizations, and individual
lawmakers all can be points of access to the political system.
Care and sensitivity should be taken to make sure that many such
points exist.
A balance also must be struck among the different kinds of
groups in a society that have legitimate voices. One way to do
this is through bicameralism. Most democracies have two
houses in their legislatures--one whose representation is based
on population size and another whose representation is based on
some other criterion. In the United States, the House of
Representatives represents by population--each congressional
district has roughly the same number of people and a single
representative. The U.S. Senate represents by state--each of the
50 states has two senators, each elected at a different time and
statewide. This ensures that the interests of states--some of
which are very small and sparsely populated--will be amply
represented.
- A legislature needs to act as a counterweight to the
executive, whether in a parliamentary or a presidential
system. No institution in government should be able to act
without accountability, without some other individual or
organization to keep it accountable to the public. In the
British Parliament, the question period--usually one hour each
day when opposition party members can question members of the
government, especially the prime minister--is designed
specifically for this purpose, as well as to provide a real role
for the opposition.
The committees in the British House of Commons also attempt
to oversee the actions of the executive departments and their
civil servants. They are responsible for ensuring that there is
no fraud, scandal, or abuse of power, and that insulated
government bureaucrats do not wield their power carelessly,
arrogantly, or sloppily. Congressional committees in the United
States do the same thing, although much more aggressively. But
whether by committees or some other mechanism, the legislature
should be set up to act in an oversight capacity.
- The legislature is often the best and most legitimate
forum for debating differences. Every society has
differences over policy directions, items to be on the national
agenda, and groups that deserve special treatment. Providing
opportunities and the best environment for real debate is an
important function of the legislature.
- An important but delicate task of the legislature is to
offer balanced representation. Every legislature has to
balance the need to represent with the need to govern. The
ability to act, in other words, must be balanced against the need
to hear all voices, even if that means delaying action to afford
every opportunity of expression for a minority that feels
intensely about an issue or action.
In Britain, the upper house, the House of Lords, was
designed to ensure a voice for the monarchy and its
representatives and designees. In some cases, upper houses exist
largely to provide another check and vehicle for representation
in the system. They can also provide balance for ethnic,
regional, class, or racial groups. For example, in the U.S.
Senate, each state has equal representation. Therefore, no one
state or region is able to dominate the debate on issues of
national import nor can the interests of any one state (or
region) be overridden because that state lacks adequate
representation.
As noted above, the U.S. and British models have
single-member districts. Proportional representation is another
way to ensure balance in representation, but it is easy to go too
far, allowing a disproportionately large role for small and
splinter groups. Evidence of this can be seen in the recent
emergence of radical, right-wing, anti-immigrant parties, which
did surprisingly well in the most recent round of elections in
Western Europe, particularly in Germany.
Conclusion
From this brief overview, it should be apparent that the
legislature is a necessary ingredient for democratic governance
in the complex societies of the modern world. Legislatures
represent a permanent and independent link between the populace
and the government. Through elections, petitions, lobbying, and
participation in political parties and interest groups, citizens
can express their will and affect the outcomes of the legislative
process.
Some common traits of a well-developed legislature include a
division of labor, a leadership structure, a seniority system,
and a committee system. As I have noted throughout this essay,
various legislatures possess these traits to differing degrees.
An interesting trend noted by legislative scholars in recent
years is the apparent convergence of legislatures around the
world. Certain common trends can be identified among legislative
bodies that have traditionally had little in common.
While we have witnessed some convergence in terms of
institutional direction among the legislatures of the world,
individual legislatures have at the same time maintained distinct
characteristics related to the history, culture, and character of
the citizens they represent. What is important to keep in mind
is that while legislatures have a crucial role to play in a
democracy, they are not meant to dominate the government. They
are large and sometimes unwieldy, their membership encompasses a
multitude of interests, and their complex internal organization
does not often lend itself to swift and decisive action.
Ultimately, the most important task of a legislature in a
democratic regime is to give legitimacy to the government by
providing representation for the citizenry.
CLEAN AIR LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The clean air legislation passed and signed into law in 1990
offers a useful illustration of the inner workings of the U.S.
Congress. Compromise legislation on air pollution was finally
reached after more than a decade of political stalemate on the
issue. Ultimately, it took a delicate balancing of varied
interests, including the administration, environmentalists,
representatives of industry, and individual members with their
own regional and constituent concerns, to develop a piece of
legislation that everyone could live with.
