*EPF412 12/12/2002
Transcript: U.S. Expert Says Only War Will Stop Iraqi Nuclear Threat
(Interview with Kenneth Pollack of Brookings Institution) (6980)

Dr. Kenneth Pollack, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., and director of its Sabin Center for Middle East Policy, says his research has led him to conclude, "very reluctantly," that the United States has little choice but to go to war with Iraq in the next few years "to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and to threaten the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the entire world with the threat of nuclear devastation."

In a recent interview with the Washington File, Pollack said there is now a consensus among U.S., British, French, German and Israeli intelligence agencies that Iraq has everything it needs to build nuclear weapons, and while estimates vary as to when this will happen, "they all fall within the range of somewhere between four and six years."

War with Iraq may not be imminent, in his assessment, "but it can't be put off for very long, maybe two or three years at most."

Pollack said one of the principal reasons for concluding that war is inevitable is the failure of the 1990s multinational program designed to contain Iraq, a program that consisted of sanctions, no-fly zones and weapons inspections.

"It failed because the Iraqis got very good at defeating the system and because international support for containment, which was the sine qua non of its success, evaporated, and I don't think that there's any likelihood that containment can be rebuilt in the future," he said.

The main Iraqi threat to the United States, in Pollack's view, is its nuclear potential, not its purported ties to al Qaeda terrorists. He said he disagrees with the Bush administration on this point.

"While Iraq is unquestionably a state sponsor of terrorism, I do not believe that they are deeply tied to the al Qaeda network. In the past, Iraq's ties to al Qaeda were always very tenuous, and while the administration does say that they have new evidence, I have not seen it and I remain unconvinced that the Iraqis have made new overtures to al Qaeda," he said.

Asked why Iraq is being treated differently from countries with known nuclear capabilities, such as North Korea, Pollack replied that the response to Iraq is based on President Saddam Hussein's past behavior.

"While the North Koreans are unquestionably aggressive and expansionist," he said, "they have not attacked anyone in 52 years. By contrast, the Iraqis have attacked five of their neighbors in the last 22 years and threatened three others. ... In addition, Iraq has employed weapons of mass destruction against its own people and against its neighbors. It has violated virtually every international agreement it has ever signed and 16 U.N. resolutions against it."

Pollack noted that the international community has tried -- but failed -- to disarm Saddam Hussein by convincing him to relinquish his weapons of mass destruction voluntarily. Hussein's refusal, he said, has cost Iraq "somewhere between 150 to 180 billion [thousand million] dollars in lost oil revenues. It has destroyed Iraq's economy. It has destroyed Iraq's conventional armed forces, and it has impoverished the Iraqi people."

In the interview with the Washington File, the Brookings scholar also answered questions about the legal basis for a pre-emptive strike against Iraq, Arab countries' views of possible military action, and what a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq might look like.

[The Brookings Institution is an independent, nonpartisan research organization focusing on economics, foreign policy, and governance.]

Following is the transcript of the interview with Kenneth Pollack:

(begin transcript)

WASHINGTON FILE INTERVIEW WITH DR. KENNETH POLLACK, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WASHINGTON FILE: Dr. Kenneth Pollack is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute here in Washington, D.C. and Director of the Sabin Center for Middle East Policy. He has an area of expertise that includes Iran, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, as well as Middle East militaries. His most recent book is The Threatening Storm; earlier this year he wrote Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness. He's contributed to many scholarly journals as well.

Prior to joining Brookings, Dr. Pollack was director for Persian Gulf Affairs for the National Security Council, as well as the Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council. He was a senior research director at our National Defense University, and he has also worked with the CIA and the Council on Foreign Relations.

DR. POLLACK: Let me start by saying that I do not represent the Bush administration. I used to work for the Clinton administration, although I also did work under the first Bush administration at the Central Intelligence Agency. My views are my own.

