*EPF301 04/18/01
Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, Wednesday, April 18
(Russia, Burundi, China, human rights, Taiwan, Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan) (10,370)

State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher briefed.

Following is the State Department transcript:

(begin transcript)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Daily Press Briefing Index

Wednesday, April 18, 2001

BRIEFER: Richard Boucher, Spokesman

STATEMENT
-- Closure of Independent Media in Russia / Campaign Against Media Most is Politically Motivated

BURUNDI
-- Department of State Working with U.S. Embassy to Establish Facts of Coup /U.S. Embassy Personnel in Bujumbura are Safe and in Touch with Other U.S. Citizens in Country

CHINA
-- Status of Talks in Beijing / No Progress on Return of EP-3 Airplane / U.S. Looks Forward to Straightforward, Productive Meetings Where Both Sides Come in with Constructive Attitudes on Discussions

HUMAN RIGHTS
-- China Passes Motion to Take No-Action on U.S. Sponsored Resolution on Human Rights Situation / U.S. Thanks the European Union for Its Decision to Lobby Against The No-Action Motion

CHINA (TAIWAN)
-- Process of Review and Discussion Under Way on Arms Sale

MIDDLE EAST
-- Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza / U.S. Expects All Sides Will Abide by Their Commitments and Agreements They have signed / U.S. Continues to Call for an End to Attacks from and Incursions Into Area A
-- U.S. and Israel Continue Dialogue about Weapons Sales and Concerns about Chinese Capabilities in Some Areas
-- Assistant Secretary Walker's Visit to Region

IRAQ
-- U.S. Continues Discussion on Sanctions with Various Governments / Process of Definition is Under Way

AFGHANISTAN
-- Visit of U.S. Delegation to Assess the Humanitarian Crisis and Serious Drought That Has Struck that Country / U.S. Policy has been to Assist Afghan People

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2001 -- 12:55 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. If I can start, let me mention one statement that we'll put out the full details of in writing. We are issuing a statement on the closure of independent media in Russia. We are very concerned about the situation there. We have seen actions that have led many reasonable observers to conclude that the campaign against Media Most is politically motivated. We think that the Russian people have made very important gains in the last few years with regard to freedom of expression and the freedom of information in Russia, and we think that these gains are put in jeopardy by the actions that the Russian Government has taken, including the use of political pressure and intimidation tactics. So we have a statement on that that will be out in full detail after the briefing.

Now, with that mention, I would be glad to take your questions about this or anything else.

QUESTION: I'm tempted to follow it up, but there's so much going on I better move along. Burundi. What are you hearing? Are there Americans there? Are they safe? And what is the State Department's handle on this coup?

MR. BOUCHER: The events are unfolding. We are getting some reports from our Embassy out there, as well as from the noble people who work for the wire services. At this point, we are working with our Embassy to establish exactly what is happening, establish the facts, figure out what is going on out there.

I will tell you what we have heard, what we know as of now. Government radio announced that there was a group led by a military officer that has taken over the government. The radio announcement talked about several actions, including government suspension -- suspension of the national assembly and a curfew that would go into effect from 8:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. To the best of our knowledge at this time, none of these actions have actually been implemented.

What we do know at this point is our Embassy personnel are safe; our Embassy people are in touch with other American citizens in Burundi. The city of Bujumbura itself appears to be calm, and obviously they are working hard out there following the situation closely.

We have about 18 Americans assigned to the Embassy there, but there are probably fewer than 100 American citizens at any given time in Burundi at this point.

Q: Do you have any assessment of the group? I mean, are they known to the US?

MR. BOUCHER: No, at this point we don't have any real assessment. We are trying to ascertain the facts, see who it is, what the motivation is, what they are actually doing, and then we'll see what happens.

Q: So since you don't have any information on that, perhaps you can tell us exactly what the status is -- what happened, rather -- with the talks in Beijing on China.

Q: May I stay with this for a second?

Q: You're kidding.

Q: No, the South African Foreign Minister -- did they get into that? Had it happened?

MR. BOUCHER: The reports were starting to come in this morning when the Secretary met with South African Foreign Minister Zuma. They did talk in general terms about the events, concern about the situation in one of the key countries of the region, and went on to sort of not knowing exactly it was unfolding, couldn't really give each other a firm view on it. And then they discussed in general various issues that are raised by this, especially the support for democracy and freedom of Africa and the way to keep working that, South Africa's example to other governments that, in fact, peaceful and democratic means are much better than any other.

Q: Richard, can you tell us why US officials are being so pessimistic about the talks that happened in Beijing?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me tell you what happened at the talks. I liked your first question better.

Q: Well, your answer was about Africa, so --

MR. BOUCHER: Well, okay, let me answer your first question, and you can ask a second if you need to.

The meetings in Beijing -- our team met with the Chinese team at the Foreign Ministry for about two and a half hours today in China. I think the summary of the meeting is that we presented our views, they presented their views, and those views, as you know, are different. Nothing was settled today. I don't think we expected anything to be settled today. There was no progress on the issue of return of the airplane.

We have made quite clear that we look to the Chinese to take a positive and constructive attitude at these meetings. Our Ambassador will go tomorrow to the Foreign Ministry to make that point again, and to make the point that we are willing to have another meeting, but only if the Chinese are willing to discuss in a constructive manner the issues in the letter that we sent them, including the return of our airplane. So we will have no news on further meetings until after we have had that meeting at the Foreign Ministry.

Q: Is he meeting with the Foreign Minister, or is he meeting with --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not sure exactly who he will meet tomorrow.

