Title: Text: Pentagon
Report on Implementation of Taiwan Relations
Act
(U.S. reaffirms commitment to
Taiwan's defensive capability) (3390)
Translated Title:
Author:
Source:
Date: 20001219
Text: Although the People's Republic of China
(PRC) "claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China
and has reserved the right to use force to unify Taiwan with
the mainland," the U.S. position is that "any effort to determine the
future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including boycotts or embargoes, [is] a threat to peace and security of
the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the U.S.," according to
a report
summary released by the Department of Defense.
The Department of Defense published an unclassified summary of the
"Report
to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations
Act,"
which assesses the security situation in the Taiwan
Strait, December 19.
In accordance with the
Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA),
the United States actively monitors the security situation in the Taiwan
Strait in order to adequately provide
Taiwan with a "sufficient self-defense
capability" consistent with U.S. security policy toward the region.
"The United States takes its obligation to assist Taiwan in
maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously," the summary says.
"This is not only because it is mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but
also because it is in our own national interest. As long as Taiwan has
a capable defense, the environment will be more conducive to peaceful
dialogue, and thus the whole region will be more stable."
According to the report summary, the United States
supplies Taiwan with military hardware and
addresses non-hardware capabilities -- including organizational issues
and training -- to enhance
Taiwan's capacity to absorb new
military technologies.
In order to determine the appropriate defense mechanisms Taiwan
needs, U.S. officials have focused on assessing the military options
they believe Beijing might exercise against Taiwan,
according to the report summary.
Possible scenarios include an invasion of Taiwan via
air or sea; a blockade of
Taiwan's commerce; or air or missile
strikes on Taiwan's population, military assets
or economic infrastructure.
"The fundamental question for assessment is whether the military
balance is or is not satisfactory in relation to those U.S. goals," the
report
summary says.
The report summary acknowledged gaps in
knowledge regarding the PRC-Taiwan military balance, but noted
that "any assessment of a military balance would by its nature have
major unresolved uncertainties."
Following are the texts of the introduction to and the executive
summary of the report:
(begin text of introduction)
Report to Congress Pursuant to Public
Law 106-113
Public Law 106-113, an
act making consolidated appropriations
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2000, states that the "Office
of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, jointly
with the United States Pacific Command, shall submit, through the Under
Secretary of Defense (Policy), a
report to Congress no later than 270
days after the enactment of this
Act which addresses the following
issues:
(1) A review of the operational planning and other preparations of
the United States Department of Defense, including but not limited to
the United States Pacific Command, to implement the relevant sections of
the Taiwan
Relations Act since
its enactment in 1979; and
(2) A review of evaluation of all gaps in relevant knowledge about
the People's Republic of China's capabilities and intentions as they
might affect the current and future military balance between Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China, including both classified United States
intelligence information and Chinese open source writing. The report
shall be submitted in classified form, with an unclassified summary."
The report, submitted in response to
Public Law 106-113, addresses relevant sections of the Taiwan Relations
Act and
gaps in knowledge regarding the current and future security situation in
the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, the report
addresses U.S. provision of defense articles and services to meet Taiwan's
legitimate defense needs, U.S. capacity to respond to the use of force
against Taiwan, and challenges associated with
assessing the security situation in the
Taiwan Strait.
(end text of introduction)
(begin text of executive summary)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS
ACT
The TRA stipulates that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such
defense articles and services in such quantity as may be necessary to
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient
self-defense capability." The TRA states that "the President and
Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense
articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of
Taiwan,
in accordance with procedures established by law." The TRA further
asserts that "such determination of
Taiwan's defense needs shall include
review by United States military authorities in connection with
recommendations to the President and the Congress." Section 2(b) states:
It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to
determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means,
including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security
of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.
The United States takes its obligation to assist Taiwan in
maintaining a self-defense capability very seriously. This is not only
because it is mandated by U.S. law in the TRA, but also because it is in
our own national interest. As long as
Taiwan has a capable defense, the
environment will be more conducive to peaceful dialogue, and thus the
whole region will be more stable. The United States actively monitors
the security situation in the
Taiwan Strait, and provides articles
and services to Taiwan to ensure it can maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability. This section of the report will
discuss these activities in more detail.