With regard to the question of Iraq, I have concluded, and I will say very reluctantly, that I believe that the United States has little choice but to go to war with Iraq at some point in the near future. It may not have to be this winter, but it can't be put off for very long, maybe two or three years at most. The reason that I feel that the United States is going to have to take this course of action is because of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. There is now a consensus among Western intelligence agencies -- the United States, the British, the French, the German, the Israelis -- that the Iraqis have everything that they need to build nuclear weapons and it is simply a matter of time. And while estimates vary, they all fall within the range of somewhere between four and six years, if left to their own devices, that the Iraqis will have a nuclear weapon. And what we found out about Saddam Hussein's thinking after the Gulf War is extremely dangerous because Saddam apparently believes that once he's acquired a nuclear weapon, that it is the United States that will be deterred; that we will be so terrified of getting into a nuclear exchange with him that he will be free to resume his pattern of aggression. It was, of course, this pattern of aggression that led the United Nations in 1991 to decide to go to war with Saddam Hussein to prevent him from further attacking other countries in the region, and it is what led the United Nations to establish the program of containment which followed the Gulf War.

One of the principle reasons that I think the United States has little other choice than to go to war is because the program of containment failed. During the 1990s we tried very hard to make multinational containment of Iraq succeed. Unfortunately, it failed. It failed because the Iraqis got very good at defeating the system and because international support for containment, which was the sine qua non of its success, evaporated, and I don't think that there's any likelihood that containment can be rebuilt in the future. In addition, over the course of the 1990s, the United States did try many other ways to deal with the problem of Saddam Hussein, including trying covert action to overthrow him, to mount a popular revolt to aid the Iraqi opposition, many other methods as well, and all of these have failed. And at this point in time with Iraq getting perilously close to acquiring a nuclear weapon and having tried all the alternatives and seeing them fail, I think the United States has little choice but to go to war with Iraq at some point in the next few years to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon and to threaten the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the entire world with the threat of nuclear devastation.

WASHINGTON FILE: Why does the U.S. government think that war is the answer; how can the U.S. government promote war as the answer in Iraq while insisting that negotiations be the answer elsewhere?

DR. POLLACK: War should always be the last resort. The problem is -- and I think the Bush administration right now is in agreement -- is that we both believe that we've come to the last resort in Iraq. As I mentioned earlier from my own perspective, the United States has tried for 11 years to find other ways to deal with the problem of Saddam Hussein. Let's remember, in 1991 there was a consensus around the world, expressed through the Security Council, that Saddam Hussein was such a dangerous leader; he was such a threat to world peace and stability that he could not be allowed to reconstitute Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. That is why the United Nations put in place the program of containment, which consisted of sanctions, no-fly zones, the inspection regime, and a whole variety of other methods that were designed to keep Saddam from reconstituting those weapons of mass destruction. But, unfortunately, that program has failed. Containment is dead, and there is little to check Iraq from pursuing its weapons of mass destruction. It clearly has rebuilt many of its programs. And, as I said, it is simply a matter of time before Iraq acquires a nuclear weapon. And it is because of this threat and the fact that the threat still exists -- the same threat that we faced in 1991, although in this case even more dangerous because Iraq is much closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon -- because this threat still exists and because we have tried every other approach to dealing with the problem of Saddam Hussein, and all of the others have failed to deal with that problem, that I think that we are forced to go to war with Saddam. And we will be forced to go to war with Saddam to prevent him from acquiring nuclear weapons.

And I think the Bush administration adds on another point, which is that they believe that Saddam Hussein is also deeply involved in support not only for terrorism in general, but for support for the al Qaeda terrorist network, which, of course, is the network that perpetrated the September 11th attacks on the United States. And their belief is that because Iraq does provide considerable assistance to al Qaeda, it is necessary to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime to be sure that you can win the war on terrorism.

I will say that I do not agree with this point. While Iraq is unquestionably a state sponsor of terrorism, I do not believe that they are deeply tied to the al Qaeda network. In the past, Iraq's ties to al Qaeda were always very tenuous, and while the administration does say that they have new evidence, I have not seen it and I remain unconvinced that the Iraqis have made new overtures to al Qaeda and the Iraqis are now in bed in some meaningful sense with each other. I think that the main threat that the United States faces is the nuclear one. The administration believes it is the nuclear one plus the terrorism threat.

WASHINGTON FILE: North Korea is developing and already possesses nuclear weapons. Israel is assumed to have them as well. The U.S. does not appear to be getting ready to attack either of those. Can you explain why they are being treated differently from Iraq?