The clean air legislation of 1990 was in fact a
reauthorization of the original Clean Air Act passed in 1970. At
the time of its passage, that act was hailed as the nation's most
comprehensive and complex pollution control law. By the 1980s,
however, many aspects of the law had become obsolete, others were
not being adequately enforced, and the country's air was becoming
more and more polluted.
While few people could dispute the importance of clean air,
any major changes in the provisions of the law would inevitably
have resulted in the loss of jobs for many Americans, as well as
increased costs for industry and consumers. For many concerned
interests that was a price they were not willing to pay.
Little progress was made in strengthening clean air
legislation during the 1980s. Leading members in both the House
and Senate used their influence to scuttle any attempts to force
a vote on the issue, and Reagan administration officials did not
wish to proceed.
In 1989, several factors came together that increased the
potential for progress. First and foremost, the new
administration under President George Bush came out strongly in
support of the legislation and offered a fairly comprehensive
proposal. In addition, George Mitchell, long a champion of clean
air legislation, became majority leader in the Senate. He took
over from Robert Byrd, who for years had discouraged action on
the law, fearing constituents of his coal-mining state (West
Virginia) would be hit hard by new restrictions. At the same
time, public pressure was building for new legislation as concern
started to grow over such issues as global warming and ozone
depletion.
These factors helped overcome some of the remaining hurdles,
such as parochial concerns and environmental and industry
interests. Nonetheless, molding the legislation proved long and
arduous. The bill President Bush had introduced in June 1989 was
not signed into law until November 15, 1990.
The legislation addressed four major sources of air
pollution: urban smog, automobile exhaust, toxic air pollution,
and acid rain. Each of the components involved a complex set of
requirements, regulations, deadlines, and penalties for
noncompliance. Different regions of the country as well as
different industries were affected to varying degrees by each of
the bill's provisions. Compromises had to be made and bargains
struck among representatives of these groups in order to ensure
that a strong coalition could be held together.
The legislation worked its way through the House and the
Senate, following somewhat different courses in each chamber
(conforming to the differing rules and norms of each body, as
well as to the personal interests of the key players involved).
Throughout the process a dialogue was maintained with
administration officials. Although the bill that ultimately
emerged disappointed some environmentalists, Democratic leaders
in Congress supported it, recognizing that it was the best they
could hope for from a Republican administration. The president's
primary concern was the cost of the legislation, and he made it
clear throughout the process of negotiation that he would veto
any bill that exceeded his prescribed cost limitations.
The legislation was nearly derailed in the Senate when
former Majority Leader Byrd offered an amendment to which the
administration was adamantly opposed. Byrd used his powerful
position as chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee to
gather support for his effort. In the end, Byrd's amendment was
narrowly defeated, 49-50.
On the House side, most of the contentious issues were
worked out at the committee level, and debate on the floor was
fairly brief. Few members viewed the legislation as perfect, but
opponents saw it as largely inevitable and proponents hesitated
to risk undermining its passage by attempting to tighten its
provisions further.
A compromise was reached in the House-Senate conference and
the presence of administration officials helped to speed the
process along. The bill passed overwhelmingly in both chambers.
Passage came at an opportune time for many members. With the
off-year election only days away and a groundswell of negative
public opinion building toward Congress as an institution,
members could hold up this landmark piece of legislation as a
positive product of the legislative system.
POLL TAX LEGISLATION IN BRITAIN
A brief look at Britain's Local Government Finance Bill, more
commonly known as the poll tax, gives us some insight into how
contentious pieces of legislation are dealt with in the British
Parliament. The majority government, back-bench majority
members, and the opposition all played a crucial role in the
development and passage of this controversial legislation.
The poll tax was suggested by Britain's ruling government,
headed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in 1987. It was, in
essence, a proposal to change the way in which Britain's local
authorities raised their tax revenue. More specifically, it was
an attempt to replace existing "rates," or local property taxes,
with two new taxes: one a flat-rate poll tax on domestic
households, the other a nationally levied uniform business rate
on commercial enterprises. The idea was based on the premise
that each individual citizen should pay a uniform tax for local
services from which all benefit equally.
Opponents of the bill argued that it was grossly unfair
because it taxed rich and poor citizens at the same rate. The
opposition in Parliament said the adoption of such a flat-tax
proposal would represent "the abandonment of the principle of
fairness in personal taxation."