Q: Richard, does this aircraft carry a black box which would indicate whether or not it made turns at the point when it hit the plane?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. You would have to ask the Pentagon on that.

Q: Richard, if you didn't expect this to be solved today, why have you gone to the degree you have in terms of saying we're not going to go on?

MR. BOUCHER: I think what we said was we looked forward to a straightforward, productive meeting, a meeting where both sides came in with a constructive attitude on the discussions. What is important to us is that we do discuss all the issues that were outlined in the letter that we sent to the Chinese, that Admiral Prueher sent to the Chinese, including the return of our airplane.

In terms of the continuation of discussions tomorrow, since there was not a productive discussion of the return of our airplane at the meeting today, we want to be reassured that they are willing to do that before we continue these discussions.

Q: Richard, if we don't continue the talks, if tomorrow we decide they don't have a constructive attitude, what do we do? Does our team just come home, or what are the next steps diplomatically? And I know you're going to say, "I'm not going to speculate --

MR. BOUCHER: That is known as a hypothetical. The first thing we are going to do is we are going to sit down and talk to them about discussing the whole agenda productively.

Q: What if they don't (inaudible) back?

MR. BOUCHER: Sorry. That's another what-if question, Terri. I just can't do it for you.

Q: You said prior to the talks that the Chinese had promised not to be polemical in these discussions. Were they in the talks polemical at this point, and what happened to that agreement?

MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I had relayed before the talks what they told you. I am not going to be able to characterize their attitude at this point.

Q: You told us yesterday that the Chinese told you --

MR. BOUCHER: We told you the Chinese had told us that --

Q: -- that they were going to be non-polemical.

MR. BOUCHER: Exactly.

Q: So did they --

MR. BOUCHER: I told you what they told us.

Q: Did they follow through on that?

MR. BOUCHER: I told you what they told us. I'm not going to try to characterize it at this moment.

Q: A couple of ambiguities here. No progress on return of the plane, but did they talk -- did the two sides talk about the return of the plane?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we would say that the issue of the return of our aircraft was not discussed in any significant manner, in any manner that was productive.

Q: Okay, and one other little cloudy thing. You said you were going to go tell them. Is the message, "We have to talk constructively about this issue for us to keep going," or, "We have to talk about this issue and know that the plane is coming back before we talk to you again"? What are you looking for -- constructive conversation?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't pick A or B, because I don't think A or B is exactly right. The message is that we want to talk about all the issues that are in the letter, including the issue of return of our airplane. As you know, that letter was heavily discussed with the Chinese. It was based on understandings reached with the Chinese, and we want to discuss all those issues and we want to see a productive discussion of those issues.

Q: You said that you had an understanding that they were to discuss all the issues mentioned in the letter. Do you consider that the Chinese have reneged on that understanding?

MR. BOUCHER: I am not going to start using other terms than I have so far. We want to see that happen. I would say that we have not seen that happen.

Q: Is the Ambassador going in tomorrow to tell the Chinese that, look, you agreed to this agenda that is in the letter, and you are not doing it? Now, are you going to do it or not? Is that --

MR. BOUCHER: I hate to deal with 28 different paraphrases, but I have told you what our characterization of what the Ambassador is going to say, and I am going to just stick with that and not let everybody in the world paraphrase it and have me say yes or no. Sorry.

Q: Richard, the Xinhua statement following the meeting today said that it was discussing the April 1 incident and other related issues. Did they bring up any other issues that we would say were not necessarily stemming -- that were beyond the agenda that we set?

MR. BOUCHER: I think you know from our letter that there were a number of things outlined in the letter: the incident itself, the accident itself, the return of the aircraft -- I think I'm missing something here -- and then we acknowledged the Chinese intended to raise their concern overall about flights. They did that. So to that extent, yes, other related issues. They raised their concerns about the flights overall. I think what is important to us is that we see all the issues raised.

Q: Did they give any indication why they wouldn't talk about returning the plane? Did they say they weren't ready to?

MR. BOUCHER: That's a question you have to ask them.

Q: Richard, you said that these talks would show what kind -- you know, well, how the relationship was likely to develop, or something along those lines, I seem to remember. What conclusions have you drawn so far on that?

MR. BOUCHER: Haven't drawn conclusions yet. We'll draw the conclusions after whatever meetings we have tomorrow and whatever happens.

Q: Richard, you have enunciated in each of the categories of things that you wanted to talk about what the US view was, and the Chinese have enunciated what they felt their view was. Did you hear anything different in their views on any of these topics? Was there any movement at all in their position on, say, continuation of flights, aircraft?

MR. BOUCHER: No. As I said, there was not progress made on these things. I think it's not surprising to any of us that we went in with a position, they went in with a position, we started our position quite clearly, and they had a position they wanted to state clearly as well. But what we are looking for is an attempt to address these in a more productive manner, a more straightforward manner, and to look at all the issues in the letter and not just to use it as a forum for restating views that we've heard before.

Q: Have the Chinese definitively told the United States that they don't want to send the plane back ever? Can you characterize where you went into the meetings with this? I mean, have they flatly said it's ours now?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I really -- at this point, trying to characterize Chinese views would (a) be not my job and (b) be much too difficult for me.

Q: Richard, perhaps you won't answer this either, then.

MR. BOUCHER: Okay.

Q: But I'll ask anyway. Did the Chinese tell you that they considered the incident to have taken place in Chinese territorial air space or --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. You would have to ask the Chinese that, what their version is.