DR. POLLACK: Absolutely. And, of course, this gets to the other part of the last question. The biggest problem with Iraq is not just that it is determined to acquire nuclear weapons, but the pattern of Iraqi behavior over the last 34 years and what we know about Saddam's intentions once he acquires nuclear weapons. This makes Iraq unique. There are many countries in the world that currently possess nuclear weapons. I particularly am not concerned about many of them. I am not concerned about Great Britain's possession of nuclear weapons. I am not particularly concerned about France's possession of nuclear weapons. There are other countries whose possession I think is far more problematic. Pakistan, for instance, not because I think that Pakistan is necessarily going to go off and attack India, but more because Pakistan is an unstable state and we can't be certain that additional strains in the future might not cause it to come apart at the seams, and then who knows where those weapons of mass destruction might fall.

The same thing with North Korea. I am deeply concerned about North Korea because it is an aggressive country, because it has shown an unstable pattern of behavior in the past. However, what is striking about North Korea, what distinguishes it from Iraq, are several different features. First, while the North Koreans are unquestionably aggressive and expansionist, they have not attacked anyone in 52 years. By contrast, the Iraqis have attacked five of their neighbors in the last 22 years and threatened three others. North Korea is surrounded by very powerful countries -- South Korea, Japan, China and Russia. Iraq is surrounded by very weak countries, all of which, with the exception of Turkey and possibly Iran, are not strong enough to stand up to Iraq. In addition, Iraq has employed weapons of mass destruction against its own people and against its neighbors. It has violated virtually every international agreement it has ever signed and 16 U.N. resolutions against it, many of which were enacted under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter, which makes them binding on all members, and, therefore, this, too, is a unique feature.

It is all these unique elements of Iraq -- Saddam Hussein's decision-making pattern, his record of aggression, also his pattern of miscalculation. This is also a critical element, that Saddam Hussein is a serial miscalculator. Whereas the North Koreans are aggressive, they've also demonstrated prudence in their foreign policy. They have not attacked South Korea because they fully understand the threat there. Saddam Hussein has repeatedly embarked on wild foreign policy adventures that could and should have led to the destruction of his own regime, but did visit enormous destruction on his own country and on his neighbors. Time and again he has done it, making wild miscalculations about the odds of success. It is all of these features that make Iraq uniquely dangerous. There is every expectation that negotiations have a chance of succeeding with North Korea. I think that Saddam Hussein's track record and what we know about his thinking about nuclear weapons, everything we've seen from Iraq suggests that there is little hope that negotiations will succeed with Iraq. And we should remember for 11 years the United Nations has tried negotiations with Iraq. For 11 years the United Nations has tried to disarm Saddam Hussein by convincing him to voluntarily give up his weapons of mass destruction and during that time, we have tried everything from diplomacy to limited use of force and none of it has succeeded. Saddam Hussein has kept his weapons of mass destruction, has insisted on keeping his weapons of mass destruction, despite the fact that it has cost Iraq somewhere between 150 to 180 billion dollars in lost oil revenues. It has destroyed Iraq's economy. It has destroyed Iraq's conventional armed forces, and it has impoverished the Iraqi people. And despite all of that, Saddam has steadfastly refused to surrender his weapons of mass destruction.

Britain, on the one hand, and, say, the French and the Russians, on the other, it is not that we disagree on whether or not the Iraqis are hiding weapons of mass destruction. It is only that we disagree on how best to handle Iraq and how to convince Iraq to give up those weapons of mass destruction.

WASHINGTON FILE: How would you respond to the charge that attacking Iraq is merely a diversion from public attention on the failed war, if you believe that we have not succeeded on the war on terrorism?

DR. POLLACK: I do not speak for the Bush administration, so I cannot tell you exactly why every member of the Bush administration may want to invade Iraq. No one on the outside can really know why anyone makes this kind of decision. What I can tell you is that I think that there is good strategic rationale for going to war with Iraq, regardless of any other reasons. If the Bush administration does believe that this is necessary for some sort of domestic political reason, I think that would be a shame. I think that would be a wrong reason to go to war. But just because someone goes to war for a reason that you don't share doesn't mean that the war isn't justified. And what I've tried to spell out is that I think that there is a very valid justification, both a strategic justification and a legal justification, for going to war with Iraq at some point in the next few years to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons and to force Iraq to live up to its various obligations to the international community.

WASHINGTON FILE: A war with Iraq would divert resources from the war on terrorism, would it not?