In assessing Taiwan's defense needs, the Department
of Defense has dedicated significant resources over the past two decades
to monitoring the security situation in the Taiwan
Strait. We have an active unofficial dialogue with Taiwan's
defense authorities to better understand their current capabilities and
future requirements. Additionally, through engagement with the People's
Republic of China (PRC), and dialogue with the People's Liberation Army
(PLA), we gain clearer insights into Chinese military capabilities and
intentions. We continue to improve our efforts in all areas to assess
the security situation in the
Taiwan Strait.
Through provision of carefully selected defensive articles and
services, we have helped
Taiwan maintain a sufficient capacity
to defend itself. Among the defensive systems Taiwan has
acquired from the U.S. in recent years are F-16 fighters, Knox-class
frigates, M-60A tanks, and the Modified Air Defense System -- a Patriot
system derivative.
We continually reevaluate
Taiwan's defense posture to ensure
that we make available to
Taiwan such items as will provide a
sufficient self-defense capability. Our arms sales policy aims to enable
Taiwan
to maintain a self-defense capability, while also reinforcing regional
stability. We avoid introducing capabilities that would go beyond what
is required for Taiwan's self-defense.
As part of our policy to ensure that we provide appropriate defensive
capability to Taiwan, President Clinton in 1994
initiated a policy review that, among other things, expanded our
non-hardware programs with
Taiwan. These programs focused on such
areas as defense planning, C4I, air defense, maritime capability,
anti-submarine warfare, logistics, joint force integration, and
training. These non-hardware programs serve multiple purposes.
Functional non-hardware initiatives address many of the shortcomings in
Taiwan's
military readiness that were identified in the February 1999 DoD Report to
Congress on the Security Situation in the
Taiwan Strait. They allow Taiwan to
better integrate newly acquired systems into its inventory and ensure
that the equipment Taiwan has can be used to full
effectiveness. These initiatives provide an avenue to exchange views on
Taiwan's
requirements for defense modernization, to include professionalization
and organizational issues, and training. Exchanges and discussions
enhance our ability to assess
Taiwan's longer term defense needs and
develop well-founded security assistance policies. Such programs also
enhance Taiwan's capacity for making
operationally sound and cost effective acquisition decisions, and more
importantly, to use its equipment more effectively for self-defense.
The TRA obliges us to maintain the United States' capacity to resist
any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize the security of Taiwan.
This obligation is consistent with America's overall strategy in the
region, our commitment to peace and stability, and our regional military
posture. The Administration's commitment to maintaining approximately
100,000 troops in the region for the foreseeable future is well-known
and widely appreciated throughout the region. The presence of 100,000
U.S. military personnel represents the capabilities of the U.S. Eighth
Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea, III Marine Expeditionary Force and
Fifth Air Force in Japan, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
As has repeatedly been stated publicly, it is the policy of the
United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern
to the U.S. We demonstrated our commitment to maintaining regional peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait by deploying two carrier
battle groups to the region in response to provocative PRC missile
exercises in 1996.
GAPS IN KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE PRC-TAIWAN MILITARY BALANCE
This section of the report discusses gaps in our knowledge
regarding the current and future security situation in the Taiwan
Strait. By describing what a net assessment of the military balance in
the Taiwan Strait would include and how it
would be structured it suggests what kinds of gaps in our knowledge are
most important. It should be noted that any assessment of a military
balance would by its nature have major unresolved uncertainties.
The Content and Structure of a PRC-Taiwan Assessment
An assessment of the PRC-Taiwan balance would begin with an
attempt to delineate the subject matter, i.e., who are the relevant
parties, and what are the plausible contingencies of interest. The focus
of an assessment depends on its intended audience. In an assessment for
U.S. defense planners, we need to identify the U.S. goals at stake in
this situation, and determine how to measure the adequacy of the
military balance in view of those goals. A second section of the
assessment would describe and compare key trends and asymmetries in the
military capabilities of the parties to the balance. A third section
would assess whether U.S. peacetime objectives -- deterring conflict and
shaping the behavior of the parties -- are adequately served by the
balance of capabilities. A fourth section would assess the likely
outcome of conflict if deterrence fails, including both the immediate
military result and the broader political effects of that result. Two
more sections would summarize major findings and formulate the key
strategic management issues that the assessment raises for top Defense
officials. Since these final sections would mainly draw out implications
from the earlier sections, the discussion of knowledge gaps in this report will
be organized around the first four topics mentioned.