Q: I'm asking you what they told you in the meeting.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, and I'm not going to be able to tell you everything they told us in the meeting. It's not our practice to convey the views of other governments here.

Q: (Inaudible.)

MR. BOUCHER: That's true.

Q: How would you characterize the US response to Chinese raising the issue of continued international reconnaissance flights, our reconnaissance flights? I mean, how did we respond to that?

MR. BOUCHER: I think we have made quite clear our position over a number of days that activities carried out in international waters, as we carry out these, international air space, international waters, are completely legal, are completely non-threatening; that these are unarmed aircraft and that they carry out normal activities that are routinely carried out by a number of nations, including China.

Q: If tomorrow's meeting does not go well with Ambassador Prueher and the Foreign Ministry, that as far as the US is concerned there is no point in the delegation staying there and that they should return to the US?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, that is the same question I was asked before. That's a what-if question. I just can't do it at this point.

Q: Well, the talks were supposed to --

MR. BOUCHER: The answer is we'll see. That's the only answer I can give you -- logically, reasonably -- at this point. We'll see.

Q: Can you characterize the atmosphere of the meeting, and in particular how it ended? Did it end amicably, or did it end kind of people -- jaws set?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I want to characterize it.

Q: A related question? China, but not the plane. Do you have anything to say today about the Zhong Gong leader who may be on his way to the United States?

MR. BOUCHER: I think yesterday afternoon we said that anything we had to say on that would be in the hands of the Department of Justice.

Q: Yes, but they say it is in your hands.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, we'll try to work it out with them, but I don't have anything further to say at this point, since he is on US territory.

Q: Okay, are you preparing an advisory for Chinese Americans who plan to visit China, telling them of the possible dangers of being arrested as spies or getting into trouble with the authorities in some way?

MR. BOUCHER: We have a certain amount of information in our Consular Information Sheet already for American citizens of Chinese origin about Chinese attitudes, about Chinese activities, about dual citizenship questions. So I think, first and foremost, we would refer people to that and invite them to look at that.

We are continuously looking at the situation with regard to different travelers. This is one of the issues that we are looking at now, whether we think it needs to be revised and something new done or not. I can't say. It is still under review.

Q: So we've had no decision on it?

MR. BOUCHER: At this point, no decision.

Q: So any report to the contrary that this thing was going to be released is basically incorrect at the moment, premature?

MR. BOUCHER: There is no decision on it.

Q: Richard, in the meeting itself, did the United States say anything about the potential impact on the relationship?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I don't have the full text yet of what was said and what was not. We have made quite clear our views about the overall relationship, the need to return to a productive stance, and the need to use this meeting in a productive manner.

Q: Richard, was there any shouting at this meeting?

MR. BOUCHER: Not that I have heard of.

Q: Can you --

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I don't have a full -- well, in that case, not just a full text, but I don't have the audio of it.

Q: I have one on the US resolution, though. Can we go to that?

Q: I just want to ask a technical question. How did this information that you have just relayed to us get back from Beijing to here? Did the Ambassador call, did the Under Secretary -- Deputy Under Secretary of Defense? What was the mechanism for getting this back to the Secretary and to the White House, and presumably the Pentagon?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. We got a report from the team, sort of an initial report from the team, and I just don't know whether they called sort of the ops center who did notes for everybody, or whether they actually talked to the Secretary or the Deputy at this point. I will have to double-check that.

Q: But it was through the State Department? They didn't communicate directly to the White House -- the team?

MR. BOUCHER: I expect they might have.

Q: You don't know?

MR. BOUCHER: But I don't know.

Q: Can we talk about the resolution being defeated in Geneva -- or shelved, I should say -- tabled, if you don't want to say defeated.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, no, that's not the appropriate -- it is one of these very complicated situations. The motion was a motion of no action by the Chinese, so people who voted in favor voted for no action on a China resolution; and people who voted against voted no, we want action on a China resolution; and people who abstained abstained.

So let me go through this. We think it is unfortunate that more members of the Human Rights Commission didn't choose to take up the China resolution at the Commission this year. The no-action motion passed this year, as it has in previous years. I will go through some of the history in a minute.

Nonetheless, we believe that we and other countries who lobbied against the no-action motion were able to effectively make the point that the human rights record of member-states should be reviewed and that no states should be exempt from scrutiny by the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Commission is the world's preeminent human rights forum, and it deserves to discuss any issues involving human rights.

We do want to thank the European Union for taking its principled decision to lobby against the no-action motion. We would also like to thank all the countries who voted against the no-action motion, despite considerable pressure to do otherwise. Their votes were a clear signal to China.

We had two goals in sponsoring this resolution: to encourage China to adhere to international standards of human rights, and; second of all, to focus international attention on the worsening human rights situation in China in the past year.

We once again urge China to respond to the concerns raised about its human rights situation during the Commission session, and to move quickly to bring its human rights practices into compliance with its obligations under international human rights instruments.

The history of this -- I will go into a little bit of the particular China motions, since you probably need the numbers. If you go back to '95, which in 1995 there was a tie vote on the no-action resolutions, 22 to 22 with 9 abstentions. That was the last time that the resolution itself, the resolution on China, was actually brought to a vote, and it was defeated by one vote at that time.

In '97 then, the resolution -- the no-action resolution was defeated 27 to 17 with 9 abstentions. In '99 --

Q: Wait, wait. What was it that was approved -- the no-action?