In spite of widespread opposition to the bill inside and
outside of Parliament, the majority government pushed the
proposal forward. Sponsors of the legislation argued it was
needed in order to correct the inequities of the current system
of local financing. They argued further that a flat-rate system
in which all citizens participated would bring about greater
accountability on the part of local councils, suggesting that if
individual voters are paying for the local services they receive,
they will weigh more carefully the cost of what they are voting
for. It follows that more eligible voters will vote when they
know they will have to pay for the result. Furthermore, by
instituting a flat tax rate, the government hoped to discourage
voters from being lured by the promise of local councils to spend
lavishly on the community with the revenues collected from
wealthy individuals and local businesses. Finally, they
contended that the change would relieve businesses from excessive
local taxation.
Under normal circumstances, with the Conservative Party
holding a strong majority of seats in Parliament,
government-sponsored legislation would move through the
legislative process relatively smoothly. Because opposition to
the poll tax was so widespread and crossed over party boundaries,
however, the fate of the Local Government Finance Bill was less
certain.
During the bill's second reading, a group of Conservative
back-benchers banded together to oppose the government's bill.
This "mutiny" did not derail the legislation, but it did
embarrass the government and encourage the opposition.
In the ensuing months, support gathered for a back-bench
sponsored amendment to make the poll tax income-related. At one
point there were rumored to be as many as 50 back-bench
supporters for the amendment. When the Labor Party decided to
back the amendment on a three-line whip, it looked as if the
government might be defeated. In the end, what was described as
"the biggest revolt by Tory back-benchers since the general
election" (38 of them voted against the government and 10 more
abstained) did not result in any significant amendment to the
poll tax bill.
Opponents held out hope that the legislation might be
derailed in Great Britain's upper house--the House of Lords.
However, because finance-related bills are rarely altered in the
upper house, the bill made it through virtually unscathed.
The history of the poll tax is instructive in several ways.
It illustrates the limitations on the power of the ruling
government. Although the legislation did become law, Prime
Minister Thatcher was forced to make a few significant
concessions, such as reducing the impact of the tax on the
poorest citizens. It also shows the importance of back-bench and
opposition opinion and the power that can be wielded when the two
groups band together, as well as the limits to that power.
THE INFORMAL ROLE OF THE KENYAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
In many respects, Kenya is similar to other African states. Like
many of its neighbors, it existed under British rule for more
than 40 years, had a British model of government imposed upon it
at independence, and soon became a one-party presidential state
headed by a strong popular leader. In other ways, however, Kenya
is unique. For instance, its parliament has taken on a much more
active and vibrant role in the political system than has been the
case in some other African countries. Thus, the Kenyan Assembly
provides a valuable illustration of how a legislature can be
effective and influential in a one-party presidential state.
According to some scholars, the National Assembly is the
most important participatory institution created in Kenya at the
time of independence. The Kenyan Assembly performs a wide range
of functions within the political system, both formal and
informal. A brief review of these functions will show that the
informal tasks tend to outweigh the formal duties in terms of
their overall importance.
The lawmaking function is not where the Assembly exerts its
greatest influence. The cabinet has the primary responsibility
for policymaking and lawmaking, and the president and his key
officials have little trouble pushing their legislative agenda
through the Assembly. Legislation is often presented to the
Assembly as a fait accompli, allowing little if any opportunity
for legislative review or analysis. In some cases where the
Assembly has tried to assert its independence on legislative
matters, usually through the mechanism of a select committee,
members disloyal to the government have been punished, pressured,
or even removed from their seats. Moreover, the legislature has
no authority over budgetary or spending policy, which reduces its
overall influence even further.
This is not to suggest that the Assembly has no influence
over policy decisions. Legislators can assume a role in defining
and clarifying policy goals and in promoting policy alternatives.
And the legislature remains a forum for criticism of government
policy and for populist, even radical, rhetoric.
The real power and influence of the Assembly comes through
the exercise of its informal powers. The most important informal
function the legislature performs is to provide legitimacy to
government actions. This in turn promotes support among the
populace for the regime. The legitimizing function is vital in
light of the revolts and bouts of instability that have plagued
other nations in the region. By accommodating cultural and
historical realities, the Kenyan Assembly allows for opposition
and dissent within the system, yet also provides stability. As a
result, the populace feels at ease about the strength and
legitimacy of the system; at the same time, it feels it has some
say in the political process.