Defining the PRC-Taiwan Balance
The PRC claims that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China
and has reserved the right to use force to unify Taiwan with
the mainland if Taiwan declares independence, if Taiwan is
occupied by a foreign country, if it acquires nuclear weapons, or if Taiwan
indefinitely refuses the peaceful settlement of cross-Strait
reunification through negotiation. U.S. policy opposes any use of force
to settle this dispute. A net assessment must therefore focus on the
military options that Beijing might exercise against Taiwan, and
on the military capabilities relevant to the contingencies that those
options would create. In addition to the forces of the PRC and Taiwan, we
would need to consider the role of U.S. forces in deterring the use of
force or in assisting Taiwan if deterrence fails. The Soviet
Union was in the past another relevant actor, initially as an ally of
the PRC and later as a competing focus of Chinese military attention.
The possibility of a coinciding military crisis on the Korean peninsula
would also shape PRC and U.S. calculations. Other regional countries
should also figure in the analysis, at least insofar as their reactions
to a Taiwan contingency would be important
to China and the United States.
It appears that several broad classes of military contingency are
possible. First, the PRC could launch an invasion of Taiwan (or
an offshore island), using amphibious or other sea or air transported
forces. Second, Beijing could try to impose a blockade on Taiwan's
commerce as a means of coercing political concessions. Third, the PRC
could try to coerce Taiwan by means of air or missile
strikes on Taiwan's population, military assets,
or economic infrastructure. Associated with each of these options would
be some Chinese strategy for avoiding, discouraging, forestalling, or
reacting to a possible U.S. intervention on Taiwan's
side.
An assessment of the military balance for U.S. defense planners must
begin from actual or assumed U.S. goals. The fundamental question for
assessment is whether the military balance is or is not satisfactory in
relation to those U.S. goals. The overarching U.S. goal is to avoid any
use or threat of force to resolve differences in the Taiwan
Strait. Thus, our goals include that the PRC be persuaded against or
deterred from attacking or threatening attack, that if a threat is made
it is unavailing, and that if an attack is made it is unsuccessful. In
the latter case, our goal would be that
Taiwan defend itself without outside
assistance -- or, as a fallback, that it defend itself long enough to
permit outside assistance, and that the combination of Taiwan and
U.S. forces defeat a PLA attack on
Taiwan, should the U.S. decide to
intervene.
Moreover, we have goals associated with the outcome of any conflict,
apart from the primary goal of defending
Taiwan against unprovoked attack. We
would want any U.S. intervention to reassure other allies and friends
and discourage other aggressions, strengthening or at least not
weakening our future military
relations in the region. Finally, we
seek to avoid in peacetime the erosion of our capacity to assist Taiwan in
the future.
From this starting point, an assessment would identify and analyze
the trends and asymmetries that may change or affect our ability to
achieve these goals given the variety of possible Chinese military
operations; and then focus specifically on the adequacy of deterrence
and the likely outcome of any conflict if deterrence fails.
Trends and Asymmetries
To assess the present and future military balance, we need to depict
trends in those military capabilities most decisive for each of the
conflict scenarios. Ideally, we would want to judge how each scenario
would play out if it happened today, or some time in the next 5 or 10 or
20 years. Given the difficulty of making any absolute judgment on likely
war outcomes, it is useful to determine at least the direction of any
change in the situation: are China's or
Taiwan's relative capabilities for
these various scenarios getting better or worse? Accordingly, we would
want to trace trends in capabilities over the past 20 to 40 years, as
well as project those trends into the future.
A starting point is to track changes over time in the number,
technical quality, and stationing of each party's weapons and equipment,
including ground, air, sea, amphibious, air defense and missile forces.