MR. BOUCHER: The no-action. Yes, that's right. The no-action resolution was approved 27 to 17 with 9 abstentions.

In '99, the no-action resolution was approved 22 to 17, with 14 abstentions; in 2000, was approved 22 to 18, with 12 abstentions; and this year, there were 23 votes for no action, 17 against it, and 12 abstentions and one absent. So you see, with some exceptions, it has been approximately at the same level every year. It varies from year to year depending on the precise membership of the committee.

What I can say is that this year on this resolution, as well as the Cuba resolution and some others, the United States engaged in a very high-level and very active lobbying campaign. The President raised this with other governments. The Secretary of State raised this with other governments. The National Security Advisor raised it with other governments. We have been doing this consistently for some time from meetings a month or two ago with the European Union, discussions with the Czech Government and others on the Commission several months ago about how to approach some of these issues, discussions for example with the Mexicans throughout. I think when the Secretary last week flew from Paris to Macedonia, the Romanian Foreign Minister was with us on the airplane and they had a discussion there of some of these resolutions. Our ambassadors have been in -- around the world. We have been making phone calls from the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, Under Secretaries for Political Affairs and Economic Affairs. So we have had a very active campaign going, and as we proceed through the votes today obviously we'll see how well we did on that campaign.

But in the end, I have to go back to our basic goals. Our basic goals are raising these issues, getting the international attention to them, and bringing some focus to the human rights records of these countries. And that is principally why we keep doing this, even though we don't always win.

Q: How did the Congo and Mauritius vote?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have the detailed votes yet on who voted for what.

Q: So you don't know if you are including them in the countries that you're thanking?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know exact -- all I have is the base --

Q: Any consequences for those who voted in favor of --

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to start saying things like that at this point. I think it's clear that we have overall relationships with people that we try to maintain and try to pursue. Obviously our relationships are better with people that we agree with, that work with us on human rights around the world. But beyond that, I don't think I could say anything.

Q: Does increasing detentions and the increasing problems with Falun Gong or discrimination against Falun Gong -- I mean, what is it going to take to change these numbers? The US really hasn't made any progress. As you say, it's been stable but the Chinese record, according to our Human Rights Report, is deteriorating.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think, as you all know, there is a lot of lobbying on this. Not all of it has to do with the human rights situation. Our lobbying on these issues, whether it's China or Cuba, is based on the human rights situation. We make the determination whether to go for a resolution or not based on the human rights situation. The issues that we raise to international attention are facts and things that have occurred with regard to human rights, and particularly what we see in China is the worsening human rights situation.

I would say that, unfortunately, much of the lobbying on the other side is not based on the human rights situation; it's based on other factors, and some governments make up their mind on other factors. So we'll have to see how to carry this forward, but there is at least a certain amount of attention to the human rights situation. The process itself brings pressure on these countries to try to bring their human rights situation more in conformity with international standards. And as I said, we are pleased that, for example, this year the European Union took a principled position, like ours, and was very active in lobbying as well, alongside with us.

Q: Do you have anything that the Administration can point to that shows that all the effort that has gone into this, all the lobbying and whatnot, has made any difference whatsoever in China's human rights records, in the way that China treats its people?

MR. BOUCHER: I would say that over the years we have, on occasion, seen some kind of progress by China in some areas towards meeting human rights standards. They have signed up for some of the international conventions, et cetera, and we have welcomed that where it has occurred. But the overall situation, as outlined in much detail in our Human Rights Report, has continued to go downhill.

I think part of what you have to ask yourself is not just have we -- yes, in certain occasions, people have been released. On certain occasions, China has signed up to particular documents. But overall, the situation has continued to worsen. I think what you have to ask yourself is, absent the international scrutiny, absent our raising these issues, would countries consider they had a free hand? Would the situation perhaps be even worse?

Q: But, I mean, beyond -- I recognize that China has signed onto these human rights -- what are they called -- human rights conventions, but they haven't implemented them.

MR. BOUCHER: No, and that's where the overall issue -- that is the overall issue. The overall issue is not just sort of -- it is not just case by case, it's not just having a debate. It is seeing an actual change to get countries who have pledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights, or the Economic and Social Rights. Getting them to actually implement those things, getting countries to live up to international standards. It is not a US view of the world that we are looking for. It is to get countries who have made commitments to live up to international standards, to actually live up to those standards. And overall with China, I would say that is a broad process that occurs on many fronts. We are looking for China to live up to international standards with regard to many, many different areas of its interaction with the world.

Q: Can you say what these other factors are? China, you said, used pressure --

MR. BOUCHER: Oh, that they are lobbying on the other side? I would just describe it as much more political than based on the actual facts of the human rights situation. Again, I'm not --

Q: Do they threaten retribution? Do they --

MR. BOUCHER: I don't want to go that far. I can't go into any detail on their arguments, and certainly it is not for me to make them.

Q: What are the recommendations on arms sales to Taiwan?

MR. BOUCHER: There is no recommendations, no decisions by the President at this point, no recommendations gone to the President, and he hasn't made any decisions. So there is a process of review and discussion that is under way, and that continues.

Q: Is there any pivotal meeting coming up?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm sorry, one question at a time.

Q: Have any recommendations gone to somebody at a lower level then?

MR. BOUCHER: I have no idea. But the only thing that matters is that recommendations -- that the President has a chance to consider and make his decision.

Q: You said they are not in yet. Is there a pivotal meeting that -- are you saying there hasn't been a pivotal meeting yet that is still in the future?

MR. BOUCHER: I didn't say that.