While providing legitimacy may be the legislature's more
important function in terms of the stability of the governmental
system, it is not its only function, and that is how it differs
from rubber-stamp legislatures such as that of the former Soviet
Union. Members of the legislature play an important
representative role by serving as a liaison between the
government and the populace, providing important constituent
services and articulating the demands of special interests.
Because they have performed this role so effectively, many
representatives have become virtual patrons, servicing the needs
of constituents who have become their clients.
Another important function of the legislature is
recruitment. The Assembly is a breeding ground for future
national leaders. In fact, the party has ceased to be an agent
for recruitment; the Assembly has assumed this role.
The legislature also serves as the primary outlet for
political participation and expression and as a symbol of
equitable representation. Even though the representatives are
often unable to influence the policy outcomes of the government,
they do provide their constituents with access to the system and
a voice in the process, whether it be in support or dissent.
At first glance, the role of the Kenyan Assembly may seem
meager compared with the powers and prerogatives of the U.S.
Congress or the British Parliament. Nonetheless, the Assembly
has survived the difficult transition to democracy, while the
legislative bodies of some neighboring African countries (such as
Uganda) have not fared as well. The Assembly's greatest strength
lies in its ability to build unity in the nation and provide
legitimacy for the regime, while at the same time steering
government policy and acting as a check on executive power.
THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN BOTSWANA
Africa is a diverse continent made up of countries with vastly
different historical and cultural traditions. As a result,
democracy has taken on different forms in the various African
nations in which it has been adopted. In some countries, where
democracy is not rooted in tradition, it has been transformed
into a military dictatorship or a one-party state. In other
countries, where a modern democratic system has meshed with the
traditional system of governance, the transition has been fairly
smooth, and democratic institutions have flourished.
Botswana is one country that inherits a strong democratic
tradition. Historically, Botswana's political system was highly
centralized under the ruler or chief, but the system remained
open because of the important role played by the legislature,
traditionally called the lekgotla. The lekgotla served as a
central organization to which all citizens had access. It was
the heart of the governmental system, with the chief acting as a
chairman of sorts, overseeing the activities of the lekgotla.
This system, which was in place at the national, regional, and
local levels, provided for effective government at all levels.
This system remained largely intact during the colonial
period, and when Botswana achieved independence in 1966, it
adopted a constitutional system with an eye toward preserving
these traditions. The Constitution vested extensive powers in a
president, to be supported by a democratic base. In addition, it
established a popularly elected National Assembly and a House of
Chiefs (to act as an advisory body to the National Assembly on
prescribed issues). Today, the legislature remains the central
forum where public affairs are conducted and issues of national
interest are discussed and debated.
Scholars argue that Botswana has been successful in its
transition to a democratic system of government because the basic
concepts of democracy were already an integral part of that
country's traditions. Today, Botswana has a vibrant multiparty
system supported by a solid constitutional and institutional
framework, where free expression and open debate are encouraged
and where dissent is expressed through various opposition
parties. It is true that the ruling party in Botswana has held
power without interruption since independence and that the
strength of the opposition parties is limited. Nonetheless, the
fact remains that political power is rooted in popular support
rather than the rule of law. There is room for dissent and a
role for the opposition, and the ruling leaders are prepared to
relinquish their power at any time if that is what a majority of
the people desire.
GLOSSARY
at-large election -- an election in which candidates are
chosen on an individual basis rather than as representatives of a
geographically defined, single-member district. At-large
elections can be held at the legislative and presidential levels.
In the United States, some states hold at-large elections for
congressional seats, when, for instance, a state's entire
population warrants only one representative. Some countries hold
at-large elections when choosing an executive. In these cases,
voters cast their ballots en masse rather than as part of a
designated voting bloc.
back-bencher -- any member of parliament who is not a
leader of the ruling government or of the opposition. These
members, even if they belong to the majority party, have little
influence over the legislative process.
bicameralism -- a legislative system made up of two
separate chambers, each serving as a check on the other's power.
In most cases, the members of each chamber are elected on a
different basis. For example, in the U.S. Congress, two senators
are elected from each of the 50 states, whereas the number of
House members assigned to each state varies according to the
state's population.
caucus -- a meeting of the members of a political party to
decide questions of policy, establish internal rules and
structures, and elect the party membership.
second reading -- a stage in the process of considering a
bill in parliament. A bill is read for the first time when it is
introduced; it is then printed and read again. During the second
reading, the general principles of a bill are debated; a detailed
discussion of the bill's specific provisions is reserved for the
committee or report stage. The opposition may vote against a
bill after its second reading.
three-line whip -- "whip" refers to a member of parliament
chosen by his or her parliamentary party to keep members informed
about day-to-day parliamentary business, to maintain the party's
voting strength, and to convey to the leadership the opinions of
back-bench members. "Whip" also refers to the weekly publication
sent out by the chief whip to all party members informing them of
upcoming business and requesting their presence at certain
meetings. The "three-line whip" relates to the relative
importance attached to a given debate or division. If an item in
the weekly publication is underlined three times, it is
considered extremely important, and failure to attend is
generally seen as a rebellion against the party's policy.