DR. POLLACK: This is something that I am concerned about. A war with Iraq does have the potential to draw away resources from the war on terrorism. In fact, my own sense is that it already is doing so in intelligence assets, translators. Other important assets, special forces, are being taken away from the war on terrorism and being diverted to Iraq. That said, the United States is a very large, very powerful country. We have tremendous capabilities and it is true that the United States can take on multiple responsibilities at the same time. The question is simply a matter of how much of a diversion of assets will it prove to be and will it be significant? Will it be meaningful? Will it really hurt the U.S. efforts on the war on terrorism in going after Iraq?

Unfortunately, as a private citizen, as someone who is no longer in the U.S. government and no longer has access to the classified information, that's something that's difficult for me to ascertain. Unfortunately, because I don't have classified information, I have to rely on the government of the United States to do the right thing. And because we do live in a democracy here in the United States, we must trust our leadership. The president is the president of the United States. He was elected in a legal fashion. He is the legitimate leader of the United States of America, and I think that we, as Americans -- all that we can do is simply say to the president we want to make sure that before we do go into Iraq that it isn't going to be a meaningful drain of our resources and that it won't increase the risk in a significant way of terrorist attacks here in the United States. And I think that if the president can look the American people in the eye and say that it won't, that we have to trust him because we elected him, because he is the legitimate leader of this country.

WASHINGTON FILE: Some people charge that the real reason that the U.S. may attack Iraq is actually for oil. After all, it is well known that the Bushes have ties to the oil sector. How would you respond to a statement like that?

DR. POLLACK: Again, I can't speak for the U.S. government and I couldn't tell you with any degree of surety exactly why every member of the U.S. government who supports a war on Iraq does support it. What I can tell you is that there is a very sound, strategic rationale for going to war with Iraq. It is derived from a threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the region, to the world, to the United States from his determination to acquire nuclear weapons, his determination to turn Iraq into a new superpower, to dominate, if not control the Persian Gulf and its vital oil resources.

Whether or not there are people in the Bush administration who somehow think that they're going to be able to swing sweetheart deals with oil companies, I actually think it is quite unlikely. In particular, I am heartened by the fact that the Bush administration is increasingly speaking of the need for a U.N. effort to reconstruct Iraq. I think if the United States allows the United Nations to handle the reconstruction of Iraq and allows them to handle the sales of Iraqi oil to ensure that the money from those oil sales goes to feed the Iraqi people and not anyone else, I think that would be the surest guarantee that the United States is not simply manipulating Iraqi oil for its own benefit. I think that would do the most to reassure the entire world and to ensure the Iraqi people too that the United States wants to use Iraq's oil resources to enrich the lives of the average Iraqi and no one else.

WASHINGTON FILE: Why does the U.S. insist on enforcing the 16 resolutions you mentioned concerning Iraq, but it hasn't really enforced the U.N. resolutions regarding Israel's occupation on Palestinian territories?

DR. POLLACK: It's a very important question. There are two important distinctions, the first and most important of which is that many -- most, in fact, of the resolutions on Iraq were enacted under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter. That makes them binding on all members. It means that Iraq must comply. None of the resolutions enacted on the Arab-Israeli dispute were enacted under Article 7. That means that they are qualitatively different from those enacted against Iraq. The second point to make is that with regard to the Israel resolutions, there are two sides to that dispute. There are two sides at fault. Israel is not the only party at fault in the Arab-Israeli dispute. There is enough fault to go around. Arabs are equally to blame for all of the problems over the last 52 years that have plagued the Middle East. So it is not simply a matter of forcing the Israelis to comply with their parts of the resolutions. Those resolutions speak to both parties; to the wrongs that both Israelis and Arabs have committed against each other, and therefore even if these were enacted under Article 7 it would be up to the Arabs as well as the Israelis to comply, and I think that Israel and its backers make a very good case that the Arabs, too, have failed to live up to any of their obligations under the resolutions as well. Resolution 242, which is the key resolution, demands land for peace and while it is true that the Israelis have not given up the land, it is also true that the Arabs have not made peace.

WASHINGTON FILE: Can you explain in more detail what basis exists for international law for preemptive regime change attack on a sovereign state recognized by the U.N. as a sovereign state?

DR. POLLACK: Well, there are two issues here. First, there's the specific case of Iraq, and then there's the more general question. With regard to the more general question, there is the precedent of anticipatory self-defense. This is a concept which some international lawyers accept and others dispute. That said, it is also a concept which many governments have used in the past to justify their actions. The Swedish government used anticipatory self-defense to prevent Russian submarines from moving into their territorial waters in the 1980s and declared that they would strike those submarines if they found them in their territorial waters, and they justified that based on anticipatory self-defense. The British government, the Israeli government, the United States government, any number of other governments that employ anticipatory self-defense to justify their own actions.

