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羅’’’F’甘’’
(ROBERT F. KENNEDY)
反對’’戰’
Against the War in Vietnam
’戰’結’’’’’有’’戰’’’國’’’’’’們’’說’正’塔’’評’羅馬’’說’
“’們’成’’’’’稱它爲’平’”
羅’’’F’甘’’(1925－1968)’’’哥哥’翰’F’甘’’’統’內閣中任’’部’’1964’羅’’’甘’’’’’’’選爲參議Ⅸ’成爲’’戰’’’個重’’批評’’’由’’民’黨’’’言’’1968’3月16日’’’’’’民’黨提’’統候選’身’’’天’對’國’’’’策’’’’’’擊’’’期’’’’’’翰遜’統’’’不’參’’選’
1965’’翰遜’統’’國對戰’’捲’升’成’’國生’中最引’’議’問’’’1968’’’’’’有五’’’’’’場戰’’成’場憤’’反戰’動’’’’公眾對’’’’隊’’’國’機’’’任’1975’’國’’’’’最’’批戰鬥’Ⅸ’’’’’間’那場戰’’陰’仍’續’’’眾文化’國’’’’
’’’’選擇之’’’’’’’我們不單選擇我們由誰’領導’而’選擇我們’’’引’’方’選擇我們’’’’’國’’’及我們’’’’’’’’’國’’’’’’選擇之’我們’舊幻’塑’’’’’那麽我們’’擔’’’’’未’’’’機’’而’我們’把’’’機’’’結’遺贈給’’’’’
今天’我’對’們談談’’’’戰’’我’’裏’’’’’’’們’論’什麽我’’我們’有關’策’產’’’’
我不’’’我’’’’數’國’’不’’’’賣’國’’’簡單’’’’隊’’’白’投降’那樣做對我們’’’個國’’’個民族都’’’接’’’’我擔心’’我’’’’數’國’亦擔心’’我們目’遵’’方’犯’’重錯’’我擔心’’我’’’’數’國’’擔心’’我們正’反對中立國’我們歷’’’盟國’’’’’望’仿’’’國’概不’’’’’我擔心’’我’’’’數’國’’擔心－我們目’’方’’不’’’勝’’不’’’’平’不’’止’’’不’’’’國’’’’’’’平’’’
我擔心’’戰’結’’’’’有’’戰’’’國’’我們’’’’’’’’’而’’’戰’雙方’’’’仇’’’有’’’’’’’’殺戮’’’’們’’說’正’塔’’評’羅馬’’說’“’們’成’’’’’稱它稱爲’平’”
而我’爲’’不’正’’國精’’’部’’’
讓我’個’’公職’雙重身’’’’’’論’我曾參’’’’’對’’問’’早期’’’正’那’’’導’我們走’’’’條’路’’’’我們’’’問’’’’’’’’’’’’失敗’’’’不’’’正把’’’體’民’’我們’支援’歷’’’統’’’’’’’’任’’任’’’’敗’’’’’婪’’’’’有’’’’引’’’’民’民族情’’’’情’’’’’’我’’歷’’我’’’們面’’擔’’’’’’任’’’’’錯’不’成爲它永遠’’’藉’’’’’’著’’賴’’’教’’’’’不’’引生’’’導’讓我們’’’’用’老’檢驗標準衡’’身’’對’’’’公正’評價’’’福’勒斯’’’提戈’’’’’言’“’’都犯錯’’’’個’’’錯’改’’盡’彌補’失’’’唯’’’’’驕傲’”
最’’個月’’’迫’’方’’’’’’’六’’Ⅸ’本’末’’’’說’中’’部分’’’稱爲“’’”’’援’’’’快’’’’而’不正’我們’’’’’’嗎?
假’我’細’’’場衝’’歷’’我們’’’’’’’’’’’重覆’’’次’’’當’機’生’’我們’’’’’’’錯’’’部隊’’’’爲’’’公報’’’次我們’’’’’證’稱’’最’’’’’’勝’’而’’次’’言’’諾’’落’’’’遺忘’’’’提’’梯’’’’高’’’’’’
’’’有’’’升’’’有’最’’’’都’未比’’’’動把我們’’離勝’’’’’’’方’’反’戰鬥’模’’’’’’’’’’’組織’’衛’身’而我們’’’’馱’戰’’’部’擔’
而’統’’次對我們說’正’我們’’’’反覆聽’’’“我們’’獲勝”’“勝’”’望’
’’’實情’’樣?我們當’’勢’’?’’