Q: Or does it work that way?

MR. BOUCHER: It doesn't always work that way. It is up to the President to decide, not only when he decides but how it decides. There is an interagency process of review and discussion and evaluation that goes on, and that process is under way. As part of that process, we consult with Taiwan authorities. We sometimes consult with members of the Hill. But we have an interagency process that evaluates the various requests and the needs, and that process is under way. Decisions don't get made until it culminates in recommendations or in a decision by the President, and when that happens we may or may not be able to let you know.

Q: Richard, would it be safe to say that these recommendations are -- the germ of the recommendation that is going to eventually come out was something that was discussed along with the plane incident at the lunch the Secretary hosted here for Vice President Cheney and National Security Advisor Rice?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I wouldn't do that because when I came down here they were just going into lunch, so I have no idea what they discussed. I am sure they will discuss a lot of things, as they usually do.

Q: I have some Middle East questions. Regarding yesterday, officials in Prime Minister Sharon's office say that there was a decision taken early yesterday morning in Israel to withdraw from Gaza, and that they conveyed that message to the Americans before you released Secretary Powell's statement yesterday.

Can you say when the Israelis informed the Americans of their decision to withdraw, and can you also describe the contacts that were between the US and Israeli officials prior to the statement yesterday?

MR. BOUCHER: I think the specific answer to those two questions is no. Let me try to review what I can tell you.

We obviously are in constant contact with the Israelis at a number of levels and a number of ways. Before we issued our statement yesterday, I don't know of the precise timing or when they told us they were pulling out, frankly. But I would say two things about it. One, there were a number of different views, including public statements that went to the other side, of not withdrawing.

And second of all, I would say that what matters in all this is what happens on the ground, or whether it's mortar attacks or reactions, or bulldozers, or loss of life. What matters all along to us here is what happens on the ground. So that is what we are focused on, and if we don't think somebody should be sitting where they are sitting, we will keep saying it until they get up and move.

Q: To follow up, did the US inform the Israelis that they were going to -- of the content of the statement they were going to release and urge them to withdraw before you issued the statement?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know if we specifically told them we were issuing a statement. We certainly told them of our views of the situation at an early moment yesterday, if not already in Tel Aviv before that.

Q: Richard, you said you don't know the exact timing, but it does very much matter; if the Arab world has a perception that if the United States publicly exhorts Israel to do something, and that something happens, it looks like cause and effect. And if it isn't cause and effect, if the Israelis in advance had said, after some preliminary discussion, hearing of your displeasure privately, which is different, that they are going to pull out of this patch of Gaza, that is another matter.

I mean, there is -- I don't want to be redundant, but you get my point. Can you clarify whether Israel saluted when the United States --

MR. BOUCHER: I get your point, but it is no different --

Q: -- when the United States blew a bugle, or did the United States know all along that -- not all along, but knew in advance that Israel intended -- after all, they were already saying they might stay a day or two only? Your call.

Q: That's several points --

Q: (Inaudible.)

Q: One person --

MR. BOUCHER: I think they were quite -- all right, you guys can argue, or I'll explain, whatever. There were quite a number of different things being said in public at that point.

Second of all, I'm not sure that the conclusion that you draw, or that you say could be drawn from the sequence of events and public statement and withdrawal, would be changed by knowing exactly when we heard, because we did express our view privately as well. And so you could draw that conclusion from the timing of private statements and withdrawal.

So I don't actually think it clarifies anybody's conclusion to try to pin these things down in that much detail, that generally -- I'll tell you the facts. We made known our views to the Israeli Government. We issued a statement. We saw them withdraw from these areas where we didn't feel they should be. We are glad to see that they withdrew. We issued a statement, though, that had to do with a lot of things that were going on in the region -- with the issues of reaction, with the issues of the need to get security talks going back again. And so there are a whole number of things that continue to be important to the United States that we continue to see as important for resolving and calming the situation that we continue to hold to that remain important to us.

Q: Richard, it does make a difference if you knew in advance; then you were not risking a confrontation. So I'd like to ask again, did you know in advance when you made the statement, and therefore did you know that there wouldn't be a confrontation with the Israelis on this? And secondly, did you perhaps want to give the impression of cause and effect?

MR. BOUCHER: I think anybody who wants to draw conclusions is probably going to draw them anyway. As I said, there is a whole number of things in our statement. You could as easily draw the conclusion that we are ineffectual by the fact that they didn't have a security meeting yesterday or they didn't do some of the other things that we've pointed to, or that we haven't seen on the Palestinian side the kind of calls for an end to violence to stopping the shootings that we've looked for.

Nonetheless, I don't think that's the way we see it ourselves. We see it ourselves as important for the United States to be as clear as possible with the parties on the steps we think they need to take. And it is important for the United States to be as clear as possible with both parties on the things that we think should be done.

I don't know the exact timing of when the Israelis told us. I don't know the timing of when they told us in relation to my statement -- to the statement we did for the Secretary yesterday, nor do I know it in relation to the other public statements that some other Israelis were making that they were going to stay there for a long, long time. So I go back to the basic point: What matters is what happens on the ground; what matters to us is what happens on the ground, and our desire is to see action on the ground either to reverse steps that we don't think are wise or to carry forward on steps that can help calm the situation.

Q: Richard, the Israelis went in again across the border into Gaza from the Egyptian side this morning. Do you have anything to say about that?

MR. BOUCHER: I think those reports are still fairly unclear. I don't have anything on that at this moment.