In the case of Iraq, however, there's qualitatively different set of issues out there because of the existence of the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, which, as I just said, were enacted mostly under Article 7 of the U.N. Charter and therefore binding on all members, including Iraq. In the case of Iraq, Iraq was demanded by the United Nations to undertake a whole range of different activities, all of which it has singularly failed to accomplish. Under Resolution 678, which grants all member states of the U.N. the authority to use all necessary means to bring Iraq into compliance with those various resolutions, the use of force is well established under international law. It is well established that the United States, Great Britain or any other U.N. member states can use force against Iraq to bring it into compliance, to force it to comply with the various U.N. resolutions that have been enacted against it since 1990. That puts Iraq in a very different category in terms of international law.

WASHINGTON FILE: What do the Arab states want? What are they thinking? Do they want this war with Iraq? Do they not want it?

DR. POLLACK: Well, there's a wide range of views within the Arab world. The Gulf states, the GCC states, those that are closest to Iraq, those who neighbor Iraq want very much to have Saddam Hussein gone, and while in public they are reticent, in private they are very supportive of a U.S. military operation against Iraq. In fact, I'll put it differently. They are very supportive of a U.S. invasion of Iraq. They do have three conditions for the invasion. One, it must be a full-scale invasion because the Gulf states are very nervous of additional U.S. limited military operations against Iraq, which they believe simply angers Saddam Hussein, provoke him without getting rid of him. What they consistently say to us is, if you're going to use force against Iraq, do the job right, mount a full-scale invasion and get rid of Saddam Hussein because they want him gone.

Second, they wanted the United States to go to the U.N. and get an imprimatur from the United Nations, which the United States has effectively done. As far as the GCC states are concerned, we've effectively checked that box. The third thing is they would like to see the United States make a greater effort to begin negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians to bring down the level of violence between the Israelis and Palestinians. The administration is handling that by laying out what it calls a road map of how we get from where we are to a two-state solution, a Palestine and an Israel both living within secured and defensible borders. And so far the Gulf states have said that they think the road map is interesting, but what they want to see is whether or not the United States is really committed to pushing the road map forward.

Other Arab states have different views. On the one hand, for example, the Jordanians are caught between. On the one hand, King Abdullah is very supportive of the United States; wants a very good relationship with the United States and is determined not to repeat what he believes was the mistake his father made in 1991 of trying to sit on the fence. On the other hand, King Abdullah has real problems. His country is economically dependent on Iraq. It is largely Palestinian, and many of his Palestinian population supports Saddam Hussein, which makes it hard for him. As a result, I think the Jordanians would very much like to see Saddam Hussein gone, but they are also very concerned about the potential fallout of a war with Iraq in Jordan. Other Arab countries oppose or support a war with Iraq depending on their own particular circumstances, depending on to a large extent how the United States handles the war.

WASHINGTON FILE: There are a number of opposition groups in Iraq. Can you speak to where they stand now and where they might stand after an invasion of Iraq?

DR. POLLACK: There are huge numbers of opposition groups both inside and outside of Iraq. Some of them are very large and very important. The main Kurdish parties being the most important example. Right now, they can field somewhere between 50,000 and 60,000 light infantry, and they are in control of about one-sixth of Iraq's territory, that area of northern Iraq that is under their control. There are other Iraqi opposition groups which are much smaller and have much less influence than the Kurds do. In fact, every other opposition group has much less influence than the Kurds. The one other big example out there are the Shi'ite group, the main Shi'ite group, the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which is based largely in Iran.

I think that in the course of a U.S. regime change effort, a U.S. invasion of Iraq, all these opposition groups are going to have different opportunities to play different roles. First, once Saddam Hussein is gone, I think that every Iraqi, whether they are inside Iraq or outside Iraq, will have an opportunity to participate in the reconstruction of their country. What's unclear at this moment is how the Bush administration and its international allies intend to rebuild Iraq and how they might use different Iraqi opposition groups in that process of reconstruction. There is a great deal of talk about forming a transitional government or an interim government or even a government in exile using one or more of the different Iraqi opposition groups. This is still in the realm of conjecture, in the realm of ideas. It is not yet U.S. policy.