SOURCES OF FURTHER INFORMATION
Here is just a sample of the many resources available to help
people learn more about the role of the legislature in a
democracy.
Books
Bradshaw, Kenneth, and David Pring. Parliament and
Congress. London: Quartet Books, 1972.
Chaleff, Ira, et al. Setting Course: A Congressional
Management Guide, third edition. Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Management Foundation, 1988.
Congressional Quarterly. Guide to Congress, third
edition. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1982.
Greenstein, Fred I., and Nelson W. Polsby. Handbook of
Political Science. Volume 5: Governmental Institutions and
Processes. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1975.
Ornstein, Norman J. The Role of the Legislature in Western
Democracies. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1981.
Schwarz, John E., and L. Earl Shaw. The United States
Congress in Comparative Perspective. Hinsdale, Illinois: The
Dryden Press, 1976.
Thayson, Uwe, Roger H. Davidson, and Robert G. Livingston, Eds.
The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.
Valeo, Francis R., and Charles E. Morrison, Eds. The Japanese
Diet and the U.S. Congress. Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1983.
Wootten, Graham. Pressure Politics in Contemporary
Britain. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1978.
Organizations
Congressional Management Foundation
513 Capitol Court, N.E., Suite 100
Washington, D.C. 20002 USA
Telephone: (202) 546-0100
Fax: (202) 547-0936
The Congressional Management Foundation offers management
training programs for members of the U.S. Congress and their
staffs, publishes books related to congressional management, and
consults with members of Congress on specific management issues.
Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 USA
Telephone: (202) 887-8500
Fax: (202) 728-1863
In addition to its weekly journal, Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, which provides news and analysis on the
legislative, budget, and political processes, CQ produces a wide
range of publications on Congress. CQ also offers courses and
seminars for professional development in government and politics
through its Professional Education Service.
International Republican Institute
1212 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20005 USA
Telephone: (202) 408-9450
Fax: (202) 408-9462
Through financial, technical, and organizational support, the
Institute seeks to assist indigenous organizations in building
foundations of democracy in countries where development has been
stunted by command economies and monopolistic political
structures. The staff provides training in leadership
development, communications strategy, policy research,
political-party building, and election processes.
Library of Congress
101 Independence Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20540 USA
Telephone: (202) 707-2905
Fax: (202) 707-9199
The Library of Congress offers the largest collection of books
and resources in the United States. In addition, the Library's
Congressional Research Service provides a model of how a
legislature can utilize the centralized staff and resources of a
large research institution for the purpose of legislative
research and policy-making.
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 503
Washington, D.C. 20036 USA
Telephone: (202) 328-3136
Fax: (202) 939-3166
Designed to help strengthen democratic institutions in new and
emerging democracies, this institute has organized legislative
seminars focusing on legislative procedures, staffing, research
information, constituent services, and committee structures in
Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa. It also publishes a
series of books based on its experiences in developing
democracies.
About the Author: Norman J. Ornstein is a resident
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. from the
University of Minnesota and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the
University of Michigan. He has worked at different times on
Capitol Hill, serving most recently as the staff director of the
U.S. Senate's Select Committee to Study the Senate Committee
System in 1977. He has written, edited, and co-authored a number
of books, including Vital Statistics on Congress (now in
its sixth edition), The New Congress, and The Role of
the Legislature in Western Democracies.
____________________
Project management and editing by the Institute for Contemporary
Studies (ICS)
Vice President -- Kenneth L. Adelman
Editor -- Heidi Fritschel
The mission of ICS is to promote the self-governing and
entrepreneurial way of life. Through its imprint, ICS Press, ICS
publishes a wide range of books on public issues. For a catalog
or more information, write: ICS, 243 Kearny Street, San
Francisco, California 94108 USA.
Freedom Papers Series:
Editor: Wayne Hall
Associate Editors: Stephen Burant, Susan O Sullivan
Design: Barbara Morgan
November 1992