Q: And another thing is that people are saying that this is the first criticism of Israel by the new Administration, the first direct criticism. Would you agree with that? And if so, did Sharon cross a line? Is there -- why -- is this a new policy? Is this a shift in the policy of the new Administration?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I need to stand up here and recite every time we have criticized something that Israel has done. We have been, I think, fairly clear if you look at our Human Rights Reports, some of our attitudes about construction activity, some of our attitudes basically about things that people should do.

But what is important to us is the work we can do with the parties, and we reflect that in the public statements, about the actions, the positive actions, that people should be taking and can be taking to resolve the violence and to calm the situation. Those are the things that we continue to work on. We continue to work to try to facilitate security meetings between the two sides, for example. That is where -- that is the kind of action we would really like to see. Reversing something that we think was a mistake is good, but what we want to see is for people to do positive things to calm the situation on both sides. And for the Palestinians, we have made quite clear what we think that involves, as well as for the Israelis.

Q: Richard, the part on the Israeli missile underneath the wing of the Chinese fighter, how does the Administration feel about the proliferation of such capable weapons systems which could have been used against your own planes?

MR. BOUCHER: Obviously there is a certain level of concern that we have about Chinese capabilities. I would say that the Israelis did tell us about the sale, I believe after the sale went forward. It was quite some time ago, frankly. We continue -- at this moment in terms of present day policy, we have an ongoing dialogue with the Israelis about weapons sales, about our concerns about Chinese capabilities in some area, and that is a dialogue that we continue at this point.

Q: Can I follow up? Did Israel break any agreements there? Does that weapon have any implicit American capabilities or --

MR. BOUCHER: I think that weapon is indigenously produced based on indigenous technology.

Q: You're not sure?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm pretty -- completely sure, 99.9 percent sure. That is the way it has been described to me. Let me put it that way.

Q: In previous meetings between the Bush Administration and the Sharon Government, has the State Department or the White House, that you know of, ever said specifically that the US would not tolerate any incursions into what is known as the Area A?

MR. BOUCHER: This issue came up once before. We addressed it in public. I think we have made quite clear to both parties all along --- we're going to have to do something the door in the hallway, at least get a different alarm. I'm sorry, I'll try to give you a serious answer once the door stops. We need David Letterman with one of his anti-car alarm things.

All right, to go back to Eli's question, that we have -- first of all, the question of incursions into Area A have come up before. We are opposed to attacks from Area A or incursions into Area A, and I think we made that quite clear when it came up a couple weeks ago.

Second of all, we have made clear that one of the views that we have expressed to both parties -- and I think we've expressed it publicly as well -- is that they need to carry out the commitments they have made to each other. They need to abide by the commitments they have made to each other and agreements that they have signed and commitments that they -- agreements that they have reached.

And it has been very important to us when, for example, looking to the Palestinians to call for the end to violence, to stop the attacks coming from their areas, to say that these are things you have agreed to with the Israelis. And it is important, we think, for both parties to respect commitments that they have made. And that was an issue that was raised by the Israeli action of yesterday and that was one of the issues that we raised in our statement.

Q: Would you say that the circumstances which led Secretary Powell to call Israeli actions "excessive and disproportionate" are no longer the case right now?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know that it is -- we reacted to a specific series of events. To the extent those events have concluded, then, yes, our concerns about those type of activities would remain. I don't know that they are actually -- those type of activities taking place today, but it is kind of funny to say that they no longer exist. Our concerns about those types of activities would remain; that particular series of events is over.

Q: Can you comment on Ned Walker's visit to Damascus? Any progress there, or what he discussed with Syrian officials?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm not sure I have much of a readout yet. Let me see what we did hear about it.

He departed for the region Monday evening. He was in Jordan today, is headed to Syria this evening, a stop in Turkey later in the week, to discuss regional issues, including Iraq, pursuing our ideas for moving to a system that removes Saddam Hussein's ability to use sanctions as a weapon against the Iraqi people and which establishes controls focused strictly on military and weapons of mass destruction items.

As far as any further onward travel beyond Syria and Turkey, there is no determination on anything else.

Q: You described today to our correspondent in Oman the Egyptian-Jordanian initiative as "very constructive". Can you elaborate on that? How does the Administration see that as very constructive?

MR. BOUCHER: I can't go beyond what I have said yesterday. We see the role that Egypt and Jordan have sought to play as being constructive.

Q: Can you say whether the Secretary has spoken to anyone in that region in the last 24 hours?

MR. BOUCHER: He spoke to Foreign Minister Peres this morning, and of course he talked to him yesterday. I think we reported on that yesterday.

Q: He talked to Peres?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes, Foreign Minister Peres yesterday.

Q: Did he -- is he talking to Palestinians?

Q: Or Syrians?

MR. BOUCHER: Not that I am aware of at this point.

Q: On Peres yesterday, was that just once or was it twice? Once after the withdrawal? Because yesterday before the withdrawal, after you delivered his statement, you said he had spoken to him after the actual move into Gaza. And then -- so are you saying that he spoke with him again after the Israelis pulled out?

MR. BOUCHER: No, he spoke to him once yesterday and once today.

Q: Can you say if there are any plans for him to speak to Arafat or any other Palestinian --

MR. BOUCHER: At this point, I will report phone calls as they happen. I don't know of any further plans.

Q: Richard, did the Israeli incursion into Gaza and the violence of the last -- what, four days -- did it -- has it complicated Mr. Walker's mission, do you think?