I will say for my own part that I think it would be a mistake for the United States to empower any particular Iraqi opposition group before the invasion or even to do so immediately afterwards. Instead, I think the United States should lead an international effort to reconstruct Iraq as a pluralist system, if not a full-blown democracy, under which every Iraqi would have an equal opportunity to participate in his or her government and that we would not privilege any particular group inside or outside the country a priori and give them a greater stake in the government, a greater ability to control or influence the government. Instead, we should be looking to enable all of the Iraqi people to participate regardless of what their political affiliations may be, regardless of whether they were part of the opposition or not.

WASHINGTON FILE: How would you respond to the suggestion that the U.S. attacks Islamic countries and that that's really at the crux of what's going on with Iraq?

DR. POLLACK: I would argue that the evidence indicates exactly the opposite. If you look at the course of U.S. interventions throughout the 1990s, more often than not the U.S. was intervening to protect Muslims. The United States intervened in Somalia to protect the people of Somalia, many of whom are Muslims. The United States intervened in Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Muslims against the Christian Serbs. The United States intervened in Kosovo to protect the Muslim Kosovar from the Christian Serbs. The United States intervened in Kuwait to protect the Muslim Kuwaitis from the Iraqis, and it also true, of course, that the Iraqis are Muslim. But the fact of the matter is most of the U.S. interventions over the last 12 years have been to protect Muslims either against another Muslim country or against a Christian country like Serbia.

WASHINGTON FILE: When there's talk of a U.S. attack on Iraq it's always assumed that the U.S. will win. It was also assumed that the U.S. would win when we went into Vietnam. Isn't that a dangerous assumption?

DR. POLLACK: As a student of military history, I'm always very wary of making predictions, and I'm always extremely nervous whenever someone suggests that any particular war is going to be easy. I've seen in my study of history any number of countries that went into a war supremely confident that they could win, and win with only a small percentage of their forces, only to find that this wasn't the case. As a result, when we're talking about a future war in Iraq, I try to be cautious. I try to bear in mind the lessons of history. That said, all of the evidence that we do have indicates that this is a war that the United States should be able to win and should be able to win quite handily. We have past experience fighting Iraqis. We fought them in 1991, and everything that we know -- and we have excellent intelligence on this -- is that the Iraqi army is much weaker than it was in 1991 and the U.S. military is much stronger than it once was. In addition, all of the other factors out there -- Iraq's political support, its economic situation, the fact that it is going to have few, probably no allies in the world -- all this also argues to the likelihood that the United States will be able to win in Iraq and probably be able to do so with minimum casualties, both on our side and in terms of Iraqi civilians.

That said, I think that it really does depend on how committed the United States is to this operation. If the United States only uses a small force to try to attack Iraq, then we will risk getting ourselves into a quagmire, getting bogged down, losing large numbers of our own troops and killing large numbers of Iraqi civilians. On the other hand, I think that it would bring a large force, 200,000 or more troops. I think that a victory is highly likely and that it is also highly likely that we will be able to do so with minimal casualties, both in terms of our own losses and Iraqi civilian losses. And I am heartened by the fact that the recent leaks that we are seeing in the American newspaper, which all seem to be planted by the Bush administration itself, indicate that the Bush administration is committed to using a very large invasion force -- 200,000 or more troops because they recognize that the difference between 200,000 troops and 50,000 troops could be the difference between a relatively quick and relatively painless victory or a very painful victory or possibly even a defeat.

WASHINGTON FILE: What about reports that the U.S. provided Iraq with satellite intelligence in the 1980s so it could use its chemical weapons against Iran? And there have also been reports that the U.S. shipped strains of anthrax to Iraq. If we did that, then do we have the right to attack them?

DR. POLLACK: The United States provided large amounts of intelligence to the Iraqi government during the 1980s to help the Iraqi government in its war with Iran. While we didn't provide specific intelligence about how Iraq should use its chemical weapons, we knew Iraq was using chemical weapons. We provided them the intelligence that they needed to win their battles, and I think there's no question that the Iraqis did use American intelligence to help them in using their chemical weapons. It is also true that the United States is responsible for shipping the Iraqis the strain of anthrax it has. All of this took place during the 1980s when the Reagan administration, I think incorrectly, engaged a policy of supporting the Iraqis against the Iranian government. That's not to suggest that the United States shouldn't have provided some support to the Iraqi government, but I think that the Reagan administration took it way too far and was much too callous in looking the other way and ignoring Iraqi misbehavior, in particular, their efforts to build advanced chemical and biological warfare capabilities. I think that it was a tremendous mistake to have allowed the Iraqis to procure any strains of anthrax or any other biological warfare agents. I think that was a terrible mistake.