我們’’’動’’’’’’’’’’爲“’’’心’”我們’識’’’’’提’’’’’’’’防衛’’’’心機’而’實際’’不’’’除’’’’民視’’’’’’我們’’’’’’不’援’’’’而’幫’’’’’’爲’’我們’識’’們’’’必須’’改變’’’們’’’傾’’支援’’’’’少’極’望’而不’爲’國白種’’遙遠’’’’’’’犧’’
正’’種’’’’’個月’’’重’折’我們’’改變’莊裏’敵’控’’’民’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’由’’’管’’’’’誠實’’’改變’’’’’’’它’麽做’’’對’民關’’’’’’’生’’’’’諾均’’’’’那麽’’’’領’’’中’我們’’’爲解’’’’’正’我們
1944－1945’間’歐’’做’’儘管當’戰’’成巨’’’’’’’’’’改革’’諾’未’’’’污’化’濫用職’’’’’今’’’’’改革’’’’’’’’’’諾言’目’’’’’’’’’’’’’爲’’’’民’有’由爲’’’’’’’而戰鬥’’有’由不把’種’’’’’’成’’’’’’難’’’
’’’個月’第’個’顯’’實’’’’’’’不’’比’’’’’盟友’它’’’’變’’’’’’場戰’正’情’’’’成爲’國’’’’’’實’’數’’’’’’’’’錢’’’’’’’’’’而’國’’陸戰隊’’’戰’’溪’’
’實’’’’’’’’’’僧’’勞’領’’’’’原’統候選’’’’’Ⅸ’’’’維’國’’Ⅸ’’’’著’成Ⅸ’僅僅’’’’國’Ⅸ還’’’’身’’予’望’
’’’’’’’’’敗’’’’’正’’’’’’’’我們援’’’民’’’’’’
第’’’’’變’日’’顯’我們’’’勝’’’對我們’’曾’望扶’’國’’’’爲’價’’’
’’’國’揮Ⅸ’談及’’市’’麽說’“爲’救’’’鎮’有必’毀’它’”當’’’揮Ⅸ們’’用’襲’’’’救’們’’’生’’’’難’’們’論’’’’’’國部隊’爲’’’’市而戰’那麽’們’應’’’’’我’’’懂’’’’爲什麽重’順化’’’’’’’市’及’之’成’’’’’’任竟首’落’’’身’’
’’’產黨’’’’’略’們’領’’’華盛’’舊’’’我們不’讓’國’’收’它們’’’’’’中毀’’’’市及’’民’’’
倘’’’’’’部隊不’’’’爲’們’’市戰鬥’我們’不’毀’’們’那種救’之’不’我們’’’’’爲它們做’’’動’’爲我們必須問’國’’’問我們’’’’種邏輯推’’’’’’’終結?
’’有“必’”爲’“’救”’’而毀滅整個’’’我們’’’樣做嗎?
’’我們對’’’不關心’樂’’’’國’’毀’’民’殺’那麽我們當’爲什麽’’那裏?
難’我們’’授’’莊’’’’’’’’’’’市’莊該’’毀’’’’們’生’’’’’’’’’’難民’’’’’我們創’’’’中’’?’’
我們’不’’解’對’場戰’不’’有任’簡單’’’’’答’’不’單方面譴’’國’’動’我們應當捫心’問’’’我們’’有’給’’個國’’成’’’重’’’’而手’’’’晰’’’證據說’’種’’’’它’’民’’’’而’’’’我們’欠’’證據’’們’’’平’不’任’’部勢’左’’’平’’正’我們擔’’盡’’給’們’’而’不’’遙遠’未’’’’殘’’’’生’’’’’’殺中’’’救’’’’
第’個’實’’比’’任’’候’’’’’’’戰’’本’不’對’國最’’’’考驗’實際’它’’’我們’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’間’接支撐我國’’’國際’’結’’’’我們最’’’證’我們’’’任’’個’方’擔’務’’’’’’我們正’證’’’國’民’不’’’’’投’’種鬥’’’’’’’我國最老’最’’那’盟國’’’’’’’’’’剩’我們’’’’’’’當警察’’’
我們有’質問’’們’’我們質問’還需’少’Ⅸ’’少生’’’少’’’’’永遠’’’’’勝’’填’我們夢’’’’’?