For the PRC and the United States, judgments would be needed on which
part of the country's overall force could or would play a timely part in
a Taiwan
scenario; for Taiwan, all available forces would be
considered likely to be engaged. We would also need to describe trends
in each side's training, exercises, doctrine, and logistics, looking for
indications of relative change in capability or changes in the kinds of
military operations envisioned or emphasized. Training and doctrine will
be important indicators of the actual competence of each side's military
forces. For the United States, we would need to consider trends in
forward deployment and basing patterns, airlift and sealift
capabilities, and the political context that makes U.S. intervention
more or less likely in fact, and more or less likely in the PRC's
perception. Trends in other countries are also relevant, such as the
shift over time from a Soviet-Chinese alliance, to a Soviet-Chinese
competition, to a post-Soviet Russia with reduced military forces.
The focus of a study of trends would be to track relative changes in
a manageable number of military capabilities that appear most important
for deterrence and war outcomes. While tracing the development over time
of each of these capabilities or competitions (e.g., "air vs. air
defense"), we would also need to consider whether the list of which
capabilities are most important is itself changing. We also need to
identify changes over time in the vulnerabilities of each side that
might facilitate the other side's operations.
Asymmetries to be considered are important differences between the
forces, doctrines, geographical and political situations, and strategic
and political calculations of the several parties to this conflict. Such
asymmetries, some of which are obvious in the PRC-Taiwan
case, strongly affect how a military "balance" between dissimilar actors
should be assessed.
Shaping and deterrence
To judge whether the military balance adequately deters Beijing, we
need to understand how the Chinese authorities assess the situation.
Whether or not we or a hypothetical observer would think the
consequences of their initiating a blockade, invasion, or strikes
against Taiwan are promising or discouraging
is not really sufficient for our purposes if China's rulers see it
differently.
Similarly, our ability to influence
Taiwan's security posture depends on
understanding their assessments, including their assessments of our --
and of China's -- likely behavior and capabilities.
Contingency outcomes
We cannot expect to predict confidently the outcome of a military
conflict. The best approximation would be to consider systematically a
range of plausible scenarios, relying on war gaming and experienced
military analysts to judge the likely outcome given the forces, levels
of training, and operational methods of all parties. We would want to
game the conflict that follows from each presumed Chinese operational
plan (invasion, blockade, strike) not only for the present situation,
but for the forces we project for the future; and the games should be
repeated, with different players who would test a variety of operational
plans and options.
Where are the Gaps in Knowledge?
For each of the major topics of assessment just outlined, there are a
number of more specific subjects on which better information would be
very useful. In some cases, we are unlikely ever to obtain exactly the
information we would want. If some knowledge gaps cannot be corrected,
it is at least advantageous to be aware that they exist. In general,
three kinds of gaps stand out.
First, we need to know more about how the authorities in the PRC and
Taiwan
view their military and political situation -- in order to identify the
most important conflict scenarios and hence the capabilities central to
them; in order to assess whether the balance of forces adequately deters
Chinese attack and reassures
Taiwan; and in order to understand how
both sides' calculations of priority, risk, and military capability
would shape the course and outcome of a conflict. We are unlikely to be
able to replicate their precise views on this military balance, but we
probably can learn much more about both sides' ideas about statecraft,
their approaches to the use of force, their perceived vulnerabilities,
and their preferred operational methods, as well as about the political
and military organizations that produce military assessments and plans.
Second, as might be predicted, we are less knowledgeable about things
that are less visible or tangible -- training, logistics, doctrine,
command and control, special operations, mine warfare -- than we are
about airplanes and surface ships. Third, although we can identify
emerging methods of warfare that appear likely to be increasingly
important in the future -- particularly missiles and information
warfare-we cannot confidently assess how each side's capabilities will
develop or the interaction of measures and countermeasures that these
emerging military competitions will generate.
(end text of executive summary)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs,
U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov) NNNN
Product Name:
WASHINGTON FILE
Document
Type: TEXT
Keywords:
TAIWAN; CHINA; REGIONAL SECURITY; TRA
01 KDIZOGLIO/PHU/RFH
Thematic Code: 01
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Language: ENGLISH
Word Count: 3390
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