That said, I don't believe that it's the case that this should somehow disqualify the United States from taking action against Iraq. I think the United States has learned from its mistakes. I think that in the Gulf War we demonstrated that we had learned that it was a terrible mistake in the 1980s to have supported Saddam Hussein's government, that it was a terrible mistake to have allowed Iraq to acquire these terrible capabilities, and that in the 1990-1991 Gulf War the United States took action to rectify that. Today, there's a very clear threat from Iraq, and I don't believe that it's the case that past mistakes should somehow disqualify future actions. Unfortunately, for better or worse, the United States is the only country in the world with the power to stop Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons, to prevent him from constituting another dire threat to the security of the Persian Gulf, of the larger Middle East, and, in fact, of the entire world. And for that reason, I think that it is incumbent upon the United States to lead an international effort to stop Saddam Hussein from posing that kind of a threat. And I think that while our past history should certainly inform our decisions, I don't think that for any reason it should be a block to new action.

WASHINGTON FILE: If weapon inspectors either find weapons or find that the Iraqis are being obstructive, do we need to go to the U.N. for a second resolution? Do we have to wait for that before there's an attack?

DR. POLLACK: No. The U.N. resolution was very clearly written. It says that if the Iraqis are found to be obstructing the inspection process, or holding back, or not declaring all of their prohibited programs, that this constitutes a material breach of the cease-fire resolution, Resolution 687, which ended the Gulf War. And it calls on member states to discuss this in the Security Council., but it very specifically says that it is not necessary for the United Nations to pass a second resolution against Iraq. Again, this was done intentionally. And remember, it was a 15-0 vote in the United Nations. All of the Security Council members agreed that it was not necessary for any member state to go and get a new resolution from the United Nations authorizing military force against Iraq. All that was required was that the issue be discussed in the Security Council. That is a very important difference.

WASHINGTON FILE: What are the things you would like to see done in the international community or by the American government to prepare for the war?

DR. POLLACK: While I do believe that it will be necessary for the United States to lead an international coalition against Iraq to remove Saddam from power because I believe that that is the only way that we're going to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons at some point in the near future, I also recognize that a war against Iraq will be quite costly and potentially very risky. And I think that there are a lot of things that the United States should do before we go to war to ensure that we minimize both the potential costs and risks of such a war. I would like to see the United States taking a much more active role in the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians. I'd like to see the United States begin negotiations between the two parties, convince the two sides to begin to make concessions to each other to bring down the level of violence. I think that would be enormously helpful, both before we invade Iraq and just as a good in and of itself. I'd like to see the United States pursue the war on terrorism further. I'd like the United States to be in a position that when we go into Iraq we are not so concerned about al Qaeda that there is a real risk that the al Qaeda terrorist network will be able to take advantage of our adventures in Iraq to conduct new terrorist attacks here in the United States.

I'd like to see the United States build as large an international coalition of support for a war with Iraq and a subsequent reconstruction of Iraq as we possibly can. I think the more countries that the United States has on board for this kind of an effort; the better off we will be, both in terms of our political, our military and our economic efforts. And I think what is important is for the United States to reach out to all our allies in the world to seek their counsel for going to war, to take on board their concerns, to try to address all of the different issues that are troubling them about a war before we go ahead and make the actual move to military operations. Beyond that, I would like to see the United States further build support within this country. I'd like to see the U.S. government continuing to work with the American people, to explain to the American people why this is such an important operation.

And finally, I'd like to see the United States take actions to ensure that other countries around the region -- Jordan, Pakistan, potentially some of the Gulf states -- are better insulated from potential fallout from an operation against Iraq. It is certainly the case that in declaring war and going to war with Iraq, the United States and its allies could create problems for some of these other states. As I mentioned, Jordan has its own problems. It is a fragile country and I'd like to see the United States take action to make sure that Jordan is insulated as best we can from the potential ramifications of a war with Iraq, to make sure that the risk of real instability in Jordan or Pakistan or any of these other countries is greatly minimized.

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

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