’’對’’問’’國’’不’答’’’’’’答’它’有答’’’除’’’場’’’’’’’’不’解’任’問’’衝’中不’’’’’’’用’’’我國’’’’們’生’’
’們早’該質問’’場戰’正給我們’’什麽’’?
當’’它’我們’’’錢’’’’邦’算’整整’分之’’’’’’我們’’’最’’價’’正’’價’我們’’夥’’’們有數’’永遠失’’生’’’正’’價’我們’國際’’’’對’中立國’盟國都’’’’它們對’個’’’’’解’’策日漸’’’’’疏遠’
我們’’’’’’價’’我們’內心生’’’’我們國’’精’’’’’’’’’百’中’我們第’次公’反對爲國’’’’’’’’’’’’我國歷’’第’次’我們’’隊中’’’由’’’’’’’原’’成’’’’’爲’我們’報’’’’’’國’’’’’虜’照’’’天’裏我們’晚間’’中都’’’’’件’暴’’動’’國’情’蔓’’騷’街’’’’我們’生’’不論我們’’什麽’價’讓我們’’’’’’’’輕’’不僅’那’’殺’’’而’還有那’不’不’殺’’’’不僅’那’殘’’’而’還有那’不’不目’’們’’’爲’成’’’’’’’’
’戰’目’’’’’我們’’’’’’民’’’’價遠遠’’’我們有’由’望’中’’’任’’’’’場戰’必須’’夠結’’’須’’滿腔’’’唯有’’’正’’雙方’’停止互毆’’’’平’我們’’不’’’’’’禱’而雙方’’禱均未獲完’’應答’’’雖’仍有’間等’’’’禱’’部分應答’’’停止’禱’’候’’
’實’’做’’’’’我們’夠’’正’我’’’’’催’’而我們’終未做’’’’民族解’’’談’’我們’夠’’我們’未’麽做’’’’讓民族解’’’’’’’’生’中切實’有’’之’’我們’夠’’我們今天仍’絕’麽做’’’’讓戰’降’’集中’衛’民區’’減少’’傷’’減’對’’’’’’我們’夠’’我們’未’麽做’’堅’’’’’’’’’’基礎’實’’副’實’改革’’’們’’’’’’’體面’解’辦’’’’
’’’我們’’任領導’著’’勝’’’’幻’’’我們目’方’’’淖中’陷’’’那麽’’’’’’而’’’方’’不’’’諸實’’’’
’註’
. . . This is
a year of choice－a
year when we choose not simply who will lead us, but where we wish to be led;
the country we want for ourselves－and
the kind we want for our children. If in this year of choice we fashion new
politics out of old illusions, we insure for our- selves nothing but crisis for
the future－and
we bequeath to our children the bitter harvest of those crises. . . .
Today I
would speak to you . . . of the war in
Vietnam.
I come here . . . to discuss with you why I regard our policy here as bankrupt.
. .
I do not
want－as
I believe most Americans do not want－to
sell out American interests, to simply withdraw, to raise the white flag of
surrender. That would be unacceptable to us as a country and as a people. But I
am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
the course we are following at the present time is deeply wrong. I am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
we are acting as if no other nations existed, against the judgment and desires
of neutrals and our historic allies alike. I am concerned－as
I believe most Americans are concerned－that
our present course will not bring victory; will not bring peace; will not stop
the bloodshed; and will not advance the interests of the United States or the
cause of peace in the world.
I am
concerned that, at the end of it all, there will only be more Americans killed;
more of our treasure spilled out; and because of the bitter-ness and hatred on
every side of this war, more hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese slaughtered; so
that they may say, as Tacitus said of Rome: "They made a desert, and called it
peace."
And I do
not think that is what the American spirit is really all about.