MR. BOUCHER: We had the same question yesterday, I think. I can give the same answer as yesterday if I remember it, but I think you asked it, and I gave the -- I'll give you the same answer I gave yesterday on that.

Q: Richard, if you're going to Syria -- or, excuse me, Ned Walker is going to Syria at a point where they are asking for serious help, which is very crucial on Iraq policy, but at the same time is (a) asking Syria to reign in Hezbollah a little bit stronger, and also, you know, the whole need for Syria to have a stronger reaction from the United States against Israel. So, I mean, does it at least -- can you say at least that it definitely complicates -- that it complicates his mission, if it doesn't change it altogether?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, I will stick with the answer I gave you yesterday, that we recognize that there are relationships between these different issues and in the way they are perceived in the region.

I think people also recognize -- people in the region recognize the United States is very active on all these fronts. We are not just expecting to work with people on Iraq policy. We are expecting to work with people in the region on the issues of peace, the issues of Israelis and Palestinians, the issues of withdrawal and respect for Resolution 425, and possible other tracks of the peace talks.

So these are issues that we have been active in. We remain very much engaged. I think we have heard from parties in the region they want to see us engaged; we are engaged. We are working with them. We are working with the parties to try to bring about positive change on all these issues.

Q: Have the Syrians said in any way that their help is contingent upon a stronger US reaction against Israel for the --

MR. BOUCHER: If you are asking me to look at public statements, I'm not aware of any. In terms of private statements, at this point Ned Walker goes there tonight. I think I will leave it to them.

Q: Richard, you keep talking about a regional approach, and many of us, I think correctly, have assumed that this was a recognition of the psychological links between the Iraq problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

How are you going -- what are you going to offer to countries like Jordan and Syria to persuade them to cooperate with your smart sanctions in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict? What are you going to offer them on --

MR. BOUCHER: I think, in some ways, that is a quid pro quo that doesn't necessarily exist. Okay?

Q: Well, look, I mean, are you going to say --

MR. BOUCHER: All right, can I explain? First of all, a different sanctions regime is something that they have wanted. Right? They have been the ones that said we shouldn't impede the flow of civilian goods to the Iraqi people. They are the ones who have told us that we shouldn't be perceived as impeding, as somehow harming the Iraqi people, even though we all know that it is Saddam Hussein and his regime that have done that, that have refused to spend the money in the Oil-for-Food program.

So in some ways, what we are doing on the sanctions is what the frontline states and what people in the region have said we should do. So then you are going to ask me, well, what should they offer us in return for doing what we think they should do? But the answer to both of those questions is these things are in our interest. It is in nobody's interest in the region to allow Saddam Hussein to get weapons of mass destruction. It is in nobody's interest in the region to harm the Iraqi people, except perhaps Saddam Hussein's. So I think we are doing something that we find to be in our interest and in the interests of the people in the region.

Now, at the same time, as you correctly stated in the beginning, there is a psychological relationship; people in the region see all these things going on and think about them together. And I think what I would say is what I said to you before and what I think I said yesterday when we answered these questions, is that there is a desire to see that the US is active on all these fronts, that we are working not just on the interests of the Iraqi people or the interests of the people in the region who don't want to be threatened by Saddam's weapons, but we are also working on the interests of other people in the region who have legitimate political aspirations, like the Palestinians.

And so they want to see the United States engaged, and I would say that our answer to that is yes, we agree. We are engaged. And that is what we point to, and that is the way we think the issues play together.

Q: Are you concerned that the Syrians are going to do some sort of military response to the attack on their radar, and have you spoken directly to the Syrian Government to advise them of your concern?

MR. BOUCHER: We have had senior diplomats throughout the region, in Beirut and Damascus and Israel, elsewhere in the region, talked at high levels to governments, including in Damascus, about the need to exercise restraint, about the need to avoid escalation and to avoid actions that could threaten the situation further. So the answer is yes.

Q: Richard, would you describe the Syrian actions so far as "restrained"? I mean, they haven't done anything at all, as far as I know.

MR. BOUCHER: That's a sort of moment-to-moment kind of call, and I don't think I can make it. But we have urged people to exercise restraint, and so far I guess we haven't seen anything that contradicts that.

Q: So they have been restrained?

MR. BOUCHER: Again, at this moment, at this precise moment, yes. And we would urge them to continue to be restrained.

Q: Can I change the subject?

Q: No, I have one more question. Can you define what would not be excessive use of force, particularly in relation to the attacks on Syria and the retaliations? Are you saying now in the Administration that retaliations are also out, because incursions, you have said, are out? Are retaliation and retaliatory attacks, such as waged against Syria, also out?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't think I can give you a list of dos and don'ts and specific lines and hypothetical actions of a variety of kinds. We have been quite clear on things that we think did not contribute to the situation. We have been quite clear in saying that there is really not a military solution to these things. And we have been quit clear with both parties to say there are things that you should do to break this cycle. It is not a question of just continuing along the cycle; it is a question of doing positive things to break the cycle of violence, for the Palestinians to stop the shootings, to stop the provocative attacks, for Hezbollah to stop its provocative attacks, but for the Israelis also to exercise maximum restraint in terms of the way they react.

Q: Are you saying -- this is a subset -- are you saying that missiles should not be used as part of the retaliations?

MR. BOUCHER: Once again, you are asking -- you can go through a list of 50 different possibilities -- using missiles, using bullets of this size, bullets of that size, trucks, tanks, armored personnel carriers. I am not going to deal with every hypothetical reaction that we might have. And I think we have been quite clear about the specific actions that we felt harmed the situation. We have been quite clear as well on the positive actions we were looking for the parties to take, and that includes actions that both sides should take. And I will leave it at that.