Let me
begin this discussion with a note both personal and public. I was involved in
many of the early decisions on Vietnam, decisions which helped set us on our
present path. It may be that the effort was doomed from the start; that it was
never really possible to bring all the people of South Vietnam under the rule of
the successive governments we supported－governments,
one after another, riddled with corruption, inefficiency, and greed; governments
which did not and could not successfully capture and energize the national
feeling of their people. If that is the case, as it well maybe, then I am
willing to bear my share of the responsibility, before history and before my
fellow-citizens. But past error is no excuse for its own perpetuation. Tragedy
is a tool for the living to gain wisdom, not a guide by which to live, Now as
ever, we do ourselves best justice when we measure ourselves against ancient
tests, as in the Antigone of Sophocles: "All men make mistakes, but a good man
yields when he knows his course is wrong, and repairs the evil. The only sin is
pride."
The
reversals of the last several months have led our military to ask for 206,000
more troops. This weekend, it was announced that some of them－a
"moderate" increase, it was said－would
soon be sent. But isn't this exactly what we have always done in the past? If we
examine the history of this conflict, we find the dismal story repeated time
after time. Every time－at
every crisis－we
have denied that anything was wrong; sent more troops; and issued more confident
communiques. Every time, we have been assured that this one last step would
bring victory. And every time, the predictions and promises have failed and been
forgotten, and the demand has been made again for just one more step up the
ladder.
But all
the escalations, all the last steps, have brought us no closer to success than
we were before. Rather, as the scale of the fighting has increased, South
Vietnamese society has become less and less capable of organizing or defending
itself, and we have more and more assumed the whole burden of the war.
And once
again, the President tells us, as we have been told for twenty years, that "we
are going to win;" "victory" is coming.
But what
are the true facts? What is our present situation?...
The point
of our pacification operations was always described as "winning the hearts and
minds" of the people. We recognized that giving the countryside military
security against the Viet Cong would be futile－indeed
that it would be impossible－unless
the people of the countryside themselves came to identify their interests with
ours, and to assist not the Viet Cong, but the Saigon government. For this we
recognized that their minds would have to be changed－that
.their natural inclination would be to support the Viet Cong, or at best remain
passive, rather than sacrifice for foreign white men, or the remote Saigon
government.
It is
this effort that has been most gravely setback in the last month. We cannot
change the minds of the people in villages controlled by the enemy. . . . If, in
the years those villages and hamlets were controlled by Saigon, the government
had brought honesty, social reform, land－if
that had happened, if the many promises of a new and better life for the people
had been fulfilled－then,
in the process of reconquest, we might appear as liberators: just as we did in
Europe, despite the devastation of war, in 1944－45.
But the promises of reform were not kept. Corruption and abuse of administrative
power have continued to this day. Land reform has never been more than an empty
promise. Viewing the performance of the Saigon government over the last three
years, there is no reason for the South Vietnamese peasant to fight for the
extension of its authority or to view the further devastation that effort will
bring as anything but a calamity. . . .
The
second evident fact of the last two months is that the Saigon government is no
more or better an ally than it was before; that it may even be less; and that
the war inexorably is growing more, not less, an American effort. . . .The facts
are that thousands of young South Vietnamese buy their deferments from military
service while American Marines die at Khe Sanh.
The facts
are that the government has arrested monks and labor leaders, former
Presidential candidates and government officials－including
prominent members of the Committee for the Preservation of the Nation, in which
American officials placed such high hopes just a few weeks ago.
Meanwhile, the government's enormous corruption continues, debilitating South
Vietnam and crippling our effort to help its people. . . .
Third, it
is becoming more evident with every passing day that the victories we achieve
will only come at the cost of destruction for the nation we once hoped to help.
. . .
An
American commander said of the town of Ben Tre, "it became necessary to destroy
the town in order to save it." It is difficult to quarrel with the decision of
American commanders to use air power and artillery to save the lives of their
men; if American troops are to fight for Vietnamese cities, they deserve
protection. What I cannot understand is why the responsibility for the recapture
and attendant destruction of Hue, and Ben Tre and the others, should fall to
American troops in the first place.
If
Communist insurgents or invaders held New York or Washington or San Francisco,
we would not leave it to foreigners to take them back, and destroy them and
their people in the process....
If the
government's troops will not or cannot carry the fight for their cities, we
cannot our-selves destroy them. That kind of salvation is not an act we can
presume to perform for them. For we must ask our government－we
must ask our-selves: where does such logic end? If it becomes "necessary" to
destroy all of South Vietnam in order to "save" it, will we do that too? And if
we care so little about South Vietnam that we are willing to see the land
destroyed and its people dead, then why are we there in the first place?
Can we
ordain to ourselves the awful majesty of God－to
decide what cities and villages are to be destroyed, who will live and who will
die, and who will join the refugees wandering in a desert of our own creation? .
. .
Let us
have no misunderstanding. The Viet Cong are a brutal enemy indeed. Time and time
again, they have shown their willingness to sacrifice innocent civilians, to
engage in torture and murder and despicable terror to achieve their ends. This
is a war almost without rules or quarter. There can be no easy moral answer to
this war, no one-sided condemnation of American actions. What we must ask
ourselves is whether we have a right to bring so much destruction to another
land, without clear and convincing evidence that this is what its people want.
But that is precisely the evidence we do not have. What they want is peace, not
dominated by any out-side forces. And that is what we are really committed to
help bring them, not in some indefinite future, but while some scraps of life
remain still to be saved from the holocaust.
The
fourth fact that is now more clear than ever is that the war in Vietnam, far
from being the last critical test for the United States is in fact weakening our
position in Asia and around the world, and eroding the structure of
international cooperation which has directly supported our security for the past
three decades. . . . We set out to prove our willingness to keep our commitments
everywhere in the world. What we are ensuring instead is that it is most
unlikely that the American people would ever again be willing to . . . engage in
this kind of struggle. Meanwhile our oldest and strongest allies pullback to
their own shores, leaving us alone to police all of Asia. . . .
We are
entitled to ask－we
are required to ask－how
many more men, how many more lives, how much more destruction will be asked, to
provide the military victory that is always just around the corner, to pour into
this bottomless pit of our dreams? But this question the Administration does
not and cannot answer. It has no answer－none
but the ever-expanding use of military force and the lives of our brave
soldiers, in a conflict where military force has failed to solve anything in the
past. . . .
It is
long past time to ask: what is this war doing to us? Of course it is costing us
money－fully
one-fourth of our federal budget－but
that is the smallest price we pay. The cost is in our young men, the tens of
thousands of their lives cut off forever. The cost is in our world position－in
neutrals and allies alike, every day more baffled by and estranged from a policy
they can-not understand.
Higher
yet is the price we pay in our inner-most lives, and in the spirit of our
country. For the first time in a century, we have open resistance to service in
the cause of the nation. For the first time perhaps in our history, we have
desertions from our army on political and moral grounds. The front pages of our
newspapers show photographs of American soldiers torturing prisoners. Every
night we watch horror on the evening news. Violence spreads inexorably across
the nation, filling our streets and crippling our lives. And whatever the costs
to us, let us think of the young men we have sent there: not just the killed,
but those who have to kill; not just the maimed, but also those who must look
upon the results of what they do. . . .
The costs
of the wear's present course far out-weigh anything we can reasonably hope to
gain by it, for ourselves or for the people of Vietnam. It must be ended, and it
can be ended, in a peace of brave men who have fought each other with a terrible
fury, each believing that he alone was in the right. We have prayed to different
gods, and the prayers of neither have been answered fully. Now, while there is
still time for some of them to be partly answered, now is the time to stop.
And the
fact is that much can be done. We can－as
I have urged for two years, but as we have never done－negotiate
with the National Liberation Front. We can－as
we have never done－assure
the Front a genuine place in the political life of South Vietnam. We can－as
we are refusing to do today－begin
to deescalate the war, concentrate on protecting populated areas, and thus save
American lives and slowdown the destruction of the countryside. We can－as
we have never done－insist
that the Government of South Vietnam broaden its base, institute real reforms,
and seek an honorable settlement with their fellow countrymen. . . .
Even this
modest and reasonable program is impossible while our present leadership, under
the illusion that military victory is just ahead, plunges deeper into the swamp
that is our present course....
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