Q: Very quickly, on the Iraqi sanctions, is there a date when, at this point, the State Department is going to release the smart sanctions? I mean, originally it was supposed to be released at the Arab summit and something happened.

MR. BOUCHER: No. I think if you remember what the Secretary said, he looked for progress on the work that we were doing before the Arab League summit. I think there was progress in that regard. We have continued our discussions with various governments. We now have Assistant Secretary Walker continuing our discussion. Assistant Secretary Welch has been having discussions with others among the Perm 5 and will be heading out to Moscow to have further discussions with them. The process of, I would say, definition is under way. How do we do this in terms of lists and committees and actions and approvals and prohibitions and things like that. I am not aware of any specific rollout date for a whole package, but it more or less needs to be done, the new mechanisms need to be in place, by the time the Oil-for-Food program would come up for renewal, which would be in June, I think.

Q: Taha Yasin Ramadan, the Iraqi Vice President, said in Moscow yesterday that categorically there is no return of inspectors to Iraq because they will work only as spies for the United States and Israel. Now, in the face of such statements that there will be no return of inspectors, where does that leave you?

MR. BOUCHER: That leaves us exactly where we are. That leaves us with deciding how we are going to do this. That leaves us with a determination of the outside world to prevent Iraq from developing, re-developing weapons of mass destruction, and it leaves the Iraqis where they are. It leaves them with sanctions in place, with controls on their finance, with inspections of cargo, and with all the things that we feel necessary to do.

It is up to the Iraqis. If they feel -- if they want to claim that they are clean, that they not developing their weapons, that they are not threatening their neighbors with weapons of mass destruction, go ahead and prove it. Invite the inspectors in. Show us. Prove us. Otherwise, we are going to do what we have to do. That is the whole way it works.

Q: Are you saying you won't (inaudible) sanctions?

MR. BOUCHER: No. We can do what we want. We can do what we think we need to do, with or without the cooperation for the Iraqis. It is up to the Iraqis, if they feel it necessary to prove something to show that they don't deserve this, then show us. Invite the inspectors in. Don't invite the inspectors in? There is not going to be any progress on the things they want. We are just going to do what we think we need to do to keep them from threatening us.

Q: Richard, can we change subjects? Can you tell us what these three US diplomats, or whoever they are, are doing in Afghanistan right now?

MR. BOUCHER: Yes.

Q: Okay. This is in fact the first trip by US officials to Afghanistan in some years.

MR. BOUCHER: Well, let's see. Here is what is going on. We have working level officials from the US Embassy in Islamabad and from the US Agency for International Development in Washington, who have traveled into Afghanistan to assess the humanitarian crisis there in the wake of the continuing conflict and the serious drought that has struck that country.

This kind of information is vital as we make decisions on providing additional humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. And you know that the United States is one of the largest donors of assistance to the Afghan people.

Any encounters with local officials will occur only in connection with this specific mission. This does not represent any sort of change in policy towards Afghanistan. We continue to meet with representatives of the Taliban and other Afghan factions as we pursue our policy goals in that country.

Q: When you say "local officials", you mean local Taliban officials or --

MR. BOUCHER: It depends where they are, who they are talking to. Any local officials would be --

Q: Only talking food and medical --

MR. BOUCHER: We are talking about food, we are going to assess the humanitarian situation so we can continue to try to provide -- along with other members of the international community -- provide the kind of assistance the Afghan people need.

Q: How is it not a change in policy if US officials for so long hadn't actually traveled or set forth inside Afghanistan?

MR. BOUCHER: We would make decisions like this based on the safety and the goals of the trip. Our policy has been to assist the Afghan people. We have done that very generously over the course of the years, and we will continue to do that. That is the policy. The implementation of that policy, if it is safe for US officials to get a better handle on the humanitarian situation by going there along with other UN team people, we will do that. If it is not particularly safe or advisable at any given moment, we may not.

Q: Is there a promise that the US officials would be safe?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't know. I think we evaluate the situation on our own, whatever the security situation might be, not particularly in relation to promises.

Q: Going back to China? Could I go back to China?

Q: Just one question on Afghanistan first? Are you looking at a specific amount of money that you would like to give to the Afghans? Are they asking for a specific amount of money? And how much are we giving them now? It's like hundreds of millions of dollars involved here, right?

MR. BOUCHER: If I remember -- yes, this year, it was $110 million, if I remember correctly. I better check that. And somebody upstairs can check that while I am speaking. They can correct me if I'm wrong before I finish. And I will have to double-check and see if there has been any allocations in next year's budget yet.

Q: Since the US side is saying that it doesn't make sense to continue with talks, if the return of the plane is not taken up, could we take it to mean that the return of the plane is the most important issue, as far as the US is concerned? Among the issues that are mentioned in the letter?

MR. BOUCHER: Among the issues mentioned in the letter, there are several issues mentioned, and I don't think I am going to start picking and choosing. Obviously we have made quite clear: we want our airplane back, and we want to be able to discuss getting back our airplane, and that we are willing to continue these discussions in Beijing if the Chinese are willing to discuss productively getting our airplane back.

But there are a number of issues in the letter, and we are willing to discuss them all, including the ones the Chinese said they wanted to raise.

Q: On China, can you confirm that the plane has been entered?

MR. BOUCHER: No.

Q: Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:05 P.M.)

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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